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Abstract
The 1958 crisis in Lebanon was a significant event in modern Middle 
Eastern and international history. Interpretations, however, overlook or 
subordinate the Lebanese dimensions and how the Lebanese interpreted crisis 
and causation, through the lens of established community mythologies.
Lebanon contains different, confessionally-defined communities, with a 
long history of tensions and clashes between them. Examination of these 
enables the Lebanese dimensions to the 1958 crisis to be given due weight. 
While regional and international dimensions are of clear importance, the crisis 
resulted from internal Lebanese factors, long and short term, relating to the 
different communities, rather than to the impact of international issues such as 
Nasserism. Where such issues were significant it was because they were not 
imposed, but invoked by Lebanese elements in the name of Lebanese foreign 
policy, in order to further their own cause and agendas for Lebanon.
The mythologies surrounding the ‘historical’ evolution of the 
communities helped shape the differing agendas for Lebanon. Of the 
communities, the Maronite community and its invocation of mythology has 
played a consistently significant role. The Druze and Sunni, were, at different 
times, of significance also, particularly in terms of relations with the Maronites. 
These groups used their interpretations of the ‘history’ of Lebanon to justify 
their agendas for the future of Lebanon, and in so doing, helped to precipitate 
a crisis. The political compromise set up to administer Lebanon was based on 
‘historical’ assumptions and differences, and was consequently vulnerable. In 
this context, the role of Chamoun in escalating the ever-present level of 
intercommunal tension, in 1957 and 1958, is another major element in the 
study.
The study uses a range of sources, including official and private papers, 
unpublished memoirs, oral evidence and newspapers, to map communal 
feelings and tensions leading to the crisis itself, and its resolution.
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Abbreviations and Transliteration/Spelling Usage
In this thesis, for Lebanese/Arabic names of individuals or places that 
were, or still are, in common usage in a Europeanised form, particularly in the 
1950s, such as Camille Chamoun or General Shihab or Nasser, or Beirut, the 
convention followed has been to use the familiar form. Otherwise a 
transliteration convention based on IJMES has been followed.
Abbreviations Used:
AUB: American University of Beirut
CLS: Centre for Lebanese Studies (Oxford)
FO: Foreign Office
PPS: Parti Populaire Syrien
UAR: United Arab Republic
UN: United Nations
UNOGiL: United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon
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Introduction
The 1950s were a period of tremendous socio-political upheavals for the 
Arab world as a whole, with the rise of Nasser to power in Egypt and the 
impact of Nasserism and a resurgent pan-Arab nationalism. The 1958 crisis in 
Lebanon has tended to be interpreted as part of those broader upheavals; 
being most frequently referred to by historians in the context of this period of 
change in the Middle East in the 1950s, and/or in the context of the Cold War, 
because of the issue of American intervention in that crisis. There would seem 
to be considerable justification for such a perspective. This was the period 
during which Western hegemony in the Middle East was threatened by 
pressures from within the region itself; and by the growing power of the USSR. 
At one level, this consisted of a struggle over the political leadership of the 
Arab world. This resulted in the polarisation of Arab politics into two hostile 
camps, with an eventually anti-Western Egypt leading one, and a pro-Western 
Iraq leading the other. The struggle was apparently (if temporarily) resolved in 
1958 with the coup in Iraq which brought down the pro-Western government 
and replaced it with one identified with an anti-Western stance such as that 
taken by Egypt.1 The crisis of that same year in Lebanon, another state 
identified with a pro-Western stance, has thus seemed to many historians to be 
clearly linked to this broader struggle. But it is the contention of this thesis that 
the 1958 crisis in Lebanon originated mainly in a failure of consensus over the 
identity of Lebanon; a failure linked to differing perceptions of community 
identity within Lebanon. Such perceptions were based on profoundly divergent 
interpretations of Lebanon’s past, and the dependence of coherent community 
identities upon such interpretations. Current developments in the region were 
interpreted in ways that fitted in with such interpretations. As a result, the 
broader issues affecting the Arab world and its relations with the West in the 
1950s were invoked by the different communal groupings in Lebanon, to justify 
and explain their actions, in the interests of sustaining their community identity.
1 For a more detailed discussion of these events in the Middle East see Malcolm Yapp, The Near East Since the First 
World W ar. Longman, London, 1991, Chapters 9 ,1 0 ,1 1 .
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Outside Lebanon it is certainly true that a number of important 
contemporaries at the time, including American observers of the region as well 
as President Nasser of Egypt, interpreted the Lebanese crisis as part of the 
upheaval in the Arab world, both in terms of its origins and resolution. But this 
was because such observers (even within Lebanon), and later, historians, 
have misunderstood or underestimated the Lebanese contribution to the crisis, 
and the longer term dimension added to that crisis by the Lebanese 
contribution. An interpretation based primarily on short-term, regional factors, 
however neat, ignores a major factor in Lebanese life: that a significant part of 
the population of Lebanon in the 1950s did not accept that Lebanon was part 
of the Arab world and used versions of ‘Lebanese’ history to ‘prove’ their 
contentions. The resultant creation of community mythologies has played a 
crucial role in moulding and sustaining popular attitudes - at times of crisis in 
particular.
The Christian Maronite community saw itself, and Lebanon, as part of 
the world of Western civilisation, as honorary Europeans, and acted 
accordingly. The existence of a separate Lebanese entity was crucial here, 
enabling such a perspective to be sustained, with all its implications for 
community identity. According to Kamal Salibi, ‘Since the emergence of 
Lebanon as a state in 1920, the Christian and Muslim Lebanese have been in 
fundamental disagreement over the historicity of their country’.2 In contrast to 
the Maronite belief in the ‘naturalness’ of a Lebanese entity, the perspective of 
the Muslim populations in Lebanon has generally seen the Lebanese state as 
an artificial creation, dependent largely on the actions of Western (French) 
imperialism, as with other states in the Arab world such as Syria or Iraq. The 
result has been the creation of a different popular mythology amongst Muslim 
communities, where the political boundaries of such a state are ones of 
political convenience (or inconvenience); but do not detract from the cultural 
unity of the Arab world. By contrast the Maronite perspective sees the state 
boundaries of Lebanon as reflecting a non-Arab cultural integrity. As Camille 
Chamoun insisted in his retrospective on the 1958 crisis:
2 K.S. Salibi, House of Many Mansions. The History of Lebanon Reconsidered. I.B. Tauris, London, 1988, p. 3.
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Les frontieres du Liban ont ete releves en 1862 par le 
contingent Francais envoye par PEurope a la suite des 
massacres du Liban.,.On voit ansi que ce n’est pas la 
France qui a cree le Liban ou en a fixe les frontieres qui 
existaient avant le Mandat Francais’.3
It can be argued that one Muslim community, the Druze, has a tendency to 
sympathise with aspects of the Maronite perspective, because of elements of 
shared history. The memorial to the Druze ‘Martyrs’ of 1958 at Mukhtara refers 
to their brave defence of ‘la liberte, I’independence’ and also ‘pour 
sauvegarder la souverainte nationale (al siyadat al Wataniyyah) .... pour 
renforcer Punite nationale (al wahdat al Wataniyyah),’ - but also a defence of 
‘Parabisme’, so this tendency cannot be taken too far. Also, it had more 
conscious support at elite levels of society, amongst the traditional land-owning 
class, whose interests were best served by maintaining a discrete entity.4
Thus an interpretation of the crisis that depends primarily on a regional 
or international perspective cannot provide a real comprehension of the 
Lebanese dimensions of the crisis, including its causation, in the Lebanese 
context the crisis was a repetition of its history where there has been a 
sustained pattern of internally generated crises which have invoked external 
intervention. The 1958 crisis, including the external dimensions to the crisis, 
conforms to the established pattern where the communities, particularly the 
Maronite community, had habitually sought to invoke active external interest at 
times of crisis rather than relying on internal mediation and compromise to 
resolve any tension. So traditionally there has been no will demonstrated 
amongst the different communities in Lebanon to solve any crisis through an 
internally-generated compromise. For this reason, it is important to examine 
the crisis from the Lebanese perspective, rather than the international one; and 
this includes the issue of the external interventions in the 1958 crisis.
The thesis thus aims to examine the crisis primarily in the context of 
tensions between the Lebanese communities, and their conscious and
3 Camille Chamoun, Crise au Moven Orient. Gallimard, Paris, 1963, p. 118.
4 Kamal Jumblat, Inscription at Mukhtara, quoted in Dominique Chevallier, La Societe du Mont Liban a I'Epoaue de la 
Revolution. Librarie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, Paris, 1971, p. 22.
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unconscious contributions to the escalation of tension to crisis point in the 
summer of 1958. But to do that, an understanding of the composition of 
Lebanon is necessary, since it is, apart from anything else, a state including a 
number of different communities, which had, by the 1950s, developed self- 
conscious, distinct and discrete community identities. There are a number of 
Christian communities, with the Maronite community being the largest; there 
are in addition a number of Muslim communities, with the Sunni community 
providing the bulk of that population. This thesis will focus heavily on the 
Maronite community and on their relationship with other communities in 
Lebanon, notably the Sunni and Druze communities. This is partly because of 
the continuity of an identifiably Maronite community as a factor in the 
intercommunal equation throughout Lebanon’s history. This community 
developed its own agenda relatively early, compared to the other communities, 
and it is the impact of this agenda as it developed that has, in turn, tended to 
set the agenda for intercommunal relations, between Maronites and Druze, 
and Maronites and Sunnis in particular. The impact of the Maronite agenda 
was significant in 1958 in this respect. But the focus on the Maronite 
community is also due to the fact that, despite this continuity, it has been less 
studied than any of the other communities in terms of their role in the 1958 
crisis. Work has been done on the Sunnis in particular in the 1950s, including 
an informative PhD thesis by Najla Attiyah.5 But there has been no 
comparable study of the Maronite community, preventing a full comprehension 
of the internal dimensions of the crisis in terms of the conscious and 
unconscious contributions of Maronite as weli as the Sunni community to the 
escalation of tension within Lebanon to crisis point.
The fact that the majority of history written about Lebanon at any point 
in its history has been written by Maronite historians can lead to the 
assumption that Maronite communal identity has been subject to a 
considerable amount of critical analysis. However, such an analysis has not 
been undertaken in any sustained way, and particularly not in relation to 1958. 
Taking 1958 as a focus, this thesis will examine the creation of community
5 Najla Attiyah, ‘The Attitude of the Lebanese Sunni towards the State of Lebanon’, unpublished PhD thesis, University 
of London, 1973.
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identity amongst the Maronites and the role of clashes between such feelings 
of communal identity at times of crisis, including 1958 as part of that pattern. 
Such an approach to the 1958 crisis requires an assessment of the extent to 
which the seeds of conflict in 1958 lie within Lebanon’s history rather than 
being simply a matter of factors arising post 1943, with the emergence of the 
independent Lebanese state: taking a long duree approach to the 1958 crisis. 
E H Carr has commented that history is ‘a dialogue ... between the society of 
today and the society of yesterday’; but in the Lebanese context history 
performs a more powerful role, as a crucial factor unifying the Maronite 
community in particular through their common ‘awareness of a common 
history’.6 For instance, the period of co-habitation between the Maronite and 
Druze communities between the late sixteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
has been of crucial importance in the evolution of Maronite identity in relation 
to ‘their’ territory of ‘Lebanon’. A consideration of this has required a synthesis 
of Lebanese history based on existing secondary sources and some primary 
source material, such as that of Henri Lammens to add to the research on 
primary source materials undertaken for the 1950s. It is, perhaps, more usual 
to see Lammens’ work listed as a secondary source since his work forms an 
important part of Lebanese historiography. However, the way that Lammens’ 
ideas on the origins of the Maronite community, and on the centrality of such 
origins to a discrete Maronite identity, are referred to in this thesis makes it 
more appropriate to categorise him as a primary source.
The history of Lebanon’s communities and intercommunal relationships 
and the history of the Lebanese entity, as well as the links between this entity 
and its communities need to be drawn out if the internal cultural dimensions to 
the crisis are to emerge. The need to examine a long term historical 
perspective when examining the 1958 crisis can be partly justified by an 
examination of the political rhetoric of Lebanese politicians, particularly 
Maronite ones, within independent Lebanon. A consistent element in Maronite 
speeches has been the theme of Lebanon’s evolution from an ancient 
historical past and the effects of Lebanon’s unique geography on the Maronite
6 E.H. Carr, W hat is History. Penguin Books Ltd, Handsworth, 1964, p. 55; John Tosh, The Pursuit of History. 
Longman, New York, 1984, p. 3.
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character, both used to interpret and justify more predictable themes such as 
the importance of the Maronite religion, kinship ties, the nature of Lebanese 
nationalism and issues of external relations, in other words, the Maronite 
communal identity lays a stress on its historical dimension, relying on scholars 
such as Lammens to give intellectual defence to the perspective. And, as the 
thesis will demonstrate, it is a stress that goes further than the usual rhetoric 
about the historical nature of national identities, as the following example from 
a 1982 speech to the United Nations by Amine Gemayel indicates:
My country ...is one of rugged mountainous terrain. The
people are hardy and proud, like their mountains’.7
This Maronite perspective has been recognised, if not welcomed, by other 
communities. The Sunni opposition figure, Saeb Salam, comparing the 1975 
and 1958 crises, commented critically that their origins lay in history and its 
interpretation, implicitly laying blame on the Maronites.8 Recently Walid 
Jumbiat, in June 1995, raised the issue of the dependence of Maronite identity 
on interpretations of history, when he commented that ‘Life is a continuous 
battle with the inner self and with history’ and urged the Maronites to move 
away from this dependence for the sake of Lebanese unity.9
But for the Maronite community, and the Druze, the traditions derived 
from Mount Lebanon have a continuing impact on socio-political attitudes. 
While much of the Maronite community is now located (as it was in the 1950s) 
in urban settings, strong connections to the concept of the village and village 
cultures, traditions and loyalties have been maintained. Kinship ties have 
remained powerful. Even if born in urban surroundings, the majority of 
Maronites feel ties to a village where relatives congregate at weekends and on 
holidays. The political system of Lebanon actually sustains this factor, because 
it is to the villages that voters have to go to vote, rather than in their place of 
daily residence.10 Even in communities that have traditionally been more 
urbanised, such as the Sunnis, there is a dimension of this tradition. In such a
7 Amine Gemayel, Peace and Unitv. Colin Smythe, Gerrards Cross, London, 1984, p. 19.
0 Saeb Salam, M assiratal Salam . [The March of Peace], Markaz Saeb Salam, Beirut, n.d., p, 21.
9 Walid Jumbiat. Al Havat. 13 June 1995.
10 David McDowall, Lebanon: A Conflict of Minority. Report no. 61, Minority Rights Group, London, 1983, p. 9.
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context, traditional patterns and loyalties can be shown to have a powerful 
effect on voting behaviour and popular beliefs and agendas.
The communai mix contained in Lebanon has ensured that there has 
been a long tradition of co-habitation in that territory, where different social 
groups that regarded themselves as being significantly different to other social 
groups inhabiting the same territory have lived side by side - but not in a spirit 
of mutual trust and harmony resulting from the development of a consensus 
between the perspectives of these groups. Rather these perspectives have 
tended to compete with each other, ensuring the continuance of tension and 
suspicion. Co-habitation, then, will be interpreted in this thesis as the 
relationship of communities occupying a shared territory, seen by all 
participants as ‘theirs’; but ‘theirs’ for different reasons and with agendas which 
tend to either assign one particular community superiority over another, or 
even to reject the ability of another community to claim any intrinsic ‘right’ in 
the territory at all. This individual sense of possession can co-exist with others, 
but equally, it contains a perpetual element of tension and stress. At times, the 
tension and suspicion have escalated to crisis point. At other times, 
consensus has apparently developed, at least at elite levels. Consensus is 
here interpreted as individuals and communities sharing territory and laying 
claim to it, but doing so on the basis of a mutually-developed compromise 
between the agendas of the communities involved. But such consensus can 
be shown to have depended on a self-interest that was usually, for whatever 
reason, short-lived. The setting up of an independent Lebanon in 1943, 
governed by the terms of the National Pact of that year, was undoubtedly a 
genuine attempt at achieving a durable intercommunal consensus. Certainly 
virtually all subsequent political leaders in Lebanon have consistently praised 
the consensus enshrined in the National Pact.11 But as this thesis will show, 
the basis for that consensus was not sufficiently wide to overcome the long- 
established reactions based on co-habitation between the communities, even 
amongst those figures who praised the concept of consensus. All too
See, for example, the words of two leaders from opposing traditions: Saeb Salam, Massirat al Salam. p. 21; Amine 
Gemayel, Peace and Unity, p. 5; and also a ‘neutral’ figure, Raymond Edde, Raymond Edde & Raymond Helmick. 
Correspondance: La Questione Libanaise selon Raymond Edde expliauee aux Americans oar Raymond G. Helmick. 
Libanica II, Cariscript, Paris, 1990, p. 46.
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frequently, for what they Identified as reasons of individual and communal self- 
interest, consensus was abandoned. This was even more true at mass levels 
of society, at times when grievances and suspicions between communities 
reached critical heights of tension and where the benefits of consensus 
advertised by their leaders seemed less obvious. The pattern of Lebanese 
history also indicates that the community that most frequently acted as one 
element in the equation (either on its own or in concert with other communities 
such as the Greek Orthodox) was the Maronite community.
Thus an interpretation of the 1958 crisis through the communal 
perspective is crucial to an understanding of that crisis. As Amine Gemayel 
has commented The Lebanese are first and foremost members of their 
community, not citizens of their state’.12 The resultant impact of this on the 
question of a definition of what constitutes the Lebanese national identity has 
been considerable. In the political dimension, it has enshrined a fundamental 
difference between the Maronites (and other Christians) and the Muslim 
communities. For the Maronites in particular, a sectarian-based political 
system has to be at the heart of the political system, acting as an insurance 
policy for the various religious interests. For the Muslim politicians, such 
sectarianism is unnecessary and even divisive.13 To be able to examine 
usefully the impact of historical patterns and interpretations on Lebanon’s 
communal history, what is required is an effective marriage between the 
theoretical and the empirical perspectives and not just either a narrative of 
events or an abstract theory unrelated to the chronology. The empirical 
historian may be tempted to highlight the uniqueness and individuality of 
differing case studies and periods, with the argument that ‘History consists of 
the compilation of a maximum number of irrefutable and objective facts’.14 
Such an approach may be the most practical and informative for extracting the 
maximum detail of a particular case study, but the resulting concentration on 
individual narratives can obscure the development of sustained patterns of 
communal behaviour that are also apparent within such case studies. This may
12 Amine Gemayel, Rebuilding Lebanon. University Press of America, Boston, 1992, p. 14.
13 See Ibid. pp. 14; 17, for example. It is interesting to note that in these comments, the Maronite Amine Gemayel 
clearly views the Muslim political perspective as being linked to that of the 'ulamas, so emphasising the theoretical 
unity of politics and religion in Islam. This underlines the attitude of Maronite suspicion of ‘real’ Muslim motivation.
14 E.H. Carr, W hat is History, p. 15.
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be important in the assessment of an individual case study, as the study in this 
thesis of events in the 1950s will indicate. But this does not mean that the 
longer term factors, in the shape of the recurrence of attitudes and behaviour, 
the expression of which may differ according to chronological context, are not 
also of critical significance.
It is thus a fundamental strand in this thesis that historians cannot afford 
to neglect the mass human dimension when studying political history; 
especially when examining the operation of mass democracies such as that in 
Lebanon at the time of the 1958 crisis. Such a dimension provides the clues 
leading to an understanding of the evolution of political orientations and 
feelings of national identity at the popular level, as well as to communal and 
individual behaviour - behaviour that is frequently dictated by cultural 
considerations and constraints at the popular level, which in turn had an impact 
on policy. This means that the historian interested in this perspective must 
seek an approach which accesses sources that enable a better understanding 
of the popular level and of the operation of community identities and cultural 
mythologies. Such approaches are commonplace to the social sciences but 
history has made a lesser use of these approaches, partly because it is not 
always easy to combine these with the demands of a historical perspective; 
one that includes a firm chronological dimension. In the case of the 1958 
crisis, it is important to assess the interrelationships between social structure 
and culture on the one hand, and popular behaviour in terms of identifiable 
events on the other. The former element, the cultural approach, can be used 
as part of an attempt to understand the patterns of political behaviour identified 
from a non-empirical perspective as being of significance in the evolution of the 
crisis. Such an approach thus provides a conceptual tool with which to assess 
political culture, at popular as well as elite levels. In such an approach an 
attempt to identify community psychology is as significant as an analysis of the 
actual events and the actions undertaken by those communities, because the 
attitudes resulting from that community psychology are seen, as in this 
interpretation of the 1958 crisis in Lebanon, as key triggers to action. 
Important elements in this might include, where evidence is available, mass 
surveys of public opinion and attitude; but failing that, some attempt through
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other sources to assess such opinion and attitudes. It must also include a 
close study of the roles of key individuals and their opinions and attitudes, 
drawing on private sources and comparing and contrasting these with their 
public statements and speeches. In this way, some assessment of the public 
and popular gloss that such individuals felt it necessary to place on their 
opinions and policies at particular times and in particular contexts becomes 
possible. The survival and significance of popular myths and legends in the 
various communities can also provide a useful channel of analysis when these 
can be shown to have been interpreted so as to have played a role in the 
development of key episodes such as those leading to the 1958 crisis.
As Vansina has pointed out, the ‘importance accorded to the events is a 
matter of general consensus in a community’. Equally, Eric Hobsbawm has 
commented that ‘the past is ...an inevitable component of the institutions, 
values and other patterns of human society’, but a component dependent on 
selections from a range of information and ideas ‘remembered’ by individuals 
and groups on the basis of their own interests.15 In any political system, such 
a democracy of some kind, dependent on input from a sizeable element of the 
whole population, such remembering will affect the evolution and practice of 
policy: ‘our political judgements are permeated by a sense of the past’ because 
‘our sense of personal identity demands roots in the past’. Essentially, groups 
of people, such as the communities in Lebanon, ‘assimilate and interpret their 
own experience’ in ways that place ‘history’ at the ‘heart of political culture’.16 
As Benedict Anderson has pointed out, the result in states such as Lebanon 
has been the creation of ‘imagined’ communities that have assumed a real 
solidity because there is a powerful will to believe that they are real.17 This 
thesis will show that an understanding and interpretation of the past by 
participants in the 1958 crisis, and that a study of such factors provides the 
necessary cultural dimensions to a history of Lebanon and its communities. 
There are dangers for the historian in seeking to involve such factors in an 
analysis. These dimensions are difficult, if not impossible to quantify. The
15 Jan Vansina, Oral Tradition as History. James Currey, London, 1985, p. 119; Eric Hobsbawm, ‘The Social Function 
of the Past’, Past and Present. 5 5 ,1 9 7 5 , p. 3.
16 John Tosh, The Pursuit of History, p. 1.
17 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Verso, London, 
1983.
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historian seeking to assess the extent of the significance of these dimensions 
to a particular incident or set of incidents must therefore rely on a range of 
judgements relating to a series of subjectivities. But to ignore these is to 
ignore the extent to which mythologies rooted in the past, justifying community 
identity, have had an impact on institutional as well as cultural and social 
contexts, as Raphael Samuel and Paul Thompson have argued.18 An 
example of this is the way that the office or institution of the presidency in 
Lebanon had acquired a quasi-mystical significance relating to the survival of 
group identity for the Maronite community by the mid 1950s, as will be seen 
later in the thesis. Equally, as the thesis will show, ‘the ruling groups’ in a 
society will have what Tosh calls ‘an interest’ in creating an imagery that 
promotes ‘mythical pasts’ where that imagery serves to sustain or ‘legitimise’ 
the power base of such groups. In particular, such imagery can be shown to 
have been invoked to create or sustain ‘popular’ support within electoral 
constituencies for potentially contentious policies, through propaganda linking 
the survival of community identity to the success of particular policies.
There was certainly a belief, borne out by events, that cultural myths 
relating to community identity influenced people’s perceptions and actions in 
relation to clearly identified policies.19 Arguably, such behavioural patterns 
were strongest in communities that had in the past, or perceived themselves to 
have been in the past, excluded from power, making collective ‘memory’ or 
myth relating to such past exclusion more relevant to community action as well 
as community perceptions, because of the presumed linkage of such with the 
survival of the community as an identifiable, discrete identity. A perception of 
persecution was thus frequently a crucial element, acting as a powerful bond 
within a sizeable community by providing elements of a common history based 
on endurance in the face of considerable difficulties, and making it more 
difficult, therefore, either to criticise or to modify elements of the community 
identity.20
18 John Tosh, The Pursuit of History, p. 224; Raphael Samuel & Paul Thompson, The Myths W e Live Bv. Routledge, 
London, 1990, p. 52.
19 ibid, pp. 20; 60.
20 Raphael Samuel & Paul Thompson, The Mvths W e Live Bv. pp. 14-15; 19; 60; John Tosh, The Pursuit of History, p. 
3.
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The 1958 crisis is officially seen as beginning with the murder of Nassib 
Al Matni, a newspaperman, on 8 May of that year, and lasting through to 8 
August, a period of three months, so it was not a brief interlude but a 
significant upset. However, a consciousness of the factors discussed above 
must lead the historian into thinking that it is misleading to see the crisis purely 
in terms of those dates. Instead it is important to see the roots of the crisis as 
lying in an earlier period so far as Lebanon itself is concerned, regardless of 
the factors apparently involved in the broader Middle Eastern context. Thus a 
study of the social structure of Lebanese society and its historical evolution is 
necessary to any attempt to explain the development of the 1958 crisis; 
because such an examination of the social structure and its workings indicates 
that conflicts within Lebanese society like the 1958 crisis were part of a long- 
established pattern of the social dynamics of Lebanon, rather than something 
relating predominantly to the events of the 1950s in the region.
It is common to see Lebanon's social structure, or at least the structure 
of some of the communities as being 'feudal'. Yet such an approach to 
explaining the Lebanese social structure is not entirely satisfactory. What may 
be termed a feudal structure was at best limited to just some of the 
communities; it was never a universal. For instance, it has been identified by 
some commentators in the Druze community and also, by the beginning of the 
nineteenth century at least, in the Maronite community - or at least the rural 
sector of that community.21 Insofar as ‘feudal’ characteristics did develop, they 
did so within the Mount Lebanon region, but not in the peripheries that were to 
be included in the independent Lebanese state. Equally, feudalism was 
hampered in its development even in the Mount Lebanon region by the impact 
of Koranic law. This, for example, laid down the basis for inheritance, including 
land, as a division among the children of the deceased, thus lessening any 
potential for the acquisition of large tracts of land by a succession of single 
heirs. Another complication to the development of feudalism as key factor in 
social organisation was the involvement of the Ottoman empire. Officials in 
the administration of this empire either were beneficiaries themselves or
21 In 1858, for example, there was a revolt in Kisrawan which is best classified as a revolt of Maronite peasants 
against their feudal lords, yet even so the issue is complicated by the fact that the peasants were backed by the 
Maronite order.
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conferred benefits on favourites by a system of land endowment iqta’; but 
such benefits were not permanent or hereditary. Land grants under this 
system reverted back to Ottoman control on the death of the beneficiary.22 
Thus though Lebanon did not witness the beginnings of private hereditary 
ownership on a really large scale till the middle of the nineteenth century, as a 
result of Ottoman reforms at that time, the system that prevailed previously is 
not easily classified for any community, and so assumptions about the 
evolution of communities from such bases cannot be made in a straightforward 
way.23
Related to this is the issue of hierarchical patterns within social 
groupings in Lebanon. According to Khoury:
Classes undoubtedly existed before this time but they 
were much more difficult to identify and their lifespans 
much shorter mainly because their relations to the means 
of production and especially property were much less 
stable.24
Equally, a class structure did not easily cross confessional boundaries in 
Lebanon except perhaps at elite levels where it can be argued that there was 
sufficient economic interest in common to promote a conscious sense of 
sharing the same social level between communities, at least for the Maronite, 
Druze and Sunni communities. But despite the apparent common interests of 
the zu’ama or land-owning elites in these communities, the perceived need of 
these elites to identify themselves with their own confessional grouping and its 
policy stance (especially in terms of foreign policy) ensured that any class 
feeling at this level was generally tenuous and short-lived. Instead the 
dominant social hierarchies in Lebanon tended to be those specific to 
particular communities. In terms of the overall social hierarchy of the state, it is 
difficult to sustain an argument that certain confessional groupings occupied a 
lower socio-economic position than another one. The range of exceptions is 
so wide that any coherent case collapses. In other words, the evolution of a
22 See Joseph Syzliowicz, 'The Ottoman Empire1, in C .A .0  Van Nieuwenhuijze (ed,), Commoners. Climbers and 
Notables. Brill, Leiden, 1977, p. 109.
23 Philip Khoury, Urban. Notables and Arab Nationalism: The Politics of Damascus. 1860-1920. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1983, p. 4.
34 Ibid
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modern class structure was certainly not a factor in Lebanon in the historical 
period, and it is difficult to interpret the groups in Lebanon even as late as the 
1950s in classical class terms.
One alternative approach used mainly by sociologists to interpret such 
communal structures as found in Lebanon is the 'community approach'. This 
has been used to examine the Lebanese social structure in terms of the 
different communities, enquiring whether such communities were 
homogeneous or heterogeneous.25 This approach, allied with the sectarian 
one, is what seems to fit best the Lebanese setting. According to Tonnies, the 
German sociologist, the Gemeinschaft or community is described as revolving 
around three intertwined elements: the 'element of descent' in which the focus 
is on blood and kinship ties resulting in a situation where 'family' life provides 
the basis of social organisation.26 The second element was provided by 
location, the actual territory linked to a particular ‘village community'.27 The 
final element was provided by employment or occupation, expressing itself 
through trade or craft guilds, corporations and offices.28 Unlike feudalism or 
tribalism, these three elements can be said to be clearly identifiable within the 
Lebanese social system regardless of sectarian community. It is general that 
family life has provided the centre of social organisation, and that village 
territoriality and (predominantly male) occupation have also been key 
characteristics in all the communal sub-groups found in Lebanon. Such a 
pattern holds good to this day. Even in the urban areas of Lebanon these 
three factors are still significant. For instance, the majority of the population of 
Ashrafiyyah, in the eastern part of Beirut, identify themselves primarily as 
village emigrants, rather than urban dwellers. In other words, the links to non- 
urban locations remains a strong factor in their sense of individual and group 
identity.
Linked to this, geographical factors can be said to provide another key 
to the communal patterns of Lebanon. The terrain of Lebanon promoted
25 Samir Khalaf, Lebanon's Predicament. Columbia University Press, New York, 1987,
26 G.P. Murdock, Social Structure, Macmillan, London, 1949, p. 82.
27 J. Coleman, ‘Community Disorganisation and Conflict', in R. Merton (ed.), Contemporary Social Problems. 
Harcourt, New York, 1971, p. 658.
28 F. Tonnies, Community and Association (Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft). Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, London,
1955, p. 69.
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geographical isolation, on a village and a community basis. This led villages, 
each usually identifiable as belonging to a particular sectarian community, to 
regard other villages, linked to different communal affiliations, with fear and 
suspicion; also the communications between such villages were so difficult that 
regular and positive social intercourse was more the exception than the rule. It 
can be said that the more that communities isolate themselves, the more they 
distrust each other, and the more society is fragmented. This certainly has 
held true historically of Lebanon, and it has left a significant legacy in the 
modern period.29
In the modern period, the majority of the population of Lebanon has 
been located in urban surroundings. In these surroundings, the Maronite 
community and the Sunni community found themselves in close proximity, 
even though they tended to live in particular districts, identified as ‘belonging’ 
to their particular confessional grouping.30 With the urban population in the 
majority by the 1940s at the latest, it becomes possible to talk of ‘masses’ in 
relation to particular communities, but not in relation to the Lebanese 
population as a whole. A working class or proletariat or ‘lower’ class that 
crossed confessional boundaries simply did not emerge within Lebanon, partly 
because the economic activities of the respective communities were too 
different and competition for access to jobs and commercial activities were too 
strong between the communities.31 The Maronites, for example, dominated 
the profitable trade with Europe and sought to ensure that its major benefits 
were kept within their own community. But if it is not possible to talk of a 
Lebanese working class, it is possible to identify within the Maronite and Sunni 
communities what may be termed Maronite or Sunni ‘masses’. By the masses 
what is implied is the bulk, quantitatively speaking, of the members within a 
particular community who, in terms of the individual social hierarchy of that 
community, belong to the middle and lower strata. Thus in class terms the 
masses might be said to include the petty bourgeoisie, the proletariat or
20 See M. Hudson, T h e  Problem of Authoritative Power in Lebanese Politics: W hy Consociationalism Failed', in 
Nadim Shehadi & Dana Haffar Mills (eds), Lebanon: A History of Conflict and Consensus. I.B. Tauris, London, 1988, 
p. 225.
0 This was also true for other communities, meaning that maps of urban areas would display a patchwork of districts 
monopolised by particular communities.
31 Michael Johnson, Class and Client in Beirut: The Sunni Muslim Community and the Lebanese State. 1840-1985. 
Ithaca Press, London, 1986, p. 4  also makes this point.
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working class and the sub-classes of a community; as well as (where 
appropriate) the rural working or peasant classes. In other words, the masses 
comprise the people economically dependent on commercial, administrative or 
landowning elites - but who, particularly in an urban context where they are in 
constant contact with each other in living and working conditions, develop a 
sense of shared interests against these elites that is likely to come into play at 
times of crisis for those masses. Consequently, what is implied by use of the 
term ‘masses’ in this thesis is the ability, and willingness, of very substantial 
numbers of people within a community to act together in order to put across a 
point of view that evolved among themselves, and was not handed down by an 
elite, or adopted from an element in the community elites and modified in such 
a way as to make it populist. In ‘normal’ conditions, the masses would usually 
be prepared to let themselves be led, or ‘manipulated’ by their community 
elites. However at times when the masses felt their own interests to be 
threatened, they would seek to bring pressure on their elites in order to bring 
about a change in policy, for instance. At such times, it was common for the 
masses to describe their own interests as that of the community as a whole.32 
In the case of the Maronite and Sunni communities, this expression of mass 
community interest generally justified itself by reference to community 
mythology; in other words to perceptions of past events, which were used to 
interpret more immediate causations of a crisis.
So as part of dealing with community identity in the modern period it is 
necessary to examine a variety of contemporary perceptions of the past, rather 
than simply examining the events of the twentieth century. In particular, the 
period of Ottoman control over the region has left a crucial series of 
consequences for mass and elite agendas in the various communities. It can 
be argued that one of the most significant in terms of present definitions has 
been the differential impact, on the communities, of corruption in government 
and administration. During the Ottoman period, different treatment was offered 
or forced on the communities, with the Maronites being frequently adversely 
affected by that treatment. The continuation of habits and customs of the 
administration of the region, established when it was under Ottoman control
32 See Ibid, pp. 4-8 for a discussion of the social composition of the Sunni community in Beirut.
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was not popularly acceptable during the modern period, that of an independent 
Lebanon seeking to be 'democratic' along Western lines. The problems 
involved in a continuation of such Ottoman habits, including the opportunities it 
gave for an opposition to form around the issue of corruption were particularly 
well displayed during the regime of Bishara Al Khoury.
But there was another factor linked to the confessional structure of
Lebanese society. The Ottoman tendency had been to seek to structure
societies under its control in ways that reflected an Islamic point of view. Thus 
social stratification in the region during the period of Ottoman control was
based on function, but also on the overall status awarded to the different
religious communities. Regardless of the experience of rare individuals, 
lasting group mobility upward or downward was difficult within this context. 
Stratification on the basis of religious affiliation was part of an already 
established Muslim practice.33 At one level, Islam organised Muslims as a 
Jama’ah or community and thereby excluded the non-Muslim social groups, 
who were either polytheists or People of the Scriptures or the Book (Christians 
and Jews). The status of Christians and Jews came to be regulated by a 
dhimmah or contract. Thus at its simplest, society came to be divided simply 
into Muslims and dhimmis. This principle of social classification was followed 
by Muslim rulers from the seventh century on, and it established Christian 
groups as being inferior in social ranking to Muslims because of their faith. 
This inferior status was demonstrated by the particular taxes which dhimmis 
had to pay, the Jizyah or poll-tax and the Kharaj or land-tax, and by the range 
of restrictions on movement and opportunities placed on them.34
But this level of social division was not the only one operating in the 
Ottoman empire. Differences were made between Muslim groups on the 
grounds of sectarian allegiance. In a predominantly Sunni empire such as the 
Ottoman empire, 'nonconformist' Muslim sects such as the Druze and the 
Shi’ite were differentiated and granted a lower social status. That status might 
be higher than that granted to non-Muslims, but it created a distinct and lasting
33 B. Turner, W eber and Islam, a Critical Study. Routledge, London, 1974, p. 97.
34 Antoine Fattal, Le Statut Legal des Non-Musulmans en Pays d'lslam. Imprimerie Catholique, Beirut, 1958, pp. 81- 
82.
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social gulf between the various Muslim sects. Moreover, these social rankings 
were not a matter of simple acceptance: the operation of such a ranking 
system built into the relations between communities a variety of degrees of 
resentment, mistrust and even outright hostility and fear. For instance, the 
dhimmah could give a certain protection to Christian groups at the same time 
as leaving other Muslim sects such as the Druze and Shi’ite open to 
persecution by their fellow Muslims with all the authorisation of Ottoman 
power. At other times Christian groups were persecuted by all the Muslim 
groups, including the 'nonconformist1 ones, again with Ottoman endorsement. 
Thus this type of social ranking gave, in practice, no sense of social stability to 
the communal relations in the region.
The involvement of external forces (notably Europe) in the region also 
had an internal impact, especially from the nineteenth century on. From the 
eighteenth century, Europe was becoming more secular in its attitudes and 
the significance of religious divisions in European society were lessening. 
Instead, the various European states were moving towards the concept of an 
individual state existing by right for reasons which had little to do with the 
religion of its elite or with loyalty towards that elite simply on a hereditary base. 
The role of the individual at all levels of society was given a higher profile with 
the evolution of the concept of the 'citizen'; a concept which theoretically (if not 
always practically) gave individuals certain fundamental rights regardless of 
social status or religious affiliation. This development had little impact on the 
Ottoman empire as a whole. Within that empire the idea of communities 
distinguished on confessional grounds continued to have legal force, 
continuing thereby the linkage between temporal and religious power 
structures.
However, in areas such as Lebanon - where for at least some of the 
communities, there was access to European ideas - the different path being 
taken by Europe was known to members of non-Muslim communities through 
education. Students learned about Western ideas of secular democracy and 
the ways in which this could (at least in theory) permit individuals and groups in 
society to initiate desired changes in society without fear of reprisal on the
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grounds of confessional allegiance. Equally, it was demonstrated through this 
system that communal groups acquired rights to make their voices heard 
because of a long-standing presence in a particular location. It was shown that 
having an established territorial identity conferred upon groups and 
individuals in the West a national identity that superseded any confessional 
differences; and that such a situation permitted change which did not involve a 
loss of individual or group identity.
But a change in confessional allegiance was the only permanent way for 
groups or individuals to effect alterations or reforms of grievances within the 
Ottoman empire. Saadeh has pointed out that in the region of Lebanon, 
'where identity is not based on residence and land, but on religious communal 
ties' change threatened 'the very existence of the community' in the historical 
experience of the region. As a result, a deep conservatism developed within 
the minority communities in particular, as the best way to prevent 'the 
eradication of the community' in a particular location.35 Anything that prompted 
a reassessment of the identity of the community by central authority might be 
dangerous to the survival of the community. Thus such change as did occur 
was likely to be given a strong appearance of conformity to established 
practice, rather than challenging established practice as was happening in the 
West. It meant that there was little reliance on the powers of communities 
themselves to bring about useful and positive change, even where it was 
identified as necessary for the good of that particular community. Instead, 
there was a growing reliance on the intervention of outside forces to effect 
such change, with the indigenous community performing an apparently passive 
role as a matter of self-defence.36 This helped to set the agenda for the low- 
ranked Christian communities in particular in their relations with and 
expectations of the Western powers.
Essentially, the classification by authority of communities on religious 
grounds conferred upon individuals a sense of identity that was essentially 
religious, and ensured that they, in turn, classified others around them in the
35 Sofia Saadeh, The Social Structure of Lebanon: Democracy or Servitude?. An Nahar, Beirut, 1993, p. 41.
30 Marwan Buheiry, ‘External Intervention and Internal W ars in Lebanon: 1770-1928', in Laurence Conrand (ed.), The  
Formation and Perception of the Modern Arab World. Darwin Press Inc, Princeton, 1989, p. 137.
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same or in different communities on precisely the same religious terms. This 
was true of those in dominant and those in inferior positions and it established 
a base for the interpretation of the identity of other forces becoming involved in 
the region. Thus when the West dominated the Arab countries, it was more 
the religious dimensions and differences which were identified as the 'obvious' 
features of Western identity, and thus became the element that was most likely 
to raise antagonisms in Muslim Arab society, rather than reaction to concepts 
of colonialism or economic domination in a more Western sense.37 This 
perspective can be identified amongst certain Muslim groups in Lebanon in 
1958; with the West being interpreted as a Christian bloc that was 
consequently intent upon undermining identity of Muslim groups there. Given 
that the attitude of the Maronite Christian grouping was to see the West as its 
natural protector, this meant that potentially, clashes over the role of the West 
in Lebanon could affect the actual sense of identity of some communal groups 
within Lebanese society.
The interpretation of the historical context of the various communities in 
Lebanon has equally the potential for producing radically different 
understandings of the historical narrative of the region. There is a powerful 
belief that each community has its own particular history and its own 
background. Histories of Lebanon are a real issue for controversy on a 
communal basis, rather than, for example, on a class or national basis as 
found in the West. The question of how to write the history of Lebanon, 
including the acceptable starting date for such a history has, since the 
nineteenth century, become a question that bears directly on the attempts of 
one or other community to impose its own interpretation as the standard, and 
thereby to establish that standard as a keystone to the construction of a 
‘Lebanese' identity. Thus the Maronites wish to begin with the Phoenician 
period, while the Sunni seek to focus on the Islamic period, underlining thereby 
the Arab identity of the state. This leads to a very fundamental fragmentation 
of opinion about what constitutes a ‘Lebanese’ identity.38
37 Hisham Sharabi, Arab Intellectuals and the West: The Formative Years. 1875-1914. John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 
1970; Albert Hourani, Arab Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1962.
30 K.S. Salibi, House of Many Mansions. Chapter 11, especially pp. 201-3, pointing out the 'war' over Lebanese history 
in recent years, but also pointing out that as early as 1935, a text was produced by Nakkash and Farrukh in which
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Nor is it just a matter of invoking the historical past in order to attempt to 
define a 'Lebanese' identity in the image of a particular communal identity. The 
issue of how to define 'modernism' is another controversial issue. At one level 
it is related to support or antipathy to the West and the nature of Western 
impact on Lebanon in terms of social values and lifestyles. Equally 
Modernisation is associated with ideas of change, frequently imparted through 
an educational system. This in turn leads on to another set of complexities 
relating to communal identity that does go beyond the confessional dimension. 
Modernisation as change, spread through education, helped the evolution of 
an identifiable educated urban middle class in Lebanon in the 1950s. Yet that 
(predominantly Maronite) middle class found itself excluded from any real 
exercise of power, particularly political power. Such power remained in the 
hands of the traditional, predominantly rural elites for the Maronites as for other 
communities, it is a measure of the continuing significance of original village 
locations that even for most Maronites, this educated class did not have a 
widespread appeal. Yet at the same time, the traditional elites were also 
having difficulties in maintaining a popular appeal to the extent they had done 
in the past.
The role of traditional leaders or 'notables' had not remained totally 
static over time within Lebanon, particularly since the evolution of Lebanon as 
a distinct entity. The traditional, quasi-feudal nature of some of this leadership 
had modified into what Hottinger calls the Za’im concept.39 The initial 
evolution of confessionally identified social groupings helped the development 
of a social hierarchy dominated by a land-based aristocracy amongst the 
various groups. Such an aristocracy was not a focus of common loyalty across 
all the communities; rather each community developed its own aristocracy 
which invoked loyalty predominantly from its own confessional members. 
Within such a social hierarchy, it was the notables who generally set the 
agenda in terms of values and beliefs - freedom to express ideas and thoughts 
outside the ideas passed down by one's own community notables was
‘Lebanon was denuded of all special historicity outside the Syrian Arab context’. The Maronite response was a work 
published in 1937 which ‘emphasised the special historical character of Lebanon'.
9 Arnold Hottinger. ‘Zu’am a in Historical Perspective’, in L. Binder (ed.), Politics in Lebanon. John W iley & Sons, New  
York, 1966, pp. 85-105.
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minimal. Such social hierarchies were under threat in all communities in 
Lebanon by the early twentieth century - and the process was undoubtedly 
helped by the period in which France ruled Lebanon through the mandate 
system.
Economic power was shifting away from these land-based aristocracies, 
and becoming more concentrated in the hands of urban commercial elites. Yet 
the political power structure set up during the mandate, and modified for the 
independent Lebanese state, relied heavily upon the involvement of the 
traditional elites. Thus political arrangements which essentially depended on 
intercommunal relations via a network of relations set up between the 
traditional elites of these various communities relied on an ability to command 
loyalty within their communities that could no longer be taken largely for 
granted by the traditional elites. It was even more of a problem when the 
traditional elites did not always realise the change themselves and made 
political assumptions that were based on their ability to call on widespread 
demonstrations of loyal backing for policies from within their own communities 
- only to find that it was not automatically forthcoming. Such developments 
tended to produce intra- and well as inter-communal tensions. This is 
particularly well demonstrated in the workings and breakdowns of the so-called 
National Pact. This, as will be seen later in the thesis, was an agreement 
between two traditional notables, Bishara Al Khoury and Riyadh Al Solh, and 
was intended to provide the basis for political compromise between the various 
communities in Lebanon, especially the two identified as the 'dominant' 
communities by the 1940s: the Maronites and the Sunnis.40 But far from being 
a recipe for stability, the National Pact not only allowed successive crises to 
occur, but arguably even encouraged them.
A major aim of this thesis is to examine the breakdown of communal 
consensus and a return to patterns of co-habitation in 1958, to demonstrate 
that while external factors undoubtedly made a contribution, it was the internal 
dynamics of the Lebanese state that ensured the events of the 1950s 
produced a major crisis that shook the state to its foundations. Gabriel Almond
40 For comment on the National Pact, see Raghid Al Solh, ‘Lebanese and Arab Nationalism, 1936-1945', Unpublished 
PhD thesis, St. Anthony’s College, Oxford, 1986.
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has sought to classify political systems and he argues that a culturally 
fragmented political system is liable to be static, even to produce 
dictatorships.41 He also argues that a culturally fragmented political system 
’resists' social change because of the need for changes to be agreed on by all 
the constituent elements in the state. Such agreement is virtually impossible to 
obtain, because each social element perpetually seeks to gain more for itself, 
while refusing to yield up part of whatever it already has. Thus compromise 
and collaboration become practically unachievable. The question is, how far 
does such an analysis reflect the realities of the independent Lebanese state 
during the 1950s?
According to Michael Hudson in his comments on the political structure 
of Lebanon:
'Consociationalism led to a degree of immobilism that 
prevented government from dealing with socio-economic 
and ideological challenges. From this point of view 
consociationalism is a cause of breakdown and chaos1,
something he sees as applying in 1958.42 He argued that by the 1950s, 
Lebanese society was organising itself behind a range of essentially secular 
political identities and ideologies, and rather than behind confessional sects 
as in the past. Equally, Saadeh has argued that 'Consociation is a system 
that contradicts the rules of Western democracy because it does not treat 
equally all citizens in a country'.43 Both these and other commentators 
evoking the concept for Lebanon of consociational democracy in the modern 
period downplay the confessional element. They do so on the following basis. 
First the identification of distinct lines of cleavage; second a multiple balance of 
power; third the existence of popular attitudes favourably disposed to a 
coalition between the various elements; fourth the existence of an external 
threat; fifth levels of national feeling that do not outweigh other potentially 
divisive factors; and sixth, a 'relatively low total load on the system'.44
41 Gabriel Almond & James Coleman, The Politics of Developing Areas. Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 
1960.
42 Michael Hudson. The Precarious Republic. Boulder, New York, 1985, pp. 87-105; 325-30.
43 Sofia Saadeh. The Social Structure of Lebanon, p. 122.
44 A Lijphart, Typologies of Democratic Systems’, Comparative Political Studies. 1.1,1969, pp. 3-44.
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Dekmejian, for instance, identified the consociational approach as of 
considerable relevance to an analysis of the segmented political cultures in 
Lebanon. He argues that Lebanon fits the consociational model in important 
ways even though he also admits ways in which Lebanon departs from the 
model. He suggests that these 'deviations' are significant in the breaking 
down of the consociational model in Lebanon.45 He cites as an example of 
this the Maronite refusal to seek a compromise in which the Maronite 
community would compromise with the Muslim sects there by giving up some 
of their power base in the state. Dekmejian points to the lack of coercive 
control possessed by the state, and places stress also on the regional context 
of Lebanon, which was traditionally very unsettled. This, he argues, could 
have been significant as well as a breakdown in the consociational formula in 
the 1950s. His argument is that 'refusal to change can generate 
dissatisfaction with the system and when the situation is under stress or in a 
conflictuai state because of different perception of events there are no chances 
to change it for better; this degenerates into a crisis1.46
These points all have some merit: but that merit is limited by the failure 
to take the long-standing confessional element in community identity into 
sufficient account, implying a greater ease in the modification of communal 
identities that can be justified on closer examination. Dekmejian himself uses 
a confessional case to support his case without identifying the potential for it to 
undermine his more secular interpretation. It is certainly true that, as A. N. 
Oppenheim points out, the process of perception is 'not a passive process but 
a dynamic one'. Perception is evolved not Just in relation to external factors, 
but also by existing attitudes possessed by 'the perceiver's culture, attitudes, 
expectations, needs, experience and many other aspects'.47 But this does not 
mean to say that the process must necessarily become increasingly 
secularised, as many commentators tend to imply on the basis of the Western 
experience.
45 R.H. Dekmejian, ‘Consociational Democracy in Crisis: The Case of Lebanon', Comparative Politics. 10,2 ,1978, 
pp. 251-66.
46 A.N Oppenheim, 'Psychological Aspects' in Margot Light & A.J.R. Groom (eds), international Relations: A 
Handbook of Current Theory. Pinter, London, 1994, p. 208.
4i Ibid. p. 203~
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The process in Lebanon by which individual and group perceptions 
affect communications with other groups, especially those in closely linked or 
the same locations, is undoubtedly complex. Potential for division and 
agreement are contained within language and linguistic values, social and 
cultural values, visual expectations of others, and, of course, the historical past 
as it affects the present. It is argued here that, rather than consociationalism, 
the result has been a continuation into the modern period of habits based on 
co-habitation. Social groups that conceive themselves as having different 
cultures (even if 'outsiders' perceive considerable similarities) will often be 
prepared to draw on these issues to underline differences rather than seek for 
similarities. Decision-makers who wish to retain the support of such social 
groups in situations where group loyalty to decision-makers is no longer 
automatic, find it necessary to stress such differences themselves, making the 
potential for compromise and collaboration with other groups more difficult. It 
can be argued that this was the case in Lebanon in the 1950s; but equally, the 
basis on which the communities in Lebanon saw themselves as different from 
other groups was predominantly still confessional at least as regards attitudes 
to other groups. If it can be argued that individuals and social strata in these 
groups had personally developed a greater degree of secularism in their own 
personal beliefs, it should not be assumed that such secularism allowed them 
to see the other groups in Lebanese society in equally secular terms, 
permitting the tensions between groups to be shaped by such secular 
perceptions.
It is also the case that the Lebanese perceptions of the regional context 
of the 1958 crisis, and of Lebanon’s foreign policy, had strongly confessional 
overtones; as indeed, if unconsciously, do the perceptions of external powers 
involved in Lebanon at that point, as in earlier historical times. Such external 
powers at least partly defined the social groups in the region of Lebanon on the 
information received from such groups. Thus external definitions of Lebanese 
group identity related to internal, and consequently, to confessional definitions. 
This is especially true as elements of identity within the identities of the 
relevant external powers frequently related most directly to that confessional 
element. Modern France, with its history of Roman Catholic Christianity,
33
related readily to the Christian communities in Lebanon and was prepared to 
be convinced of the 'difference' of the Muslim communities. The use by 
involved external powers of coercive control and control by consensus during 
Lebanon's history is thus of significance to an understanding of the external 
dimension to the 1958 Lebanese crisis, as well as of the internal dimensions. 
But, it must be asked, how does that relate to the more widely accepted 
definitions of the crisis and its evolution - and particularly to these external 
dimensions?
In terms of the wider, regional and international dimension, the short 
term factors of significance date from 1955 in particular, though the period 
1952-55 was also one of tremendous socio-political upheaval for the Arab 
world. These upheavals undoubtedly had implications for Lebanon. This was 
the period during which Western hegemony in the Middle East was threatened 
by the growing power of the USSR and also by pressures coming from within 
the region itself. At one level this consisted of a struggle over the political 
leadership of the Arab world. This resulted in the polarisation of Arab politics 
into two hostile camps, with Egypt leading one and Iraq the other. Yet, as 
Qubain makes plain, these upheavals went much further.48 Diametrically 
divergent concepts such as revolutionary republicanism versus monarchical 
gradualism; aristocratic conservative government versus socialist or semi­
socialist states; and co-operation with the West versus development of 
independence from the West all began to play a major role in the thinking of 
the Arab world.49 This polarisation split the Arab world on two levels, 
governmental and popular, and it involved Lebanon as much as it did other 
countries: ‘in Lebanon, the cleavage on the popular level took an acute 
character and because of the structure of the country carried with it 
confessional overtones’.50
Other studies of the 1958 crisis have been undertaken but, as already 
indicated, in terms of examination of the internal dimensions of the crisis there 
is relatively little secondary work that illuminates aspects of the crisis from a
48 F. Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon. The Middle East Institute, Washington DC, 1961, p. 38.
49 Ibjd, pp. 38-9.
50 ibid, p. 39.
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Lebanese perspective. One work by Fahim Qubain, published in 1961, three 
years after the crisis, provides a near contemporaneous study. It is a relatively 
comprehensive study in terms of the themes covered, and provides a useful 
narration of the events that links them to the international and regional context. 
He also indicates key internal issues, such as Chamoun’s attempt at re- 
election to the presidency; political corruption; and Muslim dissatisfaction; and 
also argues that there was a division in Lebanese society: ‘The division
involves the concept which the Lebanese holds of his identity, the nature and 
function of his country, its relation to its Arab neighbours and the world at large 
but particularly to the Christian West’.51 Yet as Qubain himself points out, his 
useful survey cannot give the full story of the Lebanese crisis; it is a broad 
overview and lacks the dimension of an in-depth study of any particular aspect. 
In terms of the lack of focus on the Maronite community, and indeed the 
identification of specific agendas for all the communities in Lebanon, this is a 
significant weakness.
A documentary selection produced shortly afterwards in 1965, by M.S. 
Agwani, together with his perceptive but brief introduction, provides some 
amplification of Qubain. He attempted to summarise the respective viewpoints 
of the major players linked to the 1958 crisis, and the possibilities for co­
operation in post-crisis Lebanon. But key sources were still not available in 
1965 and the need to select extracts from documents and to summarise other 
documents prevents a real focus on the role of the communities in 1958. 
Wade Goria’s work, Sovereignty and Leadership in Lebanon. 1943-1976 
examined, from the perspective of the early 1980s, the relationship between 
these elements and the contribution made to the 1958 crisis by a crisis in this 
relationship. But the book focuses on an elite perspective and takes little 
account of the popular dimension, despite the use made of sources such as 
periodicals and newspapers. A chapter by William Quandt on the 1958 crisis 
in Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan’s Force Without War focused on the 
relationship between force and diplomacy, and in particular the US intervention 
in Lebanon, linking this to the broader context of US policy in the Cold War era 
and of the importance of the Middle East to that policy. All of these works have
51 ibjd, p. 28.
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tended to bring a narrow focus to bear on the 1958 crisis, though in differing 
ways; and none has shown a consciousness of the importance of links 
between the political elites of the different communities and the masses. 
Some attempt to remedy this has been undertaken in the case of the Sunni 
community, with an MA thesis by Nasser Kalawoun on The Role of the Sunni 
Leadership and Community towards the State of Lebanon in the 1950s’; and a 
PhD thesis on Sunni Attitudes by Najla Attiyah. But even the Kalawoun thesis 
has emphasised the role of the elite, while that of Attiyah focused on the issue 
of Sunni attitudes towards the state of Lebanon.
In terms of primary sources none of the authors of these studies has 
made consistent use of newspaper sources, or of private papers such as those 
of Moussa Moubarak or General Bustani. Such sources, along with oral 
interviews with selected individuals and with the use of American, British and 
French official sources where possible, are the main sources utilised for this 
thesis, in general terms, the value of private papers needs no discussion. 
However, it is worth pointing out, in a thesis that seeks to illuminate popular 
attitudes, the particular value of oral sources as a complement to other sources 
such as newspaper reports. As Tosh has pointed out, oral traditions are an 
important element of popular culture in societies or communities, especially 
those without high literacy levels.52 Politicians’ papers relating to 1958 tend to 
concentrate on the immediate issues, and on self-justification. An examination 
of newspaper evidence, and oral traditions relating to the crisis, can give an 
indication of the extent to which non-political perceptions interpreted the crisis 
as part of an established tradition. Thus the oral evidence of journalists like 
Ghassan Tueni and Salim Nassar give important insights into the attitudes of 
certain sections, at least, of the masses in the confessional communities. As 
journalists, as they emphasised in their interviews, it was important to them to 
have a sense of the popular mood amongst their readership, at least, and to 
seek to identify that of other communal groups, and to reflect those in their 
newspapers, in terms of the choice of ‘news’ reported and editorials and 
articles carried. Without such a reflection, the sales of their productions was 
likely to decline, and as the crisis escalated, both commented on the increased
52 John Tosh, The Pursuit of History, pp. 30; 206.
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pressure that they felt to reflect a ‘popular’ mood ‘in tune’ with their 
readership.53 They emphasised that such was also the attitude of the other 
editors and journalists, something of importance to this thesis, given the use 
made of newspaper sources to assess popular attitudes, as will be discussed 
later.
Insofar as private papers utilised are concerned, some were already in 
the public domain, such as those of Saeb Salam and Kamal Jumblat, though 
sustained use of them in relation to an analysis of the 1958 crisis had not been 
undertaken. But other, largely untapped sources, did prove fruitful. For 
instance, some access to the Patriarchal archives at Bkirki was possible, 
enabling an assessment to be made of the role of the Maronite Church at all 
levels, including the Patriarch and the ordinary clergy, and even the relations of 
the ordinary clergy with their congregations, also of importance in assessing 
popular attitudes. The papers of Pierre Bart, Lebanese ambassador to France, 
and the unpublished memoirs of General Bustani were also drawn on for the 
1950s. The unclassified Al Khazin family papers also became available in the 
last months of this thesis. While a full survey of these would have entailed a 
lengthy process of classification, a preliminary sampling of those papers was 
undertaken, and some useful information relating to the themes of this thesis, 
notably the role of the Maronite Church, were uncovered. Dr. Albert 
Moukheiber is currently engaged in writing his memoirs, for An Nahar to 
publish in book form, but he agreed to give an interview, providing an oral 
source. Charles Malik’s papers are currently in the USA, in the possession of 
his son. In some cases the private papers of significant individuals have not 
survived. Dory Chamoun, son of Camille Chamoun, has claimed that his 
father’s papers, certainly those relating to this period, were destroyed by 
shelling during the civil war. The same has happened to the papers of Bishara 
Al Khoury, and, according to Amine Gemayel, to the papers of Pierre Gemayel. 
The wife of General Fouad Shihab deliberately destroyed his papers.
Oral interviews were undertaken with Raymond Edde, Saeb Salam, and 
Amine Gemayel, among others, providing some useful information and
53 Ghassan Tueni, Oral Interview, Beirut, 30 July 1992 ; Seiim Nassar, Oral Interview, London, 20 May 1995.
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perspectives, especially in terms of their understandings of popular 
perceptions of Chamoun’s intentions and aspects of the relationship between 
elite levels and the masses within the Maronite and Sunni communities relating 
to events in 1957 and 1958. As already mentioned, an interview was also 
undertaken with Salim Nassar, a leading figure in the Lebanese newspaper 
world in 1958. As well as his overview and insight into newspaper policy, he 
was able to comment on a number of issues and episodes that were subject to 
censorship or were for other reasons not fully reported in 1958. This interview 
was of particular significance as in 1958, Nassar was writing for Al Savvad. a 
journal with pro-Egyptian leanings. It was necessary to make use of such oral 
evidence because of the destruction or inaccessibility, for a variety of reasons 
including the recent civil war, of a number of archives of private papers of 
individuals significant in the evolution and course of the 1958 crisis. Oral 
evidence has been utilised because the evidence given by these individuals 
could be cross-referenced against each other and against the information and 
perspectives provided by the other sources used, notably the official archives 
and newspaper sources. In addition, as Catherine Hall has commented, the 
process of selectivity involved in oral evidence, of what is remembered and 
what is forgotten, is in itself an important clue for the historian. It aids an 
assessment, in this case, of the different communal perspectives and of the 
persistence of important mythologies related to community identity, such as 
that of a Phoenician origin for the Maronites or the Maronite conviction that 
there was a real threat to Lebanese independence in 1958 that was only 
prevented by Maronite efforts.54 It should also be remembered that despite 
the increasing literacy of the Lebanese population, it still maintains significant 
elements of an oral culture, particularly amongst the Muslim communities 
there.55 While access to Christian, especially Maronite, interviewees was 
easier to arrange than access to Muslim interviewees, there was a 
consciousness of a need to try to establish a balance here Thus an interview 
with Saeb Salam, a leading spokesman for the Sunni opposition in 1958, was
54 Catherine Hall, ‘Rethinking Imperial Histories’, unpublished conference plenary paper, W om en’s History Network 
Conference, 16 September 1995.
For some comments on communities in a transition between the reliance on oral culture and on a literate culture, 
see John Tosh, The Pursuit of History: Aims. Methods and New Directions in the Study of Modern History. 2nd edition, 
Longman, London, 1991; Jan Vansina, Oral Tradition as History. James Currey, London, 1985.
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significant, as were interviews with the neutralist/opposition figure of Raymond 
Edde. An interview with Mrs. Genevieve Gemayel, wife of Pierre Gemayel, 
and another with Amine Gemayel, the son of Pierre Gemayel, the leader of the 
Maronite populist party, the Kata’ib party were undertaken, giving insights into 
a party that had a mass following in the Maronite community. Sadly however, 
no access was possible to figures representing the Sunni activist stance at a 
more populist level than that provided by Saeb Salam.
In terms of more traditional archival research, for the period up to the 
1940s much of the archival research had already been done by other 
historians such as K.S. Salibi, Meir Zamir, Gerard Khoury and Engin Akarli. 
Such historians, and Salibi in particular, have utilised archival sources outside 
Lebanon, including the Italian State archives for insights into European 
perspectives on Fakhr Al Din II and the setting up of the Imarah; on the 1860s 
and the European intervention of that period. Salibi has also had access to 
Italian sources relating to the Christian communities of the Orient. He has 
utilised Russian archives on nineteenth century Lebanon and also the archives 
for the earlier period of the Syriac Maronite convent of Kannoubin and many 
other similar religious sources. Consequently, it was not felt either sensible or 
necessary to undertake major research into these sources. Instead, Chapters 
One and Two in particular, draw on the secondary sources available, and the 
documentary collections provided. However, for the nineteenth century, in 
relation to the evolution of a conscious Maronite identity, the work of Henri 
Lammens has been treated as a primary source. It has not been the intention 
of this thesis to rewrite the earlier period of Lebanese history, but simply to 
examine the way that it was utilised in the creation of community identities, 
particularly in the case of the Maronite community. In this latter respect, the 
works of Henri Lammens were, and have remained, significant however 
strongly they may now be criticised by scholars interested in providing an 
accurate account of Lebanese history. It is Henri Lammens, for instance, that 
was used in the 1940s and 1950s to provide a quasi-intellectual justification for 
the central myth of Maronite community origin, that of a Phoenician origin. 
This in turn was used to justify Maronite claims for primacy within the
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Lebanese state and the popular perspective that the Maronite community was 
Lebanon.
For the period of the Mandate, and for the 1940s and 1950s, some use 
has been made of British, French and American official archives. In the case 
of the American archives, this has been on the basis of the copies of the 
Department of State archives held at the Centre for Lebanese Studies at 
Oxford University. These archives were not fully organised when used by me. 
While some boxes had references, other useful documents existed simply as 
unclassified, loose documents.56 Consequently, some references to the 
Department of State Archives held at the Centre for Lebanese Studies have 
box references, and some do not. Use has also been made of the properly 
referenced, recently-published collections of key documents for the Middle 
East between 1955 and 1960. In the case of the British archives, research into 
the Foreign Office papers was undertaken at the Public Records Office, Kew, 
with a concentration on the comments provided by observers of the crisis at 
the British Embassy in Beirut. In the case of the French archives, some 
research was undertaken at the Guai d’Orsay archives in France; again with a 
concentration on reports from the French Embassy for the 1957 and 1958 
period. While the French archives are illuminating for the earlier period, more 
reference in this thesis is made to the British and American sources. Partly 
this is because of their easier accessibility on a regular basis; but also because 
the archives of the Quai d’Orsay are still closed for the sensitive 1958 period, 
except for the Documents Diplomatiaues. the volumes of selected papers, 
which I have utilised. This restriction is less serious because during the 1950s, 
France was less of a key player than the USA or even Britain. In any case, 
such sources can only give an onlooker’s perspective on developments of inter 
and intra-community tensions. Consequently, they have not provided the main 
focus of research for this thesis since their main value is related to the insight 
they give into the decision-making of the powers. This is not the main concern 
of the thesis.
56 I have been informed that a proper classification is now being undertaken of some items at least, but too late for the 
purposes of this thesis.
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Instead, the most intensively used type of source material used in this 
thesis is that provided by the archives of the Lebanese press. While official 
archive material, and material from sources such as private papers, have been 
used to support perspectives provided by the press, the need to illuminate the 
popular levels within the communities has meant that the press has been the 
most useful source. Relatively speaking, the Lebanese press in the 1950s was 
a free press. When press censorship was introduced, as during part of the 
1958 crisis when it was applied to the opposition press, it was seen as unusual 
and unjustified and was short-lived and indeed, not particularly effective.57 
Consequently the Lebanese press can be said to have reflected people’s 
ideas without these necessarily being subject to the filtering of direct 
censorship. In addition, the Lebanese press was prolific, with a wide range of 
daily newspapers and weekly and monthly periodicals. Most of these were 
targeted at specific audiences, in terms of their community allegiances and 
consequent political perspectives, but also in terms of their social position 
within the community. Such newspapers and periodicals carried ‘relevant’ 
information for its target audience in terms of political and socio-economic 
facts. The dissemination of the press and the information it carried was most 
significant amongst the Maronite community (and other Christian communities) 
in the 1950s. This was because literacy levels within that community were 
higher. However, at least basic levels of literacy, enabling reading aloud, had 
spread significantly amongst the Sunni community (and other Muslim 
communities) by that time, ensuring that newspapers had an important role to 
play in this community also.58 The press has played an important part in 
political life in Lebanon in the twentieth century. According to one survey 
undertaken within a decade of 1958, 74% of the population over 16 read a 
newspaper; with Beirut providing the highest levels of readership: 56% of 
readers in Lebanon being Beirut-based at that point.59 While obviously 
allowance must be made for an upward trend in such figures, it seems likely, 
given the numbers of titles aimed at all shades of opinion within Lebanon, that 
the figures for the 1950s were not significantly lower. Amongst the Maronite
57 Salim Nassar, Oral Interview, London, 20  May 1995.
58 For comments on the importance of newspapers to communities with only a basic literacy see David Vincent, 
Literacy and Popular Culture. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, pp. 230; 241-58; 175-6.
9 Bernard Voyenne, La Presse dans ia Societe Contemporaine. Armand Colin, Paris, 1969, p. 194.
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community, the wide variety of newspapers and periodicals provides a useful 
indication of how widely political views within that community diverged: 
enabling the cliche of a united Maronite community to be critically reassessed 
and showing that in 1958, for instance, intra-communal unity was only likely to 
last for short periods and be manufactured out of fear of a common threat or 
enemy such as seemed to be provided by Nasserist-inspired Arab intervention 
in Lebanon and the negative reaction of the UNOGIL report on their plight’.
Thus another aspect of the usefulness of the Lebanese press is that it 
permits an insight into the opinions and ideas of various factions and 
communities, and their modifications over time, and thereby, the arguments 
used to justify and explain such modifications. There is a debate over the 
extent to which in any society the press creates opinion or simply reports or 
mirrors opinion already in existence.60 Certainly individual newspapers and 
newspaper editors have (and do) claim either to create or to mould the opinion 
of their readership.61 However, such an expectation of the readiness of the 
readership to be guided indicates a passivity on key issues that certainly does 
not seem to have existed at any point in Lebanon, where the tensions of 
competing community agendas and other aspects of co-habitation have 
ensured a very conscious sense of identity. According to Anis Moussallem, 
the stance taken by individual newspapers and periodicals within the Lebanese 
press is the result of popular opinion within the communities. The existence of 
such clearly defined positions, and their resulting political opinions, meant 
that a newspaper wishing to be purchased on a regular basis had to reflect the 
perspective of a particular community, or part of a community, to ensure its 
survival. The Lebanese press ‘is the voice of all the political factions, as well 
as read by these factions, their leaders and the government to the extent that it 
diminishes the role of parliament as the representative voice of public opinion, 
as well as being a link between the government and the citizen’.62 Or, in the 
words of Bernard Voyenne,
60 See Bernard Voyenne, La Presse. p. 194; Stephen Koss, The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain.. 2 vols, 
Hamilton, London, 1984.
61 See, for instance, the claims of editors of nineteenth century British newspapers such as The Tim es, as discussed 
in Stephen Koss, The Rise and Fall of the Political Press. Vol. 1.
62 Anis Moussallem, La Presse Libanaise. pp. 20-22; Salim Nassar, Oral Interview, London, 20 May 1995.
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‘Qu’elle parle ou qu’elle se taise, la presse Libanaise 
reflate dans la societe Libanaise les echos des 
evenements selon les convictions et les interAets de 
chaque journal, ou au contraire, leur interdit cette 
consecration, elle authentifie ou elle etouffe’.63
Certainly American observers at the time believed that the Lebanese press 
provided a useful insight into popular opinion because it was largely 
uncensored:
‘Embassy believes press generally reflects public 
reaction accurately. Newspaper comments perhaps 
more important as mirrors than as influence on opinion 
....Press mirrors official opinion only somewhat murkily’.64
So the press in Lebanon provided a channel through which pressure 
groups of a religious and ethnic nature placed their opinions in the public 
domain and sought, thereby, to increase popular levels of support for this 
perspective and in turn to bring pressure on the government to respond to 
their agenda.65 Within the Maronite community, the Maronite Church was one 
powerful pressure group that made use of the press in this way; others 
included the populist Kata’ib party. This factor is underlined by the fact that the 
most important section of any particular newspaper was the editorial section, 
which provided a comment on the information contained elsewhere in the 
newspaper appropriate to the attitudes of the readership.66 The most 
important newspaper sources for this thesis on a regular basis have been 
those identified by Anis Moussallem as reflecting significant or influential 
bodies of opinion within Lebanon: Al Havat. An Nahar. L’Orient. and Le Jour.67 
All of these have been researched for the 1950s, with particular attention being 
paid to the years 1957 and 1958; but when these titles were in existence, they 
have also been consulted for earlier periods in the twentieth century history of 
Lebanon. The comments in these papers on their rivals, and comment 
gleaned from corroborative sources like British, French and American official 
archives as well as private papers and oral interviews, underline the
63 Bernard Voyenne, La Presse. p. 191.
64 Foreign Relations of the US. 1958-1960. Vol. XI, Lebanon & Jordan, Department of State Publication 9932, 
Washington DC, 1992, pp. 196-7, reporting American Embassy, Beirut to Department of State, 13 January 1957.
65 Anis Moussallem, La Presse Libanaise. pp. 20-21.
66 jbid, p. 73.
67 ibjd, p. 92.
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contemporary stress laid on the editorials of Kamal Mroueh (Al Havat) and 
Ghassan Tueni (An NaharT68 These two newspapers have therefore been 
quoted from most heavily in the chapters on the evolution and course of the 
1958 crisis. Other newspapers have also been examined where these were 
accessible to me. The civil war and its aftermath prevented sustained 
examination of titles such as Beirut Al Massa. Beirut, or Al Sivassa. For titles 
such as these, only a more limited study could be undertaken for copies of 
these titles that existed either outside Beirut or in the library at the American 
University of Beirut (AUB). However, the crisis years of 1957 and 1958 were 
fairly well represented for these titles.
In terms of the quality of information provided, An Nahar undoubtedly 
has proved the most useful single source. It sought to provide its readership 
with ‘authentic’ information on the affairs of the government, reporting the 
speeches of ministers and deputies of all shades of political opinion and 
community allegiance. It also sought to report, where possible, on the ‘secret’ 
affairs of government. Ghassan Tueni was a highly respected figure and thus 
had access to types of information not necessarily readily available to other 
newspapermen because he and An Nahar took what he described as a 
‘neutral’ stance, particularly in terms of foreign policy. In the spirit of the 
National Pact, the compromise that was supposed to govern the political life of 
Lebanon, Tueni and An Nahar sought to maintain a stance that was identifiably 
neither pro- nor anti-Western, and neither for nor against an Arab world context 
for Lebanon . In practice what this meant was that while aimed primarily at an 
opposition Christian readership, it was not too overtly hostile to the government 
of the time but at the same time, it contained ideas and opinions likely to 
appeal to various elements of the opposition to the government. In addition, 
the appearance of a stance of neutrality was endorsed by the fact that, 
because of the quality of information contained in the newspaper, it was quite 
widely read outside its target readership, even by members of the Sunni 
political and commercial elites.69 Al Havat was in the 1950s, the newspaper
60 Salim Nassar, Oral Interview, London, 20 May 1995. In 1958, Nassar was working for Al Savvad. a weekly 
periodical with pro-Egyptian leanings; currently he is working for Al Havat.
9 It is worth noting, here, that Anis Moussallem’s survey of the Lebanese press endorses my own conclusions based 
on research into the Lebanese press in the 1950s. See Anis Moussallem, La Presse Libanaise. p. 202.
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most widely read in the Arab world; in other words while Lebanese-based it 
had a non-Lebanese readership as well and this was reflected in its attitude, 
particularly on foreign policy. This wider dimension ensured that it was a 
particularly useful source for gleaning information on foreign policy matters, 
including the extent to which Nasser’s speeches and actions were reported 
within Lebanon. In terms of foreign policy, however, it maintained a pro- 
Western stance and advocated right-wing ideas and policies, accounting for its 
opposition to Nasser and his agenda for the Arab world.70
In addition to these sources, a Muslim opposition newspaper with a 
consciously sectarian stance has been a major source, if less often directly 
quoted because of certain difficulties of access to a complete run for the 
1950s.71 The Beirut-based Beirut Al Massa played an important role from 
1957 in mobilising Sunni opinion (and also had an effect on the other Muslim 
communities) It sought to identify Sunni grievances and suggest remedies for 
them, remedies which often clearly derived from the Nasserist agenda for 
Egypt and eventually, the United Arab Republic after its setting up in February 
1958. It also encouraged its predominantly populist Sunni readership to 
express a more vocal resentment of their position, demanding their ‘rights’, and 
supported the move to direct action by Muslims on the streets in the course of 
1958.72 Other newspapers and periodicals have been consulted on a more 
intermittent basis, partly because of difficulties of access and partly because of 
their lesser significance in reporting the events of the 1950s as a whole, 
though they can provide useful insights into particular episodes and community 
perspectives. Notably these include Al Amal. the newspaper outlet for the 
activist Maronite grouping, the Kata’ib party. The majority readership of this 
newspaper were Kata’ib party members, and it is notable that as the 
membership of the Kata’ib party increased as the 1958 crisis escalated, so
70 Al Havat maintained this stance and this wide readership until the assassination of its founder and editor, Kamel 
Mroueh, in 1967. See also Anis Moussallem, La Presse Libanaise. p. 210 for her comments, which again support my 
own investigations. In my research into Al Havat. I have benefited from being allowed to use the Al Havat archives in 
London and to discuss the past history of the newspaper with its present staff and ownership.
71 it is only over the last two and a half years that travel between (Christian) East and (Muslim) W est Beirut has been 
practical or safe. Even now, however, the war damage to Beirut has ensured that where archives have survived they 
have moved and their new locations are not always easy to identify. In addition, there are no accurate maps of Beirut 
as it is now, and drivers are unfamiliar with the layout of the city outside their own confessional localities.
72 The Beirut Al Massa ceased publication in 1960. As before, my own research and opinion on the value of this 
source are endorsed by the conclusions of Anis Moussallem, La Presse Libanaise. p. 85.
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also did the readership of Al Amal according to its own circulation figures.73 A[ 
Bina reflected the perspective of the Parti Populaire Syrien, a political grouping 
with a complex stance in 1958, as will be discussed in Chapters Four, Five and 
Six. Nida’ Al Watan acted as the unofficial channel through which the Maronite 
Church, at least at elite levels, put across its views. In particular in 1957 and 
1958, it reflected the views of the Patriarch, Boulos Meouchi. This is 
significant, because at this time, the ordinary clergy were distancing 
themselves from the stance taken by the Patriarch, and expressing their views 
more regularly through newspapers such as Al Havat and Al Amal: thus an 
examination of these sources at times when the Patriarch was actively 
involving himself in the evolution of the 1958 crisis reveals the opinion of other 
levels of the Church hierarchy and the ways in which the ordinary clergy 
sought to identify itself with the congregations.74 Two of the newspapers 
consulted were French-language newspapers, and consequently, their 
readership was essentially Maronite, certainly Christian, and also bourgeois: 
they were little read by the less-educated Maronite masses. As a balance to 
this, a pro-Egyptian opposition newspaper with a predominantly Sunni 
readership, Al Sivassa. was also consulted.75
While the major focus of the thesis is on the Maronite community and its 
role in 1958, this requires also a survey of Lebanese history and of the 
attitudes and role of other communities, notably the Druze in the historical 
context and the Sunni in the contemporary one, in order to demonstrate the 
extent to which the Maronite community evolved its identity and its agendas in 
direct relation to events and ideas involving these other communities. The 
other communities in Lebanon, notably the Greek Orthodox and Shi’a 
communities, had roles to play in 1958 as in previous episodes of 
intercommunal crisis. However, the principal protagonists in the history of 
intercommunity co-habitation in Lebanon have been the Maronites and the 
Druze, and in the context of 1958, the Maronites and the Sunni.
73 This information has been given via information from Amine Gemayel. See also Anis Moussallem, La Presse 
Libanaise. p. 87.
*4 See also Anis Moussallem, La Presse Libanaise. p. 84 for some further comment on this newspaper and its 
orientation.
See also Ibid. p. 101.
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Chapter One focuses on the development of mythologies that 
contributed to a sense of distinct community identity amongst the Maronites by 
the end of the nineteenth century: a sense based on an interpretation of their 
history which involved distinguishing the Maronites from the Druze community 
in particular. This does include some discussion of the mythological 
Phoenician roots of the Maronite community, but the concentration is on the 
Ottoman period. Consequently this chapter concentrates on Mount Lebanon, 
the geographical area identified by both Maronites and Druze as their 
heartland, and the location in which, historically, a distinctive sense of 
territorially-linked community identity emerged, first amongst the Maronites 
and subsequently amongst the Druze. No attempt to give a narrative account 
of events is undertaken. Instead, certain episodes in the history of co­
habitation in Mount Lebanon between the Maronite and Druze communities 
that were of key importance in the evolution of mythologies are highlighted; 
notably those which highlighted the competition between the communities for 
power, both political and economic. The argument is that such episodes 
enabled the development of a sense of difference, at least from the Maronite 
perspective, that was based on concrete examples and events, and not just on 
more intangible emotions and claims, such as that of a Phoenician heritage for 
the Maronite community, in addition, it was episodes such as that of the 
Imarah which fuelled the process whereby the Maronites were able to identify 
for themselves a sense of the boundaries of ‘Lebanon’. A series of 
confrontations, escalating to crisis point, between the Maronite and Druze 
communities was the background also to the evolution of a distinctively 
Maronite interpretation of the history of ‘Lebanon’, providing the basis for 
claims that Maronite community identity was a ‘national’ feeling.
Chapter Two examines another contribution to the development of 
community identity; that made by external powers; or rather by the willingness 
of external powers to let themselves be drawn by the communities, particularly 
the Maronite community, into the intercommunal confrontations and crises via 
patron-client relationships that identified particular powers or groups of powers 
with particular communities, but did so, at least from the European perspective, 
on the basis of reaction to community mythologies. Thus external agency in a
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variety of crises had a significant impact on the development of distinct 
community identity because of the contribution it made to strengthening 
patterns of co-habitation because of external endorsement of aspects of 
community mythology. External involvement undermined the necessity for a 
move away from co-habitation towards compromise and consensus. It was the 
Maronite community that, for a variety of reasons including the role of the 
Maronite Church in the community, instituted the pattern of involving outside 
intervention at times of crisis and also defined the nature of that intervention 
from the perspective of the Maronite community. The Maronite Church’s links 
with the Roman Catholic Church ensured that the outside intervention in their 
interest was both Christian and European. However, the Druze community, in 
the nineteenth century, imitated the pattern of seeking external (European) 
support in intercommunal crises. For most of the key periods in Lebanon’s 
history it was the Ottoman empire that was the most powerful agency in 
regulating affairs in Lebanon. However, the collapse of the Ottoman empire in 
the twentieth century ensured that a new phase in Lebanon’s history would 
develop. In this, the Maronite community played a key role in ensuring that 
Europe, and notably France, remained a key player in Lebanon’s affairs.
Chapter Three will deal with the next phase in Lebanon’s history, that of 
the French mandate over Lebanon. Established as a discrete entity, partly as 
a result of pressure from the Maronite community, it comprised a wider territory 
than the Mount Lebanon heartland. In terms of intercommunal relations, the 
major consequence of this expansion was to place the emphasis on Maronite- 
Sunni relations, rather than the historical Maronite-Druze relationship. By the 
early twentieth century, emigration of Maronites from Mount Lebanon had 
ensured a sizeable Maronite population in urban centres such as Beirut, where 
they had become major participants in commercial activity, with the Maronites 
(and other Christian communities) having an advantage over the Sunni in 
taking the best advantage of trade with Europe. These migrant Maronites, 
both in and outside Lebanon, took with them their community mythology as the 
basis on which they could maintain a separate identity from other communities 
in Lebanon. From the setting up of the Mandate, the major competitor with the 
Maronites, in co-habitational terms, was the Sunni community. Against the
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background of the collapse of the Ottoman empire and the setting up of the 
mandated Lebanese state, a Sunni community identity emerged. But it was 
one that was not confined, locationally, to Lebanon. Indeed opposition to the 
creation of Lebanon was one distinguishing element in the Sunni community 
identity, since that community linked its dreams of fulfilment of its community 
agenda to the setting up of a larger, and distinctively Arab and/or Islamic state, 
something that acquired its own mythological status. Such divergent 
perspectives on Lebanon made it difficult for these two communities to move 
beyond co-habitation. However a growing mutual hostility to the French 
administration of the Mandate, at least at elite levels, enabled a collaboration 
based on expediency to emerge at a time of crisis, instead of confrontational 
behaviour. Both communities believed they could move away from habits of 
dependency on outside interventions to solve the problems between the 
communities. This belief in the possibility of present and future co-operation 
was shared by all the communities in Lebanon. In its political aspect, this 
collaboration, termed the National Pact, enabled a move to a fully independent 
Lebanon with a wide base of support - but with the removal of France as a 
direct factor, the temporary nature of that expediency began to become 
apparent, and there was a return to the patterns of co-habitation, confrontation 
and crisis.
Chapter Four will examine the breakdown of collaboration, or 
consensus, within the administration of Lebanon, culminating in the crisis of 
1958, and locating that crisis within the patterns of intercommunal 
confrontation already identified. The basis of the collaboration was the National 
Pact, and the interpretation of that pact and its scope acquired its own 
mythological dimension, according to the divergent agendas of the different 
communities at times of crisis. During the period up to 1958, an administrative 
system theoretically intended to overcome permanently intercommunal 
confrontation was demonstrated to have significant weaknesses. This was 
particularly so in the area of Lebanon’s foreign policy, as orientation of that 
foreign policy was increasingly linked with the agendas of the different 
communities by the leaderships of those communities. Such a development 
had not been really recognised within the National Pact, as it was linked to the
development, unforeseen in 1943, of anti-Western feeling in the Arab world, 
and to the Cold War. Thus there was no mechanism within the National Pact 
to organise compromise, and, even at elite levels in Lebanon, there was a lack 
of will to seek consensus in this area without invoking outside agency to 
strengthen the case of the competing sides. The coincidence of an 
international crisis in the Middle East with an essentially internal Lebanese 
crisis caused by an ambitious Maronite politician escalated the tension within 
Lebanon to levels of crisis that apparently threatened the very existence of the 
Lebanese state. Certainly it revealed the flawed nature of the consensus 
encapsulated in the National Pact, though ultimately a restoration of its 
provisions was arranged partly (as in the past) as a result of external 
intervention to defuse that crisis and apparently restore equilibrium to the state. 
But the 1950s atmosphere of growing intercommunal confrontation and the 
eventual crisis of 1958 affected more than just the elite levels, those directly 
involved in managing the Lebanese state. The reasons why these Maronite 
and Sunni elites were not able, or willing, to prevent the escalation of the crisis 
in 1958 were linked not so much to external factors as to pressures from within 
their communities, and an understanding of the 1958 crisis must therefore go 
beyond consideration of the high politics of the period. In this context, then, 
the popular interpretation of the past was a major factor in the maintenance of 
separate community identities.
Chapter Five will focus on the attitudes and agenda, and consequent 
role in the 1958 crisis, of the Sunni masses in Lebanon. It cannot be assumed, 
despite the claims of the Sunni leadership, that the opinions and beliefs of the 
masses were the same as those of the community’s elite. These masses had 
not been consulted over the terms of the National Pact and its broader 
implications in terms of its impact on the socio-economic profile of the 
community and a resultant willingness to develop a relationship with the 
Maronite community in particular that was based on consensus. In practice, it 
was increasingly to be the patterns of co-habitation that seemed most 
attractive, for if they had come to accept the existence of a separate Lebanese 
entity they were increasingly unhappy with the way it operated and the way it 
conflicted with the mythology associated with their own sense of community
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identity and destiny, with consequent implications for their socio-economic as 
well as political role in Lebanon. For instance, there was a consciousness 
amongst the Sunni masses of a differential between the socio-economic 
benefits experienced by them, when compared with the Maronite masses; and 
a consequent resentment not just of the Maronites but also of their own 
leaders for endorsing the status quo. In this context, the rise of Nasser was to 
have a crucial impact. Lacking a charismatic popular Sunni (or other Muslim) 
leader within Lebanon itself, Nasser provided an ideal model. The agenda he 
promised for Egypt, and later the United Arab Republic, seemed to sum up 
what the ordinary Lebanese Sunni wanted for themselves in Lebanon. Thus 
without necessarily wishing to see Lebanon absorbed into the United Arab 
Republic, significant numbers of ordinary Sunnis were willing to use Nasser as 
a hero in a quasi-mythical sense, as part of a strategy to try to persuade their 
own leaders to develop an agenda more in the interests of the ordinary Sunni 
in Lebanon, setting the ground for a competition with the Maronite community. 
As the Chamoun government, from the mid-1950s, began to take a foreign 
policy stance that was, in the eyes of these ordinary Sunni, hostile to Nasser 
and having the aim of detaching Lebanon from the Arab world, the need to 
persuade their leadership to distance itself from the current political status quo, 
seen as being based on an intercommunal consensus that gave the advantage 
to the Maronites, became more acute. The masses expressed this through 
their increasing willingness to safeguard the Arab nature of Lebanon by taking 
direct action, encouraged by the willingness of Nasser to support their 
behaviour even to the extent of providing arms and funds - the so-called Arab 
intervention. As the crisis escalated in 1958, the masses and the leadership 
did draw closer together - but out of expediency to oppose the policy of the 
Chamoun government and to counteract the effects of Maronite behaviour at 
this point. The leadership was, ultimately, to acquiesce in the American- 
brokered solution: for the masses, this settlement was a less attractive 
proposition as it offered no more, really, than a return to the status quo ante 
1958. In this sense, there are interesting parallels and contrasts with the 
Maronite community and their attitude towards intercommunal consensus at 
popular levels.
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Chapter Six explores the attitudes and agenda, and consequent role in 
the 1958 crisis, of the Maronite community, but focusing on the masses. As 
with the Sunni community, it cannot be assumed that there was an automatic 
coincidence between the opinions and beliefs of the masses and those of the 
leadership; and there was the extra complication of intra-communal tensions in 
relation to Chamoun’s personal political agenda. There was a popular belief in 
the ‘right’ of the Maronite community to primacy in setting the political agenda 
of Lebanon, conferred by their ‘history’ or rather, mythology. But the invocation 
of this agenda was linked to a sense of insecurity. Fundamentally, the fact 
that, historically, the Maronites had been a minority community, even if they 
were now theoretically presumed to be part of a Christian majority in 
independent Lebanon, helped perpetuate a popular willingness to see external 
support for a Maronite agenda as an essential factor in achieving that agenda. 
The desire of the Sunni community to see Lebanon move away from links with 
Europe, and the Western world as a whole, towards a closer relationship with 
the Arab world was thus interpreted as a threat to the community and 
consequently to Lebanese independence. The popular Maronite reaction can 
be summed up as a return to patterns of co-habitation because intercommunal 
consensus now became linked with a threat to Maronite security because of 
the perceived threat to a discrete Maronite identity. As the political rhetoric 
surrounding developments in 1957 and 1958 grew more alarmist, the Maronite 
community began to see itself as under threat by the Sunni community and, 
with the Sunni and other Muslim communities apparently willing to take direct 
action in support of their goals, to answer this threat by direct action of their 
own. In an interesting parallel with 1943, it was only the direct intervention of 
American troops that was able to persuade sufficient elements in the Maronite 
community to return to a position where consensus was again possible, and 
assurances of Lebanese independence and of Maronite security within 
Lebanon could be accepted.
Such an approach will enable the pivotal role in the 1958 crisis of the 
Maronite community and its persistent mythologies at all levels; emphasising 
thereby the internal dimensions to the crisis.
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Chapter 1
Community Relations in Lebanese History - 
The Long-term Internal Perspective
This chapter examines the process of creation of mythological traditions 
by the Maronite community in particular over a sustained period, rather than 
providing a narrative account of the evolution of the communities, because ‘the 
historical consciousness expressed in a body of tradition’ links not just to the 
concerns of the time in which they were first recorded, but also to the concerns 
of the successive periods in which they were repeated, elaborated and re­
interpreted.76 Raphael Samuel and Paul Thompson have argued that ‘powerful 
myths influence what people think and do’, and it is the purpose of this chapter 
to illuminate that the long period over which mythologies relating to community 
identity gave such mythologies considerable power within the modern 
Lebanese context. At one level, such mythologies were part of a tradition 
passed on to ‘children and kin, their neighbours, workmates and colleagues as 
part of the personal stories which are the currency of such relationships’. At 
another level, such personal stories acquired a broader cultural and social 
context that affected popular understanding of institutions including the 
Lebanese state itself.77 The impact on other communities such as the Druze 
and Sunni ones of the powerful Maronite mythology prompted the creation, in 
reaction, of mythologies interpreting the past in ways that sustained their 
community agenda against the pressure of the Maronite agenda. Such 
reactive processes were particularly noticeable at times of crisis, when the 
Maronites were also particularly concerned to publicise their mythology. Thus 
the roots of many of the political perspectives of the 1958 crisis can be linked 
to different communal myths.
76 Jan Vansina, Oral Tradition as History. James Currey, London, 1985, p. 120. In terms of the contents of this 
chapter acting as an acceptable scholarly narrative of this period, it is realised that much of the interpretation relates 
more to 'the community’s present-day self-image put into time perspective’ than a dispassionate account of the history 
of the region. But it is precisely this contemporary perspective on the past that is crucial to this thesis. John Tosh, 
The Pursuit of History. Longman, London, 1984, p. 224.
7 Raphael Samuel & Paul Thompson, The Myths W e Live Bv. Routledge, London, 1990, pp. 14-15; 25.
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One of the most significant elements in the Maronite mythology is the 
attempt to identify a ’genesis' myth which distances them from the other 
Lebanese communities. According to Vansina, ‘Every community in the world 
has a representation of ...the appearance of their own particular society and 
community’.78 But the Maronite community has sought to create a mythology 
in relation to their origin which specifically confers on them a different racial 
and cultural orientation to that of the other communities in Lebanon, and one 
which establishes the primacy of their position in the region. The Maronite 
community seeks to relate itself to a Phoenician or Aramaic ethnic identity, 
claiming the right to an essentially Western cultural identity for Lebanon. By 
contrast, the Muslim communities in Lebanon relate to an Arab ethnic identity, 
and its associated genesis, stressing the Arab cultural dimension of Lebanon. 
This, as Selim Abou points out, makes for a ‘soul-searching’ difference in 
perspective.79 The positions taken by the Maronites and the Muslim 
communities in the period up to, and including, the 1958 crisis bear out this 
The Lebanese participants in the crisis, particularly the Maronites, used 
incidents from the past and their interpretation of the meanings of these 
incidents to justify their different agendas in ways that went beyond rhetoric. In 
1958, the sense of identity of the Maronite community in particular can be 
shown to have depended on establishing the veracity of the Maronite version 
of Lebanon’s history and the role of the Maronite community in that history. So 
while short term factors were of great importance in the causation of the 1958 
crisis, an understanding of the Maronite agenda in particular requires an 
assessment of the longer term historical dimensions. Mythology thus played a 
crucial role in the political behaviour of the communities during, the 1958 
crisis.80
The incidents of importance to this mythological dimension relate 
primarily to the pre-Mandate history of Lebanon. For that period of history, the 
major players in the various clashes were the Maronites and the Druze. This 
chapter, therefore, will concentrate on Maronite-Druze relations and the
70 Jan Vansina, Oral Tradition as History, pp. 21 -22.
79 Selim Abou, L’ldentite Culturelle. Relations Interethniaues et Problemes d'Acculturation. Editions Anthropos, Paris, 
1981, p. 42.
80 J.E. McGratto, Social and Psychological Factors in Stress. Rinehart & Winston, New York, 1970, Chapters 
9;10;11;14; N.J. Demereth 111 & Richard A. Peterson, System. Change and Conflict. The Tree Press, New York, 1976.
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evolution of a distinct Maronite, and Druze, community identity in that context, 
as each community defined itself as much in terms of difference from the other 
as in terms of an internal agenda, using myth as a major tool in that process. 
The main geographical focus of this chapter, then, becomes Mount Lebanon 
rather than the area of modern Lebanon as a whole, since this is the area 
consistently evoked as the birthplace of Maronite identity. Because of the 
inaccessible nature of the terrain there, it is generally accepted that the 
population of Mount Lebanon has retained a population that, at least in part, 
can justifiably claim an ancient pedigree. The crucial debate is over how 
ancient a pedigree can be claimed for the Maronite community, since that 
community is undoubtedly the oldest of the Lebanese communities. In this 
context, the actual geography of Lebanon has played a part in the evolution of 
a Maronite mythology, as many modern general histories indicate through the 
space they devote to a discussion of this factor in their discussions on 
Lebanon’s history. Stress in such works is laid on the mountainous nature of 
the territory and its rugged nature which has, it is claimed, favoured the 
evolution of communities with distinct, self-sufficient identities insulated from 
contact with the outside world. This has supposedly enabled the Maronites 
(and the Druze) to keep their special characteristics.81
From at least the nineteenth century Maronite mythology has sustained 
a popular belief that the community had evolved directly from the Phoenicians, 
who had moved inland after the collapse of ‘Phoenicia’ or ‘Ancient Lebanon’. 
This myth undoubtedly had its origins in the increasing Maronite desire to 
distinguish themselves from an Arab as well as a Muslim heritage. The most 
effective way to do this was by claiming one for themselves that pre-dated any 
meaningful Arab or Islamic heritage in the area. The work of nineteenth 
century Western archaeologists and scholars gave the concept of a 
Phoenician heritage some substance, providing evidence of Phoenician 
remains in the area, and enabling nineteenth century Maronite historians like
81 See, for example, K.S. Salibi, A House of Many Mansions. The History of Lebanon Reconsidered. LB. Tauris, 
London, 198B, p. 58; Engin Akarli, The Long Peace. Ottoman Lebanon 1861-1920. University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 1993, p. 6; Antoine Nasri Messara, Theorie Generale due Svsteme Politique Libanais. Cariscript, Paris, 
1994; Phillippe Hitti. Lebanon in History. From the Earliest Times to the Present. Macmillan, London, 1957.
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Henri Lammens to produce scholarly works based on this idea.82 It remains a 
factor that modern Maronite historians have had to take into account, in his 
book, A House of Many Mansions. Salibi shows that in antiquity, the 
Phoenicians, a maritime race, developed a city-state system along part of the 
seaboard between modern Lataquia and Acre.83 In other words the 
Phoenician settlement was indeed established in some of the areas which 
today form part of Lebanon. It is, of course, important here to stress that there 
is no academically credible evidence that the Phoenician city-state system 
ever coalesced into ‘Phoenicia’, a single entity, let alone one that could be 
identified with Lebanon. If anything the evidence seems to indicate the 
separateness of these city states.84 In assessing the Phoenician period, then, 
as Salibi indicates, there is no evidence that a sense of unity ever existed in 
this first period which could have been maintained over a long historical 
descent by the Maronite community. It is thus difficult to suggest with any 
academic veracity that some kind of proto-Lebanon existed, despite the 
existence of a popular Maronite mythology looking to such a Phoenician past.
Yet such scholarship has had little impact on popular Maronite belief in 
the twentieth century, because the claim to a Phoenician heritage remains at 
the core of Maronite perceptions of their difference from other communities in 
Lebanon. This rests on the belief that the Phoenicians were originators of key 
aspects of Western civilisation, notably the alphabet, subsequently taken over 
by the Greeks.85 Laying claim to this heritage has enabled the Maronites to 
feel they have a claim to having been part of Western civilisation from times of 
classical antiquity, sharing key elements of that civilisation with Western 
Europe.86 The importance of this idea for popular Maronite ideology has 
ensured its continuing mass acceptability that resists re-interpretation in the 
light of the research of men like Salibi. Phillippe Hitti wrote a history of
82 See, for example, Henri Lammens, ‘Inventaire des Richesses Archeologiques du Liban’ Al Machria. Beirut, Vol, 1. 
1898, and also the 1914 edition of this work.
63 K.S. Salibi, A House of Many Mansions, pp. 4; 12.
84 See Dominique Chevallier, La Societe du Mont-Liban a I’Epoaue de la Revolution Industrielle en Europe. Librairie 
Orientaliste, Paul Geuthner, Paris, 1971, p. 21 for instance; K.S. Salibi, House of Many Mansions, p. 27.
85 An important element in Maronite craftwork offered for sale today in Artisanats remains pieces of embroidery 
featuring the letters of the Phoenician alphabet. See also Phillippe Hitti, History of the Arabs: From the Earliest Times 
to the Present. Macmillan Education, Basingstoke, 10th edn, 1970 (1st edn 1937), p. 71.
86 Salibi points out the 'basically polemical nature of Maronite historiography’ as well as the origins of that 
historiography in the W est, among Rome-trained clerics, K.S. Salibi, T h e  Traditional Historiography of the Maronites’ 
in B. Lewis and P. Holt (ed) Historians of the Middle East. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1962, pp. 212-16.
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Lebanon in 1957 that included the Phoenician period. In doing so he refrained 
from specifically stating a belief in the theory of a Phoenician heritage for the 
Maronites. However, his inclusion of the period implied some endorsement of 
such a link.87 The work of Henri Lammens was a particularly important 
articulation of this belief, and his work has been consistently referred to in the 
last half century by Maronites, despite more serious academic revision of his 
thesis.88 By the 1950s it had been incorporated into the Maronite school 
curriculum as ‘history’, and it still remains part of that curriculum.89 A further 
measure of the continuing popular affection for the myth is underlined by the 
recent attention given in the Maronite press to the discovery of the walls and 
other parts of the Phoenician predecessor of Beirut.90 Certainly Maronite 
political figures have consistently evoked this image when claiming for 
Lebanon’s greatness and the Maronite role in that greatness:
‘We are the heirs to a great - indeed unique - cultural 
heritage...Ancient Lebanon sent out her ships not to 
conquer the world, but to disseminate learning and the 
use of the alphabet...’.91
Arguably, the linked Maronite tradition of being, through its history, a minority 
community out of step with official authority in the region and so subject to 
persecution for its beliefs, but determinedly maintaining those beliefs in the 
face of odds. This justification has helped the Maronite community to survive 
as a discrete community.
87 Or at least that he found it politic not to indicate in any way his disagreement. Phillippe Hitti, Lebanon in History. 
From the Earliest Times to the Present. Macmillan, London 1957; see aiso K.S. Salibi, House of Many Mansions, p. 
173.
88 For indications of the implicit use still made by Maronite academics of this issue, other than Phillippe Hitti, see also 
Jawad Boulos, who has argued, for instance, that Mount Lebanon has been densely populated ever since the 
Phoenician period; Jawad Boulos, Tarikh Lubnan [History of Lebanon], Dar An Nahar lil nashr, Beirut, 1972, p. 53; see 
also Henri Seyrig, ‘Statuettes Trouvees dans les Montagnes du Liban', in Dominique Chevallier (ed.) La Societe du 
Mont-Liban a L'Epoaue de la Revolution Industrielle en Europe. Syria, 1953, pp. 5; 39; 47. A measure of the popular 
affection for the myth is underlined by the attention given to the discovery of the Phoenician walls in the centre of 
Beirut. See An Nahar. 5 June 1995. The most famous contemporary Lebanese poet Said Akl, is the symbol of this 
school of thought; and one book of his verse is even titled ‘Phoenicianism’ Boutros Khawand devoted a whole chapter 
to the Phoenicians in his study of the Katai’b party, see Boutros Khawand. Al K'uwat al Nizamiat al Kata’ibiat. [The 
Kata’ib Organised Forces] Habib Eid Publishing, Beirut, 1986.
89 For example, Jean Hayek, Al Tarikh Al llmi. (The Scientific History), Al Jizq al Awal Maktabith Habib, Beirut, 1994, 
aimed at 12 to 13 year olds, traces Lebanon’s history from Phoenician times. Walid Jumblat, current leader of the 
largest Druze faction, made links between the events of 1958 and incidents in more recent Lebanese history, 
especially to the fact that the Maronites have ‘always denied our Arab origin in favour of claiming the Phoenicians as 
their ancestors just to refute this Arab origin', thus underlining the continuing impact of this myth.
90 For instance, see An Nahar. 5 June 1995.
91 Amine Gemayel, Peace and Unitv: Maior Speeches 1982-1984. Colin Smythe, Gerrards Cross, 1984, p. 120.
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The mythology of the Phoenician period gives little in the way of 
individual accounts of past events, relying more on general cultural statements 
such as those related to the alphabet. But the Maronite stress on the past 
does not just relate to this period. Events within the last millennium are also 
important in the creation of Maronite community identity. For instance, 
historiography does indicate the Maronite community was early identifiable, 
due to its distinctive religious profile, as a distinct grouping in the Mount 
Lebanon area. Certainly it was within the Mount Lebanon area that the 
Maronite Church, with its separate theology, originally based on monothelitism, 
evolved in the period after 685, after the Islamic conquest of the region.92 The 
evolution of the Maronite Church certainly gave a coherence that enabled the 
development of community feeling in a religious sense from that period on. As 
Benedict Anderson comments, one of the most important elements in a 
sustained community cultural system is the existence of a distinctive religious 
community. Such communities develop a ‘confidence in the unique 
sacredness of their languages and thus their ideas about admission to 
membership’, so undermining secular impulses towards assimilation with other 
communities with common interests.93 In this context, it is important to stress 
that this Maronite self-identity, especially in the religious dimension, was also 
evolved historically in relation to another minority community out of step with 
official authority in the region and also located in Mount Lebanon, with which 
the Maronites had to co-exist; the Druze community. The distinctive religious 
profiles of both communities acted as an effective barrier to assimilation 
between the two. Essentially the Druze are an Islamic group but (in an 
interesting parallel with the Maronites) not an orthodox sect. The Druze 
movement derived from the Ismaili strand of the Shi’ite element in Islam, 
becoming an identifiable factor in the communal map of Mount Lebanon by the 
end of the eleventh century.94 Like the Maronites, the Druze were conscious
92 Monothelitism, in theological terms, represents ‘an attempt at compromise’ between the doctrinal positions taken by 
the Western (or Roman) Church and the Eastern Church, and groups such as the Nestorians: ‘the Monotheletes...held 
that Christ had two natures but one will’, according to the brief summary provided by Hourani. Albert Hourani, A 
History of the Arab Peoples. Faber & Faber, London, 1991, pp. 8-9.
93 Benedict Anderson. Imagined Communities. Verso, London, 1991, pp. 12-13.
94 It is argued by Salibi that the Druze actually became Druze in a religiously identifiable sense in Mount Lebanon, as 
had the Maronites. S ee K.S. Salibi, House of Many Mansions, p. 12.
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of the special nature of their religion and culture and determined to resist 
efforts either to eradicate or to assimilate the group.95
While never entirely confined within the Mount Lebanon region, certainly 
in the Ottoman period, both these communities identified themselves 
particularly with this location. The result was a degree of co-existence and 
compromise between the two communities, at times breaking down into 
outright hostilities, in a pattern of co-habitation rather than collaboration. Each 
group defined the region, or parts of it, as peculiarly their own, and in some 
areas the mixed Maronite-Druze nature of the population and consequent 
claims to identical territory led to particular tensions, with wider implications for 
Mount Lebanon as a whole. As the rest of this chapter will demonstrate 
through a series of case studies, competition for land, power and privileges 
within the Mount Lebanon region over a prolonged historical period has helped 
to shape not just the self-perception of communal identity for these two groups; 
but also the habits or 'rules' for co-habitation. Such rules evolved in relation to 
the clashes which, over time, highlighted and hardened the traditions of 
‘difference’ between the communities. The history of the region helps to 
illuminate the extent of past co-habitation, and the ways in which it was 
sustained, establishing patterns, in particular for Maronite behaviour in 
invoking mythology relating to their own sense of identity, in modern Lebanon. 
Various theories have evolved that seek to explain how such mixed societies 
do evolve and co-exist, and how they can even form a unified entity that can be 
termed a nation-state with clear elements of internal cohesion and a shared 
sense of tradition in a cultural sense. But equally, it is recognised that such a 
process is not inevitable and that the ‘imagined communities’ that evolve in a 
political state may not be coherent, as in the case of Lebanon.96
95 Karam Rizk, Le Mont Liban au X IXe Siecle de L’Emirat au Mutasarrifiwah. Publication de I’Universite St Esprit, 
Kaslik, Lebanon, 1994, pp. 43-45; Sami Makarem Nasib, The Druze Faith. Caravan Books, New York, 1974,p. 28; 
Robert Brenton Betts, The Druze. Yale University Press, 1988; Toufic Touma, Pavsans et institutions Feodale chez les 
Druze et les Maronites du Liban du 18e Siecle a 1914. publications de I'Universite Libanaise, Beirut, 1971, p. 22.
Charles H. Codey, Social Organisation. Harper & Row, New York, 1962, pp. 23-31; Kenneth P. Laughton, Political 
Socialisation. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1969, pp. 3-20; 140-179; Gabriel Almond & B. Powell, Comparative 
Politics. A Developmental Approach. Little Brown & Co., Boston, 1966, pp. 64-72; Edward Shils, T h e  Prospect of 
Lebanese Civility1, in L. Binder (ed.), 1966; Politics in Lebanon. John Wiley, New York, 1966,p. 966; Kenneth 
Laughton, Political Socialisation. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1969, pp. 3-20; 140-179; Benedict Anderson, 
Imagined Communities, p. 6.
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Until the twentieth century, for most non-Maronite elements inside and 
outside Lebanon, 'Lebanon' has been simply a geographical term (not even 
used for all the area comprising the modern state) for a region that was part of 
a variety of eastern Mediterranean empires. From 685 to 1918, the region 
was under the control of successive Muslim empires, culminating with the 
Ottoman empire, and so subject to a process of attempted Islamicisation.97 But 
Christian communities, including the Maronite, continued to exist throughout 
the period of Islamic rule despite periodic persecutions.98 From 1516 to 1918, 
Ottoman sovereignty over the region was officially unbroken, and this period 
has been of key significance in coalescing the individual communal identity of 
the Maronites, and in settling the basis on which they were prepared to co­
habit, peacefully or not, with other communities, most of which were also well 
entrenched in the region by this time.99 Thus the Maronite community felt a 
need during this period to begin to evolve myths that supported the right to 
existence of their community. Equally, the Ottoman period was the one which 
saw the evolution of many of the prejudices and assumptions of other 
communities about the possibilities and practicalities of co-existence and co­
operation between themselves and other communities. In most cases, such 
assumptions did not, up to 1918, coalesce into any major coherent traditions or 
mythology of self-identity in direct reaction to Maronite beliefs (with the 
exception of the Druze community). But such traditional assumptions about 
the nature of the Maronites were to have an effect on post-1918 non-Maronite 
mythologies. In this sense, the ‘history’ of relations with the Maronites can be 
said to be of importance to most of the region's other communities.100 An 
important cultural fracture was that the Muslim communities, even the Druze, 
were seen, and saw themselves as integral parts of the Ottoman empire. By 
contrast the Christian communities were seen as outsiders and not truly part of
97 With the exception of the period 1098 to 1291 when the coastal and northern areas were part of the Christian 
crusader kingdoms.
98 As a general comment it can even be said that greater tolerance was shown by the Islamic empires for the Christian 
communities in their jurisdictions than the Byzantine empire had usually shown towards religious minorities; that such 
tolerance was usually part of the ruling policy of such Islamic empires. See N.A. Faris & M.T. Husayn, The Crescent 
in Crisis. University of Kansas Press, Lawrence, 1955, p. 108.
99 The majority elements in the intercommunal mix had been settled in the region of modern Lebanon by the end of the 
eleventh century, and included a variety of Christian communities but notably the Greek Orthodox community and also 
the Greek Catholic community; and a sizeable Shi'ite community, settled mainly in parts of the Biqa' valley, as well as 
the Sunni population of the coastal areas of modern Lebanon, especially in the developing towns there.
100 See the comments on this made by Churchill in the nineteenth century. Charles H. Churchill, The Druze & the 
Maronites under Turkish Rule from 1840 to 1860. first published London, 1862, republished Garnet Publications, 
London, 1994.
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the Islamic world, and if tolerated to an extent, there was, equally, an implicit 
pressure on them to conform and to assimilate. But as part of their strategy for 
survival as a discrete entity, the Maronite community continued to insist on 
their 'right' to territory, and to the consequent status this conferred.101 This 
tension between perspectives was a consistent undercurrent no matter how 
out of favour with official authority the Druze might have been at times, or how 
in favour the Maronites may have been.102
Sunnism had become established as the majority system of belief in the 
Ottoman empire by the end of the fifteenth century.103 Both the Maronite and 
the Druze communities of Mount Lebanon were the focus of discrimination 
against them at times by Sunni authority and evolved defence strategies 
invoking mythology relating to community identity.104 In an interesting parallel 
with the Maronite example, Abdul Rahim Abu-Hussein has argued that the 
sense of discrimination experienced by the Druze was a key factor in turning 
this rural community of mountain peasants into a quasi-feudal society by the 
sixteenth century, a society culturally conditioned by and for war with a social 
hierarchy that centred on military service and leaders who were also military 
figures, with consequent implications for the modern self-imagery of the 
community.105 He also argues that this mixed relationship with the Sunni had 
a significant impact on the Druze in that it worked to sustain the quasi-feudal 
system into the modern period, and thus to concentrate power in the hands of 
the Druze chiefs who provided the leadership of the community, and who were 
generally prepared to collaborate with Ottoman authority.100 While such
101 Raphael Samuel & Paul Thompson, The Myths W e Live Bv. pp. 18-19. This points out that such a reaction is 
common for excluded groups, as well as the invocation of ‘collective memory and myth1.
102 The Druze were periodically severely persecuted by Ottoman authority, especially near the beginning of the 
Ottoman period, during the sixteenth century. Yet despite this, even European powers in the region, such as the 
French, saw the Druze as an integral part of the Ottoman empire. See K.S. Salibi, House of Many Mansions. For the 
Ottoman persecution of the Druze see Abdul Rahim Abu Hussein, ‘The Korkmaz Question. A Maronite Historian's 
Plea for Ma'nid Legitimacy', Al A b h ath ., XXXIV , 1986, pp. 7-8; Abdul Rahim Hussein, 'The Ottoman Invasion of the 
Shuf in 1585: A Reconsideration', Al Abhath. XXXIII, pp. 13-21.
103 Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples, p. 221.
104 ibjd, p. 240.
105 Abdul Rahim Abu Hussein, 'Problems in the Ottoman Administration during the 16th and 17th Centuries: the Case  
of the Sanjak of Sidon-Beirut1, International Journal of Middle East Studies. 24, 1992, pp. 666-70; Dominique 
Chevallier, La Societe du Mont-Liban. p. 9; See also Robert Betts, The Druze. Yale University Press, New York, 1988, 
p. 54.
06 Abdul-Rahim Abu Husayn, T h e  Feudal System of Mount Lebanon as Depicted by Nasif Al Yaziji’, in S. Seikaly, R. 
Baalbaki, P. Dodd (eds), Quest for Understanding: Arabic and Islamic Studies in Memory of Malcolm H. Kerr. 
American University of Beirut, Beirut, 1991, pp. 36-40. This study argues that certainly in the period up to the mid 
nineteenth century, the social organisation of the Druze community was more 'tribal' than feudal. K.S. Salibi, however, 
considered the organisation of the Druze as essentially feudal, at least by the end of the nineteenth century. See  
K.S. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon. Caravan Books, New York, 1990, p. xxi. It may be that these two
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claims are notoriously difficult to prove, in a scholarly sense, a belief that this 
was so was part of the Druze communal tradition which continued even after 
the fall of the Ottoman empire in 1918. It was thus of significance in shaping 
Druze participation in communal politics leading up to the crisis of 1958.
The Maronite community had a different social organisation which 
reflected the fact that the Maronite Church, as well as secular elites, provided 
their leadership, it was not a community that used its military skills or 
reputation as a saleable commodity, as the Druze community did, though the 
Maronites had been equally determined to fight if necessary to prevent 
themselves being overrun. The Maronites were certainly not seen as potential 
Ottoman mercenaries in times of need; and did not so see themselves. 
However, during the Ottoman period, they showed a capacity to co-operate 
with local Ottoman authority in essentially non-military ways if this seemed to 
their advantage.107 Maronite social evolution took a different path from that of 
the Druze, therefore, both in the Ottoman period and in more contemporary 
times. For example, in the early part of the Ottoman period the Maronites 
seem to have developed a social system that some Maronite historians have 
claimed paralleled European feudalism. This Maronite ‘feudal’ social system 
was based on a system of land-holding utilising a complex range of taxes and 
requirements for service, with Maronite ‘lords’ passing on the taxes extracted 
from their ‘tenants’ (or proportions of them) to the Ottoman state.108 It was a 
system that certainly lasted into the nineteenth century in rural areas, and 
created a land-owning Maronite elite that remained important into the twentieth 
century because, apart from anything else, that elite provided many political 
leaders.109 While it would not be desirable to take too far the parallels between 
European and Maronite 'feudalisms', it can be said that especially in the 
Kisrawan district, a particularly tight social structure existed, which gave 
considerable power to the landed elite, where a form of labour service was
perspectives can be reconciled by seeing the last half of the nineteenth century as the period of transformation from 
tribal to feudal for the Druze.
107 Abdul Rahim Abu Hussein, ‘The Korkmaz Question1, pp. 3-5; K.S. Salibi, House of Many Mansions.
103 Abdul Rahim Abu Hussein, T h e  Feudal System of Mount Lebanon1, pp. 33; 37-8.
109 Families such as the Shihab, the Edde and the Al Khazin families, for instance, though not the Gemayel or 
Chamoun families.
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owed by the peasantry towards their lords, service which also kept them tied to 
the land.110
The rise of a more urban-based Maronite commercial elite spreading 
outside Mount Lebanon itself eventually provided a challenge to the power of 
traditional land-owning Maronite leaders, especially as the majority of the 
Maronite population was, as the twentieth century progressed, also to be found 
outside Mount Lebanon, taking advantage of the economic opportunities 
offered by the commercial elite. The result was the evolution of a slightly 
modified, nostalgic, Maronite mythology that saw the ‘old’ values as being 
essentially rooted in the peasant society of Mount Lebanon, rather than in the 
land-owning elite of the region. But it was a mythology that still emphasised 
the importance of the territorial roots of the community’s identity.111 These two 
traditions existed alongside each other over a sustained period, but Hourani 
has argued that by the Mandate period, ‘influences radiating from Beirut’ had 
achieved dominance, even within the Mount Lebanon region itself.112 A 
commercial elite did begin to evolve in the sixteenth century as a result of 
trade with Europe, particularly the silk trade, and began to locate itself in urban 
areas, though it was not until the nineteenth century, and in areas largely 
outside Mount Lebanon, that this elite acquired significant influence over the 
Maronite masses.113 However, certainly in the period up to the 1958 crisis, the 
influence of the land-owning elite over the masses remained powerful, if only 
because of the linkage with events seen as contributing to Maronite community 
identity.
Within the period of Ottoman sovereignty it was a general rule in the 
Ottoman empire that Ottoman central authority was administered through local
110 There is some debate over the parallels that can be drawn. Chevallier argues for important distinctions while Harik 
draws clear parallels between Lebanese feudalism in this period and that of the European Middle Ages; see 
Dominique Chevallier, La Societe du Mont-Liban . p. 85; Iliya Harik Politics and Change in a Traditional Society; 
Lebanon 1711-1845. Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1968, pp. 37-38; Abdul Rahim Abu Hussein, Provincial 
Leaderships in Syria. 1575-1650. American University of Beirut, Beirut, 1985, pp. 70-81.
11 Raphael Samuel & Paul Thompson, The Mvths W e Live Bv. pp. 140-41.
112 Quoted in K.S. Salibi, House of Many Mansions, p. 163.
113 Lewis points out that the crusaders had first 'opened the way' to closer commercial relations between the Muslim 
world of the Middle East and the Christian W est, and that these became more regular and sustained from the 
sixteenth century. In the region of Lebanon it was increasingly the Maronites who were to take advantage of this. See 
Bernard Lewis, 'The Use by Muslim Historians on Non-Muslim Sources', in Lewis & Holt (eds) Historians of the Middle 
East, p. 182. S ee also Maurice Shihab, Le Role du Liban dans I'Histoire de la Soie. University of Lebanon Press, 
Beirut, 1968 and Karam Rizk, Le Mont Liban du X IX  Siecle de I'Emirat au Mutassarrifiwah. pp. 198-215, for details of 
the silk trade in Lebanon.
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functionaries. But such general rules tend to disguise a vast range of different 
practices and effects.114 Thus in terms of Ottoman authority over the area of 
modern Lebanon the question needs to be asked to what degree and in what 
ways did that central authority make itself felt and what impact did this have at 
varying periods on the various communities of Mount Lebanon and their 
relationships with each other and with Ottoman authority, both local and 
central. In terms of the experience of the area that was later to form Lebanon, 
the Ottoman state officials with most direct contact and influence over local 
districts and their peoples were the amirs or the governors of sub-provinces or 
sanjaks. The region contained several such units and it was common for the 
amirs to compete amongst themselves for favour and for power from the centre 
- with all the consequent implications for their districts. But local Ottoman 
officials were also likely to find themselves responding, in terms of policy 
implementation and practical government, to forces from below quite as much, 
if not more, than to pressures and instructions from above, a common 
experience in an imperial context.115
An example of this provides the first case study. The imarah has 
traditionally been considered by Lebanese historians as providing a prototype 
for a separate Lebanon, something that could be termed a truly ‘Lebanese’ and 
local administrative entity. Certainly it was referred to as such by the 
Maronites into the 1950s, and was to be used as a justification for the creation 
of an independent Lebanon within its modern boundaries. Recently the work of 
historians like Abdul Rahim Abu Husayn, draining on Ottoman sources, has 
forced a reassessment of what Salibi now refers to as the ‘imagined 
principality’.116 But this does not alter the importance of the traditions 
surrounding the imarah in Maronite mythology, including the belief that it was 
the precursor of the Mutassarifiyyah, and thus of an independent Lebanon.
The Imarah, emerged within the context of Ottoman rule as early as the 
seventeenth century, lasting into the nineteenth century.117 It was an
114 Claude Dubar and Salim Nasr, Les Classes Sociales au Liban. Presse de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences 
Politiques, Paris, 1976, pp. 13-14.
115 See, for instance, Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism. Chatto & Windus, London, 1993, pp. 230-1.
116 K.S. Salibi, House of Many Mansions, p. 117.
117 The term Imarah is used by historians, but was not used by the Ottomans at the time. They referred to it as an 
lltizam, a term used for the farming out of taxes.
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administrative entity that did not have fixed boundaries during that period; the 
territory included in the administrative scope of the Imarah expanded and 
contracted with the different amirs. This fluctuation resulted from the differing 
relations of these amirs with the Ottoman state: amirs on good terms with the 
state were likely to find their administration expanding to cover larger areas 
and vice versa.118 Mount Lebanon was always part of the Imarah, but at its 
widest extent, such as in 1861, the Imarah’s boundaries more or less 
paralleled those of mandate and independent Lebanon. It is a consciousness 
of this that has led members of the Maronite community to invoke the Imarah 
as justification for the shape of modern Lebanon. But the importance of the 
Imarah to the Maronites also relates to what is interpreted by them as its 
‘Lebanese' nature because of their perception of the role and importance that 
the Maronites came to assume within the Imarah; and their belief in the 
consequent pre-eminent status they saw this as conferring on the Maronites in 
comparison to other communities included within its boundaries. The history of 
the Imarah illuminates the developing community consciousness of the 
Maronites and also, of the Druze, though the entity also had an impact on 
other communities in the region, such as the Sunni and the Shi’ite.
The usual interpretation in Maronite historiography has been that the 
Imarah's initial evolution was largely Druze, resulting from the efforts of Fakhr 
Al Din II, amir between 1590 and 1633.119 A considerable amount of 
predominantly Maronite mythology has surrounded Fakhr Al Din; something 
increasingly resented by non-Maronite communities because of what they see 
as the ‘misrepresentation’ of this perspective. From the 1920s, Lebanese 
schoolchildren have been taught through their history texts to regard him as 
the first ruler or amir of ‘Lebanon’ and so the historical founder of the Lebanese 
state.120 For the purposes of this thesis, the scholarly realities are less
118 The favoured amirs were effectively rewarded by being given extra administrative districts removed from less 
successful amirs.
119 Fakhr Al Din died in 1635. See K.S. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon. Caravan Books, New York, 1977, p. 3. 
An alternative interpretation of the origins of the Imarah is provided by Abu Hussein who argues that in fact, the 
historical validity of seeing Fakhr Al Din as the founder of the imarah is dubious, despite the support for this view of 
most modern Lebanese historians. He argues that the Imarah had 'no real existence before 1667, with the coming to 
power of Ahmad Ma'n'. See Abdul Rahim Abu Hussein, 'The Korkmaz Question', pp. 3-4. However, the importance to 
this thesis of popular communal belief justifies the presentation of the established arguments, rather than a 
consideration in depth of such an alternative.
120 Underlining the importance of this, Salibi points out that Walid Jumblat has argued that a rewriting of such texts, to 
eradicate ‘Christian-fabricated myths' would be essentially in any ‘lasting political settlement in Lebanon'. K.S. Salibi, 
House of Many Mansions, pp. 200-202.
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significant, however, than the established mythologies. An indigenous Druze 
chief, Fakhr Al Din was first appointed amir of the sanjak of Sidon-Beirut, which 
included the Druze heartland in Mount Lebanon, and from this base, sought to 
increase his local power.121 At the time of his holding office, in the early 
seventeenth century, the Ottoman empire was going through a period when 
central authority was weak.122 Delegated authority by the Ottoman state to 
control the region, Fakhr Al Din worked to take full advantage of this 
weakness. Another factor was also working to his advantage at this time, that 
of European intervention in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire in this area 
anyway.123 As a result of the European interest in the area, Fakhr Al Din 
seems to have believed that his attempts to carve out more power for himself 
would have European backing against any central Ottoman attempts to bring 
the area back under central control - though this was to prove a miscalculation. 
But the way in which Fakhr Al Din tried to extend his power was by bringing 
about, as an initial step, a positive co-habitational period, based on a degree of 
real co-operation between elements within the Maronite and Druze 
communities, in Mount Lebanon. It can be argued that a genuinely 
collaborative and local administrative system with considerable autonomy 
within the Ottoman empire evolved and worked for much of this period, 
creating an entity that began to make Lebanon more than a mere geographical 
term. This in turn had an effect on Maronite mythology, giving it focus and 
substance.
It has generally been accepted by Lebanese historians that though 
Fakhr Al Din was removed from office by central Ottoman authority in 1633, the 
concept of the Imarah survived.124 It is argued that this was because the
121 A modern view might see Fakhr Al Din as a Syrian strongman given an opportunity by the Ottoman state to subdue 
and destroy local leaderships in Mount Lebanon on their behalf who actually succeeded in achieving a ‘symbiosis’ 
between the Maronites of Kisrawan and the Druze of the Shuf. K.S. Salibi, Ibid. For an older view, see Michel Chebli, 
lin e  Histoire du Liban a L’Eooque des Emirs. Librarie Orientale, Beirut, 1955; Adel Ismail, Histoire du Liban du 17eme 
siecle a nos jours. Le Liban au temps de Fakhr Al Din II (1590-16331. Maisonneuve, Paris, 1959, Vol I, p. 11; Chebli 
argues that THistoire des Shihabs est I’histoire d’une resistance. C'est [’histoire d'une communaute Nationale, faite de 
commun autes confessionelles etablies sur une montagne maritime qui leur sert d’inviolable refuge et unis pour la 
defense et la preservation de leurs libertes spirituelles et temporelles'.
122 On this point, see, for instance, M.S. Anderson, The Eastern Question 1774-1928: A Study in International
Relations. Macmillan, London, 1966.
124 ®ee Chapter 2  f ° r more detailed discussion of the European intervention and perspective on events in this area.
Abdul Rahim Abu Hussein, T h e  Korkmaz Question', pp. 3-4; Engin Akarli, The Long Peace Ottoman Lebanon. 
1861-1920, University of California Press, London, 1993, p. 17; K.S. Salibi, Histoire du Liban du 18eme Siecle a nos 
Jours, pp. 38-114. Fakhr Al Din was 'sent in chains to Istanbul where he was put to death by strangling in 1635', K.S. 
Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon, p. 3.
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Ottoman authorities valued the Imarah for the greater effective control it 
seemed to give over the area and so endorsed its continuation, initially under 
another Druze chief, Ahmad Ma’n. On his death, however, a Sunni Muslim 
dynasty, the Shihabi, was imported from the south-eastern Biqa' region at the 
end of the seventeenth century.125 By this time, it was obvious to successive 
amirs that the Imarah worked on the basis of a continuing overall co-operation 
between leading elements in the Druze and Maronite communities based on a 
degree of resistance to central Ottoman authority.126 It was one thing on which 
leaders in both communities were prepared to agree, even though the Druze 
were undoubtedly the dominant element. The Shihabis, faced with this factor, 
found it practically necessary to endorse this Mount Lebanon 'tradition1 of 
some resistance to central authority to an extent, though they consistently 
attempted to modify this tradition. Thus, despite Ottoman state expectation, the 
Imarah actually did little to make the area more amenable to central control. 
This was even more the case given the factor of continuing European interest 
in the region. This had the effect generally of restraining central Ottoman 
intervention in the area, because of the relative power balance between the 
Ottoman empire and the Christian West in the eighteenth century.127 The 
overall result, in practical terms, was that within the Imarah at least the elites of 
both communities had a degree of freedom unknown elsewhere in the Ottoman 
empire. For instance, it proved difficult for Ottoman authority to exercise any 
sustained direct control in the region: they remained dependent upon local co­
operation with their fiscal, military and political policies from local elites. While 
they were able to remove amirs who seemed to be becoming too powerful, 
such as Fakhr Al Din II, the Ottoman state realised that on a daily basis, it had 
to work through the amirs, rather than being able to impose directly a long-term 
coherent central authority. This meant that, in the words of Abdul Rahim Abu
125 Abdul Rahim Abu Hussein, 'The Korkmaz Question', p, 3, points out that the Shihabs were related through the 
female line to the Ma'n's, giving the Shihabs a certain local legitimacy in the eyes of local elites.
128 These leading elements were initially essentially the landed elites of both communities. Over the period of the 
Imarah these leading elements expanded, especially amongst the Maronite community, to include the educated 
classes, often with a strong clerical element, and the commercial/mercantile classes. It should also be noted that this 
co-operative spirit had little impact on the lower orders of society in each community; as is indicated by the constant 
danger of small-scale intercommunal violence at this level, a violence kept in check by local leaders for the most part.
127 See Frank Bailey, British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement: A Study in Analo-Turkish Relations. 1826- 
1835. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., p. 42; Matti Moosa, The Maronites in Modern Tim es, p. 281; 
Toufic Touma, Pavsans et Institutions Feodales au Liban. p. 66.
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Hussein, the Imarah became ‘a political institution that became a quasi- 
autonomous hereditary principality1.128
This had real implications for the development of a self-conscious, 
separate and culturally-based sense of community identity, at least at elite and 
educated levels, trickling down the social hierarchy in the form of repeated 
mythology. This was strongest and most widely felt amongst the Maronite 
community, largely because of the increasingly important administrative role 
assumed by that community within the Imarah. Initially, Druze interests 
dominated the Imarah's affairs and so, administrative policy. Given the social 
structure of the Druze community, Druze interests essentially meant those of 
the Druze chiefs, the landowning class.129 But despite the primacy given to 
Druze interests Ottoman central authority generally tolerated the existence of 
the Imarah since they believed that an amir could generally be relied on to 
prevent the autonomy getting out of hand and developing into outright rebellion 
such as that of Fakhr Al Din II. At this stage the personal co-operation 
between elite levels in the communities had the effect of promoting the 
already-mentioned quasi-feudal landowning elite amongst the Maronites, 
mirroring the primacy accorded to the land-based Druze chiefs in dealing with 
the respective communities and in some senses, it can be argued, bringing the 
communities closer together. Undoubtedly in the first century and a half of the 
Imarah's existence, this Maronite elite identified its interests firmly with those of 
the Druze, despite their religious differences.130
But this apparent intercommunal collaboration did not last and was, 
anyway, restricted to elite levels. The Maronite elite was not at first in any 
position to do more than accept Druze leadership, and seems to have 
recognised this and to have acted accordingly, to protect its interests. But at 
lower levels of the hierarchy things remained rather different. If there was little 
active intercommunal hostility, thanks to the capable administration of Shihabi 
amiiB such as Bashir I (1691-1707) and the influence of community leaders,
128 Abdul Rahim Abu Hussein, 'Problems in the Ottoman Administration', pp. 671-3; K.S. Salibi, T h e  Lebanese 
Emirate, 1667-1841'. Al Abhath. XX, 3 ,1 9 6 7
129 Toufic Touma, Pavsans et Institutions Feodales chez les Druzes et les Maronites du Liban du 18e Siecle a 1914. 
publication de I'Universite Libanaise, Beirut, 1971, pp. 23-4.
30 Albert Hourani, Lebanon: 'The Development of a Political Society' in L. Binder (ed) Politics in Lebanon, p. 15.
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the differences in religious cultural backgrounds ensured that neither the mass 
of Druze nor the mass of Maronites felt particularly close to one another. For 
one thing, unlike the landowning elites of the two communities, they had no 
real shared interests to move them beyond a periodically uneasy co-habitation.
However, gradually, from 1711, the Druze community at all levels began 
to feel at a disadvantage vis a vis the Maronites within the Imarah, something 
that was eventually to undermine the potential for successful co-operation 
between the elite members of the communities and so to bring down the 
Imarah itself. This development became discernible by the mid-eighteenth 
century, and by that time, the Druze did indeed have real grounds for fear of 
oppression and unequal treatment by the amirs and the bureaucracy of the 
Imarah, The result was a consequent gradual breakdown in the previous co­
operation and a return to a state of co-habitation at all levels; a state of co­
habitation increasingly marked by Druze resentment of the Maronite 
community. The Sunni Shihabi amirs of the eighteenth century were not able 
or ready, for a variety of reasons, to cultivate close links with the Druze.131 
The Battle of Ayn Dara in 1711, between warring Druze factions, weakened the 
Druze community as a whole. As a result of the battle Druze numbers were 
reduced as the defeated faction in the community was largely slaughtered or 
exiled.132 However, this factional conflict was to prove particularly unfortunate 
for the Druze elite, in terms of their ability to sustain a high profile 
administrative role within the Imarah.. The Maronites showed themselves able 
and willing to take advantage of this chance to consolidate a position of power 
within the Imarah. The potential for this had already been developing slowly 
and after 1711 Maronites took over more and more of the administrative posts 
available within the Imarah and thereby were able to control access to the 
amirs. This helped to give the Maronites an influence they had never before 
achieved, and consequently, in their community mythology, a lasting interest in 
the history of this period as well as a sense of the possible benefits of
131 For further details of the relations of the Shihabi amirs and the Druze, see K.S. Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon, 
pp. 6-12.
2 There is currently a debate over the Druze factions involved. Relying on the work of a  nineteenth century 
historian, Nasif Al Yaziji, it has been traditional to see this battle as taking place between the Qaysi and the Yemeni. 
Hussein argues that it was, in fact, between the Yazbaki and the Jumbiats. See Abdul Rahim Abou Hussein, 'The 
Feudal System of Mount Lebanon', pp. 39-41; K.S. Salibi, Histoire du Liban du 18e Siecle a nos Jours, pp. 50-3.
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sustaining attitudes of co-habitation, rather than consensus. Equally, this 
development gave the Druze a new sense of oppression.133
By the beginning of the nineteenth century the Maronites, with their 
long-established traditions and culture combined with their recent experiences 
within the Imarah, had become an increasingly cohesive community, with all 
social levels sharing a sense of special identity that derived from their 
collective mythology. The community proved itself capable of sufficient internal 
discipline to permit the community to be said to be acting as a community on 
certain key issues. Certainly the community can be said to have shared 
certain aspirations relating to the exercise of a degree of autonomy in their own 
affairs, and to have been able to achieve these through the Imarah. The 
quasi-feudal social structure touched on earlier was undoubtedly one cohesive 
factor. But there were others that promoted this sense of shared identity.
As already suggested, one of the most significant factors was the 
existence of the Maronite Church. This not only provided internal coherence 
for the Maronite community on the basis of religious distinctiveness, but also 
promoted external links that sustained the ‘Western’ orientation of the 
community. By the start of the nineteenth century the Maronite Church had 
had links with the Roman Catholic Church over a long period. Starting from an 
informal contact level during the eleventh century, these had developed into a 
formal relationship in 1584. These links had reached a stage by the end of the 
sixteenth century where the Papacy granted a certain status and acceptance to 
the Maronite Church.134 This meant that Maronite priests could, and often did, 
go to Rome for training. When they returned they retained their sense of 
Maronite identity, and sought to define it in ways acceptable both to their fellow 
Maronites and the Roman Catholic tradition, which was an essentially Western 
tradition.135 This equally meant that using their Roman Catholic connections,
133 K.S. Salibi, Histoire du Liban du 1 Be Siecle a nos Jours. Nawfal Publishers, Beirut, 1988, pp. 52-3.
134 Matti Moosa, The Maronites in History. Syracuse University Press, 1986, pp. 220-21; 280; K.S. Salibi, 'The 
Maronite Church in the Middle Ages and its Union with Rome', Orients Christianne. XLII, 1958, pp. 92-104; Nasser 
Gemayel, Les Echanqes Cuiturels entre les Maronites et I'Europe du College Maronite de Rome (15841 au College de 
Ayn W araa (17891. no publisher, Beirut, 1 9 8 4 ,2  Vols.
Nasser Gemayel, Les Echanqes Cuiturels: Iliya Harik, Politics and Change in a Traditional Society. Lebanon 1711- 
1845. Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1968 p. 130. This last work gives the examples of Ibn Quilan, the 
earliest Maronite writer, and of Istfan Ai Duwayhi (1629-1704) Maronite Patriarch, as stressing the 'unbroken 
orthodoxy' of the Maronite faith. It is interesting to note how many of the Maronite historians have been priests, and 
how they have effectively glossed over the earlier monothelistic heresy of the Maronite Church, for instance, while 
stressing the Western origins and orientation of the community as a whole, something they argued was 'proved' by the
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the leaders of the Maronite community (including religious leaders) were able 
to secure and maintain political support from the West with the aim of 
protecting them, at least to a degree and in their own perception, from any 
serious acts of central Ottoman hostility that might be directed against them.136
This was not all. As well as helping sustain links with the West, such 
priests performed another function of major cultural importance to the Maronite 
community at popular levels. For the bulk of the Maronite population, contact 
with Maronite clergy was a major factor in sustaining their social solidarity as a 
community. This bulk must be classed as peasants or share-croppers, working 
for landowners, both Maronite and Druze, whose interests were generally 
removed from those of the peasants. Even though many of the clergy came 
from the landowning class up to the nineteenth century, the clergy still provided 
the regular leadership for the Maronite community on a daily basis, and so 
provided a major channel through which the mythology relating to community 
identity was interpreted. This was particularly so since clergy founded and ran 
village schools to spread literacy in both French and Arabic, and used these 
schools also to provide a version of information about the community that 
promoted both the Maronite Church and its Western orientations, and the 
distinctiveness and superiority of the Maronite community.137 A number of 
these schools even developed into more sophisticated and important 
educational centres. The motivation of the Church was plain: such a policy 
helped to perpetuate their role and power within the community, but the result 
was that the Maronite community was, by the nineteenth century, a much more 
educated social group than the Druze. This relatively literate community was 
then exposed to the history of their community as written by Maronite 
historians who were also clerics, and whose aim in writing such history was 
'not so much to establish its history as to vindicate its claims' in the
closeness of the Maronite and Roman Catholic Churches. K.S. Salibi, T h e  Traditional Historiography of the
Maronites', in Lewis & Holt (eds), pp. 213-4.
136 Salibi points out that though in fact the Maronites 'remained comparatively free from Muslim tutelage', they were a
people 'on the defensive as a community and as a Church'. K.S. Salibi, ‘The Traditional Historiography of the
Maronites', in Lewis & Holt (edsLHistorians of the Middle East. Oxford University Press, 1962, pp. 215-6.
137 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, pp. 12-13; K.S. Salibi, House of Many Mansions, p. 113.
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contemporary period to a special identity produced and justified by this past: 
i.e., to develop a mythology that was accepted as ‘valid’ historically.138
All of this also had the effect of helping to modernise the internal social 
and class structures of the community, especially since it was associated with 
Maronite involvement in trade with Europe. The increasingly literate and 
Western-orientated Maronites had an advantage here over the other 
communities in Lebanon. The silk trade was of great significance here, as 
Maronite links with the West flourished, particularly with France. The socio­
economic impact of the silk trade on the Maronite community as a whole was 
considerable, especially in the Mount Lebanon region.139 Silk from Mount 
Lebanon was of a high quality, and both in Mount Lebanon and Beirut, the port 
through which most of the silk was exported, it generated an economic 
dynamism based on consciousness of the potential of the trade and its profits. 
Certainly it provided the economic base on which to build an educated class in 
the Maronite community, as more families found themselves both able to afford 
the expenditure, and conscious of its benefits in terms of the ability that such 
education gave for a participation in the trade on a more equal basis with their 
Western partners.140 The sustained existence of a Maronite educated class 
able and willing to take on positions of authority in the public affairs of the 
Imarah meant that in this sphere as well the Maronite community had become 
more prominent as early as the seventeenth century. Graduates from these 
Maronite advanced educational sectors were increasingly employed by the 
Shihabi amirs in particular. But even local Druze chieftains had found it useful 
to employ them in their administrative affairs in particular. As a result there had 
been Maronites in a position to determine or at least have a significant 
influence on the policy of the amirs and on local intercommunal politics over a 
sustained period within the Imarah.141
138 ibid, p. 216 .
139 This is not to say that the Maronite community was the only one to benefit economically from the silk trade; it was, 
however, the community that benefited most. See Dominique Chevallier. La SoGiete du Mont Liban. p. 137.
140 The presence of disease in the mulberry trees of Italy and France and the demand for silk from centres such as 
Lyons ensured that the French merchants who were particularly involved in the trade were very eager to foster the 
trade and see that all sides benefited financially. See Maurice Shihab, Le Role du Liban dans I'Histoire de la Soie: 
Karam Rizk, Le Mont-Liban au X IX  Siecle. pp. 200-201; Dominique Chevallier, La Societe du Mont Liban. p. 201.
141 Iliya Harik, Politics and Change in a Traditional Society, p. 170; Matti Moosa, The Maronites in History, p. 284.
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It all meant that the Maronites replaced the Druze as the politically 
dominant community to such an extent that it can be said that by the reign of 
Bashir II (1788-1840) the Imarah had acquired a Christian character, 
something which had a profound impact on the communal balance of the 
region. This Christian character was the more apparent because Bashir II was 
a convert to Maronite Christianity, and the remaining Shihabi amirs were also 
Maronite.142 Thus for both practical and ideological reasons, the use and the 
power of Maronite officials in the administration increased still further, as did 
the power of the wealthy and well-organised Maronite Church.143 However, 
the next stage in the communal history of the region was to be less happy for 
the Maronites; though as the case studies of events in 1820, 1840-2 and 1858- 
60 demonstrate, this unhappiness was also to advance Maronite communal 
identity.
In the mid-nineteenth century, Ottoman central authority sought to seize 
an opportunity to restrict what seemed to them (with some justification) the 
growing autonomy of the Imarah region. This created a complex scenario. 
The battle lines were eventually drawn up in 1840 between central Ottoman 
authority, the Christian amir, Bashir II and his largely Maronite supporters, and 
leaders of the Druze community, predominantly from the Jumblat family, with 
the scenario complicated by efforts from external European powers to 
intervene on one side or another.144 The Maronites then and now (and other 
Christians under his rule) interpreted Bashir II as a ‘reigning prince and the 
scion of a dynasty of reigning princes’. This was in direct contrast to Ottoman 
interpretation at the time, and the perspective on Bashir II that entered Druze 
and Sunni mythology. In this interpretation Bashir II was ‘a mere fiscal 
functionary of the Ottoman state’. At stake was the issue of the legitimacy 
accorded to any independent rule or policy of Bashir ll’s.145 In 1841 a nasty 
civil war broke out - the first that can with any veracity be termed a Lebanese 
civil war - directly relating to this issue. The origins and aftermath of this war to 
1860 are worth examining in some detail, given their long term impact on
142 K.S. Salibi, Histoire du Liban du 18e Sfecle a nos Jours, p. 53.
143 It is recognised that other Christian communities, such as the Greek Orthodox, also benefited from these 
developments. However, the main focus of this chapter is on the Maronites.
144 K.S. Salibi, Histoire du Liban du 18e Siecle a nos Jours, p. 74.
145 K.S. Salibi, House of Many Mansions, pp. 109-10.
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Maronite-Druze mythologies in relation to the other community and to 
'Lebanon'. The period saw the development of a political mythology for the 
area based on assertions of the primacy of religious and communal identity 
that has proved remarkably durable, as the events of 1958 demonstrate.
The background to this conflict was a clash between Bashir II and his 
senior in the Ottoman administration, Abdallah Pasha, the governor of Acre, 
that dated back twenty years before the incidents of 1840-1. Both as an 
Ottoman official and on his own account, Abdallah sought to reduce the 
autonomy of the Imarah. Abdallah saw the key as being the amir, and so was 
determined to find an opportunity to bring Bashir II to his knees. Consequently 
no sooner had Abdallah taken up his appointment in 1819 than he demanded 
from Bashir II an exorbitant tribute, hoping thereby to cause conflict. Bashir II 
was forced to obey, but the attempts of his tax collectors in 1819 to collect the 
tax provoked the population of the Matn and the Kisrawan, two regions in 
Mount Lebanon, to outright rebellion.
The importance of this rebellion, known as the ‘ammiyyah or 
commoners' rising, is that it was an essentially and consciously Maronite 
rebellion, involving members from all levels of the Maronite community in the 
region, and also the Maronite Church, justified by reference to community 
mythology.146 The Maronite nature of the rising is further underlined by noting 
that even though taxes were to be raised from the Druze also, their dislike of 
paying failed to rouse them to active dissent.147 Given that poverty levels 
amongst the Druze were, on the whole, lower than among the Maronites, this 
is a fair indication that the Maronite rising was not a result of an economic 
overburdening to breaking point of the Maronite population. Instead, what the 
ammiyyah does indicate is the development of a mythologically-based 
community social culture among the Maronites that had a religious and secular 
base; where the sophisticated institutional organisation of the Maronite Church
146 Samir Khaiaf, Lebanon's Predicament. Columbia University Press, New York, 1987, pp. 32-3. The involvement of 
members of the landed elite was limited and related to particular agendas. For instance, two of Bashir's own cousins 
who wished to take the emirate for themselves were involved, along with their immediate supporters. So while it was 
largely a rebellion of the lower orders it did have a wider constituency. This rebellion even included some of the 
personnel of the Maronite Church, which was now recruiting from the lower orders, something the educational system 
it had instituted made possible.
147 Attempts were made by Maronite leaders of the uprising to involve the Druze, but without success. See Samir 
Khaiaf, Lebanon's Predicament, p. 35.
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promoted this sense of shared identity amongst the congregations by evoking 
mythical ‘rights’ of exemption from Ottoman control. Through clerical 
channels, information and ideas were spread to the Maronite community in the 
region, and the spiritual authority of the Church was used to increase popular 
resentments to the point of physical resistance. The Maronite Church had 
accumulated both land and cash over the previous three centuries. Whereas 
it had been dependent upon the protection of the Maronite landed elite in the 
period up to the late eighteenth century, by the nineteenth century it was 
independently powerful within the community. Even its personnel was now 
drawn from all levels of the Maronite social strata and not just from the elite.148 
That it was prepared to use that power against what it interpreted as an 
Ottoman attempt at intervention, underlines the extent to which the Church was 
a powerful force in creating and maintaining a self-conscious, mythologically 
and ethnically-based Maronite communal identity; something with profound 
implications for events in the twentieth century. For example, a letter in 1818 
from the Maronite Patriarch, Joseph Tyan, to Pius VII made reference to the 
Maronite 'nation' - a term which is best understood in the context of the time as 
'people', or 'ethnic group'.149
While it would be hard to sustain a case that in 1820, this closed 
communal identity amounted to 'nationalism' in a Western sense, the 
ammiyyah is of importance in terms of indicating the strength by this time of a 
sense of separate identity bound up in a sense of location among the 
Maronites, one that was widespread and coherent in its beliefs and aims. 
Those aims were far more than a resistance to paying taxes; the demand was 
presented to the Maronites in the region, and accepted, as part of a resistance 
to Ottoman authority that was necessary to the maintenance of the community 
and its separate traditions. Traditional hierarchical bonds remained important 
and powerful within the community. They simply combined with what Khalaf 
has termed 'a more communal form of social cohesion where the sources of 
political legitimacy were defined in terms of ethnicity and confessional
Ibid. pp. 32-35.
149 Joseph Tyan, Patriarch of the Maronite Church, to Pope Pius VII, 24  October 1818, in the unpublished Al Khazin 
Family Papers.
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allegiance'.150 In a sense, though, as events in Kisrawan were to show, it 
could be argued here that the peasantry and the Church were in advance of 
the landed and commercial elites in terms of their position on the autonomy of 
the community, as these elites still found reasons for co-operating with both 
Ottoman authority in the shape of the amir, and with leaders from other Muslim 
communities where their interests coincided.
The impact of the ammiyyah on Ottoman authority in the region is 
indicated by the inability of that authority to control the rebellion or to collect the 
revenue required. Bashir II abandoned the emirate in 1820 and went into 
voluntary exile in the Hawran. However, Abdallah was also unable to cope 
with the situation in the Lebanon and the situation deteriorated to such an 
extent that Abdallah was forced to accept Bashir M's return to office in 1821. 
Further complications affecting Ottoman authority in the region meant that 
Bashir IPs return at this point was short-lived, and he again went into exile 
within months of his return.151 This time, he went to Egypt, where he was well 
received by Muhammad Ali Pasha (1805-49), a strong figure who effectively 
ruled Egypt as an independent entity within the Ottoman empire. Muhammad 
Ali increasingly acted as an independent ruler and he was interested, by this 
period, in extending his power base. In particular, he coveted Syria.152 As a 
result of Muhammad Ali's intervention with Ottoman central authority, Abdallah 
and Bashir II were both returned to their old positions in 1822.153
Bashir II seems to have been convinced that his return to his emirate at 
this point would not again be challenged by officials senior to him in the 
Ottoman hierarchy; and that consequently he could afford to take a strong line 
in reasserting his authority within the Mount Lebanon region. Over the next 
eighteen years, Bashir II successfully alienated virtually all his subjects from 
his rule. But his policies also increased intercommunal hostility, and in so 
doing, created a crisis which was to result in considerable intercommunal
150 ibid, p. 35. Khalaf argues also that the rising ‘embodied a nationalist fervor and a desire to seek independence 
from Ottoman control'. However, this is taking matters to an unsustainable extreme: a continuance of autonomy, yes; 
outright independence was not yet an issue.
151 For details of the dispute involving Abdallah Pasha of Acre, Muhammad Darwish of Damascus and Bashir himself, 
leading to the exiles of both Abdallah Pasha and Bashir and the installation of Muhammad Darwish in Acre as well as 
Damascus, see K.S. Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon, pp. 25-6.
152 Engin Akarli, The Long P eace, pp. 22-3.
153 K.S. Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon, p. 26.
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violence and the ending of the Imarah, since the splits between the vital 
elements in that entity had become too acute for it to continue. Bashir II turned 
the Druze community even more strongly against him shortly after his return in 
1822. He was aware that there was opposition to his return from that 
community, notably from Bashir Jumblat, a leading Druze and former ally, who 
had worked to prevent his return from Egypt. Back in power, Bashir II initially 
tried to make Jumblat pay for his plotting by imposing a crippling fine. 
Jumblat's refusal to pay, and his attempt to raise the Hawran district against 
Bashir II, gave the latter an excuse to destroy him militarily. By January 1825, 
Jumblat headed a coalition of Druze leaders in open revolt. But Bashir II 
gained the victory, and used it to establish a position of political dominance in 
Lebanon, supported at this point by the Maronite community.154 The 
importance of this, as Salibi points out, is that the Druze were convinced that 
Jumblat had been crushed because he was a Druze, rather than because he 
was a dangerous 'political rival'.155
In the consequent power vacuum, Maronite dominance in the 
administration of Mount Lebanon increased, ensuring their support for Bashir II 
in the period to 1831, while the Druze seethed in practically powerless 
resentment. However, from 1831 things were to develop differently. For the 
rest of that decade, the Druze community had another cause for dissatisfaction 
with Bashir II and an opportunity for demonstrating it by turning to open support 
for Ottoman central authority, as from that date, the region was effectively 
under Egyptian control. Bashir It's return to power in 1822 as a result of 
Egyptian backing and protection, rather than that of central Ottoman authority, 
ensured that he was dependent on a continuation of Egyptian support if he was 
to remain in power in the Imarah. Muhammad Ali intended to establish control 
over Syria, including the Imarah, and expected to use Bashir II in achieving his 
goal. In 1831 Muhammad Ali’s son, Ibrahim Pasha, was despatched to
154 Bashir was determined to make his victory complete; consequently he arranged for Jumblat to be returned from 
Damascus, where he had taken refuge, to Acre, where he was conveniently strangled, thus robbing the Druze of their 
most prominent leader at the time. At the same time, he also had other Druze leaders arrested and confiscated Druze 
property on a widespread basis. Though Druze leaders then appealed to Ottoman central authority, and were indeed 
granted decrees for the return of their property etc., neither that authority nor the Druze were, in the aftermath of this 
defeat, able to enforce the firmans (written orders or decrees) that were granted against Bashir in this respect. See  
K.S. Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon, pp. 26-7.
155 ibid, p. 27.
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establish Muhammad Ali’s hold over Syria, and it was also planned that 
Lebanon would be used as a base and as a source of goods and manpower in 
the venture. Conscious of the willingness of central Ottoman authority to 
depose him if the opportunity offered, Bashir II had little choice but to accept 
his involvement with Egyptian plans.
Within the Imarah, one result was that the Druze discovered a new 
loyalty to the Ottoman state, and actually took up arms on behalf of this cause 
after 1831. The immediate result was a series of clashes within the Imarah 
between Druze and Maronites, because initially Bashir H‘s alliance with the 
Egyptians was acceptable to the Maronites, as the Egyptians were prepared to 
establish a state of genuine religious toleration and equality between them 
and the Muslim communities, which the Maronites hoped would make their 
position within the Imarah even stronger.156 But relatively swiftly the situation 
became still more complex in terms of communal relationships, as elements in 
the Maronite community, especially at the lower levels, became resentful of the 
practical impact of the Egyptian involvement. Ibrahim Pasha remained in 
charge in Syria for nine years with Bashir II acting as his vassal or agent in the 
Imarah. In order to run Syria effectively and to build a strong Egypt, Ibrahim 
Pasha had to impose a heavy burden of taxation, and to establish a system of 
administration within the Imarah that would enable the taxes to be collected 
effectively.157 He also had to employ methods of forced conscription into the 
Egyptian army. If the Maronites had originally welcomed the arrival of Ibrahim 
Pasha, the ordinary Maronites and the Maronite Church soon grew to resent 
the taxation and the conscriptions, which involved them in fighting for a Muslim 
state.
The Druze were even more hostile to these developments during the 
1830s. Bashir II was forced by his Egyptian overlords to become involved in 
suppressing Druze revolt - and to use Maronite conscripts to aid in the 
suppression. The suppression was successful and Bashir II attempted to 
restore peace between the Druze and his administration, and between the
156 K.S. Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon, p. 28.
157 Samir Khalaf, Lebanon's Predicament, p. 35-6. Khalaf points out that the period of Egyptian control led to an 
expansion in foreign trade, and not just with Europe, as well as to other administrative developments.
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communities, by as generous peace terms as he could get away with. But it 
still saw fines and impositions, and the exiling of Druze leaders, and so it 
hardly had the conciliatory effect hoped for.158 The Druze could not forget or 
forgive the fact that the amir had used the Maronites to suppress them, with 
considerable implications for the future of co-operation between the 
communities in the context of the Imarah at least.
Yet within a short period of time, Maronite leaders there were seeking 
collaboration with other opponents of Bashir M’s rule, within the Imarah and 
outside it, including the Druze. Maronite fear of the impact of further 
conscription from their community to fight for the Egyptians in Syria was the 
spur to this development, one that resulted in an effective revolt that helped to 
bring down Bashir and Ibrahim Pasha. The eviction of the latter from Syria, 
primarily the result of the intervention of external powers like Britain, France 
and Russia seeking to settle ‘The Eastern Question', also brought down his 
ally, Bashir II.169 But the final collapse of the Imarah was due primarily to local 
factors, despite an involvement of European powers in arranging the nature of 
the post-Imarah administration of the region.
In 1840, Bashir found that he was opposed by Maronites and Druze, 
brought together by their hostility to him. In May 1840, the majority of leaders 
from both communities in Mount Lebanon led their followers in an uprising 
against Bashir II. With help from Ibrahim Pasha during the summer of 1840, 
Bashir II was initially able to suppress the uprising. However, once the 
Egyptian army had begun to collapse, during September and October 1840, 
Bashir M’s ability to contain the uprising also disappeared. Two days after the 
final defeat of Ibrahim Pasha on 10 October 1840, Bashir II fled Lebanon for 
the final time.160 It is not necessary to go into great detail about the events of 
1840, but certain points do need to be made. First, as in 1819-20, the initiative 
against Bashir II within the Maronite community was taken by the peasants,
158 K.S. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon, pp. 34-36; p. 40; Toufic Touma, Pavsans et Institutions Feodales. p. 
145.
159 The European powers were prepared to support Ottoman authority at least partly because the Ottoman empire had 
begun a programme of administrative reforms, collectively known as the Tanzimat, which seemed to be in line with 
European developments at this time. For a Lebanese perspective on this, see K.S. Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon, 
p. 40.
He was taken by the British into exile in Malta.
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backed by the Church. Secondly, the events of 1840 made it plain that co­
operation between the Druze and Maronite communities over the period of the 
Imarah had developed no basis beyond narrow self-interest: it did not mark an 
attempt on either side to reconcile their differences. This is highlighted by the 
reasons for the failure of the first phase of the 1840 rebellion, during the 
summer of 1840. As well as getting support from the Egyptians, Bashir li 
succeeded in splitting the Maronite-Druze alliance against him and turning their 
attention back to intercommunal hostilities by promising to Druze leaders that 
he would 'make them masters of the Maronite district of Kisrawan'.161 In the 
event, Bashir II never had the chance to put his promises into effect, and 
despite this initial success, neither the Imarah nor Bashir II were to survive the 
continuing tensions in the region.
With Bashir II gone into exile, the interested European powers arranged 
for the replacement of Bashir II by Bashir III, another member of the Shihabi 
family. Bashir III turned out to be a particularly incompetent (and short-lived) 
amir.w2 But it is fair to say that even a competent amir might not have been 
able to avoid the intercommunal unrest that followed within the region between 
1840 and 1860, a period including the civil war of 1841. The violence of 1841 
started with a small scale quarrel in the spring between Maronite and Druze in 
the Dayr ai Qamar region. But the quarrel was essentially about the respective 
property rights of members of the Maronite and Druze communities and during 
the summer of 1841 hostilities escalated in scale. In October 1841, the scale 
of intercommunal hostilities escalated significantly, with a high rate of 
casualties on both sides initially. The intervention of central Ottoman 
authorities in November tipped the scale against the Maronites, however, 
especially as by this time Bashir 111 was in Druze hands.163 In January 1842, 
Bashir 111 left Lebanon for Istanbul, ending the period of Shihabi rule in the 
Imarah, and effectively, if not yet officially, the Imarah itself. The degree of 
consensus between the Maronite and Druze elites that had been present at the 
start of the Imarah had undergone a process of slow erosion; but now its last 
remnants had disappeared, since there was no reason for either side to
161 Samir Khalaf, Lebanon's Predicament, p. 37.
162 K. S. Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon, pp. 40-44.
163 ibid. pp. 49-52.
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sustain it. Under the administration of ‘Umar Pasha, appointed by the Ottoman 
state to restore order in the Mount Lebanon region, anti-Maronite violence was 
reduced in scale, but an anti-Maronite bias was clearly present in that 
administration’s policy in the region.
The violence of 1841 can be directly attributed to the legacy of 
intercommunal suspicion and resentment created by Bashir ll’s policies and 
the consequent mythology surrounding him.164 The Druze resented the 
administrative set-up and officials of the region left by Bashir ll’s regime, and 
the visible extent to which the Maronites had profited by Bashir M's activities 
against the Druze. Under Bashir II, confiscated Druze property had been given 
to Maronites, and the Druze community had had to watch the Maronites 
enjoying and displaying their newly-acquired wealth and property. Even if the 
Maronites had turned against Bashir II in the end, they had also for a long time 
profited from his emirate in terms of improved status and power within the 
administrative system - displaying itself in a spirit of confidence in political life 
that was deeply irritating to the Druze community from the highest level to the 
lowest.165 If Bashir II had succeeded in destroying, to a large extent, the 
political power of the Druze feudal lords, he had not undermined the feudal 
social organisation of the community. The loyalties of the Druze masses, 
mainly rural peasants, remained firmly with their lords and they were not 
happy, therefore, to see these lords reduced in power and status.166
Thus the relationship between the communities and between the Druze 
and the administration of the area was anyway extremely unstable and Bashir 
III had swiftly managed to make things worse on coming to power by 
continuing the policy of oppressing and seeking to crush any remaining Druze 
power.167 A further complication was the attitude of central Ottoman authority 
in all this. The Ottomans saw the deterioration of affairs within the region as 
being useful to them, hoping it would make the area ultimately more amenable 
to direct rule from Istanbul. So they were prepared, discreetly so as not to
164 K.S. Salibi, House of Many Mansions, pp. 109-10, pointing out that Maronites in the twentieth century still viewed 
Bashir II as an essentially benevolent despot, while the Druze in particular typecast him as a malign figure in history.
165 Iliya Harik, Politics and Change in a Traditional Society: Lebanon 1711-1845. Princeton University Press, New  
Jersey, 1968, pp. 225-227; Leila Fawaz, An Occasion for W ar. I.B. Tauris, London, 1994, pp. 21-3.
166 Toufic Touma, Pavsans et institutions Feodales. p. 136-147.
167 K. S. Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon, p. 45.
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upset the interested European powers, to encourage dissent between the 
communities and to encourage non-co-operation between both communities 
and Bashir III.168 But the suspicions and resentments were also part of longer 
term intercommunal resentments stemming from beliefs that each of the two 
communities had, by the 1840s, ‘rights’ to pre-eminence in the Mount Lebanon 
region. In this context, bloodshed between the communities amounting to civil 
war in 1841 and 1842 can be said to have been both predictable and nasty.
But the situation then, and the subsequent troubles up to the 1860s, 
was complicated by external (European) intervention concerned about the 
shedding of Christian blood in particular. By this time, the weakness of the 
Ottoman state meant that the Ottoman authorities could not afford just to 
ignore such intervention, notably the European protests about events in the 
region of Lebanon and the Ottoman failure to control the violence there in 
1841.169 The development of the Tanzimatthroughout the Ottoman empire is 
a good example of this.170 Overall, during the Tanzimat period, 1839-76, 
sincere efforts (if only as a result of prior European pressure and a 
consciousness of continuing European observation) were undoubtedly made to 
include non-Muslim subjects in the empire's operation to a greater degree, 
through associating them with the administration. But the Tanzimat had the 
advantage, for the Ottoman state, of creating a policy where the European 
powers could not really complain if Lebanese autonomy had ended, so long as 
it was done apparently in the name of improving administrative efficiency and 
democratic participation for both Muslims and non-Muslims, it has to be said, 
however, that as far as Mount Lebanon was concerned, the real Ottoman 
priority was to bring the region under direct control from Istanbul. Thus they 
continued, despite assurances to the contrary, to seek to prevent a restoration 
of stable, if not friendly, co-habitation, as continued instability was seen as the 
only effective way to end Lebanese autonomy without provoking a hostile 
European intervention.171 Ottoman authorities consequently did little initially to 
halt the bloodshed in 1841 and there is evidence that they even encouraged
168 K.S. Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon, p. 46.
169 Engin Akarli, The Long Peace, p. 27.
170 The essence of the Tanzimat could be said to be a series of Ottoman reforms encouraging centralisation. See H. 
Lammens. La Svrie Precis Historiaue. Dar Lahad Khater, Beirut, 1994, p. 303.
171 Karam Rizk, Le Mont Liban au X IX  Siecle de I’Emirat au Mutasarrifivvah. pp. 170-71.
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and armed the Druze. Certainly Ottoman troops did join in against the 
Maronites on occasions. At other times, they merely stood by and watched the 
conflict; if they did intervene to protect the Maronites it was after a long time.172
However, the Ottomans were not the only ones intriguing to prevent a 
restoration of stable co-habitation in 1840-2. The Maronite Patriarch in 1841 
wanted to see a restoration of Bashir II, and hoped to bring about a situation of 
such instability that the Maronites and Druze would both be prepared to forget 
the past and demand his return, and the Ottomans would be forced to endorse 
it, to the long term advantage of the Maronite community and Church.173 In 
intercommunal terms the result of all this intriguing was to destroy for the time 
being any basis for peaceful relations despite the need for consensus 
between the communities if any Ottoman efforts at centralisation were to be 
resisted. When Druze lords sought, with Bashir II gone, to reclaim former 
property, a series of disputes with the current owners, who were mainly 
Maronites, ensured that resentments were maintained and developed into 
clashes and a series of massacres of Maronites by Druze, and Druze by 
Maronites.174 Eventually, in late 1841, interested Western powers, notably 
France and Britain, did force the Ottoman authorities into an apparently more 
active role in trying to settle the dispute.175 In fact they took advantage of the 
clear collapse of Maronite-Druze collaboration, to announce in January 1842 
that it was no longer possible to sustain a Lebanese autonomy based on that 
assumption. The time had come for a new arrangement, in effect the 
establishment of direct Ottoman rule over the area.
The new governor of Mount Lebanon, ‘Umar Pasha, appointed after the 
fall of Bashir 111 in January 1842, had no connections with the area. He swiftly 
made it plain that his main objective was to consolidate direct rule by 
destroying any remnants of the Imarah and past autonomy and any hope of a
172 Charles Churchill, The Druzes and the Maronites. pp. 52-56; K. S. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon; Karam  
Rizk, Le Mont-Liban au X IX  Siecle. p. 239; Engin Akarli, The Long Peace, p. 30; Joseph Abou Nohra, 'L'Evolution du 
Systeme Politique Libanais dans le Contexte des Confiits Regionaux et Locaux 1840-1864' in Shehadi & Mills (eds) 
Lebanon, p. 42.
This was perhaps, in contemporary perspective, not as unlikely as it might appear now. After all, Bashir II had 
returned before from exile, and he was a  son of the Maronite Church, which had also benefited from his emirate. The 
Patriarch's efforts for a Shihabi restoration came to an end in 1845 when Bashir It's son, Amine, became a Sunni 
Muslim.
174 See K. S. Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon, pp. 49-52, for some discussion of events in this period.
175 Engin Akarli, The Long P eace, p. 31; Charles Churchill, The Druze and the Maronites. p. 132; Phillippe Hitti, 
Lebanon in History, p. 438.
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Shihabi restoration. His initial policy was, as far as possible, to gain the support 
and loyalty of those elements that had opposed the Shihabis. Essentially in 
the Mount Lebanon area this meant the Druze community, though there was 
some potential for favouring some among the Maronite lords who had 
opposed both Bashir II and Bashir III. But despite the efforts of ‘Umar Pasha, 
there was no real improvement in terms of either the governability of the Mount 
Lebanon region, or intercommunal relations there. Maronite-Druze hostility 
remained at a high level in the aftermath of the recent bloody events. Without 
incentives to solve these issues, which would have compromised Ottoman 
control over the region and risked a further European intervention, neither side 
was willing to co-operate to any useful extent in the administration of the area 
by ‘Umar Pasha.176
In terms of intercommunal relations, matters actually became worse as 
‘Umar Pasha ensured the return of some Druze lands to their former owners, 
and made other concessions to the Druze to try to reconcile them to his rule. 
He failed, but his efforts did give the Druze a renewed sense of superiority over 
the Maronites in the Mount Lebanon region, increasing thereby Maronite 
resentments.177 It is a measure of the strength of this intercommunal hostility 
that even at elite levels, the shared hostility felt by both communities to the 
imposition of direct Ottoman governmental control could not bring the 
communities together. A meeting between Druze and Maronite leaders was 
held in Mukhtara on 19 November 1843 to discuss the setting up of a Druze- 
Maronite pact - but it never came to anything because the intercommunal 
hostility was still too great to be overcome, though leaders from both 
communities did try to rebel against ‘Umar Pasha. The elites from both 
communities, however, refer to the Mukhtara meeting because, as Tosh points
17e Joseph Abou Nohra, L'Evolution du Svsteme Politique Libanais. pp. 42-3.
177 The level of Maronite fears about Ottoman policy at this point, and the fact that beyond rhetoric, no attempt was 
m ade by Ottoman authorities to relieve those fears, is indicated by a letter of 1847: ‘II est possible que les habitants de 
la Montagne en voyant enlever leurs armes croient que queiques anciens privileges que la Sublime Porte leur a 
accorde relativement a I’administration arretee ici, de concert avec les representants des 5 grandes puissances, et 
que votre excellence est charge d’etabiir seront modifies et charges, et que cette idee inspire de la frayeur. Ou la 
Sublime Porte n’a aucune pensee a pareille chose’. Letter extract from a Vizir (unidentified) to Amir Chekib Effendi, 
12 November 1847, in the unpublished Al Khazin Family Papers.
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out, such groups will always seek to promote ‘mythical pasts which serve to 
legitimise their power or win support for particular policies’.178
European involvement in the area during the 1840s and 1850s did not 
help matters, as European governments and European missionaries brought 
their own rivalries to the area and a consequent willingness to endorse 
indigenous rival mythologies to boost their standing with different 
communities.179 There was also an internal religious dimension, because of 
the Maronite Church. The modernisation of the Maronite community during the 
nineteenth century, including the gradual development of a class system, 
lessened the power of the traditional Maronite landowning elite, especially 
outside the Mount Lebanon area itself. This meant that more and more the 
Church had become the institution through which the values and traditional 
culture of the community were sustained and passed on. For example, it was 
Maronite clergy such as Bishop Nicola Murad who continued and made even 
more coherent the development of a 'Lebanese' historiography. This was 
based on an essentially Maronite view of the past history of the area, 
perpetuating and giving an intellectual gloss to the beliefs, for example, that 
the Maronites were directly descended from pre-Arab inhabitants of the Mount 
Lebanon area.180 The Church had thus been responsible for collecting and 
presenting in a coherent and authoritative manner many of the traditional 
beliefs of the community, and so justifying the development of an exclusive 
Maronite identity separate from that of the Arab Muslims in the region and 
throughout the Ottoman empire.181
It is not surprising that, given its links with Rome, the Maronite Church 
should be actively hostile to British Protestant missionaries on purely religious 
grounds, forcing the British to turn their attentions to the Druze. But the Church 
and, following its lead, the mass of the community were hostile on cultural 
grounds as well. The religious dimension established in Maronite cultural
178 John Tosh, The Pursuit of History, p. 20; K.S. Salibi, House of Many Mansions, p. 203.
179 Engin Akarli, The Long Peace. Chapters 2 & 3. Karam Rizk, Le Mont Liban au X IX  Siecle. p. 226.
180 Salibi argues that Maronite historians have ’never had a clear understanding of the relationship of Maronite and 
Lebanese history to the history of Muslim Syria and Islam’; also that ’historiographical isolation led Maronite historians 
to depend only on predecessors and so repeat them’; or in other words, there was little will to understand the broader 
context of this history. K.S. Salibi, ’The Traditional Historiography of the Maronites1. in Lewis & Holt (eds), pp. 216-7. 
See also Iliya Harik, Politics and Change in a Traditional Society, pp. 126; 140.
101 liiya Harik, Politics and Change in a Traditional Society, pp. 128; 142.
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thinking ensured that the British in general were seen as heretics and a threat 
to the Roman Catholic, and thus to the Maronite, Church; and thus in turn to 
Maronite cultural identity. France, by contrast, was a faithful daughter of the 
Roman Catholic church, and thus could be seen as a protector of Maronite 
religious and cultural interests. And of course, there were the already 
established trade links which favoured France in the main and so linked 
Maronite economic prosperity with contact with France; and the Maronite 
Church certainly benefited from the general prosperity of the communities.
Both the Druze and Maronite communities were aware, by the 1840s, 
that European interest in Lebanon could be used to reduce the impact of 
Ottoman rule there; but equally both communities were concerned to ensure 
that any European intervention was to the advantage of their particular 
community at the expense of the other, where possible. The Druze during this 
period sought to counteract the impact of the Maronite links with France and 
the Roman Catholic Church by utilising the interest in the region of France’s 
main rival, Britain. British interest was demonstrated through a number of 
channels, including those of the state and British Protestant missionaries. The 
small amount of British missionary success indicates the extent to which the 
Druze took little account of the 'civilising' conversion message, simply using 
British interest as a counterbalance to French and Roman Catholic interest in 
the Maronites. Equally support from the British state was seen as critical not 
only in Druze attempts to resist the full force of Ottoman direct rule, but also in 
containing Maronite ambitions within Mount Lebanon, particularly given the 
power of the British at this point.182 With inter-communal relations in the 
period 1841 to 1860, as well as relations with Ottoman authority, being marked 
by frequent clashes, the European powers remained concerned and thus 
susceptible to appeals from the communities in which they had an interest.
In 1843, the Imarah was replaced by a new administrative system that 
resulted from a plan initially put forward by the European powers, but 
accepted, with modifications to its advantage, by the Ottoman state. The 
European aim was the restoration of intercommunal stability: that of the
102 Engin Akarli, The Long P eace, p. 27.
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Ottomans, an increase in central authority.183 In fact, the new system served 
to entrench and formalise the patterns of intercommunal hostility in the period 
to 1860 while it failed to bring about anything but a temporary increase in 
Ottoman power. This system involved the division of Mount Lebanon into two 
qa’immaqamiyyah or administrative districts, with the basis of the division 
theoretically being a separation of the two main religious communities under 
the direct rule of an official of their own religion, answerable to the amir 
appointed by the Ottoman state.184 The reality was that the European powers 
demonstrated the extent to which they understood the communities involved 
on the basis of the mythologies they put forward, with the Maronites in 
particular claiming primacy in certain locations, rather than seeking a more 
practically-based division. (It is worth pointing out that these qa’immaqamiyyah 
covered an area that more or less paralleled the area of modern Lebanon: 
under Bashir II the area of the imarah had expanded and the arrangements of 
1843 reflected that expansion.)
The effective continuation of civil war under the qa’immaqamiyyah 
resulted from the fact that though the new system aimed to separate the two 
communities, there was a sizeable Druze population in the official Maronite 
district, and, according to Salibi, a majority Maronite population in the official 
Druze district. This more or less ensured the continuity of intercommunal 
strife, especially since some Druze peasants had Maronite landlords, and 
some Maronite peasants had Druze landlords. These peasants were thus 
swift to interpret any harsh policies by landlords as having a confessional 
dimension, rather than being simple economic oppression.185 Various 
attempts were made to get the system working effectively, but given the 
circumstances of the continuing intercommunal tension, it was almost 
inevitable that these should fail. In some years such as 1845 the tensions 
flared into bloody conflict - at other times an apparent calm reigned, but one 
that easily degenerated into hostile intercommunal incidents. As indicated, the 
continuance of Anglo-French interest and rivalry in the region was an important
103 In other words, it imposed another layer of administration between the amir and the population of the old Imarah. 
See Spagnolo, France and Ottoman Lebanon. S t Anthony's College, Oxford, 1977, p. 38.
104 The line of division ran roughly along the Beirut-Damascus highway with the Maronites to the north and the Druze 
to the south, with the northern district administered by a Maronite official and the southern one by a Druze official.
105 K.S. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon, p. 63.
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factor in sustaining the intercommunal hostility and in making it still more 
complex.186 There was an increasing willingness of leading Maronites to 
invoke French support against both Ottoman authority and the Druze, as the 
correspondence in the Al Khazin family papers illustrate.187 In addition, in the 
Maronite-administered districts the divisions were intra- as well as inter­
communal. The Maronite administration were drawn from the traditional land­
owning elite, but their policy of co-operation with Ottoman authority and Druze 
elites, was opposed by many among the Maronite masses and even the 
ordinary clergy, many of whom were now drawn from the people because of 
the continuation of intercommunal violence and resistance to Islamic rule.188
In 1858 the seething unrest and tensions burst out into full scale 
violence once more, both inter and intra-communal. The Maronites were the 
main sufferers; they both felt and were at a disadvantage. Partly this was 
because the Maronites at this period lacked outstanding leaders to whom a 
mass loyalty could be given. This was one consequence of the intra-communal 
tensions between the ordinary Maronites and the feudal land-owning elites. 
Those of the latter involved with the administration of the new system had 
proved themselves in the eyes of the masses to be untrustworthy and 
incompetent; hence the revolt of Maronite peasants against their Maronite 
landlords in Kisrawan.189 But this was not the only problem. Maronites 
throughout Lebanon were aware that an anti-Christian feeling was no longer 
simply a local affair, that it was extant at higher than normal levels in the
106 Yussuf Karam to Patriarch Boulos Massad, extract from letter quoted in K.S. Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon, p. 
79.
107 See, for instance, French Consul in Beirut to Shaykh Wadih; Shaykh Elias and Shaykh Wablin Al Khazin, 4  
September 1845, responding to Maronite pleas for intervention. For discussion of the European perspective on such 
pjeas, see Chapter 2.
08 K.S. Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon, pp. 18-19, comments on the international implications of this also Karam 
Rizk, Le Mont-Liban au X IXs Siecle. p. 153.
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of support for the landed element, but had a wider popularity as it took a more broad-based perspective towards the 
Maronite social hierarchies. See Malcolm Kerr (ed.), Lebanon in the Last Years of Feudalism. 1840-1868. A 
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Ottoman empire as a whole, a result of the development of the Tanzimat and 
Christian European involvement in that development.190
Maronites received information about anti-Christian incidents where the 
Ottoman authorities, including the military, had either turned a blind eye to the 
events or had even encouraged and become directly involved in them, such as 
the massacres of Christians in Damascus, Aleppo and Jerusalem.191 One of 
the key areas of tension in Lebanon itself in the 1850s was Kisrawan but the 
unrest did not stay confined to this area; it spread to neighbouring areas where 
it acquired an inter-communal aspect, involving Druze and Maronites.192 
According to Samir Khalaf, Druze leaders in Mount Lebanon as a whole were 
successful in deflecting grievances against themselves from their own Druze 
peasantry by provoking sectarian rivalry. Mixed areas such as the Shuf and 
the Matn were particularly vulnerable to this between 1858 and I860.193 Thus 
the pattern of events in 1859 and 1860 seemed to bear out the worst Maronite 
fears of Ottoman connivance in massacres. Certainly the Ottoman authorities 
made no effective attempts to halt the intercommunal violence which reached 
a peak between May and August 1860. The Maronites were badly defeated, 
because of intracommunal tensions which ensured they did not band together 
to fight the Druze. It was only their defeat and the subsequent massacres and 
plunder of Maronite property that served to overcome the divisions in the 
community. According to Meir Zamir, 10,000 Christians, mostly Maronites, 
were massacred and another 100,000 made homeless.194 The impact of 1860 
has had a lasting effect. Not only was it evoked during 1958, but as recently 
as 1981, in L’Orient Le Jour. Bashir Gemayel made explicit links between the 
events of 1975 and the massacres: The immediate cause of this war was the 
threat addressed to the Maronite community by the Druze leader Kamal
190 FO 787/1383, Mr Finn, Vice Consul of Sidon to Mr. Malmesbury, 22 July 1858, Beirut.
191 Karam Rizk mentions the anti-Christian graffiti painted on the walls of the churches of Acre and Aleppo, as well as 
referring to meetings between elements from the Sunni, Shi'ite and Druze communities, plotting for a general 
massacre of Christians in the region. See Karam Rizk, Le Mont Liban au X IX  Siecle. p. 184; K.S. Salibi, Modern 
History of Lebanon, pp. 93-4. During the Damascus massacres, for instance, the Pasha there had refused to use his 
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Jumblat, a threat that could not but awake in our Christian subconsciousness 
the memory of the 1845 and 1860 massacres’.195
In addition, to the fury of the Maronites the peace settlement that was 
arranged in 1860 made no serious attempt to punish the Druze for their 
excesses, further exacerbating the long-term base of hostility between the 
communities, and of Maronite resentment of Ottoman rule though it did serve 
to bring the Maronite community closer together.196 For practical reasons little 
could be done, given the large numbers involved and the reluctance of 
Maronites to stand up and testify against their attackers. Somewhat 
understandably they feared unchecked reprisals if they did so.197 Yet the 
ultimate importance of 1860 to Maronite communal mythology was that it 
provided Maronite martyrs, to act as a focus for shared grief and pride.198 It 
helped, also, to coalesce political feelings in the Maronite community and to 
further a common Maronite agenda. As Zamir has commented, the tragedy 
'proved' the need for an autonomous entity from their perspective.199 This 
coalesced at a time when European thought was developing concepts of 
national identity justifying the existence of independent states. Elements in the 
Maronite community, aware of these developments, began to express their 
ambitions in nationalist terms, terms which included reference to a specifically- 
defined ‘national’ territory as the rightful location for the Maronite ‘nation’.200 
On this basis, a political agenda began to develop that started to dream of a 
'Lebanese' independence, and which found its first expression in 1861, as a 
result of the reaction of Ottoman authority and European interest to the events 
of 1860 and the consequent attempts to restore stability to Lebanon.
195 Al Havat. 14 June 1985; Bashir Gemayel, L’Orient Le Jour. 23 June 1981.
196 Several prominent Druze chiefs, including Said Jumblat were arrested and tried, but with the exception of Said 
Jumblat, who died from natural causes in prison, the sentences against them were allowed to lapse. As for the lesser 
Druze chiefs involved, along with those Sunni and Shi'ite who had joined in, nothing was done to punish them.
197 K.S. Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon, p. 109.
198 Again, Bashir Gemayel in 1981 referred to the fact that he 'never felt an inferiority complex' as a result of his 
minority background, because of his heritage and links to these martyrs. L’Orient Le Jour. 23 June 1981.
199 Meir Zamir, Formation of Modern Lebanon, p. 8.
200 The traditional sense of community and place, and a shared history and religion all fitted in with the European 
agenda of the time for identifying a national people, and for accepting that such a national people should express that 
national feeiing through a state coinciding with ‘national’ territory. This encouraged the Maronites, who had long 
referred to themselves in the old sense as a ‘nation’, to develop an essentially Christian sense of nationalism in the 
context of the Ottoman empire. It should be stressed, however, that if the Maronites used European terminology as it 
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Anthony Smith, for example, provides a definition that includes the Lebanese, or Maronite national movement as fitting 
his definition of a national movement. See Anthony Smith The Ethnic Revival in the Modern W orld. Cambridge 
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In late 1860 to 1861, a new administrative entity was set up to replace 
the qa’immaqamiyyah. But an underlying belief of Ottoman and European 
authority was that the failure of the qa’immaqamiyyah was at least partly due to 
the extent of territory included in the districts and the settlement of 1861 aimed 
to rectify this. A Mutassarifiyyah, or autonomous province within the empire; 
was set up to replace the qa’immaqamiyyah, regulated by the 1861 Reglement 
Organique and its later modification, the Protocole of 1864. The terms of the 
settlement were worked out so as to modify the impact of central Ottoman 
control over the area.201 Though the Ottomans did their best to restrict this 
return to autonomy by decreeing that though the governor was to be Christian, 
he was also to be non-Lebanese, or in other words, not a Maronite, in practice 
arrangement actually involved a series of compromises worked out by the 
Ottomans and European powers, first between Druze and Maronite interests; 
then between the local wish for a return to complete autonomy and the 
Ottoman desire to restrict it; and finally between the Ottomans who wished to 
retain full sovereignty over the area and the interested European powers who 
sought to ensure their role. The Reglement Organique thus represented an 
official recognition by the Ottomans of Mount Lebanon's unique autonomous 
status at a time when they were otherwise conducting a centralisation policy for 
the empire as a whole. For the first time 'Lebanese' identity had acquired a 
legal definition and was associated with a 'modern' system of administration202 
Moreover, this new entity was essentially Christian in character, with the 
Maronites as the dominant element.203
But while welcoming this dimension, from the Maronite perspective, a 
crucial issue was that the Mutassarifiyyah was, by comparison with the Imarah 
in 1841-2 and the qa’immaqamiyyah, very restricted in area, covering only 
Mount Lebanon itself and omitting the Beirut, Biqa', Tripoli and Sidon regions. 
This was because the international commission working out the settlement had
201 The Reglement Organique gave the interested European powers a voice in the nomination of the mutessarif or 
governor, who was now to be a Christian, for instance. As a further indication of the erosion of Ottoman authority, 
only a small Ottoman garrison could now be stationed in the Mount Lebanon area. The Sanjak  now had its own 
council and administration and drew up its own budget. Its inhabitants enjoyed tax privileges and exemption from 
Ottoman military service, a privilege arranged by European intervention. See Enain Akarli. The Lona Peace, nn. 82-3: 
103-4; 133-47.
Modern, at least in the European sense of the time, which was one valued by the Maronites themselves, and 
certainly a contrast to the rest of Syria.
203 Matii Moosa, The Maronites in Modern Tim es, p. 287; Youssef M. Choueiry, ‘Ottoman Reform and Lebanese 
Patriotism1, in Shehadi & Mills, (eds) Lebanon, p. 70.
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wanted to include in the Mutassarifiyyah only those regions which had what 
they classified as an identifiable ‘Christian’ (i.e.: Maronite) majority, in order to 
reduce the risk of interconfessional conflicts.204 However, since the Maronites 
had become conscious of a need to link their claims to be a national group to a 
territory that could reasonably be described as more than a mere region, and 
with some natural defining boundaries. Mount Lebanon was, in fact, too limited 
an area to qualify. Despite the concessions given to the Maronites in terms of 
internal autonomy within the Mutassarifiyyah, there was thus considerable 
dissatisfaction with the Mutassarifiyyah within the community. The Maronites 
used their mythology to develop an argument that there were ‘natural’ 
geographical boundaries to the area which 'proved' a Maronite ‘historical’ claim 
to predominance within a wider territory. The geographical limits of the 
'country' were defined as Nahr al Kabir in the north, the crest of the Anti- 
Lebanon in the east, and the Litani river in the south. The Maronites ignored 
the fact that in geographical terms the quoted lines were not , in fact, 
boundaries that defined a discrete territorial unit by this reliance on myth rather 
than cold reality.205
However, the Maronites also used myth to argue that their historical 
claim to the areas was underpinned by the contemporary fact that most of the 
Christians (mainly Maronites) in these areas were in favour of annexation to 
Mount Lebanon to create a wider entity. This was undoubtedly the case. But it 
ignored the claims of the Druze and Muslim populations of the areas, and in 
these areas it was these Muslim communities that were in the majority; the 
reason why they had been excluded from the Mutassarifiyyah in the first 
place.206 But cultural national feelings were not the only factor behind the 
Maronite determination to lay claim to these four areas. Another important one 
was the practical consideration that the reduction in area had been seriously 
detrimental to the economy of the Mutassarifiyyah. The Maronites realised
204 This element of European policy was supported by the Ottoman government, because it sought to limit the area 
within which its sovereignty would be restricted and to reduce the revenue loss that would ensue from the economic 
privileges granted to the residents of the area.
05 Matti Moosa, The Maronites in Modern Times, p. 287; Ahmad Beydoun, Identite Confessionnelle. Chapter 1; M 
Jouplain, La Question du Liban: Etude d'Histoire Diplomatique et de Droit International (1908) Fouad Bitan & Cie, 
Jounieh, 1961.
205 Necessarily so, given that consideration of their perspective would destroy the Maronite claim. As John Tosh 
points out, part of the problem with mythology is the extent to which it supports the focus on one’s own community at
the expense of knowledge or understanding of the perspectives of other peoples. John Tosh, The Pursuit of History, 
p. 22.
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that Mount Lebanon alone could never be completely autonomous within the 
Ottoman empire, let alone independent outside it, without an expansion in 
territory.
The economic problems involved were complex and varied. Mount 
Lebanon had a shortage of arable land, with no open plains for the cultivation 
of cereals or high grade pasture. Also it was cut off from the coast and thus 
from access to port facilities and direct access to the external contacts and 
trade upon which so much of Maronite prosperity depended. In addition, Mount 
Lebanon had come to rely on imported food stuffs because their own crops 
were largely cash crops - silk and tobacco. Without port facilities of their own, 
from 1861 the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon faced having to pay heavy tariffs 
to the Ottoman empire.207 From 1861 on, up to the final collapse of the 
Mutassarifiyyah in 1920, the Maronites consequently repeatedly called for the 
'return' of four regions which they regarded as integral to their idea of 
'Lebanon'. They repeatedly quoted their 'historical', 'geographical' and even 
economic arguments to justify their claims over these areas, arguing that the 
Imarah had had clear boundaries and that these should be restored to their 
fullest extent. If it was a specious claim, given the fluctuating size of the 
Imarah in historical reality, it was also a necessary one if Maronite ‘national’ 
ambitions were to have any political and economic reality; and the Maronite 
reasoning to this effect shows the relative sophistication of their political 
mythology and its expression by this period.208
But the Maronites under the Mutassarifiyyah continued to feel 
vulnerable within their restricted territory, fearing both renewed Ottoman 
attempts to restrict their autonomy and Druze hostility. Such fears led as early 
as 1861 to the first concrete expression of Maronite dissatisfaction with the 
new arrangements, both administrative and territorial. A Maronite political 
agenda, supported by the Maronite Patriarch, developed as the terms of the 
Reglement Organique became clear in the course of 1861; one which saw the 
best way of safeguarding current Maronite autonomy as being the return of a
207 Marwan Buheiry, T h e  Rise of the City of Beirut' in Lawrence I Conrand (ed.), The Formation and Perception of the 
Modern Arab World. Darwin Press, Princeton, 1989, pp. 483-97.
Fouad L. Bustani, Introduction a l'Histoire Politique du Liban Modem e. p. 126; Yussuf Saouda, Fi Sabil al Istiklal 
(For Independence), Beirut, 1967.
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Shihabi Maronite as governor instead of a Christian Ottoman representative.209 
This agenda provided an opportunity for a group which can even be termed a 
nationalist Maronite movement to take action to further the cause of Maronite 
autonomy.
The leader was Yussuf Karam, a Maronite figure from the North. The 
movement's supporters were, in general, influenced by the Western ideas on 
nationalism already touched on in terms of the territorial definition of ‘Lebanon’; 
but also by the 'Lebanese' history presented by writers such as Nicola Murad. 
Inspired with patriotic fervour by such writings, and convinced by Western 
inspired ideas of the need to express patriotic feelings in terms of a political 
agenda demanding independent national status within a defined territory, the 
movement rebelled openly in 1861 against Ottoman authority and the current 
administrative system in Mount Lebanon. The uprising of 1861 was defeated 
and Karam went temporarily into exile. But the grievances that had inspired 
the movement and had gained it wide support and not just from the Maronite 
masses still remained. A further rebellion was attempted by Karam in 1866, 
but was again defeated. Karam went into permanent exile in 1867, but his 
actions gave the Maronites a popular hero with whom to identify their national 
feelings and their resistance to the Mutassarifiyyah1 s limits. Of great 
significance anyway in terms of myth creation in this community, the fact that 
the Maronite Church had supported Karam and his ideas, even though it 
stopped short of open rebellion, ensured his continuing high profile as a 
national’ hero.210 As Zamir has pointed out The strong support he [Karam] 
continued to receive even after his expulsion proved how deeply nationalist 
ideas were already rooted in the Maronite community'.211
However, especially after the failure of Karam's rebellions there was 
little chance of the Maronites succeeding in their attempts at expansion of the 
Mutassarifiyyah. The European powers approved the administration of the 
entity as successive governors set up programmes to ensure administrative 
honesty and efficiency and to develop a sound infrastructure for Mount
Engin Akarli, The Long Peace, p. 37.
210 Meir Zamir, Formation of Modern Lebanon, pp. 10-11.
211 Meir Zamir, ibid. p. 11.
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Lebanon by setting up public works programmes. But despite these efforts 
between 1861 and 1914, many Maronites emigrated from the Mutassarifiyyah,: 
many to Beirut though many also overseas to places like the USA, Egypt and 
West Africa.212 This exodus, however, did not erode Maronite communal 
feeling. It can be said to have deepened rather, both amongst those who went 
and those who stayed. France played a significant role in this development, 
endorsing Maronite national claims in its political and intellectual rhetoric, 
though not in terms of active interference.213 As a community and a culture, 
the Maronites flourished between 1861 and 1914. By contrast, the state of the 
various Muslim communities in the area of modern Lebanon during the same 
period was far less satisfactory. Inside or outside the Mutassarifiyyah, they all 
shared a considerable resentment over the new concessions granted to the 
Maronites and other Christians, though this was especially acute for the Druze 
as so many of them did live within the Mutassarifiyyah. As effective cultural 
and economic contacts between the Maronites and the West increased, and 
the Maronites became more prosperous and vocal in their demands, these 
communities had to watch the Ottoman empire decline ever more rapidly, 
culturally, politically and economically.
If the Maronites feared the long-term consequences of not having their 
own coastal access, Muslims increasingly feared the reality, as it seemed to 
them, of unofficial Christian expansionism and domination. The Druze were, 
according to Salibi, 'reconciled after 1861 to their status as a minority'.214 But 
acceptance, faute de mieux, can hardly be termed a permanent reconciliation 
and renouncing of past hostilities. Rather it was a continuation of co­
habitation, as the Druze there realised they had littie other option. The same 
held true for the other Muslim communities required to cope with this increased 
practical and cultural Maronite self-confidence.
By comparison with the increasing confidence and coherence of the 
Maronite 'national' culture, the Muslim communities immediately after the
212 Albert Hourani & Nadim Shehadi (eds), The Lebanese in the World: A Century of Emigration. I.B. Tauris, London, 
1992, pp. 4; 21-22. See also Meir Zamir, Foundation of Modern Lebanon, p. 15, who argues that approximately one 
quarter of the population of the Mutassarifiyyah emigrated.
213 K.S. Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon, p. 114; Meir Zamir, Foundation of Modern Lebanon, pp. 16-17.
214 K.S. Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon, p. 118.
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setting up of the Mutassarifiyyah had little to match it, and certainly nothing that 
could be termed a national feeling. But the work of missionaries amongst the 
Druze and the Sunni, in terms of spreading literacy and setting up an Arabic 
press for example, did begin to have a real impact, though not in terms of 
conversions.215 By the end of the nineteenth century popular literacy amongst 
the Druze and Sunni had made enormous advances. As a result intellectuals 
in these communities became better equipped to take Western ideas and 
extract from them those concepts which were not in direct conflict with Islam. 
They could then utilise these to create coherent and widely acceptable cultural 
concepts. It was a contrast to the cultural development of Maronite ideas, 
where the Western contact was cherished for its own sake. But as in the 
Maronite community, such skills promoted the spread of more uniform 
versions of Druze and Sunni myth-based community identity.
An Arabic literary revival developed in the Islamic world at the end of the 
nineteenth century; one that was centred in Lebanon, indeed even in Beirut. 
This sought to draw on an indigenous cultural tradition in the area, not a 
Western one, in evolving a mythology. While this was a literary reawakening 
that involved both Christians and Muslims, its most important effect was to 
encourage a wider cultural reawakening amongst Muslims generally, and this 
was very obvious among the Lebanese Muslims. Drawing on ideas initially put 
forward by Christian Arabs a concept of 'nationalism' was evolved that drew 
essentially on the idea of Arabia rather than being pan-lslamic. It looked back 
to a pre-lslamic origin and then to a golden age in the early days of Islam, and 
went on to argue that the days of Arab glory had been stolen by the Persians 
and the Turks. Now, it was argued, there was the opportunity for Arab history 
to be rediscovered and made the basis of a great new cultural and national 
movement that was essentially secular.216 It is, in this context, interesting to 
note that it was during this period at the end of the nineteenth century that as 
Muslim historiography developed in Lebanon and began to take an interest in a 
past golden age, the period of the Crusades first assumed a significance for
215 K.S. Salibi. Modern History of Lebanon, d p . 113-15.
216 Ahmad Beydoun, Identite Confessionnelle. pp. 25-33; Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon under 
French Mandate. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1958, p. 52.
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the Muslim element in the region in terms of their myths relating to a 
characterisation of the Maronites in particular.
For example, during the period of the Crusader Kingdoms, 1098-1291, 
part of the region of Lebanon had been under Christian rule, and the first real 
links between the Roman Catholic and Maronite Churches had developed. 
More, while some Maronites did clash with the crusaders, many others had 
supported them, either actively or passively.217 Muslim historians began to 
research this period from their own perspective, and, ignoring the evidence of 
co-operation from their own side in the past, began to argue that Muslims had 
long-standing grounds, as well as the more recent ones, for resentment 
against the Maronite population in Lebanon.218 Such ideas made a certain 
progress in Lebanon, as elsewhere, in the last years of the nineteenth and the 
first years of the twentieth century. But while they helped to restore a degree 
of pride to the Lebanese Muslim communities, and a feeling of a worthwhile 
culture with long historical roots to give it global credibility, it was not nationalist 
in the way that the Maronite cultural feeling had become. It was part of a sense 
of a greater Arab entity, comprising a ‘Syria’ including Lebanon, and Iraq and 
Arabia.
The final case study in this chapter concerns the period 1908-9 in 
particular, when a series of events took place which were to accelerate the 
cultural and national developments and differences of the Maronites and the 
Muslim communities of Lebanon; the latter in the context of a general Arab 
feeling, and to coalesce still further the different communal agendas and 
perceptions of the 'other1. The decline of the Ottoman empire had, in Turkey, 
encouraged the development of an essentially secular Turkish nationalism, 
encapsulated in the so-called Young Turk movement. This aimed to restore 
the central authority of the Ottomans in an essentially modern and secular way, 
and it involved eradication of any separatist feeling within the Ottoman empire, 
whether Christian or Arabist.219 The involvement of the army in the Young
217 There were, in terms of actual historical accuracy, also Muslim leaders who had co-operated with the crusaders, 
such as Bani Ammar in Tripoli. However, this element in the history of the period was ignored, largely.
218 K.S. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon, pp. 157-158; see also Michael Johnson, Class and Client in Beirut. 
Ithaca Press, London, 1986, p. 16, for comments on the development of Arab nationaiist ideas as well as 'Lebanese 
ones relating to this concept.
219 Engin Akarli, The Long P eace, pp. 71-3.
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Turk revolt was particularly ominous for the non-Turkish parts of the empire, 
given that it provided the Young Turks with the means to enforce their policies 
of Turkification.220
Until this time the Muslim Arabs of Lebanon had been willing to accept 
the Turks as brothers in Islam, even if they did blame them for denigrating 
Arab culture by wresting control of the Islamic world from them. But the 
activities of the Young Turk regime ensured that they felt alienated and 
resentful.221 The reaction was to speed up the development of a popular Arab 
feeling in areas like Lebanon, where Arab elites were beginning to protest 
against young Turk policies. This was done via demands for specifically Arab 
entities to be recognised and protected by being given special administrative 
entities. At the same time the Maronites and other Christians in the region of 
Lebanon were distinctly alarmed by the Young Turks. While they still expected 
to rely on European protection for their special status, they were worried by the 
apparent degree of European approval for the developments initiated by the 
Young Turks.222 Hence the appeal of Abbe Louis Al Khazin to Pius X, in which 
he begged the Pope to assure 'la securite de la nation Maronite au Liban et a 
preserver sa foi dans des situations critiques1.223 Even if the plans of the 
Young Turks did not mean an automatic ending to the Mutassarifiyyah they 
feared the impact on their continuing plans for independent status, and 
demands for an expansion of their territory.
After the setting up of the Young Turk regime in 1908, one effect of the 
Arabic cultural reawakening in Lebanon became apparent. Those amongst the 
Christian population (which included some Maronites, but by no means a 
majority) who supported the concept of an Arab nationalism came together 
with members of the Muslim elite there, promoting the development of an 
essentially ‘Arab’ mythology. It was a limited collaboration quantitatively and in 
terms of a practical agenda. However, some historians have identified this as
220 K.S. Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon, p. 157.
221 Ibid.
222 Engin Akarli, The Long Peace, p. 75.
223 Abbe Louis Al Khazin to Pope Pius X, undated but from the internal evidence of the letter from the period 1909-14, 
in the unpublished Al Khazin Family Papers. The letter seeks particular assurances that the Young Turks will not be 
allowed to secularise the educational system; by now a critical element in the power of the Maronite Church itself, and 
in the maintenance and development of Maronite communal or 'national1 feeling. It is worth noting the reference here 
to the Maronite 'nation'; by this time it is clearly meant in the modern 'nationalist' sense.
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the start of modern Arab nationalism, with real implications for the separation 
of Lebanon from the Ottoman empire and the institution of a nation-state of 
Lebanon based on a compromise between Christian and Muslim elements.224 
Yet such interventions gloss over the very different agendas. The Maronites, in 
particular, sought full independence from Ottoman rule, while the Muslims 
would have been content with an arrangement guaranteeing special status to 
an Arab homeland within the empire. The Muslims in Syria and Lebanon 
hoped to invoke British support for this, using their interpretation of a great 
Arabic historical and cultural heritage and a shared language as the basis of 
their claim.225 By 1912 these demands were alarming the Maronites who 
feared that an Arab empire would still be essentially Islamic in character and 
that they would lose out if Western sympathies put the Arab case higher on 
their agenda than the Maronite case. Such a development might well be in 
British interests, for example. If such an Arab empire was set up they feared 
they would even lose the autonomy they had under the Mutassarifiyyah,226 
Maronite fears about Muslim attitudes towards them, both in Lebanon and 
around it, were undoubtedly heightened in the years 1911-14. in those years 
popular pan-lslamic feelings in the region were sparked off by fears of foreign 
invasion, by resentment of the Turkish programme of intervention and above 
all, by the humiliation of Turkish arms in the Balkan wars.227
With the Ottoman empire clearly on the brink of collapse, the Lebanese 
Muslims viewed the active involvement of the French in the region with even 
increasing fear of imminent occupation. This, they were convinced, would lead 
to the setting up of a Maronite Lebanese state with a Muslim minority at the 
mercy of the Maronites, and stretching to areas of real importance to Sunni, 
Druze and Shi’ite communities. Muslims leaders attempted to forestall such 
developments for seeking reforms of the area’s administration as a whole, 
including all the areas coveted by the Maronites. it was in this context that 
Muslim leaders sought to enlist Maronite acceptance of continued existence
224 Georges Antonius, The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement, first published 1939, re­
printed Librairie du Liban, Beirut, 1959, Chapter 5.
Zein N. Zein, The Emergence of Arab Nationalism, with a background study of Arab-Turkish Relations in the Near 
East, first printed 1958, re-printed Caravan books, New York, 1973, pp. 54-9.
226 Youssef M. Choueiri, 'Ottoman Reform and Lebanese Patriotism1, in Shehadi & Mills (eds), Lebanon, p. 75; Engin 
Akarli, The Long P eace, p. 78.
227 Engin Akarli. Ibid.
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within the Ottoman empire in an autonomous, essentially Arab entity covering 
the area of Lebanon. Offers were made of shared equal representation in any 
future administration, even though in such a province the Christians would, 
numerically, be a minority.228 Some Christians were attracted by the idea, 
even some of them Maronites. But on the whole it won little widespread 
Christian support.229 Yet in the context of increased Turkish efforts at crushing 
Arab and Maronite separatist efforts in 1913, a genuine degree of co-operation 
even without a concrete agenda for any joint future did begin to emerge. 
However it was still a co-operation relating more to co-habitation, being based 
on mutual hostility to the current Turkish regime rather than a development of 
cultural unity based on shared local feelings and ambitions. The Maronites still 
sought independence, and most Muslims, autonomy within the empire.
It was in this atmosphere, then, that in the two years before World War 
One various societies and communities were developed by the Maronites as 
centres for political activity, and as the mediums through which the goal of an 
independent political state could be achieved. Despite an undoubtedly small 
membership, these groups had a great influence on the expression of Maronite 
Christian aspirations in national terms.230 In addition, such groups presided 
over an expansion of the secular element in Maronite communal feeling, as 
many of them were Western educated lawyers and journalists, less susceptible 
to the control of the Maronite Church.231 These groups sustained the links 
with France, through secret contacts with French representatives in this pre­
war period, laying the ground for Maronite involvement in the setting up of the 
Mandate. The objective of such groups was an independent Lebanon with 
extended boundaries, but as an entity under French protection. Such 
developments could not aid the spread of co-operation between Maronites and 
Muslims.232, However, matters were brought to crisis point in 1914 with the
220 Such an offer can be seen as the precursor of the National Pact of 1943, see Chapter 3.
229 Engin Akarli, The Long Peace, p. 100.
230 K.S. Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon, p. 159.
231 One of the first such societies was A I nahda A l Lubnaniyyah (the Lebanese revival).
232 See Claude Dubar & Salim Nasr, Les Classes Sociaie au Liban. p. 322; Michael Johnson, Class and Client in 
Beirut, pp. 16; 22; 25. The latter argues that Christian economic dominance was resented by the Muslims, but that the 
commercial links did create some sort of link between elements within the communities, essentially the 
commercial/mercantile classes and the elites or notables. Certainly these elements shared a common wariness of the 
impact of a popular radical movement that might endanger their political and economic dominance. Yet equally, 
Maronite leaders started using rhetoric of various kinds, including an appeal to religious values, to sustain their power, 
thereby raising confessional tensions. This tactic was also adopted by Sunni leaders; and the tendency of leaders of 
both communities to use these tactics continued, as subsequent chapters will show.
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outbreak of the First World War. The impact of this war on community 
relations in Lebanon was crucial.
The Turkish regime, allied with Germany, installed a Muslim Ottoman 
governor in Lebanon, Ahmed Jamal Pasha. His rule was marked by a degree 
of harshness and cruelty towards any in the region with separatist aspirations. 
Thus the Maronites and Muslim Arab nationalists became particular targets. A 
number were executed adding to the list of Maronite ‘nationalist’ martyrs and 
creating ‘Arab nationalist’ ones. It has to be said that the links of both groups 
with the Allies ensured such harsh treatment.233 In 1916, however, came the 
beginnings of dramatic change for the Ottoman empire and consequently for 
Lebanon. Encouraged by the British, Arab revolts spread through the Ottoman 
empire in the Middle East. In Lebanon the resultant collapse of Ottoman 
authority left an Arab administration in charge, under the leadership of ‘Umar 
Al Da'uq, a local Sunni Muslim leader. In 1918, Faisal, the son of Sharif 
Hussein, arrived in Lebanon with a token force to signify endorsement of this 
development, as part of the claim to the setting up of an Arab kingdom, 
including all of Syria, and including the Lebanon. The Maronites were 
dismayed, and the Muslim communities delighted, but these feelings were 
swiftly reversed. The intervention of the victorious European powers was the 
key to understanding this development - and the role of these powers in the 
region will form the focus of the next chapter, because they also were affected 
by the myths when exposed to them, and formulated policy that took such 
myths into account in most cases, rather than making a dispassionate 
assessment of the situation and then formulating policy.
233 K.S. Salibi. Modern History of Lebanon, pp. 159-61.
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Chapter 2
External Perspectives in the Historical Setting
One constant in twentieth century Lebanese politics has been the fact 
that each of the major communities has held to myths that have involved an 
external power identified within a community perspective as a ‘protector’ of its 
particular interests. For the Maronites in particular, such myths have become 
part of the unconscious collective tradition of the community, adhered to 
uncritically but also constantly susceptible to reworking to suit a particular 
situation or crisis. But such perspectives are sustainable because of the 
collaboration in such traditions of external powers, for a range of reasons 
relating to their own agendas over time, and because of the success of 
indigenous communities in presenting a community profile likely to evoke 
sympathy. This, in turn, has resulted in the creation of mythologies relating to 
Lebanese communities (and indeed the Middle East as a whole) on the part of 
such external powers. As well as the impact on community identities within 
Lebanon, the impact has been the establishment of a series of myths about 
‘Lebanon’, particularly Western ones, that, as this chapter will demonstrate, 
were based on superficialities rather than on a genuine, historically-based 
understanding of the region.234 The importance of such shared myths relating 
to community identity at times of crisis such as 1958 was great, because of 
the habit of the indigenous communities of invoking ‘protection’ from outside 
forces to defend their interests; and because of the willingness of the external 
powers to be drawn in.
Marwan Buheiry has commented that in the case of Lebanon there is no 
instance of internal conflict without external intervention, something which he 
sees as ‘constituting perhaps a law of Lebanese history’.235 His interpretation
234 See John Tosh, The Pursuit of History. Longman, London, 1984, p. 3, for some historiographical comment on such
processes,
35 Marwan Buheiry ‘External intervention and internal wars in Lebanon: 1770-1938’ in Laurence i Conrand (ed.); The 
Formation and Perception of the Modern Arab World. Darwin Press Inc, Princeton, 1989, p. 137. Buheiry also
commented on a series of further external interventions in Lebanon without the excuse of internal conflict to justify 
intervention, but that concept does not seem to be borne out by case studies of external interventions. Certainly it was 
not a factor in those interventions highlighted in Chapter 1, and was not a factor in 1958.
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that territorially and culturally, Lebanon’s strategic position has ‘provided a 
fertile ground for the patron-client game in international relations’, where the 
different Lebanese communities have considered that they ‘possessed one or 
more traditional sponsors’ from outside Lebanon and have involved these 
sponsors in Lebanese affairs from time to time, is a useful one through which 
to consider external involvement.236 It is also useful for an understanding of 
the dimension external perspectives have added to the evolution of community 
mythologies and so, identities, over time, both in terms of experience and the 
rhetoric used to define such identities.237
One of the most significant external contacts throughout Lebanon’s 
history has traditionally been with Western Europe, including the papacy, from 
the period of the Crusades, at the end of the eleventh century.238 The 
crusader period was to have lasting effects, if only because the involvement of 
the Western powers in the region was the result of an appeal from that area, 
and not a question of ‘unprovoked’ Western interference.239 Essentially many 
of the assumptions made by external Western European powers, notably 
France and the Vatican, about the region of Lebanon and its inhabitants have 
their origins in this period, or are at least perceived to have done so.240 In the 
eleventh century Western Europe or Latin Christendom was emerging from the 
chaos of the previous century and beginning to regain confidence in itself and 
its wider destiny as the only true guardian of the Christian message. The 
Crusades were in many ways a manifestation of these feelings, particularly the 
feelings of superiority felt by Western or Latin Christianity towards other
238 Jbid, p. 138.
237 This rhetoric has increasingly related to the European concepts of nationalism; see Chapter 1, p. 88.
238 The First Crusade started in 1096-7. For comments on the European background at the time of the crusades, see 
David Nicholas, The Evolution of the Medieval World. Society. Government and Thought in Europe 1312-1500. 
Longman Group Ltd, London, 1992, pp. 264-5 in particular.
239 The Byzantine emperor, Alexius I Comnenus appealed to Pope Urban II (1088-99) for aid against Turkish invaders 
which he saw as threatening Byzantium. However, the emperor had expected cash aid and a few reinforcements, 
rather than the crusading army which actually turned up; especially since that army turned its attention against the 
Muslim ruler of the Holy Land, rather than helping Byzantium to repel the Turkish invaders from Central Asia. See  
David Nicholas, The Evolution of the Medieval World, pp. 262-6; Jonathan Riiey-Smith, The Crusades. Athlone Press, 
London, 1987, pp. 1-2; Maurice Keen. Medieval Europe. Penguin Books, London, 1968, p. 124.
240 See, for example, Edward S. Creasy, History of the Ottoman Turks from the Beginning of their Empire to the 
Present Time. London, 1878, reprint Khayat, Beirut, 1961, p. 64; also J.A.R. Marriott, The Eastern Question. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1951, p. 66. This work explicitly sees the Eastern Question, from the European perspective, 
as dating back to the crusading period.
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versions of Christianity notably those prevalent in the Middle East. They also 
involved a mixture of religious and materialistic fervour.241
The existence of even ‘corrupt1 Christian communities such as the 
Maronites in the area provided further justification for the crusading 
enterprise.242 If the Franks were the natural leaders of Christians everywhere, 
then it was their duty to liberate the Holy Land and recover Jerusalem - but 
equally, Frankish willingness to undertake the task was tangible proof of their 
having been granted the leading role and having the right to judge their fellow 
Christians! Thus they could also argue that they were coming to rescue such 
communities from their own heresy, which Byzantium had failed to do, as well 
as rescuing the region as a whole from Islam, for which they would be duly 
rewarded by God.243 Such justifications laid the foundations on which later 
mythology about the Maronites in particular could be laid.
However, if their motivation was plain to the Crusaders, the ‘infidel 
barbarians1 of the region were apart from anything else puzzled by western 
Christian motivation and horrified by what they saw as the ‘barbarism1 of the 
crusaders.244 Faced with an invading army, Islam prepared to defend its 
territory and its faith. As Islam mobilised to resist the crusaders, the region of 
Lebanon saw a split amongst its inhabitants which was to begin the process of 
the creation of Western stereotypes, and so perceptions, of the region's 
peoples: stereotypes based more on confessional assumptions than anything 
else. The Maronites, or elements of that community at least, came to side with 
the Christian West and earned a special status in the eyes of the West as a 
result.245 Even those Maronites that did not openly or actually side with Latin
It is not intended here to go into great detail on the Crusades. But it is important to make the following comments. 
W estern Europe had an established tendency by 1096 to see the heresies that afflicted it as coming from the East, 
with the consequent impression that only Western Christianity preserved the 'true' faith in unadulterated form. This 
resulted in hostility not just towards Islam but also towards Byzantium. Both states and individuals hoped for material 
gain as well as a demonstration of moral superiority from these adventures. See Maurice Keen, Medievai Europe, p. 
123; Jonathan Riley-Smith, The Crusades, pp. 4; 5-7; 14-15; Norman Daniel, The Arabs and Medieval Europe. 
Longman Group Ltd, 1979, p. 127.
242 The conviction of moral superiority comes out clearly from the messages of Pope Urban to his flock, rallying 
support for the Crusades, where he talks of the Franks as the natural leaders of Christianity. See J.R.S. Phillips, The 
Medieval Expansion of Europe, p. 117; Maurice Keen. Medieval Europe, pp. 123-5.
Such a reward was to be both earthly and heavenly; communal and individual. See Norman Daniel, The Arabs and 
Medievai Europe, p. 117; Maurice Keen, Medieval Europe, pp. 123-5.
2 This horror was not just religious, distaste at the ‘barbarity’ of the personal hygiene and medical knowledge of the 
crusading invaders was also expressed. See David Nicholas, The Evolution of the Medieval World, p. 266.
245 Jbjd. P- 263. This was increasingly invoked by the Maronites as well, especially from the nineteenth century on. 
See, for example, Henri Lammens, La Svrie: Precis Historiaue. first printed 1921, reprinted Dar Lahad Khater, Beirut, 
1994, pp. 146-7. W hile Henri Lammens may be a  problematic historical source, he is useful in the indication he
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Christendom were regarded by the Crusaders as doing so, earning them the 
status of ‘natural allies’ of Christendom. In Western eyes this had the effect of 
creating an enduring myth about their ‘right’ to interfere in the region, which 
could be evoked at times of need even if relations with Middle East Christian 
communities were not of regular importance. Of equal long-term significance, 
the Maronites were also seen increasingly as natural allies of Christendom by 
the world of Islam - possibly having the effect of driving them further towards 
the West’s side in the conflict between Christendom and Islam.246
It might be expected that the Druze would, by contrast and in the 
context of Islamic expectations, take the side of Islam in the conflict. In reality 
the Druze position in this period was much more complex and their motivation 
much more ambiguous to outside perceptions. Druze ideas of their own 
localised self-interest, rather than any sense of loyalty to the Islamic world, 
dictated their actions. As a result, the majority of the Druze were perfectly 
prepared to take the side of the crusaders rather than that of Islam if it seemed 
to suit their agenda at the time.247 The long-term effect of this willingness to 
collaborate had little impact on Islamic perceptions of the Druze 248 As regards 
Western perceptions, it did have some effect, but the Druze had little 
importance in Western eyes over succeeding centuries until a revival of 
Western expansionism in the nineteenth century. The same was not true of 
the links between the Western world and the Maronite community - or at least 
elements of the latter in the period from the fourteenth to the nineteenth 
century.
provides of later European traditions and perceptions, as well as Maronite ones, of the crusading period. See K.S. 
Salibi, ‘Islam and Syria in the Writings of Henri Lammens’, in P. Lewis & B. Holt (eds), Historians of the Middle East. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1962, p. 342. See also Chapter 1, p. 89 for comments on Maronite and Muslim 
perspectives on this period.
40 The evidence would seem to indicate that the crusaders almost took it for granted that the Maronites would look to 
Christendom and that they treated the Maronite community in the light of that expectation. See M. Jouplain, La 
Question du Liban: Etude d'Histoire Diplomatique et de Droit International, first published 1908, reprinted Fouad Biban 
& Co, Jounieh, Lebanon, 1961, p. 61.
247 This was particularly so for the period 1100-1125, when the crusaders were occupying the area of the modern 
Lebanese coast, more or less, and the Druze community felt it necessary to collaborate with them. However, later in 
the crusading period, at least, both the Franks and the Muslims were to take harsh measures against them
248 The crusading period has traditionally been of much less significance to the Islamic world than the Western world 
and so participation by a group like the Druze who were apostate anyway was of less long-term significance than their 
general apostasy - an interesting contrast to the emphasis laid on Maronite participation by the W est. As Bernard 
Lewis points out, at the time and subsequently, the crusades were ‘not regarded by Muslims as something separate 
and distinctive’. Bernard Lewis, ‘The Use by Muslim Historians of Non-Muslim Sources', in Lewis & Holt (eds), 
Historians of the Middle East, p. 181. See also Henri Lammens La Svrie: Precis Historiaue. pp. 195-6.
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The point that impressed itself firmly on the psyches of those involved in 
sustaining such links was that they were not just informal. Nor were they 
simply religious. With the failure of the crusading movement, secular Western 
interest in the region of Lebanon was primarily economic until the late 
eighteenth century, when it again acquired a strategic dimension. France was 
the Western power that succeeded in sustaining long term links during this 
period, though attempts were made periodically by other powers to gain 
economic benefits for themselves in this way. In the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries, for example, the Italian Medici family attempted to create a sphere of 
influence in Lebanon. Venice was involved in trade with other parts of the 
Ottoman empire, and sought to take over from France in Lebanon. But both 
efforts were abortive.249 France had, by the early modern period, established 
the basis for lasting and sustained contact, very largely on its own terms, by 
establishing a presumption that was both ideological and practical that 
acknowledged them as the superior element in the link. This link originated in 
the efforts of the French monarchy to assert its power in Christendom. Using 
the Crusades as part of these efforts, Louis IX promised the Maronites his 
special protection in 1259.250 The assumption of French ‘special protection’ 
was to be sustained and formalised by successive Kings of France because of 
the tangible benefits it brought to France. Letters to this effect exist from Kings 
of France from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, including Henry IV, 
Louis XIV, Louis XV and Louis Phillippe.251 French influence was even 
acknowledged by Islamic authority at times. For example, a treaty was signed 
in 1535 between Francis I of France and Sulayman the Magnificent, when 
France gained privileges which included a tacit acknowledgement of its role as 
a protector of the Maronite community.252 French involvement in the trade of 
the region focused on the silk trade from this period, and thereby on the 
Maronites, because it was the Maronites that dominated this trade; and it was 
to French advantage to play on the ‘traditional links’ between France and the
249 Henri Lammens, La Svrle: Precis Historiaue. pp. 242-5; M Jouplain, La Question du Liban. pp. 104-6; 111.
250 Later canonised, something which undoubtedly added to the status of the French monarchy, Louis IX (reigned 
1226-70) was seeking in this instance to gain an advantage over Henry III of England, his rival both in Europe and in 
the Holy Land.
251 See Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples. Faber & Faber, London, 1991, pp. 258-9, for instance
252 France at this time was seeking to develop economic links with the Ottoman empire as a whole, though it was not a 
major part of its trading policy. See Henri Lammens, La Svrie: Precis Historiaue. p. 242.
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Maronites.253 But though the context in which the link operated between 
France and the Lebanon changed, as well as French motivations for sustaining 
the link, the presumption of a French cultural superiority did not disappear, 
rather it strengthened.
It was not just France that developed a ‘special relationship’ based on 
an exchange of presumptions rather than realities with the Maronite community 
in the crusading period, and then sustained it. The spiritually and temporally 
ambitious Latin or Roman Church also became directly involved through the 
channel of the Maronite Church.254 Serious missionary efforts brought the 
Maronite Church into a form of union with Rome in 1180. The ‘heresy’ of the 
original Maronite Church was forgotten and Rome worked hard to improve on 
and to expand its links with the Maronite Church, with considerable success.255 
The Papacy established for instance the concept that the appointment of a 
Maronite Patriarch had to be ‘approved’ by Rome as a result of which the 
Patriarch was given a special ambassadorial status. Many Maronite clerics 
trained or studied in Italy from the late fifteenth century and a Maronite college 
was established in Rome in 1584256 But the Vatican did not just rely on the 
presence of Maronites in Rome for sustaining its influence in the Maronite 
Church and through that, on the community as a whole. Roman Catholic 
missionaries (Franciscans, Jesuits, Capucins and Lazarists mainly) were 
active in Lebanon itself, working hard to develop the links between the Papacy 
and the Maronite Church still further. From the late sixteenth century in 
particular, these missionaries materially increased the importance of the 
Maronite Patriarch and the Church itself in the localities, but also strengthened 
the confessional base of Maronite community identity by emphasising the links 
with Rome.257
253 ibid, pp. 242-5.
254 Indeed, Rome was able to view its efforts with the Maronite Church as one of its few, as well as one of its lasting, 
successes stemming from the crusading movement.
255 M. Jouplain, La Question du Liban. p. 38.
256 K.S. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon. Caravan Books, New York, 1977, pp. 12; 122.
257 In the context of the Imarah, the Roman Church ensured its missionaries used their influence with Fakhr Al Din II, 
for instance, and with subsequent amirs, to advance Maronite interests - and they made sure that the Maronites were 
aware of this. The Capuchins were of particular importance during the time of Fakhr Al Din II, when they played on his 
ambition to develop an independent power base in Lebanon. See Henri Lammens, La Svrie: Precis Historiaue. pp. 
244-5.
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From the late eighteenth century, in the context of the weakening of the 
Ottoman empire relative to the power of European states, the Middle East, 
including Lebanon, again became a focus of interest to a number of those 
states, and not just to France. The Eastern Question, as it is commoniy 
termed, in this period can be summed up as the clashes and tensions 
surrounding relations between the Ottoman empire and the Christian West, 
focusing on the relations between Ottoman authority and minority communities, 
especially Christians in that empire.258 These minority communities 
increasingly sought protection and support from the West and used the rhetoric 
of the West to express their ambitions for autonomy, or even independence, 
within that empire. This had an important impact on intercommunal relations in 
Lebanon, especially in terms of the expectations expressed by the Maronites 
on the basis of co-habitation with Muslim communities, and the reactions of 
those communities to the Maronite agenda. These expectations and reactions 
were made comprehensible to the West in relation to the background of myths 
already established about the region. At this period, only France had a serious 
economic interest in the region, through her involvement in the silk trade. For 
other European powers, interest in the region of Lebanon was a mixture of 
strategic interests, and cultural imperialism, including a renewed missionary 
fervour, but this time focusing on a largely Protestant evangelicalism, which in 
itself led to myth creation.259
In addition, the Enlightenment movement had seen a hardening of 
European cultural attitudes towards non-Europeans, because one product of 
Enlightenment thought was a habit of ‘classifying’ and ‘listing’ the objects of the 
natural world, both animate and inanimate. Long before the publication of 
Darwinian ideas, Europeans had become accustomed to ranking things around 
them according to ideas of ‘superiority’ and ‘inferiority’. The ranking was 
extended to human peoples and the ranking here tended to be based on 
physical appearance and the resemblance of cultures to European cultures.
250 See M.S. Anderson, The Eastern Question. 1774-1923. Macmillan, London 1966 and William Doyle, The Old 
European Order. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992, pp. 288-9. For a non-European perspective see K.S. Salibi, 
Modern History of Lebanon, pp. 16-17; Malcolm Yapp, The Making of the Modern Middle East. 1792-1923. Longman, 
London, 1987, pp. 59; 114.
259 K.S. Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon, pp. 56-7; D Chevallier, La Societe du Mont-Liban a I' epoaue de la 
Revolution industrielle en Europe. Librarie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, Paris, 1971, pp. 202-208, p. 293.
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The higher the degree of resemblance, the more ‘civilised’ the people and thus 
the higher up the ranking they were placed. But such exercises also included 
potential for a people moving up the rank order by improving their civilisation 
(and consequently their physical appearance would also become refined). 
One of the key things in this was possession of or subsequent acceptance of 
Christianity. The comment of one nineteenth century children’s text gives an 
indication of the kinds of stereotyping established:
We will not say that the Turks cannot mend, but that they are 
not a hopeful people; they are trying for the externals of our 
civilisation without the Christian faith on which in every 
instance it has been based. Before any great improvement 
can take place in their condition, they must....renounce 
almost every quality which we in Western Europe have 
hitherto considered to be synonymous with the name of a 
Turk.260
The publication of Darwin’s ideas and the subsequent development of ideas of 
social Darwinism simply gave scientific reinforcement to already established 
myths. So Lebanon could be valued because it had a well-established 
‘civilised’ Christian community which in European eyes gave the Europeans a 
duty of protection over that community. This enabled the West, or at least the 
Roman Catholic element in it, to endorse unequivocally their preference for 
their Maronites. The Western Protestant perspective saw the Maronites as 
Christian but in need of help to see the light, and identified the Druze as a 
backward group, greatly in need of Western help if they were to be ‘improved’ 
and converted. In particular, this helps to explain the nature of the nineteenth 
century British (and American) interest in the area, and to give the background 
to Anglo-French rivalry.261
In terms of European imperialism in the nineteenth century, as Edward
Said argues, ‘In the expansion of the great Western Empires, profit and hope
of further profit were obviously tremendously important, but there is more than
that to imperialism and colonialism’. Said adds, furthermore:
Neither imperialism nor colonialism is a simple act of 
accumulation and acquisition. Both are supported and even
EeQ Mrs Bessie Parkes-Belioc, Peoples of the World. Cassell, Petter & Gilpin, London 1867, p. 158.
261 John Spagnolo, ‘Franco-British Rivalry in the Middle East', in Nadim Shehadi & Dana Haffar Mills, Lebanon. History 
of Conflict & Consensus. !.B. Tauris, London 1988, p. 107.
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impelled by impressive ideological formations that include 
notions that certain territories and people require and 
beseech domination as well as forms of knowledge affiliated 
with domination.262
This perspective was not new in Lebanon’s experience of contact with the
West: French missionaries had long seen themselves as having a ‘civilising’
mission in the region.263 However, its expression in the shape of paternalism
and in the context of a European global dominance such as existed in the
nineteenth century was new.264 In terms of attitudes towards the Lebanese
communities, confessionally based stereotypes were still powerful. It is
instructive to note the Protestant British attitude of the time towards the
Maronites and the Druze in Mount Lebanon:
Taken by themselves, they (the Druze) are a race with 
many good qualities - bold, active and industrious, but 
their sense of religious animosity once roused, they are 
most ferocious, and while they retain their peculiar tenets, 
there is no hope of their ever becoming a really civilised 
people.265
The Maronites, identified as ‘members of the Church of Rome’, were an 
improvement on the Druze - being, for one thing, physically cleaner. But 
implicit in the description of the Maronites and their dispute with their Druze 
neighbours was the idea that despite their Christianity, they were not really 
civilised because their form of Christianity, Roman Catholicism, was an inferior 
or debased form of Christianity as compared to Protestantism.266
Popular British mythology about the region was affected by the 
perspective of Charles Churchill, who settled in Lebanon in the mid-century 
and used his writings to spread his vision of a future when the region would
262 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism. Chatto & Windus, 1993, pp. 8-9. Said also refers to ‘An almost 
metaphysical obligation to rule subordinate, inferior or less advanced people', Ibid. p. 9. The various communities of 
Lebanon, Christian or not, certainly fell into this subordinate category.
263 Henri Laurens, Le Rovaume Impossible. Armand Colin, Paris, 1990, p. 118.
264 See, for example, Kathryn Tidrick, Empire and the English Character. I.B. Tauris, London, 1990, p. 3 for some 
comments on paternalism in operation.
235 Mrs Bessie Parkes-Belloc, Peoples of the World, p. 219.
2GG ibid. pp. 216; 217-218. Another British observer, Charles Henry Churchill, accused the Maronites of ‘persistent 
jealousy’ which led to outbreaks of violence in the area, such as the events of 1860. See Charles Henry Churchill, The 
Druze and the Maronites Under Turkish Rule, from 1840-60. Bernard Quaritch, London, 1862, pp. 1-3. The British 
focus on the Druze in this period was first established by Lady Hester Stanhope. She first aroused British 
consciousness of the region at the level of popular literacy, as a result of the publication of her own colourful memoirs. 
Churchill was another British eccentric and refugee from disapproval at home. See Robin Bidweli, Introduction, re­
print of Charles Churchill, The Druze and the Maronites. Garnet Publishing, London, 1994, p. x.
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become independent from Ottoman rule. In such a case it could acceptably 
only ‘become English or else form part of a new independent state’ which he 
again envisaged would be pro-British before anything else. He attempted to 
further British links with the area though works like Mount Lebanon in 1852 and 
The Druze and The Maronites in 1862. In the introduction to the latter he 
wrote:
The time is fast approaching when the imperative claims 
of Christianity and humanity must and ought to absorb all 
others in the much vexed Eastern Question. I would fain 
hope that this present work may induce some to take the 
point of view when contemplating England’s present or 
anticipated action in the political affairs of the Ottoman 
empire.267
Such British attitudes laid the foundation for an Anglo-French rivalry in the 
area; given the long-established French links there, and an equal French 
conviction of their superior civilisation.268 Both powers had realised that the 
Ottoman empire was a crumbling edifice in political terms. This consciousness 
increased a genera! European belief in their own superiority in all identifiable 
aspects, but also gave a conviction to Britain and France that they had a duty, 
or even a right, to oversee the affairs of the Ottoman empire, a duty they 
expressed partly by reference to their established mythologies about 
communities in regions like Lebanon. The result was a new phase in 
European-Ottoman relations.
Due to a complex variety of political, religious and cultural strategic 
European interests in the region covered by the Ottoman empire, European 
powers in the period up to 1914, especially Britain and France, believed their 
own interests were best served by keeping that empire going. As a result the 
various interested European powers, but again especially Britain and France, 
felt they had a right and a duty to intervene in aspects of internal Ottoman 
policy that in their eyes impinged on their interests or those of their ‘clients’, it 
was in defence of their own wider interests, for example, that the European 
powers of Britain and Austria had intervened in Ottoman affairs to expel the
287 Charles Henry Churchill, The Druze and the Maronites. Preface, p. v.
268 See, for instance, Colin Mooers, The Making of Bourgeois Europe. Verso, London 1991, pp. 44-6.
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Egyptians from Syria in 1840.269 Such demonstrations of European might 
served to emphasise Ottoman dependence on these powers for its survival to 
those powers, and the Lebanese communities looking to them for support. 
European pressure on the empire produced between 1836 and 1876 the 
Tanzimat programme, a programme which was intended to ‘civilise’ the empire 
in a European sense through a process of ‘democratisation’.270 If the Ottoman 
empire was able to use the programme for its own ends, it also produced a 
considerable amount of resentment within the empire which tended to be 
directed against the minority communities favoured by the Europeans. This in 
turn created practical dilemmas for the European powers which claimed to 
support and protect the interests of these communities.271
The confessional dimensions to the Lebanese problem, including the 
Catholic-Protestant tensions of the European powers, ensured that nineteenth 
century Europe would not be able to produce a solution acceptable to all the 
European powers, let alone the confessional communities in Lebanon.272 In 
escalating the tension between Maronites and Druze, the Tanzimat programme 
thereby ensured that the interested European powers would act to sustain 
Ottoman rule in the region; and it is certainly possible to argue that 
expectations of European intervention lessened the chance in this period of 
any compromise of interests between the communities.273 Yet the series of 
crises in Lebanon in the nineteenth century did confirm the belief of both 
Britain and France that management of the region including Lebanon was
269 See Chapter 1, pp. 77-8; see Dominique Chevallier, La Societe du Mont-Liban. p. 37.
270 This programme was discussed in terms of its impact on Lebanon in Chapter 1; but for a more general survey and 
for the European dimension, see Malcolm Yapp, The Making of the Modern Middle East, p. 111; also Albert Hourani, 
Philip S. Khoury & Mary Wilson (eds), The Modern Middle East. LB. Tauris, London, 1993.
271 In terms of Lebanon, of course, this was brought home to the European powers with the events of 1858-60, when 
they had to face the fact, as did the Ottoman government, that the Tanzimat was not well received by those it was 
intended to benefit. S ee Malcolm Yapp, The Making of the Modern Middle East, pp. 59; 114.
272 In this context, it is interesting to compare the cases of Lebanon and Montenegro within the Ottoman empire. They 
had in common the geographical setting of remote mountains and a past of virtual autonomy for Montenegro and 
periods of practical autonomy for Lebanon (during the emirate period for example). But Montenegro became 
secularised from the mid-nineteenth century. Thus when the inhabitants of the region united to fight for independence 
from the Ottomans in 1878 they won general European aid and approval. European intervention advanced 
Montenegro’s claims for independence essentially because it did not directly impinge on existing European rivalries. 
See Malcolm Yapp, The Making of the Modern Middie East, p. 60.
273 The British gave their support primarily to the Druze; while the French maintained their iong-standing support of the 
Maronites. Ottoman officials could, and did, take advantage of this to neutralise European support for any further 
autonomy in the region by setting one European power against the other, in an age of rivalry between the European 
powers, especially Britain and France, in the imperial arena this had the effect of increasing the tensions between 
these powers in areas outside the Middle East as well as within it. As a result, the European perspective on the 
Middle East problem became so involved that any incident taking place in Lebanon had its echoes in Europe and 
political relationships there. See Malcolm Yapp, The Making of the Modem Middle East, p. 136; K.S. Salibi, Modern 
History of Lebanon, p. 3; John Spagnolo, ‘Franco-British Rivalry in Lebanon’. Nadim Shehadi & Dana Haffar Mills 
(eds), Lebanon. A History of Conflict and Consensus. l.B. Taurus & Co Ltd, London, 1988, pp. 109-10.
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essentially an Anglo-French concern, rather than an Ottoman one, where the 
nature of Anglo-French relations, rather than local agendas, would be decisive 
in setting the terms of European intervention.274 Given that it was plain to 
interested parties in Lebanon that any autonomy, let alone independence, from 
the Ottoman empire would depend on European support, this led to a situation 
where the Maronites, in particular, expressed their agenda increasingly in 
terms acceptable to European powers, rather than addressing the other 
communities and seeking to evolve joint agendas. This deepened the patron- 
client relationship between the Maronites and France; it also ensured that co­
habitation, rather than co-operation would be seen by the Maronites as being 
in their best interests in terms of intercommunal relations.
From the French perspective, policy in the region up to 1914, and 
subsequently, was focused on efforts to maintain influence in the management 
of the Eastern Question as a whole by retaining its influence in Lebanon. 
There was also a continuing economic dimension to their interest in Lebanon, 
a dimension that was given priority by banks and commercial houses and 
companies involved in textile, mainly silk, production in Lebanon. The 
production of silk was important to the Lebanese, especially in the Mount 
Lebanon area.275 But French textile firms, especially silk firms, made an 
important contribution to the French economy; and these had a heavy reliance 
on the supply of cheap silk from Lebanon. In the immediate pre-war period, 
France was absorbing 93% of Lebanon’s silk.276 These factors meant that 
French interests were best served by fostering the concept that France was the
2 French willingness to co-operate with the British in the region varied according to a variety of factors. After 1870, 
France was in direct competition with the British in areas like Africa, and was seeking to assuage her humiliation in the 
Franco-Prussian W ar of 1870-1. in the period 1870-1905, French co-operation with Britain in Lebanon was minimal, 
therefore. The renewal of good relations between the powers, in the 1905 Entente Cordiale also signalled a new 
willingness to seek solutions to rivalries in this area, as elsewhere, on a basis of compromise. However, it would 
always be a mistake in this period, as iater, to ignore the continual strand of French suspicion of British motives and 
actions in Lebanon, and elsewhere. See John Spagnolo, Ibid: also John Spaanolo. France and Ottoman Lebanon. St 
Anthony’s College, Oxford, 1977; Gerard Khoury, La France et I’Orient Arabe. Armand Colin, Paris, 1993, pp. 30; 65. 
For the wider perspective see Bernard Porter, The Lion’s share: A short History of British Imperialism 1850-1983. 
Longman, London, 1984; Dominique Chevallier, La Societe du Mont Liban. pp. 162; 167.
275 It is estimated that between 1911 and 1912, for instance, 50%  of the population of Mount Lebanon was dependent
on the trade for their living. See Boutros Labaki, Introduction a I'Histoire Economigue du Liban. Soie et Commerce 
Exterieur en Fin de Periods Qttomane. publication de I’Universite Libanaise, Section des Etudes Economiques, IV,
Beirut, 1984, pp. 147-9.
278 The indigenous production of raw silk in France was badly affected by disease; Lebanon’s low taxes and cheap 
labour, relative to levels in France, ensured a supply of silk that was cheap, making French silk cloth a profitable 
commodity to all concerned. Ibid.
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natural ally of the Maronites in times of difficulty.277 France thus emphasised 
its ‘time-honoured’ role as protector of Catholics and Catholic-related 
Christians.278
France recognised that at least virtual independence from the Ottoman 
empire was part of the Maronite agenda for which they expected French 
support.279 But by this time, the Europeans had established a set of 
reasonably coherent criteria for the establishment of an independent state, and 
there was considerable debate over whether those criteria were fulfilled in 
Lebanon. From a European perspective at this time, the only ‘genuine’ basis 
for the creation of an independent state was the existence of national feelings 
and aspirations.280 French political circles became receptive to the idea of a 
national feeling developing in Lebanon, under French tutelage. The 
emergence of Yussuf Karam and his appeal for French support was thus 
greeted by French political and intellectual circles with enthusiasm and 
encouragement, but without much surprise.281 In exile in France, Karam 
became not an unsuccessful malcontent, but a gallant, heroic martyr who had 
sacrificed all he had, except his life, for his country.282 It became possible, 
now, to claim there was a ‘nationalist leader’ in Lebanon, with popular support. 
From this it was possible to construct a theory of an emerging national feeling 
in Lebanon which was essentially Christian, and dependent on France for
277 This was not to be difficult in the period up to 1914. The Maronites accepted French advertisement that they had 
intervened on behalf of the Maronites in 1860, for instance, convinced by the rhetoric that France was committed to 
furthering Maronite interests, but failing to comprehend the wider agenda involved from the French perspective.
278 It must be remembered that other Catholic powers, notably the Austrian and Italians, were also interested in 
increasing their power in the region by persuading the Maronites to look to them, but their interest was not 
reciprocated by the Maronite community.
279 In fact, French willingness to commit themselves to any major extent to the Maronite cause was limited; especially 
since the French did not feel their hold over the community was threatened by the British. In 1860, for instance, it was 
not until after the massacres of Christians in Damascus that the French government despatched troops to intervene. 
The instructions to the 7,000 troops sent to Beirut were that they were to help the Ottomans re-establish order in 
Lebanon, as well as to guard the Christians there. Equally, the compromise that settled the 1860 crisis consisted of a 
formula that supported Ottoman power rather than supporting the Maronites or any other local community such as the 
Druze. See K.S. Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon, p. 109; Leila Fawaz. An Occasions for W ar. I.B.Tauris, London, 
pp. 192-228.
0 It had been this that had 'justified' the creation as nation-states of Italy and Germany, for example. There was an 
example of a creation of a nation-state in a  former area of the Ottoman empire - Greece, established in 1830. But all 
these examples had, in European eyes, the gloss of nationalism according to European definitions. Gerard Khoury, ]_a 
France et I'Orient Arabe. pp. 20; 30; E Gellner, Nations and Nationalism. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1983; E Hobsbawm, 
Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, Elie Kedourie, Nationalism. 
Praeger, London, 1960.
281 Karam was a Maronite leader from Ihdin in the north, who first came to prominence in the Tanzimat period, co­
operating with the Ottoman authorities, notably in subduing the Kiswaran peasant revolt. He had expected to be 
rewarded with high office in the aftermath of the 1860 settlement. Disappointed, he turned to rebellion against the 
Ottoman state. On his defeat in 1866, Karam had been sent into exile in Europe. See K.S. Salibi, Modern History of 
Lebanon, pp. 113-14; John Spagnolo, France and Ottoman Lebanon 1861 - 1914. Ithaca Press, London, 1977 pp. 
151-5; Meir Zamir, The Formation of Modern Lebanon. Croom Helm, Beckenham, 1985, p. 17; Gerard Khoury, J_a 
France et I’Orient Arabe. p. 30.
282 John Spaanolo. F~rance and Ottoman Lebanon, pp. 201; 151-5.
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support, providing an interesting development of the myths about Lebanon in 
the patron-ciient context.283
However, the situation was complicated by the fact that it was not only 
among the pro-French, pro-Roman Catholic Maronites that ideas of 
nationaiism had begun to have an impact by the last decades of the nineteenth 
century. The influence of European and American Protestantism was 
significant in the development of the ‘Arabic scholarly and literary revival of the 
nineteenth century’.284 This encouraged the development of an Arab 
nationalism that saw Lebanon as part of an essentially secular Arab world, not 
as some outpost of Western Catholic civilisation. While this perspective 
initially entailed no threat to the ideas of the Maronites, since both advocated 
the ending of Ottoman dominance as their first goal, the reaction of the 
interested European powers to this development of Arab nationalism was not 
so neutral, and this was inevitably to have its effect on Lebanon. For instance, 
it implied the creation of an independent Syria including Lebanon, a concept 
favoured by Britain because it seemed to offer more opportunities to her. By 
contrast this idea of a secular Arab Syria was vehemently opposed by France 
because it seemed to be contrary to French interests.285 Equally, British 
‘support’ for the Arab cause was to have its long-term impact on the level and 
seriousness of Arab nationalist expectations of British support, especially after 
1914, in ways that did not necessarily relate to concrete expectations of 
economic or other benefits, but instead had more to do with established 
ideological patterns.286
What was to bring Britain and France together in the early years of the 
twentieth century, was not developments in Lebanon itself, but their perception
283 In fact, the support even among the Maronite community in Lebanon was by no means universal, but by this time, 
there was an established Maronite emigrant community in France which ensured Karam a  certain publicity. See L. 
Baudicour, La France au Liban. Dentu, Paris, 1879, Chapter 6.
284 A leading ‘Lebanese’ figure in this was Butrus Al Bustani, an American-educated scholar who drew on the 
techniques of European scholarship to fuel the discovery of a notable and noble Arab culture in the past. There was a 
European perspective on Arab history which pointed to past influence of Arab culture on European thought. This 
movement was not just confined to Lebanon, but Lebanon played an important part in this movement. See K.S. Salibi, 
Modern History of Lebanon, pp. 147; 154-6; Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age. 1798-1939. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1983, pp. 100-1 ;132-45.
285 France felt the need to demonstrate the linkage between French and Maronite interests explicitly, to counter British 
support for Arab nationalism in the period to 1914, See Adel Ismail, Documents Diplomatique et Consulaires relatifs a 
I'histoire du Liban et des oavs du Proche Orient du X VII9 siecle a nos Jours. Editions des oeuvres Politiques et 
Historiques 1975-178, Vol 20, No. 69, pp. 214-16.
286 See Elizabeth Monroe, Britain’s Moment in the Middle East 1914-1917. Chatto & Windus, London, 1918, p. 19.
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of a growing German threat, in the Middle East as elsewhere.287 The tangible 
result of this was a defensive drawing together, expressed in the 1905 Entente 
Cordiale; which saw the first tentative arrangements which were to dictate the 
post-1918 pattern of European involvement in the Middle East.288 The spirit of 
general co-operation between Britain and France in the Middle East continued 
up to the outbreak of war against Germany in 1914, and the involvement of the 
Ottoman empire increased it, since it was tacitly acknowledged that the spoils 
of any victory would include a dividing up of the imperial possessions of the 
losers; and in terms of the Ottoman empire, Britain and France expected to be 
the major beneficiaries and made plans accordingly.289 This had implications 
for the future of Lebanon itself, a factor swiftly realised by elements in the 
Maronite community which had well-established links with France. Along with 
their counterparts in France, a publicity campaign was undertaken to make 
known to the French public, through speeches and articles dealing with the 
disposal of the post-war Ottoman empire, that it was important to ensure that 
French influence was maintained in the region.290 This was particularly so for 
Lebanon, since it was, in the words of the British, not a ‘purely Arab’ area. 
Insofar as it had time to consider it, then, the mood of the French public was 
that the ‘civilising mission’ of France should continue and prevail in Syria and 
Lebanon, because France had ‘rights’ there. This emotional dimension meant
The ‘Arab Question' was assuming a greater importance in the early years of the century, as the Ottoman empire 
became ever more unsettled as a result of internal unrest. In 1905 Young Turk activity in the heartland of the Ottoman 
empire became significant; and a manifesto on the Arab dream was addressed to the Great Powers. In 1908 the 
Young Turk movement came to power. In the period 1908-14, this had a considerable impact on Lebanon; and 
resultant appeals were made by the Maronites to the European powers involved in the 1860 settlement. But the new 
rapprochement between Britain and France cannot be seen as a direct response to this local unrest; it was part of 
wider considerations. See Chapter 1, pp. 84-5 for the Maronite position; Zeine N. Zeine, The Emergence of Arab 
Nationalism. 1973, With a Background Study of Arab-Turkish Relations in the Near East. Caravan Books, New York, 
1973, pp. 66-72;86-91.
288 For instance, German plans for a Berlin to Baghdad railway set alarm bells ringing in London and Paris as part of a 
German global strategy. As part of the Entente Cordiale, there was an agreement between Britain and France on a 
series of imperial rivalries in areas where their interests had clashed during the nineteenth century. Thus Britain was 
to have a free hand in Egypt in return for France having similar freedom in dealing with Morocco. Equally spheres of 
hegemony in the Levant were agreed; with France looking to Lebanon and Syria and Britain to Palestine and Iraq. 
Elizabeth Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East, p. 79; Zeine N. Zeine, The Emergence of Arab Nationalism, pp. 
102-3. See also J.A.S. Grenville, A World History of the Twentieth Century. Vol 1, ‘W estern Dominance, 1900-45', 
Fontana Press, London 1987, pp. 50-60, for a brief summary of diplomatic patterns in this period.
J.A.S. Grenville, World History, p. 54; Zeine N. Zeine, The Emergence of Arab Nationalism, pp. 100-106.
290 The economic dimension to this must not be forgotten; the war seriously affected the silk trade, for instance, as 
French firms were expelled from Lebanon in 1914, and the banks, commercial houses and firms involved in the trade 
wished to see that trade restored and with greater guarantees of its continuance - something best achieved by a 
formal acknowledgement of French involvement in the area in some form or other. See Boutros Labaki, Introduction a 
PHistoire Economiaue du Liban. IV, pp. 147-9; Michel Seurat, L'Etat de Barbarie. Editions du Seuil, 1977, pp. 173-220.
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that it had implications for French domestic politics, and thus it became a 
sensitive national issue.291
The other major power involved in the Middle East equation was Britain. 
France’s stance on the region was relatively straightforward; she wished to 
preserve her influence in Syria and Lebanon essentially, in some form or other. 
Britain’s position was complicated by the immediate considerations of the 
wartime campaign against Germany in the region, by her imperial 
responsibilities including India and Egypt, and by the competing claims for 
British support of Arab nationalists and Zionist activists.292 The British need for 
an Arab revolt is highlighted by the correspondence between Sir Henry 
MacMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, and the Arab leader 
Sharif Hussein in 1915 and early 1916. Sharif Hussein indicated to MacMahon 
in July 1915 that, in return for a series of ‘basic provisions’ that amounted to 
the creation of an Arab nation that would include Syria and Lebanon, Britain 
would be granted preferential status, and an Arab revolt would be 
undertaken.293 In a subsequent change of letters, Sir Henry MacMahon 
responded with a rhetoric that certainly can be read as promising British 
support for the creation of an Arab state at least partially covering Syria and 
Lebanon, although equally, it was open to other interpretations, as the Arabs 
were to find.294 British interests in Palestine and Mesopotamia, in the context 
of her wider imperial responsibilities and the need to gain support at home for 
a post-war settlement that included these areas as part of the British sphere, 
were the key to the British failure to support the Arabs at the Peace 
Conference.295 It was these considerations that lay behind the British
291 Stephen Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon Under the French Mandate. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1968 edition, 
pp. 44; 81.
2 See Zeine N. Zeine, The Emergence of Arab Nationalism, pp. 103-4;106-8; 115-23; George Antonius The Arab 
Awakening, first published in 1939 by J.B. Lippencott Co, New York, re-print by Hamish Hamilton Ltd, London, 1969, 
pp. 127-36:258-70.
93 Sharif Hussein to Sir Henry McMahon, 14 July 1915, given in full in George Antonius, The Arab Awakening. 
Appendix A, pp. 414-15.
294 Sir Henry McMahon to Sharif Hussein, 30 August 1915; Sharif Hussein to Sir Henry McMahon, 9 September 1915; 
Sir Henry McMahon to Sharif Hussein, 24  October 1915; Sharif Hussein to Sir Henry McMahon, 5 November 1915; Sir 
Henry McMahon to Sharif Hussein, 13 December 1915; Sharif Hussein to Sir Henry McMahon, 1 January 1916; Sir 
Henry McMahon to Sharif Hussein, 30 January 1916, all given in full in George Antonius, The Arab Awakening. 
Appendix A, pp. 415-27. Antonius argued that T h e  area of the Turk’s defeat was precisely the area of Arab 
aspirations....The leaders felt that they had amply fulfilled their share of the bargain concluded between Sir Henry 
McMahon and the Sharif Hussein, and they confidentially looked to Great Britain to fulfil hers. But when it came to a 
reckoning at the Peace Conference, there was a wide divergence between what the Arabs claimed and what Great 
Britain was willing to recognise as her share of the bargain’. See George Antonius, The Arab Awakening, pp. 276-7.
295 The Balfour Declaration had been made in 1917, establishing the principle that Britain was favourably disposed to 
a ‘Jewish national home in Palestine, provided this did not prejudice the civil and religious rights of the other
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negotiations with France in 1916 over the disposal of the former Ottoman 
empire. The British informed the French of the content of the McMahon letters, 
and made it plain that they need not affect the progress of negotiations.296 In 
the spring of 1916, Francois Georges-Picot and Sir Mark Sykes drew up an 
agreement sharing out between France and Britain the spoils in a post- 
Ottoman Middle East.297 Essentially the resultant Sykes-Picot Agreement 
underlined and incorporated the perception that Lebanon was a part of Syria, 
rather than a separate entity. Essentially, the French government considered 
Lebanon as a geographical region within Syria; despite the existence of groups 
even within France that were in favour of a separate existence in some shape 
or form for Lebanon in the post-Ottoman world. Yet at the same time the 
French Foreign Ministry at least was aware that there might be problems in 
setting up such an entity; that the formerly privileged Maronites would not 
easily be absorbed into a wider Syria. But it comforted itself with the belief that 
the Maronites would realise that they could not demand the continuation of the 
privileges after their ‘liberation’ from Ottoman dominance, since the reason 
why the privileges had been needed would no longer exist.298 Yet the post-war 
settlement saw the setting up of separate mandates for Syria and Lebanon; the 
question is, why did this change of emphasis come about?299 The answer is 
that both Britain and France realised that it was necessary to reconcile 
conflicting perspectives, and for a time, to relegate the mythologies to a 
supporting position.
In September 1919, the British announced that they were withdrawing 
from Syria and handing over military control to France, with General Gouraud, 
Commander-in-Chief of the French troops there, becoming the French High
inhabitants of the country’, a position which established a basic contradiction. Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab 
Peoples, pp. 318-9; George Antonius, The Arab Awakening, p. 261.
296 Archives of the French Foreign Ministry, Paris A-Paix, vol 178, folios 1-3, Paul Cambon, French Ambassador to 
London to Aristide Briand, 11 November 1915. The French were not happy, and were not fully informed of the extent 
of McMahon's rhetoric, but in the short term, the letters had little effect on the progress of Anglo-French negotiations in 
1916. See Gerard Khoury, La France et I’Qrient Arabe. p. 88; Stephen Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon under French 
Mandate, p. 73.
In broad terms, this Agreement effectively agreed to French control over Syria and Lebanon; and British control 
over Palestine and Iraq. For a more detailed outline, see K.S. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon, pp. 159-60. 
See also Antoine Hokayem & Marie Claude Bitar, L’Empire Ottoman. Les Arabes et Les Grandes Puissances. 1914- 
1920. les Editions Universitaires due Liban, Beirut, 1981.
Antoine Hokayem & Marie Ciaude Bitar, L'Empire Ottoman: Archives of the French Foreign Ministry, Paris, A-
Paix, vol. 178, folios 1-3, Paul Cambon, French Ambassador to London to Aristide Briande, 21 December 1915.
299 Archives of the French Foreign Ministry, Nantes, Canton 2364, Telegram, Francois George-Picot to Mustapha 
Cherchali, J e d d a h ,, 23 May 1917, from the Papers of Francois George-Picot.
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Commissioner for the region, and effectively in charge of setting up the post­
war civilian administration.300 in the peace negotiations that followed the 
ending of the war in November 1918, it became apparent to the negotiators 
that, despite the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the claims of Arab nationalists, 
French ambitions in the Middle East had become considerably inflated. Their 
demand now was for an acknowledgement of their control over all of ‘Syria’, 
which they interpreted as including not only Palestine but also northern Iraq, 
Cilicia and a large area of Asia Minor. Longrigg points to the stress the French 
now put on their ‘traditional’ ‘rights’ in the region so outlined, ‘based on her 
ancient Capitulations; her protectorate of Catholics, her educational and 
philanthropic work, her economic effort in the territory’. As with her other 
imperial interests, significant elements of French intellectual thought, and 
certainly a large section of French popular thinking, perceived Syria as a part 
of France ‘outre mer’.301 But in the context of the post-war thinking of the 
victorious Allies, France believed her trump card in terms of her claim to this 
entire region was the ‘affection’ in which she believed she was held by the 
‘Syrian’ people, which she expected to counter any talk of national feeling in 
the peace negotiations.302
It must be remembered that the French had a long-standing resistance 
to any idea of a pan-Arab national feeling; any talk in the pre-war period of a 
pan-Arab Syrian unity, for instance, had been firmly rejected as being contrary 
to French interests. The English had commented on French sympathies for 
Christian minorities in the Ottoman empire and the resulting disregard for any 
incipient Arab national feeling as early as 1913.303 Faced by the concepts of 
Maronite and Arab national feeling in the context of negotiations over the future 
of the former Ottoman empire, French negotiators initially refused to give either 
serious credence. In terms of Arab nationalism, the French argued that it was
300 In the aftermath of the success of the Arab revolt, the British had established military control in Syria and Lebanon, 
as well as Palestine, from October 1918. See K.S. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon, pp. 160-2; Zeine N. Zeine, 
The Emergence of Arab Nationalism, pp. 122-3.
30 Stephen Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon Under the French Mandate, p. 73; K.S. Salibi, The Modern History of 
Lebanon, p. 160; Malcolm Yapp, The Making of the Modern Middle East, p. 277. See Archives of the French Foreign 
Ministry, Paris, A-Paix, vol. 178, folios 1-3, Paul Cambon, French Ambassador to London to Aristide Briand, 11 
November 1915, for some hint that the French might move to such a position; M Seurat, L'Etat de Barbarie. pp. 177- 
204.
302 This, of course, underlines the extent to which the French were in the immediate aftermath of peace, ignoring the 
existence of indigenous agendas in the area, including the Maronite agenda. See Stephen Longrigg, Syrian and 
Lebanon under the French M andate, p. 73; Meir Zamir, Formation of Modern Lebanon, p. 70.
303 Le Caire, Documents Dipiomatiaues et Consulaires Adel Ismail, 19 June 1913, vol. 20, no. 69, pp. 214-16.
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the work of Britain, who had deliberately created an anti-French feeling, rather 
than genuine nationalism, amongst the Arabs.304 The French argued that a 
‘Bedouin’, Sharif Hussein, despite being the ruler of Mecca and a member of 
the Prophet’s own tribe, was not capable of inspiring or leading any genuine 
mass national feeling in the region. This could be found only amongst the 
more Westernised, or ‘Catholic’ communities of the region, and France was 
convinced that they favoured French control, and argued accordingly in the 
negotiations,305
In their arguments, the French Ignored the evidence of the recent 
past.306 Any form of self-government such as the Arabs seemed to be 
claiming was not suitable, it was argued, for such a primitive group as the 
Arab, and experience of French benevolent policy would show them their 
folly.307 It was in this belief that the French began to talk to Arab leaders even 
before the formal start of peace negotiations; a position which helps to explain 
the emphasis on a Syrian entity and not a separate Syria and Lebanon. In this 
way, the French hoped to convey a message that France was the protector of 
Muslim as well as Christian interests, and consequently, that it was in the 
interests of all that the French secured a mandate over the whole region.308 
Picot attempted to persuade Faisal that if he looked to a future pan-Arab entity 
which included Lebanon, the only way of achieving it would be as a result of a 
French mandate over the region, since only France could unify the region 
securely and peacefully in the short term.309 In a meeting on 13 April 1919, the 
French believed they had achieved a basis for co-operation, where Faisal
They also accused Britain of being motivated by a spirit of anti-Catholicism, which blinded them to the ‘real’ 
interests and desires of the inhabitants of the region, as well as to French disinterest in seeking to pursue her ‘mission 
civilatrice1 there. In their pro-Protestant bitterness at their failure to establish themselves as a major force in the area, 
they argued, the British were using ‘a Bedouin and his horde of bandits' to create a false impression of Arab popular 
nationalism, because they had bribed the ‘Bedouin’ into a pro-British stance. Stephen Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon 
under the French M andate, pp. 74-81; Lvon Republican. 4  August 1920.
Ibid: Henri Lammens, La Svrie: Precis Historiaue. pp. 329-40.
306 For instance, they ignored the 1912 incident of the Syrian Martyrs and the impact it had had on Arab feelings in 
arguing that Arab nationalism was a purely British creation which would disappear once France embarked upon their 
great and historic task of civilising the Middle East. See Henri Lammens, La Svrie: Precis Historiaue. pp 335-40; 
Stephen Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon under the French Mandate, pp. 73-4; Meir Zamir, The Formation of Modern 
Lebanon, d . 59.
507------------- .
Henri Lammens, La Svrie: Precis Historiaue. pp. 335-40; Stephen Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon under the French 
Mandate, pp. 73-4; Meir Zamir, The Formation of Modern Lebanon, p. 59.
Indeed, it was Picot who was entrusted with the task of negotiating with Faisal. He certainly had no wish to see a 
separate Lebanon, which he saw as being ‘incompatible’ with the good administration of a  French mandate over the 
whole of Syria. Meir Zamir, The Formation of Modern Lebanon, p. 56.
309 Ibid, pp. 56-64.
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would gain popular Arab approval for a French mandate over a Syria that 
would take the form of a ‘federation of local communities’.310
Things were not to be so easy as the French had hoped. Faisal was 
also exploring the extent of British and American support for the Arab 
nationalist cause. He proposed, for instance, that the Peace Conference base 
a settlement on the wishes of the population in the Middle East, and that they 
set about finding out the wishes of the population in the area - a move 
calculated to win American involvement in the settlement of Syrian affairs. 
Faisal’s belief was clearly that any such enquiry would endorse Arab claims, 
something which concerned the French and the Maronite community.311 It is in 
this context that the French government switched to taking more seriously the 
claims for a separate Lebanon. When Faisal’s plan was mentioned at the 
Conference, the response of the ‘Lebanese’ delegation was that ‘Lebanon’ 
would not consent to an integration with Syria; that ‘Lebanon’ was not Arab, 
despite the infiltration of the Arabic language during the time of Ottoman rule; 
and that the maintenance of its distinctive non-Arab personality was dependent 
on French protection,312 This provides an interesting indication of the extent to 
which the French government, led by Clemenceau, was also exploring 
alternatives to his agreement with Faisal, particularly with this evidence that 
Faisal was not prepared to stand by the April 1919 agreement.
What caused the French concern was the advocacy by President 
Wilson of the principle of self-determination for formerly subject peoples. The 
claims of the various groups such as the Arab and Maronite nationalists 
convinced Wilson that there was a real need to investigate the situation in the 
Middle East. In relation to Lebanon, Wilson’s attitude was aided by the 
opinions of Howard Bliss, the principal of the Syrian Protestant College of 
Beirut (later the American University of Beirut).313 In the summer of 1919, a 
Commission of Inquiry, into the feelings and aspirations of the peoples in the 
Middle East was set up, the King-Crane Commission, with a brief to visit Syria,
310 Had. pp. 60-1.
311 Gerard Khoury, La France et L’Orient Arabe. p. 174.
312 Archives of the French Foreign Ministry, Paris, Arabie vol. 5, fol. 69/70/r/v; Gerard Khoury, La France et I'Orient 
Arabe. d . 187.
3 1 3 " " " "
Bliss had Wilson's ear because his father-in-law, Cleveland Dodge, was a close friend of Wilson.
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Lebanon and Palestine.314 It was in this context in order to counter the impact 
of Arab nationalism and any findings of the Commission not favourable to 
French aspirations that the French were forced to abandon their grand dreams 
for the Middle East, and, falling back on the Sykes-Picot Agreement, to make 
the most of their traditional influence. Thus they proceeded to capitalise on 
their old links with the Maronite community in Lebanon. They sought to ensure 
this community would express support for the establishment of a French 
mandate there. It was now necessary to move to a position where a separate 
Lebanese entity was part of French policy. So, rather than ignoring them, it 
became important to convince Maronite nationalists that accepting a period of 
rule by France was ‘perhaps the best guarantee for a separate and 
independent Lebanon’ - eventually.315 Finally, to quote Salibi, ‘French and 
Maronite interests clearly converged’ from the later months of 1919.316
The King-Crane Commission visited Lebanon in the summer of 1919. 
However, as their 1922 Report indicated, they found that only the Maronite and 
Greek Catholic communities were whole-heartedly in favour of a French 
mandate, and the Commission questioned their dominance in the area. But 
equally, there was no real unity amongst the other confessional communities in 
the region, if the Sunni, for instance, generally supported the idea of 
incorporation into an Arab state, the Druze generally tended to support the idea 
of a British mandate over the region. The conclusions of the Commission were 
effectively negative in terms of the French claim to a mandate in Lebanon, but 
by the time the Report was published, in 1922, the affairs of the region had 
already been settled essentially on the basis of the Sykes-Picot Agreement.317 
With the backing of Britain, the French were able to convince the Allied 
Supreme Council of their case and the right to set up mandates in Syria and
314 It was initially intended to be a four-man commission, consisting of representatives from France, Britain, Italy and 
the USA. However, opposition to it by the European countries meant that it was in fact a two-man Commission, 
conducted by two American delegates who gave their name to the Commission: Dr Harold King and Charles Crane. 
See Gerard Khoury, La France et L’Orient Arabe. pp. 171; 190; Elizabeth Monroe. Britain’s Moment in the Middle East, 
p. 63.
15 K.S. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon, p. 164.
3J® iyd , p. 163.
317 It was fairly swiftly apparent that the Commission was going to be an irrelevancy to the settlement of the region and 
that this was realised even by leaders such as Faisal. Gerard Khoury quotes an accord of 6 January 1920 between 
Clemenceau and Faisal in which Faisal agreed to recognise a separate Lebanese entity under a  French mandate, but 
leaving it to the Peace Conference to decide the limits of the entity. Gerard Khoury, La France et L’Orient Arabe, pp. 
243-4; 311.
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Lebanon was offered to France on 28 April 1920.318 Under the terms of this 
offer, the Peace Conference even left it up to France to decide on the extent of 
a separate Lebanon, despite furious protests from Damascus.319 Thereafter, 
the French moved swiftly to set up their mandate administration. In the event, 
the Peace Conference was to leave it up to France to decide on the limits of a 
Lebanese entity, despite furious protests from Damascus. Given her ‘free 
hand’, France was eventually to decide that her best interests lay in the 
creation of a Greater Lebanon.
From the point of view of French-Maronite relations, research by 
historians such as Gerard Khoury has revealed a complex process which led 
the French to this position, in which the most consistent element in French 
policy between 1916 and 1920 was willingness to use the Maronite agenda 
when, but only if, it suited their broader strategy. This interpretation is 
significant in that it helps to explain intercommunal relations in Lebanon in the 
post-war period, and to explain French-Maronite relations in the mandate 
period. A key factor which altered the emphasis of French policy in relation to 
Syria and Lebanon from 1919 was Faisal’s refusal during that summer to 
accept the persuasions of men like Clemenceau and Picot, and his decision to 
rely instead on the international commission of enquiry to settle matters in the 
region and give due weight to Arab claims. Faisal’s attitude was the basis of 
the rift that was to develop between the continuing and expanding Arab and 
Lebanese nationalist movements, and within Lebanon, it was to have a direct 
influence on Sunni thinking and consequently on their relations with the 
Maronite community.320 The Sunni, being used to being part of a greater 
entity, were less attracted by the concept of an independent Lebanon; they 
were also conscious of being a group not favoured by the Western powers and 
thus were instinctively opposed to any future that drew Lebanon further into 
contact with a Western power, seeing no personal, political or economic
318 K.S. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon, pp. 162-4.
319 Faisal had, by this time, declared independence and been ‘crowned’ as King of Syria in March 1920. In the 
summer of 1920, he led his troops in an attempted invasion of Lebanon. General Gouraud defeated Faisal's army with 
relative ease, and proceeded to evict the Arab nationalists from Damascus also, as a  prelude to the setting up of 
French administrations in both Syria and Lebanon. See K.S. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon, p. 164; Meir 
Zamir, Formation of Modern Lebanon, pp. 77; 88-93; Gerard Khoury, La France et L’Orient Arabe. pp. 307; 336.
320 Gerard Khoury, La France et L'Orient Arabe. pp. 307; 336; Meir Zamir, Formation of Modern Lebanon, pp. 79-80; 
Stephen Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon under the French Mandate, pp. 106-7.
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advantages to this on the whole. In this sense, the Sunni community was 
more definitely opposed to the policy of the Maronites than were the Druze. It 
was, after all, at this point that French policy provided a Greater Lebanese 
entity which entailed the creation of a larger Sunni element in that entity 
because it took in parts of what had been Ottoman Syria. It is at this point, and 
in reaction to this external dimension, that the internal power struggle over the 
future of Lebanon switched from being between the Maronites and the Druze 
primarily, to being between the Maronites and the Sunni, primarily. The focus 
of that power struggle was increasingly to express itself in terms of Sunni 
hostility to Maronite myths about Lebanon, and the apparent endorsement of 
those myths by the French.
Once the plans for creating a unified Syria under a French mandate in 
co-operation with the Arabs had finally collapsed, the French became more 
susceptible to pressures from the Maronites in and outside Lebanon - including 
the pro-Maronite lobby in France itself.321 This was particularly so given that 
the French were, in late 1919 and early 1920, beginning to be concerned about 
the decline of pro-French feeling among the Maronite community within 
Lebanon itself, if not amongst emigrant circles. Maronites had been made 
unhappy and suspicious by the negotiations with Faisal and had feared a sell­
out. These fears became more concrete with the report of a Maronite 
deputation that heard Picot saying ‘Since France would have the mandate over 
all of Syria, Lebanese Christian interests would be safeguarded so there would 
be no need to separate Lebanon from the rest of Syria.322 With such reports 
circulating in Lebanon, anti-French speeches began to be made, backed up by 
large demonstrations giving an indication that the Maronite community as a 
whole were opposed to French policy at this time. Bkirki, the seat of the 
Maronite Patriarchate, was the focal point for this Maronite opposition to 
French policy. Patriarch Howayek’s fears of Muslim domination in a greater 
Syrian entity, and his consequent sense of being betrayed by France, was 
sufficiently great to lead him into taking a step that represented a very
321 The possibilities for a separate Lebanon, and for that to be of a significant size, had always been part of French 
rhetoric. At the same time as negotiating with Faisal, Clemenceau had taken care to make noises of support for the 
Maronite agenda. See, for example, Archives of the French Foreign Ministry, Paris, E. Levant, 1918-1929, Syrie, 
Liban, vol. 19, folio 40, Clemenceau to Howayek, Maronite Patriarch, 10 November 1919.
322 Meir Zamir. Formation of Modern Lebanon, p. 62.
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considerable break with tradition in terms of Maronite loyalties; he approached 
General Allenby to request, at the Peace Conference, British protection within 
a British mandate over the area.323
The French authorities were not pleased by these developments: Picot 
complained to the Quai d’Orsay that the Maronites, and the Patriarch in 
particular, were acting in a selfish and short-signed manner. According to him, 
they were creating an anti-French agitation ‘inspired only by the concern to 
protect the privileged status which circumstances had granted to them in 
former Lebanon’.324 Despite the outrage, however, the French realised that it 
was in their own interests to restore good relations and dispel Maronite 
resentments.325 After all, if control over Syria was ever to become difficult, 
France could at least fail back on Lebanon. Thus the French began to mark 
out a Lebanese entity that, apart from anything else, included the best part of 
the coastline of the region.326
Despite their continuing unhappiness with the French government, the 
Maronites had come to the conclusion that the only way to counter the claims 
of the Arabs, claims which had the sympathy of the British and the Americans, 
was to rely on the French. Consequently the Maronite delegation to the Peace 
Conference was encouraged to ask for a French mandate.327 The French 
Foreign Minister, Stephen Pichon, was in favour of this development.328 These 
groups were mainly made up of Maronite emigrants settled in France, who had 
begun to coalesce into coherent groups in the early part of the century. For 
example, the Comite Central Syrien, the CCS, was founded in June 1912 by a
323 In fact, the British stayed loyal to the spirit of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, if only so as to protect their own plans 
from French interference, and responded with advice to the Patriarch to appeal directly to the King-Crane Commission. 
See FO 371/4181 105815/2117, GHQ, Cairo to Foreign Office, 8 July 1919.
324 Archives of the French Foreign Ministry, Paris, E Levant, vol. 13, no. 724, Beirut, Francois George-Picot to 
Stephen Pichon, 23 May 1919; 3 June 1919.
325 Clemenceau wrote to the Patriarch, promising to help the Lebanese maintain an autonomous form of government 
and an independent national status, in the expectation that this would provide a basis for Maronite acquiescence in the
French take-over. Clemenceau hinted that this entity would take account of Maronite territorial claims, giving the
‘Mountain1 access to the coast and the territorial plains since these were 'necessary to its prosperity’; and argued that 
French sympathy with the aspirations of the 'people' of Lebanon had led him to these conclusions. In this light, he was 
sure that the Lebanese ‘people’ would welcome a French mandate over them, saying that ‘I want to hope that the 
definitive solution to the Syrian question....will allow the French government to advance the wish of these people’. 
Archives of the French Foreign Ministry, Paris, E. Levant, 1918-1929, Syrie, Liban, Vol 19, folio 40, Clemenceau to 
Howayek, 10 November 1919.
326 Stephen Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon under the French Mandate, p. 117.
327 Gerard Khoury, La France et L’Orient Arabe. p. 187.
323 Gerard Khoury, La France et L'Orient Arabe. p. 176, quoting Archives of the French Foreign Ministry, Nantes, 
fonds Beirut, carton 2208, Telegram, Stephen Pichon to Francois George-Picot, E. Levant 1918-1929, Vol 57, Syrie, 
Liban folios 25-52; B. Oudet, ‘Le Role du Comite Central Syrien dans la Politique Syrienne de la France, 16 June 
1917-24 July 1920', unpublished MA thesis, Sorbonne, Paris, 1986, p. 41.
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group of Paris-based Syro-Lebanese, headed by Chekri Ganem, with Dr 
George Samne as the Secretary General. It had close ties with the Comite de 
TOrient and to imperial interests generally in France. Like other similar groups, 
it is believed by historians such as Gerard Khoury, drawing on French Foreign 
Ministry archives, that the Quai d’Orsay found it in its interest to fund such 
groups occasionally, so that at times of need, such as during the settlement of 
the old Ottoman territories, the Ministry could make use of them.329
Yet it would be a mistake to emphasise the contribution of these 
Maronite pressures on the French government to the establishment by France 
of a separate Lebanese entity based on the concept of a Greater Lebanon. 
Ultimately, the French had no objections to the demand for expanded borders 
for Lebanon as this was compatible with the seizing for France of as much 
territory as possible, and leaving the British with as little, through capitalising 
as much as possible upon the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement and so 
blocking Arab aspirations in the region.330 By 1920, the only way to do this 
effectively was by responding positively to the demands of the Maronite 
community, effectively endorsing their mythology about a separate Lebanon. 
The confusion and conflicting claims surrounding the peace process in the 
Middle East, and the report of the King-Crane Commission, when that 
emerged, served, however, to exacerbate tensions between the communities 
in Lebanon itself.331
When it came to the shape of a Greater Lebanon, it is possible to argue 
that the interests of the Maronites did have a predominant effect - but the 
French decision to endorse that solution had already been taken primarily in 
the light of French interests, not Lebanese ones. Indeed the impact of 
Maronite thinking on the shape of Greater Lebanon arguably had more to do 
with the accident of the ‘man on the spot’ being General Gouraud, 
Commander-in-Chief of the French forces in the region, and so the man who 
played a major role in shaping Lebanon’s borders. The evidence of many 
sources, both anti-French such as Faisal himself, and pro French, such as de
329 Meir Zamir. The Formation of Modern Lebanon, p. 48; Gerard Khoury, La France et L’Orient Arabe. pp. 172;181.
330 Stephen Longrigg, Svria and Lebanon under the French Mandate, pp. 87-8.
331 For instance, there was a  breakdown in co-habitation and intercommunal violence, with killings on all sides, in the 
early months of the mandate. Ibid. pp. 87-93; Meir Zamir, Formation of Modern Lebanon, pp. 56-8;80-7.
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Caix, Gouraud’s own secretary, was that Gouraud was for personal reasons, 
very susceptible to pressure and suggestion from the Lebanese Christians.332 
Men like de Caix warned of the dangers of creating a Greater Lebanon that 
took in too much territory where there was an overwhelming and undoubted 
Muslim majority in the population. But Gouraud, inspired by the concept of the 
‘grandeur’ of France in the region, and his own religious fervour, ignored such 
warnings. He was personally sure that ‘the real Syria desired and awaited 
France’, and he acted accordingly.333 His policy was to lay a fresh emphasis 
on the links between the Christian (and especially the Maronite) communities 
and France, and this added to Muslim hostility towards France - not the best 
basis for administering the new entity, as the French were to find out. This was 
even more the case since there was also an element of Maronite 
disappointment with France, especially since the French troops in Lebanon 
under Gouraud’s control had not managed to prevent a number of Muslim 
killings of Christians during the 1919-20 period. France itself, or at least 
important elements there politically and intellectually, were disappointed to be 
awarded only a mandate, and had already begun to identify the task as a 
thankless one. French freedom to govern as they saw best would be 
practically restricted by the terms of the mandate, and the impact of the French 
civilising mission would be consequently reduced. So the mandate period 
started with no great feelings of optimism on any side.334
Yet despite this, the setting up of the mandate went ahead with due 
swiftness and ceremony once the problem of Faisal had been dealt with. 
General Gouraud issued the formal notice of the institution of a self-contained 
Greater Lebanon on 1 September 1920.335 Greater Lebanon was proclaimed 
as being the result of France’s aim to help the populations of Syria and 
Lebanon to achieve their aspirations of freedom within the context of 
autonomous entities, wherein it was the intention of France to help the new 
state to achieve its dreams by overseeing its eariy stages. Of course, the
332 Stephen Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon under the French Mandate, pp. 100-7; Meir Zamir, Formation of Modern 
Lebanon, pp. 74-5; 93-4.
333 Ibid.
334 Meir Zamir, Formation of Modern Lebanon, pp. 89-90; 100-2.
335 For details of the constitution and the decrees setting up Greater Lebanon, as well as its territorial extent. See 
Nicola Ziadeh, Syria and Lebanon. Ernest Benn Ltd, London, 1957, pp. 49-51.
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reality, was that it fulfilled the ambitions of the Christian population - though not 
even all of them, given the support of some Christian elements for Arab 
nationalism - but definitely not the desires of the vast majority of the Muslim 
population.
It has been argued that a nation exists ‘when a significant number in a 
community consider themselves to form a nation or behave as if they formed 
one’.336 Anthony Smith states that ‘Nations’ are formed ‘on the basis of pre­
existing ethnie and ethnic ties’, in a process where ‘ethnic’ were transformed 
into ‘national ties and sentiments through processes of mobilisation, 
territorialisation and politicisation’.337 In the case of the Lebanese experience, 
what can be described as national feeling can be identified as coalescing in the 
nineteenth century, but in relation only to one single, and self-consciously well- 
defined ethnie: the Maronites. It was a vision based on what Salibi describes 
as the core to any politically conscious community: ‘a common vision of their 
past’.338 The other communities in the mandate territory, however, did not 
share that common Maronite vision.
336 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, p, 6.
337 Anthony Smith, Theories of Nationalism. Camelot Press Ltd, London, 1971, p. 22.
338 K.S. Salibi, House of Many Mansions, p. 216.
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Chapter 3 
The Creation of Independent Lebanon
The proclamation that established Greater Lebanon under a French 
mandate set up a scenario that theoretically also confirmed a state based on a 
Christian-Muslim co-operation. In reality, it was more of a continuation of the 
established co-habitational patterns that made use of differing reactions to the 
myths surrounding that scenario. But eventually, towards the end of the period 
1920-43, Lebanese from widely different backgrounds and outlooks in terms of 
their confessional and other orientations did manage to find a way of balancing 
the tensions over such myths. Under the pressure of a mutual hostility to the 
French agenda, they did create something new: a consensus that was to be a 
basis for setting up an independent Lebanon. This chapter will examine the 
evolution and basis of the consensus in this period, to demonstrate the extent 
to which it was based on compromises relating primarily to particular issues 
current in those years, rather than being a genuine compromise based on a 
settlement of those tensions and resentments that were expressed in the 
various community mythologies, especially those of the Maronites and the 
Sunni. The reason for this will be shown to be the reality that the ‘consensus’ 
was primarily an arrangement based on short-term expediency that, in the 
long-term, was only satisfactory to the political elites of these two groups in 
particular. Thus it did not really represent a move away from co-habitation to 
real consensus, as will be shown in subsequent chapters which will examine 
the continuation of conflicting community mythologies. Here it must also be 
remembered that if the 1920 proclamation did set up the concept of a 
Christian-Muslim co-operation, it also encapsulated the potential for very 
divisive and contradictory ambitions for the future within that state.
Yet there were new dimensions to the intercommunal patterns in the 
period 1920-43. There was the expansion of intercommunal tension at 
significant levels to areas outside the Mount Lebanon area itself.339 In addition
339 Though the Maronite community had spread outside the Mount Lebanon area, tensions between Maronites and 
other communities in places such as Beirut did not reach the levels of tension within Mount Lebanon where there was 
competition over the same territory.
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the focus of intercommunal tension in the context of Greater Lebanon 
switched. From 1920 onwards, the focus was on the relationship between the 
Sunni community and the Maronites; rather than between the Druze and the 
Maronites. The tension expressed itself in terms of concern about the balance 
of power between those communities in a separate Lebanese entity, with each 
side seeking to protect its own position and mythology. Thus it is on the 
relations between Sunni and Maronites based their differing perceptions of 
themselves and the 'other1; and how these understandings translated 
themselves into action and policy, that this chapter, and the rest of the thesis, 
will focus. The Sunni were quantitatively the majority Muslim group within the 
new mandate and, in 1920, also identifiably the most significant group whose 
agenda and hopes for the future (as part of an Arab entity) looked along a path 
widely divergent from that hoped for by the Maronites. The Sunni came from a 
tradition of dominance within the Ottoman Empire where they had been in the 
majority, quantitatively and qualitatively throughout its existence.
The Ottoman empire had been an essentially Sunni entity in 
confessional terms. With its collapse, many of their leading figures had had 
expectations for a future that would sustain that historical dominance within an 
Arab context. Now they were forced to define themselves in a context that was 
neither Muslim nor Arab. The other Muslim groups in Lebanon, the Druze and 
the Shi’a, were not unsympathetic to the Sunni vision for the ideal future of 
Lebanon, but it was not of such fundamental significance to them, for a variety 
of reasons linked to their history as minority groups within the Ottoman Empire 
and their resultant community mythologies. Thus neither community felt the 
sense of defeat that the Sunni community felt with the setting up of the 
mandate, even if they resented the intrusion of the French and feared that the 
Maronites would be overly favoured. Individual elements in the Druze 
community did take up an actively anti-French and pro-Arab stance, notably 
the Arslan family, but most of the community sought compromises with the 
French, if not the Maronites. The Shi’a swiftly recognised they were better off 
as a sizeable minority in a Greater Lebanon, as opposed to a minority in an 
overwhelmingly Sunni Arab entity or French-administered Syria. In both
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communities, the traditional social structure ensured that the position of 
leaders was generally adopted by their followers.340
It was not just the Sunni community that felt itself to be dealing with a 
new situation. The same was true of the Maronite community in 1920. This 
was not just because the Maronites now saw the Sunni as their major 
protagonists in any future struggles over the evolution of Lebanon as a 
separate state. In the context of Greater Lebanon, they feared they were no 
longer automatically seen by the West as an unquestioned majority 
community. In Mount Lebanon, the Maronites had been a powerful force, but 
in many of the areas of Greater Lebanon they had no such tradition. In areas 
outside Mount Lebanon there were other Christian communities; but these did 
not automatically fall into line with the pro-Western stance of the Maronites. 
This was particularly true of the Greek Orthodox community, whose situation 
was very complicated. Primarily located in the coastal towns and ports, where 
they formed a significant presence, they had no particular commitment to a 
separate Lebanese entity. The wealthy Greek Orthodox merchants, 
particularly in Beirut and Tripoli, relied on trade with the Syrian interior and 
wished to remain on good terms with the Sunni community in general. 
Concepts of Arab nationalism had attractions for some Greek Orthodox 
elements also. Thus they took up a consciously neutral stance in relation to 
the internal tensions of Greater Lebanon and the differing communal agendas, 
seeking to hold themselves aloof from any potentially clashing community 
visions.341 Practically, many Maronites were fearful of finding their heartland 
submerged in a Muslim sea; making them more in need of protection from 
traditional European allies, rather than less. It meant that Maronite perceptions 
about the desirability of a separate Lebanese future were linked to a feeling of 
insecurity about its durability on its own terms.342
340 This was particularly true for those in Jaba! Amil, though the Shi'a of the Biqa1 were less content. See K.S.. Salibi, 
A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered. I.B. Tauris, London, 1988, p. 169; Meir Zamir, The  
Formation of Modern Lebanon, first published 1958, reprinted Croom Helm, Beckenham, 1985, p. 136.
341 See Meir Zamir, Formation of Modem Lebanon, p. 133; Rachid Khalidi, Lisa Anderson, Muhammad Muslih, Reeva  
S. Simon (eds), The Origins of Arab Nationalism. Columbia Press, New York, 1991, pp. 3-23; Zeine N. Zeine, The  
Emergence of Arab Nationalism. Caravan Books, New York, 1973.
Fadia Kiwan, 'La perception du Grand-Liban chez les Maronites dans la periode du mandat', in Nadim Shehadi & 
Dana Haffar Mills (eds), Lebanon. A History of Conflict and Consensus. I.B. Tauris, London, 1988, pp. 127-9.
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The first major dissension between these two 'new' protagonists 
focused on the issue of the geographical outlines of Greater Lebanon, and 
thus predated the actual setting up of the mandate. It underlines the extent to 
which the differing perceptions became fundamental to the relationship from 
the start. The fate of the coastal area and the four qada's claimed by the 
Maronites to be part of 'Lebanon' was a major issue, resulting in the 
description of them as the 'disputed territories'. Without these, the majority of 
Maronites believed that a separate Lebanon could not exist. But the 
population of the areas, predominantly Sunni, considered the territories as 
part of 'Syria1.343 The inclusion of Tripoli in Greater Lebanon, and its role 
within that entity also provided an issue surrounded with particular acrimony. 
The importance of Beirut can obscure the earlier importance of Tripoli, as a 
port and as a political centre.344 Tripoli's inclusion in a Greater Lebanon would 
be a real boost for that entity and by the same token, Syria would feel it a real 
loss. Ultimately, Maronite pressure was effective in persuading the French to 
choose Beirut over Tripoli as the headquarters, because of its nearness to 
Mount Lebanon, providing thereby an enduring cause of Sunni resentment.345
The endorsement by the French of the main essentials of the Maronite 
vision of Greater Lebanon was disguised to an extent by the presentation of 
the official announcement of the new mandate in 1920. The attendance of 
both the Mufti and the Maronite Patriarch at the ceremony gave the
343 They invoked the past Ottoman government of the areas to support their claims that the idea of a  Greater Lebanon 
involved the 'dismemberment' of traditionally Arab land, and called on support from the population of the proposed 
Syrian mandate to prevent the incorporation of the disputed territories into what they saw a s a predominantly Christian 
entity. Maronite assumptions were based on the fact that many of these territories had been part of the Imarah at 
some period in the past. See Chapter One, pp. 59-60.
344 Buheiry argues that up to the nineteenth century 'in terms of population size, construction activity, artisanal 
production and trade' Tripoli was the leading city in the region. Though Beirut's importance developed during the 
nineteenth century, Tripoli remained important. Marwan Buheiry, 'Beirut's Role in the Political Economy of the French 
mandate 1919-39' in Laurence I. Conrand (ed.), The Formation and Perception of the Modern Arab W orld. Darwin 
Press Inc, Princeton, 1989, p. 538; Michael Johnson, Class and Client in Beirut. The Sunni Muslim Community and 
the Lebanese State 1840-1985. Ithaca Press, London, 1986, pp. 11-12.
S45 From the perception of French administrators of the mandate it possibly made most sense to include Tripoli in 
Greater Lebanon because a number of experts favoured the idea that the administrative quarters of the mandate be 
located there. Arguably this might have compensated the inhabitants of Tripoli for their official detachment from Syria. 
But Emile Edde and the Patriarch, Howayek, seem to have played pivotal roles in switching attention to Beirut. Their 
perception, and that of the Maronite mercantile elite which was predominantly Beirut-based, was that Tripoli needed to 
be in Lebanon, but subordinate to Beirut, promoting chances of Maronite economic dominance at the same time as 
allowing an exploitation of the trade that traditionally passed through Tripoli. According to Salibi and Salam, the 
realisation of this agenda by inhabitants of Tripoli helps to account for the enduring resentment displayed by Tripoli at 
its inclusion in the Lebanese entity. This demonstrated itself in rhetoric that was both anti-Maronite and anti-French 
into the period of independence. See Marwan Buheiry, 'Beirut's Role', in Laurence Conrand (ed.), Formation and 
Perception of the Arab W orld, p. 538; Meir Zamir, Formation of Modern Lebanon, p. 118; K.S. Salibi, The Modern 
History of Lebanon. Caravan Books, New York, 1965, p. 169; Saeb Salam, Oral Interview, Geneva, 4  January 1991.
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appearance of the support of both communities for the mandate.346 But the 
actual words used by Gouraud indicate the degree of rejection by the French of 
the Muslim position. He stressed the role of the French soldiers in freeing 'the 
Lebanese' of what he described as ' the evil power that wanted to dominate 
them'.347 He rubbed salt in the wounds of those in Lebanon that resented the 
French role in ending this kingdom by informing 'the Lebanese' that they 
owed a debt of gratitude to France for the French blood so generously 
‘donated’ to safeguard them from this 'evil power'; with the implication that 
France expected that this should lead them to demonstrate this gratitude by 
docility within the mandate and its policies:
C'est en partageant votre joie et votre fierte que je 
proclame solennellement le Grand-Liban et qu'au nom du 
gouvernement de la republique Frangaise je le salue 
dans sa grandeur et dans sa force, du Nahr-EI-Kebir aux 
portes de la Palestine et aux cretes de i'anti-Liban... I l ya 
cinq semaines, les petits soldats de France... donnaient 
I'essor a tous vos espoirs, en faisant s'evanouir en une 
matinee de combat, la puissance nefaste qui pretendait 
vous asservir.348
There was no such spirit of gratitude amongst the Sunni element. The 
proclamation simply served to emphasise the extent of their defeat.349 From 
start, the Sunni element in particular were to prove themselves willing to co­
operate with any groups in Lebanon that opposed French policy. It was a 
question of the greater enemy. It was thus on emotional rather than on 
considered, rational grounds that in 1920 the overwhelming majority of 
Muslims refused to indicate an acceptance of the mandate by participation in 
its political mechanisms.350 This is underlined by the fact that those few Sunni 
figures who did co-operate with the mandate in the early years, in terms of 
taking up political positions, had no personal followings to take with them into
346 Fadia K iw an ,' La Perception Maronite du Grand Liban1, in Shehadi & Mills (eds), Lebanon, p. 128.
347 In other words, the Syrian kingdom Faisal had briefly set up in 1918.
348 No mention was made of an Arab connection for Lebanon; instead mention was made of the Phoenician, as well as 
Greek and Roman, heritage of the area. See the report in Le Reveil. 2 September 1920. See also, Edmond Rabbath, 
La Formation Historiaue du Liban Politique et Constitutionnelle. Publication de I'Universite Libanaise, Beirut, 1986, p. 
372.
349 The timing of the proclamation was a further sting; it came just after the entry of French troops into Damascus to 
put down forcibly protests against French rule in Syria. Under such circumstances the Muslim population of Greater 
Lebanon, and particularly the Sunni element, regarded the French as an occupying force and the existence of a 
separate Lebanon as a demonstration of French power. See Elizabeth Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East. 
1914-17: Chatto & Windus, London, 1981, p. 80.
This is not to claim that there were no such rational grounds for Muslim hostility; simply to emphasise the emotional 
nature of this initial reaction. See Edmond Rabbath, La Formation Historiaue du Liban. p. 381.
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the mandate system and were rather the focus of hostility from within their own 
community. Men like Al Jisr, Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies from its 
institution in 1926 until 1932 and a presidential candidate in 1932, can be held 
as representing only their own personal opinions.351
Emotion was equally important to the Maronite community in its initial 
reaction to the mandate.352 The Maronite Church had taken a leading role in 
the setting up of the mandate and expected to continue to take such a role, 
preaching the necessity of a separate Lebanon and of Maronite primacy in that 
entity.353 As Zamir points out, there was an 'almost mystical belief1 in the 
validity of a Greater Lebanon as the natural 'homeland' of the Maronite 
'people'; and the involvement of the Church in sustaining that belief was of 
considerable importance.354 Here, the important thing is the firm conviction 
that this was the case.355 As a result, this 'crucial' role played by the Maronites 
in the creation of a separate Lebanon, by ensuring the setting up of the 
mandate, became part of Maronite tradition in a way that gave popular 
justification to the view that, in the words of Salibi:
In the story of modern Lebanon the principal line of 
historical continuity between the Mount Lebanon of the 
nineteenth century and the Greater Lebanon of the 
twentieth, certainly at the internal political level, was the 
Maronite connection. Their destiny is linked with the 
survival of the Lebanon.356
The belief that where Maronite visions of a Greater Lebanon conflicted with 
French policy, it was French policy that altered, not Maronite visions, served to 
establish Maronite claims of a 'right' to dominance in Lebanon as a matter 
beyond question. In other words, 'Lebanese nationalism' was essentially 
based on Maronite communal mythology.
351 K.S. Salibi. Modern History of Lebanon, p. 174.
352 Nor was this emotion confined to the Maronite community in Lebanon itself; it was also a powerful force in the 
various emigrant communities, such as those located in France.
353 Eiias Howayek, the Patriarch, seems genuinely to have played a key role in convincing Gouraud that Greater 
Lebanon was the ’right' path to follow, for instance. See Chapter 2, pp. 118-19.
354 As a result of the experiences of wartime starvation in Mount Lebanon, the Maronite Church had been very 
insistent that Greater Lebanon included the ports, for instance. See Meir Zamir, Formation of Modem Lebanon, pp. 
117-19.
355 Elias Howayek, 'Revendication du Liban: Memoire de la delegation Libanaise a la Conference de la Paix’, 25  
October 1919, Paris, in Documents of the Maronite Patriarch. Maronite Church, Bkirki, 23 February 1936.
356 K.S. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon, p. 1.
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Nationalism has been described as the myth of historical renovation. In 
the mandate period, that process in Lebanon involved little in the way of myths 
of origin that were not specific to the promotion of Maronite traditions. The 
myths discussed in Chapter One relating to a Phoenician and Mardaite 
ancestry for Lebanon were central to the nationalism supported by both 
Maronites and the French, and Maronite leaders such as Emile Edde cited as 
'proof1 of the validity of such myths the work of nineteenth century Maronite 
scholars and clerics, such as Henri Lammens.357 In the pre-1914 period, also, 
a number of Maronite societies such as al Nahda al Lubnaniyyah [The 
Lebanese Revival] had developed which, despite a small membership, had a 
real impact on the expression of Maronite ‘nationalism* in political terms.358 
The diaspora of Maronites identified in Chapter One also had an effect, as 
groups of emigrants in France, Egypt, South America and the USA established 
societies supporting the concept of an ‘independent’ Greater Lebanon and 
using mythology to ‘prove’ that the origins of Lebanon were Western rather 
than Arab, effectively distancing the Maronite community from those other 
communities in Lebanon which did claim an essentially Arab origin.359 There 
was thus little attempt by the Maronite community to seek to develop a 
Lebanese nationalism that was not exclusive of non-Maronite traditions. 
Equally, those elements of the population conscious of Arab descent, mainly 
the Sunni, Shi'a and Druze communities, reacted angrily to being expected to 
acquiesce in a scenario that rejected their Arab heritage. In particular, they 
rejected, comprehensively the myths of Phoenician and Mardaite descent - not 
just for themselves but also for the Maronites. There was, in 1920, no obvious 
common ground for the creation of a discrete national feeling among the 
communities in Lebanon through reference to a shared past, mythical or 
otherwise.
357 This was a  very public exercise in the mandate period, not something confined to scholarly circles. See, for 
example, the comments of Emiie Edde reported in An Nahar. 28 August 1937.
358 Meir Zamir, Formation of Modern Lebanon, p. 23.
359 Some historians like Edmond Rabbath have even suggested that ‘Lebanese nationalism' arose amongst such 
emigrant Maronite communities rather than in Lebanon. See Edmond Rabbath, La Formation Historiaue du Liban. pp. 
360-8. However, this ignores the emotions within Lebanon itself. There was undoubtedly an interchange of ideas, and 
these undoubtedly served to reinforce the development of a ‘nationalist’ agenda for Lebanon. Equally such societies 
were undoubtedly utilised by the French to demonstrate support for the mandate. S ee Meir Zamir, Formation of 
Modern Lebanon, pp, 70-8.
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In understanding the operation of the mandate, the reactions of the 
various communities to French perceptions of that mandate and of the Greater 
Lebanon that it created also need to be taken into account.360 For one thing, 
the men entrusted with setting up the mandate’s administrative systems 
consciously set about establishing a meticulous, perfectionist structure that 
would be a contrast to the laxer structures of the Ottoman Empire.361 It was 
this, arguably more than any resentments amongst the communities in 
Lebanon, that was to bring about the constant stream of troubles and crisis 
that were eventually to alienate both the Sunni and the Maronite communities 
from French administration. Ottoman administration had been based on a 
parochialism that resulted from a lack of effective control at the centre. Local 
leaders in Lebanon had become accustomed to brokering much of the daily 
administration of their region for themselves in the absence of a firm hand at 
the centre. In addition, bribery had habitually been used in the establishing of 
a range of privileges and powers at all levels of local society. Nothing in this 
had prepared the inhabitants of the region for a system that would emphasise 
strict application of any laws and deference to a strong central authority. But it 
was this that the French were determined to set up in Lebanon.
In setting up their administrative structures and policies, French officials 
were aware that they would have to cope with confessional complications; that 
they would need to create a balance between Christians and Muslims. 
Gourard's hopes of achieving a suitable formula were initially high.362 Before 
the official setting up of the mandate, he made this public in a speech on 22 
November 1919:
Mais si nous sommes les descendants des croises, nous 
sommes les fils de la Revolution epris de liberte et de 
progres, respectueux de toutes les religions et fermement
360 The creation of the Lebanese and Syrian mandates was a complex issue in France itself. For example, there were 
those in France who were hostile to the mandate, either because they were anti-colonial, or because they wanted a
colony and not a mandate. For further details of the creation of the mandate, and for further details of French
expectations, see Briand's addresses to the Senate, 5 April 1921 and 12 July 1921, as recorded in Asie Francaise. 
no. 192, 1921, pp. 205-8; 378-80; Poincare, address to the Chamber of Deputies, 1 June 1921, as recorded in Asie 
Francaise. no. 192, 1921, p. 268. See also Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon under French Mandate. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1968; and Philippe Gouraud, Le General Henri Gouraud au Liban et en Svrie. 1919- 
1923. L'Harmattan, Paris, 1993.
361 Elizabeth Monroe, The Mediterranean in Politics. London, 1939, p. 76.
362 Stephen Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon under French Mandate, p. 114.
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resolus a assurer une justice egale aux adeptes de 
chacune.363
This was not an isolated expression. He returned to this theme on 6 December 
1919, speaking at the Omari Mosque:
Representant de la France dans ce pays aux religions si 
nombreuses et si diverses, j'etends les faire respecter 
toutes en me placant au-dessus de toutes les 
confessions et je fais appel en retour au plus large esprit 
de tolerance de tous.364
But his early confidence was soon replaced by exasperation over the attitudes 
of the local population.
The French were very conscious that they were setting up a mandate, 
while they were used to administering a colony.365 But even so, they were 
determined to try to set up a system that was, in their perception at least, 
sound. However, to achieve this they saw it as necessary to involve all 
elements of the communal mix in Lebanon in a balanced participation. But 
they could not order, only persuade - and in doing this successfully they faced 
an uphill task with the Sunni community, who demonstrated a resistance to 
such participation.366 Equally they faced a problem with achieving a balanced 
participation because of the overenthusiasm of the Maronite community for 
participation. The Maronite belief that they were responsible for the creation of 
a separate entity in the first place led them to believe also that they had a right 
to be centrally involved in the evolution of policy for, and the active 
administration of, Greater Lebanon367
Yet even the Maronite willingness to participate developed into a 
complex issue, as the French were to find out. The gratitude that the French
363 Stephen Longrigg, Svria and Lebanon under French Mandate, p. 118; Henri Gouraud, Speech given at a reception, 
22 November 1919. See Philippe Gouraud, Le Genera! Henri Gouraud. p. 39.
364 ibid.
305 The French public servants entrusted with this task were accustomed to having total powers in this respect, and 
found it difficult to adapt to a situation where they were expected to act only as advisers, rather than giving orders. 
See Stephen Longrigg, Svria and Lebanon under French Mandate, p. 114.
360 From the French perspective, the Sunni position was contradictory and thus profoundly irritating. On the one hand,
accustomed to participation in the Ottoman administration, they complained of being underrepresented in the new 
state and were resentful at their 'omission'. Yet on the other hand, they refused to endorse the legitimacy of the
mandate by agreeing to participate in its mechanisms. For instance, in 1922, they refused to participate in the
elections to set up a Chamber of Representatives. See Meir Zamir, Formation of Modern Lebanon, p. 127; Michael 
Johnson, Class and Client in Beirut, pp. 23-4.
367 See the comments in Bishara Al Khoury, Haaa'ia Lubnaniwah [Facts About Lebanon], Maktabit Basil, Harissa, 
1960, Vol. 1, pp. 124-6.
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had expected to invoke did not materialise in the shape of a co-operative 
attitude towards the administration of the mandate. This was because the 
actual operation of the mandate clashed with Maronite expectations of the 
dominant role they would take therein, expectations raised by the Maronite 
tradition of French endorsement of their mythology and the ‘rights’ it conferred. 
The issue was also complicated by the persistence of some fear in the 
community that France might abandon both the mandate and the Maronite 
cause. There had been persistent rumours in the period 1918-1920 that the 
French would evacuate both Syria and Lebanon; and fears about a French 
commitment to the Maronite cause seemed to be given some substance by the 
French insistence on trying to involve all the communities in administration of 
the mandate. It was the Maronite nightmare that French efforts to establish 
better relations with the Muslim communities might be successful to an extent 
that would affect Maronite primacy in the French order of priorities.368 If there 
was general Maronite support for Greater Lebanon, this did not lead to a 
consequent general agreement within the community over the exact methods 
and policies that needed to be pursued in order to achieve the continuance 
and prosperity of this entity. Rather the Maronite community was politically 
divided from the start and prepared to be critical of the French. For example, 
some elements in the community swiftly began to press for a French policy in 
the mandate that would lead to rapid independence; others for a practical 
autonomy that would leave the French in the mandate as figureheads and no 
more. To further these separate agendas, individual Maronite leaders soon 
showed themselves willing to co-operate with politically conscious leaders from 
other communities in Lebanon in order to put pressure on the French.369
The result of all this was a continuation of the patterns of co-habitation, 
patterns based on mutual suspicion and mistrust. Maronite Sunni relations, for 
example, were dominated by this to the extent that, in the words of Zamir, To
368 The case of Cilicia seemed ominous, since France had evacuated Cilicia despite previous declarations that this 
would not happen. French sensitivity to their position and international links that was far from welcome to the 
Maronites; who saw it as something of a betrayal. See Yussuf Al Sawda, Personal Papers, unpublished and 
unclassified, Universite du Saint Esprit, Kaslik.
369 There were even some small Maronite elements openly opposed to the mandate to the extent of being prepared to 
forge alliance with Muslim opinion. However, this did not signify a willingness to endorse an Arab nationalist position; 
rather attempts were made to recruit politically conscious leaders from the Muslim elements to the cause of a separate 
and independent Lebanon. See Fadia Kiwan, ‘La Perception du Grand-Liban' in Shehadi & Mills (eds), Lebanon, p. 
124; Meir Zamir, Formation of Modern Lebanon, p. 124; Farid Ai Khazin, T h e  Communal Pact of Identities', Papers 
on Lebanon, Centre for Lebanese Studies, Oxford, October 1991, p. 8.
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every action taken by one community there is a counteraction from the other' - 
and these actions and counteractions had little to do with the new practicalities 
the French were attempting to institute and much to do with established 
mythology and the expectations raised thereby.370 French administrators 
found all this exasperating and incomprehensible. Gouraud, for example, went 
so far as to describe the Maronites as 'difficult, spoilt and greedy'.371 But it was 
within this communal complexity that they sought to make the mandate work.
It can be argued that the setting up of the French mandate was a 
negative thing in terms of communal relations in Lebanon, because particularly 
in terms of majority Maronite-Sunni relations it did deepen divisions. Yet at the 
same time the French presence during the mandate period was to be a key 
factor in the process by which Greater Lebanon became more than an artificial 
entity sustained only by an external power.372 It was solely due to the French 
presence, and to the actively interventionist stance taken by French mandate 
officials, that any Muslim opposition to the concept of a separate Lebanese 
entity was ineffective for a sufficiently long period to make the survival of an 
independent Lebanon in a post-mandate period possible. The continuance of 
the mandate was to force sufficient numbers among the Muslim communities 
to a position of collaboration if not always directly with the French, then at least 
with elements in the Maronite community; and the Maronites were even more 
committed than the French to the continuance of a separate Lebanon.373 Thus 
the positions of the relevant players did not remain fixed throughout this 
period; and the factors leading to shifts and developments in Maronite-Sunni 
communal relations will provide the focus for the rest of this chapter.374
370 Meir Zamir, Formation of Modern Lebanon, p. 117.
371 From the French perspective in the early years of the mandate at least, the Maronite attitude was unnecessary, if 
only because of the practical constraints that resulted from the continued minimal co-operation of the Sunni in 
particular with the mandate. Effectively, the French had to continue to involve the Maronites! Ibid. pp. 121-3.
72 Stephen Longrigg, Svria and Lebanon under French Mandate, pp. 114-18.
373 Meir Zamir, Formation of Modern Lebanon, p. 91; Philippe Gouraud, Le General Henri Gouraud. pp. 77; 128.
374 The various other communities in Lebanon also had a mixture of reactions to involvement in the mandate, but it 
was the Maronite-Sunni axis that has been most significant. For the attitudes and reactions of the Greek Orthodox 
community, see Joseph Abou Jaoude, Les Partis Politiaues au Liban. Universite Saint Esprit, Kaslik, 1985, pp. 170-1; 
Meir Zamir, Formation of Modern Lebanon, p. 102. For those of the Shi'a, see ibid. p. 68. For those of the Druze, 
whose main concern was undoubtedly the traditional one of desiring to prevent Maronite dominance in Mount 
Lebanon, see Ibid: and Stephen Longrigg, Svria and Lebanon under French Mandate, pp. 148-52.
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Under the terms of the mandate declaration, a constitution was to be 
granted to Lebanon, to inaugurate a period of indigenous administration under 
French tutelage. This was required to be in place before the end of September 
1926.375 Insurrection in Syria in 1925 had spread to Lebanon by 1926, but it 
had not created a major crisis. It was to avoid this developing, according to 
Philip Khoury, that the constitution was set up while, at the same time, the 
French army was utilised to contain agitation among the Muslim elements in 
Lebanon.376 French hopes that the promulgation of a constitution would 
defuse Muslim agitation at the time were to prove misplaced, because the 
Muslim perspective was that an acceptance of the constitution would imply an 
acceptance of Greater Lebanon within its current boundaries. This line of 
thinking was made plain at a meeting on 5 January 1926; when 37 of the most 
important Sunni leaders and notables of Beirut voiced their refusal to 
participate with drafting of the constitution.377
But despite Sunni hostility, a Lebanese republic with a parliamentary 
system was installed under French guardianship from 1926.378 The extent of 
this new republic's freedom of action was limited by this latter condition: the 
political and legal system was still essentially controlled by France as the 
mandatory power in a way that was actually enshrined in the constitution of 
that year.379 The 1926 constitution recognised Lebanon as an entity distinct 
from Syria, in the shape of a constitutional republic, with the new republic 
being given a measure of independent action. But its constitution also included 
a fundamental acceptance of French power, under the terms of the original 
mandate, by its inhabitants.380 The provisions of the constitution were to be at
375 This promise was endorsed by the Representative Council for Greater Lebanon, set up in 1922, as the first attempt 
by the French to create an administrative system. For further details see Edmond Rabbath, La Formation Historiaue 
du Liban. p. 379.gyg =----------» i”
The spread of trouble to Lebanon was a cause of very real concern to the French authorities there because it was 
not just confined to one social level or Muslim community. It involved the masses and the intelligentsia, for example, 
and can be taken as an indication of a very widespread discontent with the mandate. Philip S. Khoury, Svria and the 
French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism. 1920-1945. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1987, pp. 151- 
204. For further details of the Syrian insurrection and its impact on Lebanon, see Stephen Longrigg, Svria and 
Lebanon under French Mandate, pp. 148-52; Edmond Rabbath, La Formation Historiaue du Liban. pp. 379; 401-2.
Meir Zamir, Formation of Modern Lebanon, p. 210; Edmond Rabbath, La formation Historiaue du Liban. pp. 378-9. 
370 Though this hostility did not, from 1926, lead the Sunni to continue their 1922 boycott of elections, instead, they 
used 'parliamentary democracy' as 'an expression of protest rather than a means to government'. In other words, they 
participated to disrupt the process, rather than to further it. See Michael Johnson, Class and Client in Beirut, pp. 23-4. 
See also Edmond Rabbath, La Formation Historiaue du Liban. p. 399.
379 Fouad L. Bustani, Introduction a L'Histoire Politique du Liban Moderne. FMA, Beirut, 1993, pp. 150-151 for the text 
of the Constitution.
380 The extent of the new republic's freedom of action was limited: the political and legal systems were essentially
controlled by France as the mandatory power; and this was actually enshrined in the constitution. In addition, the 
Governor inherited the wide range of prerogatives that the High Commissioner had held, and the extent of French
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the heart of Lebanese political life for the rest of the mandate, because they 
set the agenda for both opposition to and support for Lebanon as a separate 
entity.
In Sunni eyes, the constitution gave formal endorsement to an entity 
and a mythology that they profoundly opposed.381 In addition it introduced an 
element of populism into the management of affairs within Lebanon that had 
implications for the ways in which the hierarchies of power in the Sunni 
community traditionally operated.382 The elected assembly had a democratic 
base, and this was seen as a threat by traditional elites, heightening their 
hostility to the Lebanon that this constitution encapsulated.383 By contrast, for 
the Maronite population it meant a permanent settlement of the Lebanese 
question in a way that they had long desired.384 Once again the majority of 
Maronites could look to France uncritically, accepting France as their 
traditional saviour as well as the guarantor of their safety.385
One idea behind the terms of the constitution was the setting up of a 
political system that would provide for the equitable representation of the 
various communities. To enable the constitution to react to a changing 
communal balance, the constitution did not lay down a formula that fixed a 
ratio for proportional representation nor did it reserve specific government 
positions for each community. According to Salibi 'the constitution did not lay 
down hard and fast principles for co-operation between the various 
confessions' because the French believed that the system would work best if it
control over the local bureaucracy was enormous. The mandate administrative system came to include services 
dealing with nearly all the functions of a modern state, and these services were expected to operate according to 
standards and agendas laid down by the French and not by the indigenous communities. For the text of the 
constitution see Fouad Bustani, Introduction a I'Histoire. pp. 150-238. For further comments on the constitution and 
administrative system see Edmond Rabbath, La Formation Historiaue du Liban. pp. 370-9; 399; K.S. Salibi, Modern 
History of Lebanon, pp. 165-7.
For instance, the 1926 constitution declared that the boundaries of Lebanon established in 1920 were permanent 
and unchangeable, and required an elected president of the republic to swear loyalty to a Lebanese nation as it 
existed within these boundaries. See the text of the constitution in Fouad Bustani, introduction a I'Histoire. pp. 229-38. 
302 This, of course, was also true for other Muslim communities.
383 K.S. Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon, p. 167.
304 There were ‘Kiyanists’ who were ready to accept and endorse Greater Lebanon or a l Kiyan (the entity) regardless
of their religion, and these did include a small number of Muslims leaders who were even in 1926 ready for economic
political or personal reasons to endorse the idea of a l Kiyan. But the majority were from the Christian communities.
05 The setting up of the constitution did lessen the sense of insecurity about French intentions that had existed at the 
start of the mandate. See Edmond Rabbath, La Formation Historiaue du Liban. p. 379.
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was not too prescriptive but left room for a spontaneous 'process of give-and- 
take'.386
In practice the system was slowly to bring the Maronite and Sunni 
communities closer together, but not in ways that the French had hoped. This 
closer relationship was based on shared resentment of the French, based on 
things such as raised expectations amongst interested parties that often ended 
in disappointment and frustration when expectations could not be fulfilled. 
According to Kiwan, the series of crises that characterised the 1926-34 period 
in particular was caused not so much by the French as by the attempts of 
various Maronite leaders to exercise their 'right' to a powerful role.387 In the 
immediate post-1926 period, continuing lack of input from the Sunni 
community meant that in practice, much of the power that was in Lebanese 
rather than French hands on a daily basis was in fact exercised by a French- 
educated Maronite intelligentsia. Prominent figures included men who had 
participated in the Peace Conference in Paris: Habib Pasha El Saad; Daoud 
Ammoun; Emile Edde; and Bishara Al Khoury. The Maronite Patriarch, Elias 
Howayek, was also influential. Sunni leaders in Lebanon felt a particular 
resentment of these men and their high profile under the mandate.388 But 
when it stimulated Muslim leaders to express opposition to this development, 
that opposition was demonstrated outside the mandate structure. To French 
disappointment, it did not persuade Muslim leaders to participate in the 
administration of the mandate.389
306 K.S. Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon, p. 167. It was also seen in Lebanon as being partly a continuation of the 
'divide and rule1 approach used by the French in their colonial past, as well as a genuine attempt to take account of the 
internal map of Lebanon, as the work of Zamir, first published in 1958, makes plain. See Meir Zamir, Formation of 
Modern Lebanon, pp. 203-15.
m  Fadia Kiwan, ’La Perception du Grand-Liban', in Shehadi & Mills (eds), Lebanon, p. 124. As Salibi has pointed out, 
though, any Maronite resentment of the French was initially restricted to the political elites, and did not represent the 
attitude of the masses, for whom the period was one of 'consolidation and achievement'. K.S. Salibi, Modern History 
of Lebanon, p. 177. If this disappointment was most acutely felt by the ambitious among the Maronite community both 
Sunnis and Maronites (and leaders from the other communities) shared in the dislike of a number of French officials 
such as General Sarrail, High Commissioner of Lebanon, who, ignorant of the Levant, made unnecessary errors of 
judgement in dealing with leaders from the various communities. See Stephen Longrigg, Svria and Lebanon under 
French Mandate, pp. 148-54.
They were seen as having played a significant role in the creation of a separate Lebanon. Howayek's words in 
1919, that ‘Rien n'unit ces deux pays (le Liban et la Syrie)' were not lightly forgotten or forgiven. See Le Reveil. 23 
November 1977, which reprinted Howayek's words, thus providing a useful indication of the enduring effect of this text. 
See also K.S. Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon, pp. 169-77.
389 Perhaps inevitably, it was those who had been Arab nationalists before the mandate that took the lead here. See  
Rachid Khalidi, 'Ottomanism and Arabism', in Rachid Khalidi et al (eds), The Origins of Arab Nationalism, p. .55. They 
sought inspiration and tactics from Syrian opposition groups. For instance, the General Syrian Congress met in 1928 
and twice in 1933 to voice their opinion about the existence of Lebanon in its present boundaries. It was argued that 
the 'disputed territories' be returned to Syria, but that Mount Lebanon should be independent. However, after the 
suppression of the insurrection of 1925-7, this stayed largely at the level of rhetoric. See Edmond Rabbath, Unite
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Up to 1932, there was no sign of any co-operation with the mandated 
Lebanese republic on the part of any Sunni political notables with significant 
followings. The only Sunni figure of any note who was prepared to work with 
the republic was Shaykh Muhammad Al Jisr, but while he did have a following 
in his own community, it was not large.390 Jisr had been a politician during the 
Ottoman period, and, between 1926 to 1932 he was to become effectively the 
sole representative of Sunni community in the administration of the Lebanese 
republic.391 With the French seeking Sunni involvement, Jisr became 
Speaker of the new Chamber virtually unopposed. In terms of the political 
arena, it was Jisr's involvement in the affairs of the mandate that provided the 
excuse that eventually drew other Sunni political leaders (as well as figures 
from the other Muslim communities) into a degree of involvement on their own 
account. This was because in 1932, despite the criticism levelled at Jisr for his 
co-operation to date, he decided to stand in the presidential elections.
By the early 1930s, it was becoming plain to the leaders of the Sunni 
community at least that Lebanon as a whole was, in economic terms, 
flourishing under the mandate and that standards of living across the board in 
Lebanon were rising.392 Shrewd leaders amongst the various communities 
needed to take this into account when evolving their political (and other) 
strategies towards the mandate. By 1932, local political groupings were 
evolving among the Sunni community in Lebanon. But leaders in these 
groupings, like Salim Salam and Abd Al Hamid Karami or Riyadh Al Solh, were 
still not willing to abandon their calls for union with Syria.393 The problems 
faced by these men in reconciling their desire for involvement in local 
Lebanese politics with their refusal to follow any policy lines that might seem to 
endorse the existence of Greater Lebanon is clearly demonstrated by their 
reaction to Jisr's candidacy in 1932.
Svrienne et Devenir Arabe. Librairie Marcel, Paris, 1937, pp. 166-7; Amine Naji (ed.), 'Minutes of the Congress', Al 
Amal. no. 7 ,1 9 7 7 , pp. 119-55.
390 K.S. Salibi, Modem History of Lebanon, p. 174.
391 Jisr was prepared to become involved because he held no personal ideology that led him into conflict with the aims 
of the mandate, while he did have personal ambition and a dislike of being out of power.
392 As Longrigg points out, Lebanon (and Syria) were even less affected by the depression of 1928-35 than France 
itself, for example, to say nothing of other states in the Middle East. Stephen Longrigg, Svria and Lebanon under 
French Mandate, d d . 271-83.gag1" .....  r
This, of course, ensured that the French mandate authorities were at best cautious in their attempts to involve them 
until they had demonstrated that they had abandoned this position.
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Jisr's participation in the administration of the new republic had ensured 
that he had co-operated with Christian leaders, notably Maronite ones. But in 
1932, the likely alternative to Jisr was a president who was not only Christian, 
but also Maronite: and almost certainly a figure associated with persuading the 
French into creating Greater Lebanon. Jisr was the only figure likely to be able 
to contest the presidency with men like Bishara Al Khoury or Emile Edde, both 
of whom planned to stand in 1932. Not only would he collect Muslim votes; he 
could also hope to secure some Christian backing.394 But men like Al Solh 
could not bring themselves to endorse Jisr's candidacy because of this 
perception that in so doing they would 'recognise' the existence of Greater 
Lebanon, and so they continued to stand aloof. Yet at the same time, 
elements from the Sunni mercantile elite in Beirut began to find it in their own 
interests to accept the reality of Lebanon, rather than dream of being part of 
Syria.395 Thus by the mid 1930s, tentative efforts were being made by the 
Sunni mercantile elite began to make moves towards co-operation; and since 
this mercantile elite was one provider of Sunni politicai elites, this had an 
effect on willingness to move towards political involvement by some Sunni 
leaders.396
The irony was that by this time the French mandate officials had 
undertaken a policy that served to drive the Maronites away from a whole­
hearted co-operation with the French. At the time of the 1932 presidential 
election, the French had become extremely concerned about the continued 
lack of collaboration from Muslim leaders, especially the Sunni ones. They felt 
the state was insecure as long as this continued and so sought ways to end 
the stalemate. But they tended to blame Sunni-Maronite hostility rather than 
any failure in French policy. The French hoped to lure the Sunni into 
developing a degree to support for the mandate by distancing themselves to a 
degree from the Maronites and sought to use the occasion of the elections to 
achieve this.
394 K.S. Salibi. Modern History of Lebanon, pp. 175-6.
395 As Johnson points out, only through co-operation with the mandate could the mercantile elite make the most of 
their key economic position. See Michael Johnson, Class and Client in Beirut, p. 25.
396 Marwan Buheiry, 'Beirut and the Political Economy of the Mandate' in Laurence Conrand (ed.), The Formation and 
Perception of the Modern Arab W orld, p. 558.
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Within the Maronite community, the two leading political leaders at that 
time were Bishara Al Khoury and Emile Edde, both well-respected and 
successful lawyers with considerable ambitions in the political field. Both 
intended to stand for the office of President in 1932.397 Edde was more French 
in his cultural orientation than Khoury, and a strong supporter of anti-Arab 
views. He also gave endorsement to aspects of popular Maronite mythology. 
For instance, he was a supporter of the idea of a Phoenician origin for the 
Maronites and was close to the poet Charles Corm, one of the most vocal 
proponents of this concept as the following lines indicate:
Si je rappelle aux miens nos aieux Pheniciens 
C'est qu'alors nous n'etions au fronton de I'histoire 
Avant de devenir musulmans ou chretiens 
Qu'un meme peuple uni dans une meme gloire 
Et qu'en evoluant nous devrions au moins 
Par le fait d'une foi encore plus meritoire 
Nous aimer comme au temps ou nous etions paiensL.
Mon frere musulman, comprenez ma franchise;
Je suis le vrai Liban, sincere et pratiquant.398
If Edde did not go to the extremes of Corm, he certainly liked to think of
Lebanon as Christian and part of a Western Mediterranean world; while 
according to Salibi, he associated the Arab world 'with the desert'.399 It was a 
popular position among the Maronites, though less welcomed by the other 
Christian communities, but it effectively ensured that if elected, he would 
confirm Muslim hostility to the Lebanese republic.
By contrast Bishara Al Khoury was less openly and vocally devoted to 
the concept of Lebanon as part of a Mediterranean world. If he was personally 
inclined towards such a position, and was a firm supporter of a separate
Lebanese entity he was also a pragmatist. He believed that to secure this
entity in the long term, it would be necessary to co-operate with the Arab 
context of the region and so sought to take a position that would further 
Muslim-Christian co-operation. However, since his strategy was to develop
397 Camille Chamoun, Mudhakkarati. [Memoirs], Beirut, 1969, p. 8, lodged in the headquarters of the Bloc National.
393 This poem has remained important to those Maronites who endorse the Phoenician concept. See Charles Corm, 
'La Montagne Inspiree', republished in La Revue Phenicienne. Beirut, 1964, pp. 53-61.
399 K.S. Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon, pp. 172-3.
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linkages between himself and Muslim elements by opposing a continuance of the 
mandate, and arguing for full Lebanese independence instead, he was less popular 
with the French officials.400 Like Edde, Al Khoury was also able to find considerable 
support for his views amongst the Maronite community. Both were to set up political 
parties with predominantly Maronite followings; Khoury the Bloc Constitutionale and 
Edde, the Bloc National.401
The determination of French officials in 1932 was to find a compromise 
position between the communities in the political arena. In 1926, a Greek Orthodox, 
Charles Dabbas, had been appointed to the presidency, rather than elected.402 He 
had held office 1926-29, and had been so successful, it seemed, that he was 
reappointed for the period 1929-32.403 It had been hoped that by 1932, the mandate 
was sufficiently established to permit a move to selecting the president through an 
electoral system, as envisaged in the 1926 constitution. However, the manoeuvrings 
of the three candidates and their supporters as the election approached did not 
indicate that a compromise candidate supported by significant elements from all the 
communities was likely to be elected.404 Also, a fresh cause of tension had been 
added to the 1932 scenario when the result of a census, demanded by the Muslim 
Congress, had indicated that there was not a Muslim majority in the territory included 
in the mandate.405
400 He was deeply influenced by the ideas of his brother-in-law, Michel Chiha. As a banker, Chiha was an important 
figure in the commercial world, but he was also a figure in the intellectual world. A far-sighted pragmatist, Chiha 
argued that a genuine nation-state of Lebanon could only come about if all the communities were able to feel their 
perspectives were valued. Chiha had been an important influence in ensuring that the Constitution did in theory permit 
such a state to evolve. Yet even so, Chiha, in his writings on Lebanon referred frequently to the Phoenicians. K.S. 
Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon, pp. 167; 173-4. See Michel Chiha, Politique Interieur. Edition du Trident, Beirut, 
1964 for a further discussion of his ideas.
401 These parties were to represent the two key positions around which Maronite alliances were formed, whether in 
opposition of some kind or support for the mandate. Thus these two determined much of the nature of Maronite 
political life during the mandate. But for all their differences, both shared a fundamental support for the idea of a 
distinct, separate Lebanon. Even Al Khoury did not take his support for collaboration with the Arab position to the 
extent of endorsement of ambitions to restore all or part of Greater Lebanon to 'Syria'. Michael W . Suleiman, Political 
Parties in Lebanon. Cornell University Press, New York, 1967, pp. 251-60; W . Awwad, Ashab al fakhama ru’assa 
Lubnan. [Their Excellencies, the Presidents of Lebanon], Dar Al Ahliyyah, Beirut, 1977, pp. 112; 131; 157.
His main qualifications in French eyes were that, in the atmosphere of tension in 1926, he was sympathetic to pan- 
Arab ideas, and so might hope to conciliate the Muslim communities. However, his commitment to a separate 
Lebanon had been demonstrated by his membership of the 1919 delegation to the Peace Conference.
403 He had shown himself to be a capable administrator, and made few mistakes. However, arguably, he did make 
one significant mistake, to endorse moves to increase the role of Roman Catholic missions in the country, which 
effectively meant an increase of foreign influence. But despite this, the evidence indicates he was a popular figure 
across confessional boundaries. See K.S. Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon, pp. 170-1.
404 Some deputies saw Jisr as best option; but the Maronite Patriarch vehemently opposed his candidacy. But Edde 
decided to endorse Jisr's candidacy to block Al Khoury's chances. See Fadia Kiwan, 'La Perception du Grand-Liban', 
in Shehadi & Mills (eds), Lebanon, p. 124.
405 The Congress, held in Beirut in January 1932, had demanded that the constitution be amended to make it 
mandatory that the president be a Muslim, since the delegates (including Jisr) believed that there was a Muslim 
majority in Lebanon. See Michael Johnson, Class and Client in Beirut, p. 24; Fadia Kiwan, 'La Perception du Grand- 
Liban', in Shehadi & Mills (eds), Lebanon, p. 146.
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Table 1:
The Results of the 1932 Census in Lebanon406
Community Population figures Percentage
(approx.)
Maronites 226,378 29%
Greek Orthodox 76,552 10%
Greek Catholic 45,999 6%
Armenians 31,156 4%
Other Christian groupings 22,308 3%
Total Christian Population 52%
Sunni Muslims 175,925 22%
Shi’ite Muslims 154,208 19%
Druze 53,047 7%
Total Muslim Population 48%
The short-term solution arrived at by the French was a suspension of the 
constitution, and the re-appointment of Charles Dabbas as president for a 
further term. In 1933 he was replaced, by Habib El-Saad a seventy-five year 
old politician who, it was hoped, would not be strong enough (in any sense) to 
cause trouble.407 In addition, the Chamber of Deputies was dissolved, with 
the promise of new elections in 1934. Thus moves towards a directly-elected 
administration were delayed and effective administrative power remained in 
the hands of French officials, who simply continued appointing local figures to
408 David McDowall, Lebanon: A Conflict of Minorities. Minority Rights Group, London, Report No. 61, p. 11.
407 For further details of Habib Al Saad, see K.S. Salibi, Modem History of Lebanon, pp. 165; 170-1; 177.
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the Chamber of Deputies, men who they expected would be co-operative such 
as Charles Dabbas. Initially, it served to increase tensions between the 
communities; but the French attempt at even-handedness and compromise 
was to be a significant factor in changing the nature of French-Maronite 
relations and Maronite attitudes to the mandate.408
More than just disappointed Maronite leaders began to doubt the 
Maronite role under the mandate.409 By the time that the Chamber of Deputies 
was summoned in 1936 to elect a successor to Ai Saad, a considerable 
legacy of mistrust had built up.410 Emile Edde was elected - by a majority of 
one vote. But popular Maronite opinion was that the French had attempted to 
prevent this outcome, because they had not wished for the election of a 
powerful figure with a strong following in the Maronite community, but had 
hoped for one dependent on the French, it is an indication of the lowering of 
respect for the mandate amongst Maronites at this period.411 Another 
indication of deteriorating French-Maronite relations had come in 1935, when 
the Maronite Patriarch, Arida, began a dispute with the High Commissioner. 
Given the status of the Patriarch, this was an unfortunate development for the 
French. The dispute was over the future status of the tobacco monopoly in 
Lebanon, currently under French control under the terms of the Regie des 
Tabacs et Tombacs. The Patriarch wanted to see this extremely lucrative 
monopoly opened up for Lebanese (essentially Maronite) participation. In the 
face of French resistance to this, he began to take a very critical position 
towards the administration of the mandate by the French 412 His demands for 
a high degree of Lebanese control over its own economic affairs, and, linked 
with that, its political affairs, caught the notice of the Syrians. Syrian leaders 
actually began to come to Bkirki to talk to the Patriarch, and a working 
relationship began to develop.413 The following statement by the Patriarch in
408 Fadia Kiwan, 'La Perception du Grand-Liban', in Shehadi & Mills (eds), Lebanon, p. 146.
409 Al Khoury's followers, for instance, began to talk of French despotism as Al Khoury, on personally bad terms with 
Henri Ponsot, made it plain that he thought he had no future politically under a French-run mandate. See Ibid.
410 Ponsot's successor as High Commissioner, Count Damien de Martel, was prepared to take a more pro-Maronite 
stance
411 K.S. Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon, p. 179; Raymond Edde, Oral Interview, Paris, 19 July 1994; Dr. Albert 
Moukheiber, Oral Interview, Bayt Meiri, 15 April 1995.
412 Stephen Longrigg, Svria and Lebanon under French Mandate, pp. 205-7.
413 Philip S. Khoury, Svria and the French Mandate. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1987, p. 454.
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1935 provides an important indication of the change in attitude taken by the 
Patriarchate at this point:
J'ai montre que je n'occupais avec interet de la question 
Syrienne. Le Liban et ia Syrie sont lies par la 
communaute de langue, des moeurs, des traditions, 
d'interets economiques. C'est pourquoi il est difficile 
d'etablir entre eux une separation absolue.414
it was a huge change, and important because it had a real impact coming from 
this source. Bkirki was now established as a channel for discussion, though 
not always fruitful ones, between Muslims and Maronites, but this helped to 
create an illusion, at least, of consensus between the communities 415
This was to be of enormous importance in creating an atmosphere 
where a greater degree of co-operation could evolve between the leadership of 
the Lebanese Muslim and Christian communities, especially in terms of Sunni- 
Maronite links, over the last years of the mandate. In 1936, trouble flared 
again in Syria, again finding an echo in Lebanon. Amongst some elements of 
the Maronite and Sunni communities, these troubles worsened intercommunal 
hostility. It was in this context that the Kata’ib party emerged. This was a 
Maronite or (as they advertised it) a ‘Lebanese’ Phalange grouping, composed 
of mainly urban-based young radicals that had at the centre of their agenda the 
defence (by militant means if necessary) of the Maronite community and its 
mythology of a separate Lebanon. Equally, a group of Sunni formed the 
Muslim equivalent, the Najjadah party.416 The reaction of the French to the 
potential for violent unrest that seemed to be emerging was to seek to re­
negotiate the terms of both the Syrian and Lebanese mandates; with the object 
of establishing a basis for recognition of the two as sovereign states, eligible to
414 Le Jour. 11 September 1935.
415 Said Murad, Al Haraka al Wahdawivvah fi Lubnan Bavn al Harbavn al Alamivatavn 1914-1964 [The Unionist 
Movement in Lebanon Between 1914 and 1964], Maahad al Inma al Arabi, Beirut, 1968, pp. 264-5.
416 But while these groups caused concern to both community leaders and French mandate officials in the late 1930s, 
they were actually still small groupings, relatively and certainly in the case of the Kata’ib party, also capable of more 
pragmatic politics. See Itamar Rabinovich, ‘Arab Political Parties: Ideology and Ethnicity’, in Milton J. Esman & Itamar 
Rabinovich (eds), Ethnicity. Pluralism and the State in the Middle East. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1988, p. 163; 
Michael Johnson, Class and Client in Beirut, p. 24; Michael W . Suleiman, Political Parties in Lebanon, p. 114; Rabiha 
Abou Fadel & Antun Saadeh, Al Naaidwaal Adib Al Mahiari [The Critics and the Writers of Emigre Literature], Maktab 
Al Dirasat Al Kimat, Al Matn, 1992; Stephen Longrigg, Svria and Lebanon under French Mandate, pp. 225-6. For a 
more detailed discussion of the events of 1936, including the riots of November 1936, see K.S. Salibi, Modern History 
of Lebanon, pp. 179-81; Farid El-Khazin. The Communal Pact of National Identities, especially p. 12.
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join the League of Nations. By doing this, the French hoped to defuse tension 
in Syria and Lebanon. However, France still intended to maintain a 
considerable control over both through establishing its own pre-eminent status: 
for instance, the armies were to remain under French supervision; and the 
French ambassadors were 'to take precedence over all others'.417 On 13 
November 1936, the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies ratified the proposed 
treaty, on the grounds that this would create a situation where the end of the 
mandate was in sight, and at the same time, the continuance of a separate 
Lebanon was guaranteed. In addition, under the terms of the treaty, a 'just' 
representation of ail the different communal communities in Lebanon was to be 
guaranteed in government and administration to the highest levels 418
But it was the Franco-Syrian treaty of the same year that had an even 
greater impact on Lebanese Muslim opposition groupings than the Franco- 
Lebanese treaty and its promises. The terms of the Franco-Syrian treaty 
included a Syrian acceptance of the existence of Greater Lebanon as a 
legitimate entity in its own right. This development left the pro-Syrian elements 
in Lebanon isolated. While some individuals and groups still maintained the 
dream of union with Syria; the majority at this point saw the way forward as 
lying 'in the creation of an internal unity within the various states of the Arab 
world'.419 This development brought to prominence one particular Sunni 
politician, Kazem Al Solh. He was the first major Sunni politician to argue that 
the way forward for Muslims and Christians in Lebanon was through an 
acceptance of an independent Lebanon in which common ground between the 
communities could be sought.420
Sensibly, Kazem Al Solh was vague about the nature of any future 
relationship between Lebanon and the wider Arab world. For him the crux of 
the current situation was that if his fellow Sunni were successful in promoting 
the absorption of Lebanon in Syria, the results of the 1932 census indicated
417 K.S. Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon, p. 181. Salibi also provides a useful discussion of the further details of the 
treaties, Ibid, pp. 181-2.
418 In the end, neither the Franco-Lebanese treaty nor the Franco-Syrian treaty were ratified by the French. Albert 
Hourani, Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essav. Oxford University Press, London, 1946, pp. 202; 314; 337. Also K.S. 
Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon, pp. 181-3.
419 Najla Attiyah, T h e  Attitude of the Lebanese Sunni' p, 131. See also Raghid Al Solh, 'The Attitude of the Arab 
Nationalists towards Greater Lebanon During the 1930s', in Shehadi & Mills (eds), Lebanon, pp. 157-61.
420 Kazem Al Solh Papers, unpublished, held by Raghid Al Solh, Oxford.
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that half the population would be alienated by that development. Yet if Mount 
Lebanon were to be excluded from a Greater Syria to avoid this, Mount 
Lebanon would inevitably seek to maintain French protection and so a French 
colonial presence would be maintained in the region. This could lead to a 
position where Mount Lebanon would effectively become a ‘French province1, 
and a centre of subversion against the Arab nation.421 Kazem Ai Solh saw no 
reason why an independent Lebanon should automatically be left out of any 
larger Arab entity created at some unidentified future point: it need be no more 
of an issue than the existence of separate and independent Syria and Iraq, for 
example if that Arab entity were to be a decentralised one.422 Thus instead of 
displaying hostility towards the Maronites, Kazem Al Solh wanted Sunni 
leaders to become missionaries for Arab nationalism among the Christian 
Lebanese. He argued that the positive attitude being taken by the Maronite 
Patriarch towards Syria and his open criticism of the French, demonstrated the 
potential that did exist for changing attitudes amongst even the Maronites. it 
would involve a rejection by the Maronites of the mandate; but in return, 
acceptance by Muslims of an independent Greater Lebanon with a strong 
Christian element. Kazem Al Solh's position had an impact on some other 
Sunni politicians, especially those from Beirut, and including Riyadh Al Solh, 
the later architect of the National Pact.
However neither Sunni nor Maronite politicians were, in the last years of 
the 1930s, prepared to take collaboration between the communities forward on 
this basis in anything but a tentative fashion. If there was discontent with the 
French amongst the Maronites, it was not yet so extreme as for a majority of 
leaders to seek an end to the mandate. Equally if there was a growing interest 
in liberal-minded Christian intellectual circles in Arab nationalism, it tended to 
be more theoretical than practical in its programme. But at the same time 
closer collaboration between Muslims and Christians became more possible at 
elite levels, as a mutual acceptance of a separate Lebanon was evolving 
during the last half of the 1930s. It was a help in this respect that the 
constitution was restored in January 1937. This led to a period of indigenous
421 See Kazem Al Solh Papers, 'Mu'tamar al Sahil1 [Conference of the Coast], unpublished manuscript. See also Farid 
Al Khaztn, The Communal Pact of National Identities, p. 14.
422 Ibid.
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constitutional government which, for the first time began to include Sunni 
politicians who were accepted by the mainstream of Sunni opinion.423 It was 
during this period that a pattern was established where a Maronite president 
had a Sunni prime minister.424
The Second World War, starting in 1939, was to provide the final spur 
needed to produce a situation where a practical compromise for working 
together in the context of an independent Lebanon could evolve, at least at an 
elite level. It was the war that confirmed a feeling amongst the majority of even 
the Maronite elites that a continuation under direct French rule was not in their 
interests. The way forward lay with an independent Lebanon. If the various 
communities hoped that an independent Lebanon would develop in different 
directions - the Maronites as part of a Western world, ideally still with close 
(but not colonial) links with France; the Sunni and other Muslim communities 
as part of an Arab world - it was considered less important to resolve this 
potential conflict than to bring to an end the mandate. Events as the war 
proceeded could only heighten this willingness to work together in an 
atmosphere of agreement about where the greatest evil lay for the traditional 
Lebanese elites.
For one thing, the outbreak of war saw a further suspension of the 
constitution. Gabriel Puaux, then High Commissioner, swiftly dissolved the 
Chamber of Deputies and appointed Emile Edde as president and head of 
state. Puaux believed this was necessary in order to keep control over the 
situation in the Lebanese mandate (and a similar pattern was followed for 
Syria) in a wartime emergency situation when France couid not afford the 
efficiency of an administration being disrupted by petty local politics - an 
interesting indication of how the French viewed the intercommunal relationship 
at elite levels at least in Lebanon. What was in the best interests of both 
France and Lebanon was 'a good perfect and an obedient general council'.425 
Predictably the resentment felt at the way in which the mandate was actually
423 In 1937, for example, a Sunni deputy, Khayr Al Din Al Ahdab, formed a government under Edde's presidency. 
Having previously been a fervent Arab nationalist, this was a significant move. His actions were to set an important 
precedent for the involvement of Muslim leaders in a Lebanese government.
424 In March 1938 Khayr Al Din Al Ahdab was succeeded by Khalid Shihab, a Sunni Shihabi emir, and he in turn was 
succeeded by Abdallah Yafi, a  Sunni lawyer.
425 Gabriel Puaux, Deux Annees au Levant. Hachette, Paris, 1952, pp. 56; 60-65; 225-226.
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undermining, and not promoting, the freedom of action of community elites, 
ensured the willingness of the elites to regard collaboration with each other as 
preferable to a continuation of the mandate.
Resentment at elite levels at least deepened as the war progressed.426 
The fall of France and the setting up of the Vichy regime complicated the 
situation considerably because it meant that the situation in Lebanon was no 
longer a matter of significance just to France and the population of Lebanon. 
The Maronites, in particular faced a dilemma over whether to support Vichy or 
the Free French, as it was unclear to them which side would best serve their 
own agenda. The Middle East as a whole was strategically important to all 
sides in the conflict, and thus the internal state of Lebanon became an issue of 
more than local importance, especially in terms of winning the allegiance of 
interna] factions. Initially, Vichy France officially carried on the administration 
of the Lebanese mandate, and did so by suspending any promise of an 
imminent move to independence. It did not increase the popularity of the 
mandate administration, and gave an opening to the other side in the form of 
the British-backed Free French government in exile.
As part of the various arrangements reached between the British 
government and the Free French government in exile, Britain initially promised 
to continue to respect the privileged position of France in Syria and Lebanon. 
Churchill felt it necessary to reach a compromise that would enable the Free 
French to act to undermine the Vichy-run administration in Lebanon, so it could 
be replaced with something more sympathetic to the Allied position. Foreign 
Office officials informed the Free French leaders that Britain would recognise 
them as exercising ‘the rights which France derives from the mandate’ in the 
Levant, agreeing that the mandate system could be terminated only if it was 
replaced with a treaty along the lines of the intended 1936 treaties, so binding 
Lebanon to France 427
425 Emile Edde was prepared to work with the French in the mandate, but that should not be taken as an indication that
he was opposed to Lebanese independence. After all he had signed the Franco-Lebanese treaty of 1936. But he did 
feel in 1939 that Lebanese, and Maronite, interests were best served by a continuation of French interest and 
protection. Raymond Edde, Oral Interview, Paris, 19 July 1994.
427 Charles de Gaulle, W ar Memoirs: The Call to Honour. 1940-42 Documents. London, 1955, pp. 312-13; Elizabeth 
Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East, p. 80; Salwa Mardam Bey, Awraa Jamil Mardam Bev Istiklal Suria 1939- 
45, Shirkat Al Matbu’at HI al Tawzi’ w a ai nashr, Beirut, p. 154.
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But this spirit of co-operation was not to last. The British became more 
aware of the realities of the situation inside Lebanon, and its likely impact on 
British strategy if the British were to continue endorsing a position which 
delayed any announcement of Lebanese independence. This was the 
background to the announcement of British support for Lebanese and Syrian 
independence, on 6 June 1941.428 The reaction of the Free French was to 
issue of a counter-proclamation that announced the continuation of the 
mandate. This was not well received within Lebanon. A measure of the 
degree of hostility felt at elite levels at least can be gauged by the public 
meeting of 25 December 1941, at Bkirki, attended by representatives of nearly 
all the communities within Lebanon, including some dissident Eddeists. The 
meeting ended with the public expression of a rejection of a continuation of the 
mandate by those present, including Maronite leaders and the Maronite 
Patriarch.
It was this joint rejection of the mandate, setting the tone for relations 
with France over the following period that can, for the first time, be termed 
genuinely 'Lebanese'. But it would be a mistake to take this spirit of 
collaboration between the communities as also expressing a genuine 
resolution of the areas of conflict between them - though this was not realised 
by most community leaders themselves at the time. For instance, the 
Maronites would never be prepared to accept an interpretation of a Lebanon 
that was in existence simply as a prelude to the creation of a future unified 
Arab state, though the potential for this was still part of the Sunni agenda and 
so implicit in their insistence in the National Pact on locating Lebanon as part 
of the Arab world. Equally the Sunni would not accept a long-term future for 
Lebanon that sustained a perception of Lebanon as part of the Western world, 
but this was still central to Maronite thinking and also implicit in the National 
Pact 429 But in the emergency context in which they perceived themselves to 
be in 1941 such conflicts did not act as serious obstacles.430 The communities' 
leaders were searching for common denominators and so ignoring any need to
An Nahar. 27 November 1941. See also Raghid Al Solh, 'Lebanon and Arab Nationalism 1936-45', Unpublished 
PhD thesis, St. Anthony's College, Oxford, 1986, pp. 202-04.
429 See Farid Al Khazin, The Communal Pact of National identities, pp. 13-18.
430 ibid.
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define clearly their different positions for the future.431 It was in this spirit that 
the National Pact itself was to be evolved in 1943.
British support for Lebanese independence was a crucial factor in 
1943.432 Between 1941 and 1943, Sir Edward Spears, the British Ambassador 
in Lebanon, deliberately used his position to undermine the French position 
there by promoting collaboration between the communities in Lebanon on the 
basis of shared anti-French feeling.433 Spears succeeded in acquiring an 
increasing influence.434 Against this background, the attempt by the French to 
regain control over Lebanon in 1943 was likely to be a failure. The French 
administrators in Lebanon arrested the independent administration of Lebanon, 
and its leaders, including Bishara Al Khoury, were imprisoned. Emile Edde 
agreed (out of a sense of duty, he claimed) to take on the leadership of an 
administration under French mandate rules.435 This precipitated a crisis, with 
demonstrators taking to the streets to demand the release of the prisoners and 
the restoration of a free administration. Given the unequivocal British backing 
for the demonstrators, the French could only back down. Lebanese 
independence de facto started at this point. It was in this context of crisis that 
the National Pact emerged; and its content needs to be understood as a 
response to crisis rather than as a carefully calculated plan based on long-term 
aspirations. It was essentially what Michael Johnson has termed 'an unwritten 
gentlemen's agreement1 between Riyadh Al Solh and Bishara Al Khoury for the 
future running of the state, drawn up as it became apparent it would be 
needed.430 It drew on the experience of the landed and commercial elites
431 There was a wider dimension to this that involved the acceptance by Syrian leaders of a separate Lebanon so long 
as Syria itself was independent from France. See Raghid Al Solh, 'Lebanon and Arab Nationalism', p. 216.
43a The regional balance of power was drifting in Britain's favour, and Arab leaders in Syria were generally more pro- 
British than pro-French. Equally the realities of the situation meant that the Free French regimes in Syria and Lebanon 
were dependent on British support; and this was widely apparent to the populations in the mandates. See Salwa 
Mardam Bey, Awraa Jamil, pp. 188-91.
433 Spears realised that this was one thing that, in the context of events in 1943 at least, would hold the communities 
together; that it could earn a long-term goodwill for Britain at least from the pro-Arab elements (more important than 
the Maronites, given Britain's wider responsibilities in the Middle East), and that it would give him a chance to work out 
a personal grudge against de Gaulle. See Raghid Al Solh, 'Lebanon and Arab Nationalism', p. 185; A.B. Ganson, The  
Anglo-French Clash in Lebanon and Syria. 1940-45. Macmillan, London, 1987, pp. 146-51; Farid Al Khazin, The  
Communal Pact of National Identities, p. 34.
43 He used this to promote the concept of future Lebanese co-operation with other Arab states, though leading figures 
such as Bishara Al Khoury and Riyadh Al Soih. See Salwa Mardam Bey, Awraa Jamil, p. 189; Farid Al Khazin, The 
Communal Pact of National Identities, p. 18.
435 Nicola Ziadeh. Syria and Lebanon. Ernest Benn Ltd, London, 1957, p. 76; Raymond Edde, Oral Interview, Paris, 19 
July 1994.
436 Michael Johnson, Class and Client in Beirut, p. 26. The Pact was an agreement worked out in private between 
these two men, broadly to preserve the interests of the elites in their communities. It was never formally recorded in 
writing. Insofar as it does exist in any written form it is to be found referred to in Riyadh Al Solh, Speech, 7 October 
1943 in Cabinet Papers 1926-1948. Muassassat al Dirasat al Lubnaniyyah, Beirut, 1986, Vol. I, p. 126; in Bishara Al
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across confessional boundaries, working together under the mandate, and 
against the French administrators; as well as on the agreement reached in the 
abortive 1936 Franco-Lebanese treaty that the basic principle for a political 
compromise in Lebanon was 'the fair representation of all the country's 
sections in the government and high administration1.437 This meant a division 
of responsibilities in the government of Lebanon on a confessional basis. 
Almost certainly it was the commercial significance of the Maronites that 
ensured an arrangement that enshrined a Maronite and Christian 'majority' in 
government for the future.438 In other words, there was an element of practical 
acceptance at elite levels among the non-Maronite communities that the 
Maronite role in the economy needed to be safeguarded by guaranteeing their 
political voice. Thus not only were there to be more Christian deputies in the 
Chamber of Deputies, but also the President was to be a Maronite. However, 
the Prime Minister was to be a Sunni, enshrining also the influence of that 
community relative to the growing Shi'a community.439
This Pact was intentionally vague in terms of numbers of deputies and 
relative powers of the various offices of state, in order to permit future flexibility 
and modifications of the constitution within the broad outlines of the Pact. 
Being accepted by the elites, it was to become the basis of the permanent 
political arrangement for an independent Lebanon.440 The impression of the 
Pact put forward by the political elites of the Maronite and Sunni communities 
has been that it represented a genuine intercommunal consensus; that it was a 
position that moved the communities beyond co-habitation to co-operation 
based on mutual conciliation.441 But as Al Khazin points out, in 1943 the pact 
was, for Lebanon's Sunni and Maronite leaders, merely an expression of the 
'lowest common denominators' at that time rather than a carefully developed
Khoury, Haaa'ia Lubnanivvah Vol. I, p. 264; Vol. II, pp. 15-21. See also Bassem Al Jisr, Mithaa 1943: Limaza Kan W a  
Limaza Saaat [The National Pact, 1943, with Reasons for its Existence and Failure], Dar an Nahar III nashr, Beirut, 
1978, pp. 142-60; Raghid Al Solh, 'Lebanon and Arab Nationalism', pp. 274-8 .
437 K.S. Salibi. Modern History of Lebanon, pp. 181-2; Michael Johnson. Ibid.
438 As Michael Johnson points out, the Muslim commercial sector had no wish to upset the Christian commercial 
sector, and could see advantages for themselves in such an arrangement. See Michael Johnson, Class and Client in 
Beirut, pp. 117-8.
439 Shi'a numbers were growing, but the community was little regarded by either the Sunni or the Maronites within the 
terms of the National Pact. Most members of the community were poor, and consequently relatively powerless in this 
period. Ibid. p. 118.
440 Farid Al Khazin, Communal Pact of National Identities, p. 34.
441 Raghid Al Solh argues, for example that the main significance of the pact was its 'contribution to the emergence of 
a democracy by conciliation', arguing that for men like Al Jisr, it 'came to symbolise national integration and 
confessional unity'. Raghid Al Solh, 'Lebanon and Arab Nationalism', pp. 274-78.
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agreement that provided a genuine basis for the communities to collaborate in 
the long-term.442
in other words, this informal agreement was not in fact a 'national1 pact. 
It was born out of particular conditions, and with the intervention of external 
forces, for it materialised only when the Syrian and British interests, as well as 
internal Lebanese interests, all converged in a desire to defeat the French in 
their desire to maintain the mandate. This pact did not provide any new basis 
for dealing with the confessional problem in Lebanon; rather it provided a basis 
on which, against a greater enemy, it was possible for the communities to work 
together. But in practical terms ,in non-crisis situations when reasons for co­
operation were less apparent, it perpetuated the likelihood of co-habitation 
rather than consensus, because it institutionalised, rather than modified, 
existing confessional divisions; and thereby different conceptions of a 
'Lebanese' national identity.
The Western powers, especially the French and British, utilised the 
established myths as it best suited them - but this also ensured that they 
tended to see the Maronites in particular as the Maronites defined themselves, 
in terms of that mythology. This was to have profound implications for the 
relations that an independent Lebanon was to have with external powers at 
times of crisis. Required to react, Western powers were likely, at times of 
pressure, to resort to the resultant stereotypes in order to interpret what was 
going on instead of making more dispassionate assessments.
443 Ibid, p. 23.
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Chapter 4
The Development of the Crisis, 1943 - 58
The National Pact of 1943 has been described as ‘a compromise 
formulation on the identity of the country and on power-sharing between the 
religious communities', because it involved 'a number of mutual renunciations 
and guarantees1.443 If such an interpretation of this unwritten, 'gentleman's 
agreement' is a fair summing up of the Pact, both in origin and in practice, then 
the collapse of the Pact in 1958 requires more explanation than indicating a 
return to the habits of co-habitation. Some other factors would seem to be 
needed to account for the breakdown of the new 'Lebanese' consensus. 
Certainly this has been traditional in many of the explanations of the 1958 
crisis which have highlighted external intervention, especially by Nasser and 
the USA, as the major causatory factors. Salibi, for example, comments that 
‘It was largely events external to the Lebanese domestic scene which caused 
the last years of Chamoun's Presidency to be marred by violence and 
crises'.444 But this chapter will show that, once again, it was the internal 
dynamics of Lebanese intercommunal relations that ensured the events of the 
1950s resulted in a major crisis and that the undoubted involvement of external 
powers needs to be seen in the context of a continuation of Buheiry's patron- 
client game.445
The National Pact needs to be reassessed, and seen as essentially an 
attempt, made at elite levels, to reconcile the various community mythologies 
relating to self-identity and a ‘naturally1 separate Lebanon, and the role that the 
various communities (or their elites) would play in any future state. That 
attempt was seen as necessary because of the ‘crisis' of 1943, and was 
accepted as being in the interests of the elites of the communities involved in 
its evolution. But it was an attempt that took little practical account of any other
443 Theodor Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon. Centre for Lebanese Studies & I.B. Tauris, London, 1993, p. 72.
444 K.S. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon. Caravan Books, New York, 1977, p. 198; Marwan Buheiry, 'External 
intervention and internal wars in Lebanon 1770-1928' in Lawrence I Conrand (ed.) The Formation and Perception of 
the Modern Arab World. Darwin Press Inc, Princeton, 1989, p. 138.
445 Marwan Buheiry in Nadim Shehadi & Dana Haffar Mills (eds), Lebanon: A History of Conflict and Consensus. I.B. 
Tauris, London, 1988.
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interests within the community, being made in haste and under pressure. A 
new mythology was created in association with the National Pact, which has 
seen it established in political rhetoric as something central to the existence 
and survival of an independent Lebanon. Even here, however, it has been 
differently presented to the various communities. Moreover, the attempts to 
‘sell’ the National Pact and an independent Lebanon to the masses of the 
various communities did not tackle basic underlying disagreements and 
differences at the lower levels of society. This was particularly true for the 
Sunni masses, both urban and rural. They were less influenced by the 
supposed material opportunities for the Lebanese state and in general, as 
Najla Attiyah has pointed out, still emotionally disposed to favour a link with 
Syria, as being in the best interests of their religion and traditions.446 On the 
Maronite side, there was still a large part of the community (notably the 
followers of the Eddes) who were not favourably inclined towards the National 
Pact and immediate Lebanese independence, preferring a continuation of the 
mandate or even a future as a ‘territoire d’outre-mer’ 447
Explanations of the crisis need to test the validity of the assumptions 
contained within the National Pact about the state and nature of intercommunal 
relations, especially those between the Maronites and the Sunni. These 
assumptions could not be tested out before being put into practice as the basis 
for a long-term consensus; they were a matter of expediency. But it certainly 
seemed in 1943 to be in the interests of the various political, land-owning and 
commercial elites to assume that the consensus contained in the Pact was 
workable, and that these elites either represented anyway, or could dictate, the 
opinions and loyalties of their followers, so giving the gloss of universal support 
for the Pact. One important assumption tacitly accepted by these elites was 
that the intercommunal balance of power within Lebanon was stable and that 
the balance of power within the region as a whole would remain the same for 
the foreseeable future.
446 Najla Attiyah, T h e  Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis towards the State of Lebanon’, Unpublished PhD thesis, 
University of London, 1973, p. 101.
447 This perspective was put to me by my father, Nouad Boueiz, in my youth.
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As Michael Johnson points out 'Under the terms of such a vaguely 
defined Pact, the Christian and Muslim bourgeoisies could agree that while 
their economic links with Europe and the West were essential, their moderate 
'Arabism' would also ensure they maintained their market in Syria and 
extended their access to the wider Arab market beyond',448 In other words, it 
was an arrangement that was supposedly based on mutual self-interest at elite 
levels, and one that was expected to work sufficiently flexibly to ensure that 
benefits would be appropriately distributed at these levels. It was the gradual 
discovery that these assumptions were flawed in the context of developments 
in Lebanon itself, and the Middle East, in the years after 1947 in particular, that 
brought about the events culminating in the American landings of 1958.
The limited nature of the Pact is underlined by the fact that even as the 
administration of an independent Lebanon got under way, there were 
identifiably mixed feelings amongst the leaderships of the communal groups 
involved. This was particularly true of the Maronite and Sunni groupings. 
Maronite leaders remained somewhat nervous about the prospects of working 
with the various Muslim communities without the direct involvement of a 
Western imperial power to protect their interests 449 Sunni leaders were happy 
about the apparent Maronite willingness to cease running to France at every 
point of difficulty, but still unsure of the extent to which the Maronites saw 
Lebanon as primarily an Arab entity.450
Inherent contradictions contained in the National Pact began to create 
difficulties in the practical running of the state shortly after the ending of the 
Second World War. This chapter will focus on the gradual collapse of the Pact 
and the reasons therefore via three main themes:
Government corruption
448 Michael Johnson, Class and Client in Beirut. The Sunni Muslim Community and the Lebanese State 1840-1985. 
Ithaca Press, London, 1986, p. 26.
449 This is understandable, given that Lebanon was unique in the Middle East in having a Christian element in the 
population that was neither 'de jure  nor de facto second class citizens'. Theodor Hanf, Coexistence in W artim e 
Lebanon, p. 3.
450 Ibid. p. 4.
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The role of individuals in positions of political power seeking 
to change the outlines of the way in which Lebanon was 
governed for personal reasons
Lebanon's foreign policy and the use made by Lebanese 
politicians and political parties of traditional contacts with 
both Western and Arab states to bolster up the positions and 
ambitions of individuals and groupings at elite leveis.
The corruption issue is one of recurring importance in an understanding 
of the collapse of the National Pact, because it was one of the earliest to 
become apparent, and was to remain a matter of concern. The Al Khoury 
regime, in power from 1943 to 1952, swiftly acquired a reputation for 
corruption, favouritism and nepotism. In the early months of 1946, Gebran 
Tueni and Kamel Mroueh, two leading newspapermen, highlighted the issue in 
a series of editorials. On 12 January, Tueni attacked the 'favouritism, 
clientelism and nepotism' of the regime; asking in March 'How much longer 
can the government continue with this profiteering mentality?'451 On 24 April, 
Mroueh wrote: 'Silence is not golden. We need to tell the thieves that they are 
thieves'.452 The President's brother came to embody the corruption of the 
regime. ‘Sultan Selim1, as he came to be known, was widely seen, with 
justification, as exercising huge influence behind the scenes. Gebran Tueni, 
for instance, condemned the 'use of power by the relatives of the President for 
his own purposes'.453
The corruption issue caused significant tensions in 1947 when elections 
for a new legislature were held, the first since independence, and elections 
which would be a preliminary to a presidential election in 1949. It also involved 
a clear attempt by self-interested members of the political elite to modify the 
government of Lebanon bringing together the themes of corruption and the role 
of individuals. Under the terms of the constitution, the composition of the 
Chamber was of crucial importance in terms of deciding the presidency. Under 
the terms of the constitution also, a president could not stand for office for a
451 Gebran Tueni, Editorial, An Nahar. 12 January 1946; 1 March 1946.
452 Kamel Mroueh, Editorial, Al Havat. 24 April 1946. Similar editorials appeared on 30 January 1946; 11 May 1946.
453 Gebran Tueni, Editorial, An Nahar. 24 January 1946.
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second consecutive term, but in 1947 Bishara Al Khoury wanted a second 
term. For this to be possible, he needed a Chamber favourably disposed 
towards him to the extent of being willing to amend the constitution to permit 
his candidacy as an emergency expediency. On 13 May 1947, Kamel Mroueh 
indicated his fear that the elections would be corrupt, commenting that 'We are 
behaving morally and politically like a people who have become decrepit; we 
are reaching the period of collapse'. The day before the elections on 25 May, 
he warned that 'the whole country is being used for the benefit of some 
families'.454 The outcome of the elections, and reactions to it, certainly 
seemed to bear out accusations of fraud. Serious accusations came from 
several prominent figures, notably Antun Boutros, the Maronite Patriarch, and 
two prominent and respected Archbishops, Augustus Moubarak and Boulos 
Akl.455 Moubarak's stance is of particular importance in indicating the validity 
of the accusations. He was a relative of Al Khoury's and had been a friend of 
his for over 45 years. Now he was referring to the Al Khoury regime as 'a 
despotic government' and the new Chamber as 'a fake Chamber' because it 
was elected through 'fraudulent elections'.456
A whole range of newspapers representing a wide range of confessional 
allegiances joined in the chorus of accusations of electoral fraud, representing 
a more populist perspective.457 Those political parties who also voiced 
protests at the conduct of the election may have been unified in their 
identification of the corruption in the regime. However there was no other 
consensus between them, as a brief survey of the parties themselves 
indicates. Opposition came from the loyalist Maronite grouping, the Kata’ib 
party; but also from the more moderate Bloc National, which looked to a 
membership that was not exclusively Maronite. The pan-Arabist Parti
454 Kamel Mroueh, Editorial, Al Havat. 13 May 1947; 24  May 1947.
455 Antun Boutros to Riyadh Al Solh, Letters, 29 May 1947, complaining about electoral fraud. These were published 
in pamphlet form. S ee The Crime of 25 Mav 1947. Bloc National Party, Beirut, 1947.
456 Augustus Moubarak, Letter, 27 May 1947, Archives, Bloc National Party Headquarters. The letter also appeared in 
print in The Crime of 25 Mav 1947.
457 These include the following: Al Diar: Nidal: Asia: Al Ruad: Nida Al W atan: Sada Al Ahwal: Beirut: Beirut Al M assa: 
Kul Shav’: Telegraph: Al Hadaf: Lissan Al Hal: Al Ahrar: Al Bavrak: A! Jadid: Al Yaoum : Le Soir: L'Orient: Saut Al 
Sha’b: Al Zam an: Al Dunia: An Nahar: Al Akhbar: Al Dabur: La Revue du Liban: Zahla Al Fatat: Sada Al Shimal: Sada  
Lubnan: Al Afkar: Al Mustaabal: Al S afa. See also The Crime of 25 Mav 1947 for some comment on the newspaper 
reaction.
162
Populaire Syrien (henceforth the PPS), came out in opposition, as did other 
parties with agendas that looked beyond Lebanon itself, the Ba'ath and 
Communist parties. The reaction of political opponents, however, became 
more vehement in the aftermath of the passing of the Bill to amend Article 49 
of the Constitution on 22 May 1948. The Bill, passed by 48 deputies to 7, 
permitted Al Khoury's candidacy at the forthcoming election of 27 May 1949 as 
a 'special case'.458 An examination of the protests underlines the fact that the 
apparent unity provided by the concern of the opposition about the regime's 
corruption was complicated by a series of self-seeking agendas that indicate 
the limited nature of the co-operation on the issue from these opposition 
groupings.
This is made particularly plain through a focus on leading political 
figures protesting at this development. Kama! Jumblat was motivated partly by 
principle but also by self-interest. 'Sultan Selim' was by this time perceived as 
a threat to Jumblat's power base in the Shuf because he had developed links 
with the Maronites there; therefore a continuation of the Al Khoury regime, 
implying a continuation of Sultan Selim's activities, was personally 
unwelcome.459
Camille Chamoun, a member of Al Khoury's own party from 1943 to 
1948, took the lead amongst Maronites unhappy with developments in 1947-8, 
again out of mixed motives. Chamoun had hoped to stand for the presidency 
himself, but frustrated in this, and fearful of threats to his power base in the 
Shuf, he shifted towards outright opposition to Al Khoury taking a series of 
actions designed to give him a high profile in the opposition.460 He had 
publicly absented himself from the Chamber on 22 May 1948, the day the 
constitution was amended. In so doing he certainly established his credentials 
as the leading Maronite opponent to Al Khoury, furthering his chances of future 
success in a presidential contest.401 But for Chamoun there was also a
458 Edmond Rabbath, La Formation Historiaue du Liban Politique et Constitutionnelle. Publication de I'Universite 
Libanaise, Beirut, 1986, p. 558. Not only was this point about corruption made at the time; it was recently given 
prominence in L'Orient Le Jour. 16 March 1995.
459 K.S. Salibi. Modern History of Lebanon. Caravan Books, New York, 1977, p. 194.
460 As with Kamal Jumblat, Chamoun feared the impact of Sultan Selim in the Shuf. See K.S. Salibi, Modern History 
of Lebanon, p. 194.
461 An Nahar. 11 March 1995; K.S. Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon, p. 193,
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genuine concern, shared by other opposition figures, that Al Khoury desired a 
permanent hold on the presidency and that this renewal was to be the first step 
in that development.462 Thus both Chamoun and Jumblat were prepared to 
work together in opposition to Al Khoury - but it was an alliance of expedience 
and not a meeting of minds on wider political issues.
With Al Khoury returned to power in 1948 the third theme also became 
of significance: that of Lebanon's foreign policy and the use by political figures 
for their own ends of interested external powers. In the years following the 
end of the Second World War, the Middle East entered a period of upheaval 
and change focusing in particular on the circumstances surrounding the 
termination of the British mandate over Palestine in 1948 and the creation of 
an Israeli state. In the aftermath of the resultant Arab-lsraeli war of 1948-9, the 
Arab Islamic world became increasingly hostile to Western interventions in the 
Middle East, since the Western powers were blamed by Arab governments for 
their defeat in that war.463 Lebanon was not immune to the effects of the 
upheavals, in particular the military coup in Syria in March 1949, but the Al 
Khoury regime was determined that the success of military or para-military 
groupings in other Middle Eastern states would not be mirrored in Lebanon. 
Action would be taken, whether legitimate or not, to ensure this.
This was made plain quite early. The Syrian example induced the 
Lebanese PPS, led by Antun Saadeh, to attempt a coup on similar lines in 
early July 1949. It did not succeed; indeed it received relatively little backing, 
but its aftermath served to indicate to the Lebanese opposition the lengths to 
which the Al Khoury regime would go. Saadeh took refuge in Syria, but as a 
result of pressure exercised by Riyadh Al Solh, Saadeh was returned to 
Lebanon.464 His return was followed by what has been described as the 
swiftest and most unfair trial in the history of Lebanon with Saadeh being
462 The intention behind the system of terms of office that were non-renewable on a consecutive basis was that this 
would prevent any one grouping in the political jigsaw from gaining too much power by establishing a monopoly over 
the presidency.
463 The defeat is now generally seen as resulting from Arab disorganisation, something recognised at the time by the 
masses if not the governments themselves. See Malcolm Yapp, The Near East Since the First World W ar. Longman, 
London, 1991, p. 138.
464 Riyadh Al Solh was connected by marriage to Husni Al Zaim, the Syrian leader. See Nazir Fansa, Avam Husni Al 
Zaim. Dar Al Afak, Beirut, 1982, pp. 75-81.
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refused the right to make any defence, and being tried, convicted and 
executed all on the same day.465 This drove the PPS into bitter opposition to 
both the Al Khoury regime and to the Zaim regime, something that was to have 
long-term implications for a Lebanese consensus, since the grounds on which 
they would co-operate with any other political groupings in Lebanon depended 
on their attitude to the events of 1949, rather than to any broader political 
agenda.466
But the harsh reaction of the Al Khoury regime to the attempted coup 
did serve in the short-term to create an opposition alliance based on mutual 
expediency. Para-military parties like the Kata’ib party and its Muslim 
counterpart, Najjadah, were subject to repressive policies that drove them 
towards temporary alliance with each other and with other opposition 
groupings. Kamal Jumblat, having organised his followers in 1949 into a 
Progressive Socialist Party in direct reaction to these developments, forged an 
alliance, apparently based on a shared socialist perspective, with Chamoun.467 
The resultant Socialist National Front was, however, based more on mutual 
opposition to Al Khoury than a real sharing of political ideology.468 In 
continuing to denounce the widespread corruption of the Al Khoury regime, the 
Bloc National took the lead.469 But opposition figures also began to take a 
perspective on events that looked outside Lebanon itself and sought to place 
the republic in its regional context, playing on the fact that the polarisation 
going on within the Arab world between pro- and anti- Western camps had a
465 The records of this trial are still not to be found in the archives of the Ministry of Justice. Information beyond 
popular rumour has been provided by M. Chlouk, a journalist for An Nahar. who has researched the trial, but has not 
yet published his conclusions; see also K.S. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon, p. 193.
466 In 1958, the PPS actively supported Chamoun because they refused to link themselves to an opposition that 
contained Al Khoury and had links to the Syrian regime that had betrayed them in 1949. See Editorial, Al Bina. August 
1958; Press Release No. 5, PPS, December 1958.
467 See K.S. Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon, pp. 193-4; Michael Johnson, Class and Client in Beirut, p. 122; 
Michael Suleiman, Political Parties in Lebanon: The Challenge of a Fragmented Political Culture. Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca, 1967, p. 214.
468 Salibi, for instance, argues that the Front was partly a public relations exercise, indicating a perceived need among 
Lebanese politicians to take a publicly united stance where possible to maintain popular credibility for their opposition 
stance. See K.S. Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon, p. 194.
469 Raymond Edde, leader of the Bloc National in 1952, made it a matter of pride to make a stand against government 
corruption. He is still leader of the party in 1995. He has been referred to in the Lebanese press, notably by Michel 
Abou Jaoude in his editorials for An Nahar. as ‘the conscience of Lebanon’. Salim Nassar in articles to mark Edde’s 
80th birthday referred to him as 'the best president Lebanon will never have’; see Al Havat. 15 March 1993; 17 March 
1993.
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direct relevance to the internal concerns of the various Lebanese 
communities.470 Despite the fact that the National Pact was supposed to 
ensure an even-handed attitude towards both the Western and the Arab 
camps, an ideal foreign policy was interpreted by most Lebanese at all levels 
of society as having a direct impact on the superior security and status of their 
particular confessional grouping relative to others 471 Thus Al Khoury's refusal, 
which he justified by reference to the National Pact, to join the 'Common 
Defence' pact, conceived in 1951 as a Western project to counteract the 
interest in the region of the USSR and of the growing local Communist parties, 
alarmed the Maronites, while it pleased even those Muslim elements who were 
otherwise opposed to the regime 472
Despite such complications, the opposition front did eventually succeed 
in toppling the Al Khoury regime, helped by two developments that may be said 
to be opposition linked. In the 1951 elections a Chamber was elected that was 
not so overwhelmingly linked to Al Khoury's interests.473 On 16 July 1951, 
Riyadh Al Solh, one of Al Khoury's most significant supporters, was 
assassinated by the PPS.474 This had very far-reaching results, because Ai 
Solh was unequivocally the most popular Sunni leader of the time, and his loss 
undermined further the basis of support for Al Khoury's government. The 
immediate aftermath of Al Solh’s death, however, saw an apparent increase in 
the practical power exercised by Al Khoury. As one of the architects of the 
National Pact, Al Solh had effectively restrained Ai Khoury; now it was unlikely 
(and indeed impossible) for Al Khoury to choose a successor who could hope 
to be on such terms of equality in terms of power resources. Thus even if it 
was not recognised at the time, Al Solh's death amounted to a breakdown in 
the national consensus. Influenced by his brother, Al Khoury appointed Sami
470 See F. Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon. Middle East institute, Washington D.C., 1968, p. 31.
471 For instance, in 1945 the Arab League Pact had accepted the existence of a separate Lebanon. See Leila Meo, 
Lebanon: Improbable Nation. A Study in Political Development. Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1965, pp. 
90-1.
472 The proposed pact was significant, because it was the first real attempt by the W estern powers to get the Arab 
states (and Lebanon) to demonstrate publicly an alignment with the W est against the USSR. Leila Meo, Lebanon: 
Improbable Nation, p. 111.
On the basis of a new electoral law, passed in 1950, according to Nicola Ziadeh, Svria and Lebanon. Ernest Benn 
Ltd, London, 1957, p. 111.
474 For details, see L. Yam ak The Syrian Social Nationalist Party. Harvard University Press, 1966; Nicola Ziadeh, Svria 
and Lebanon, p. 112.
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Al Solh as prime minister; although a member of the same Sunni family, Sami 
Al Solh was a less powerful politician.475
It was to be the corruption issue, though, rather than foreign policy 
complications, that brought down the Al Khoury regime in September 1952. A 
series of editorials underlines the continuing significance of this factor. Kamel 
Mroueh, for instance, claimed in May 1952 that trust between 'governed and 
governors' had broken down because of corruption. In September he labelled 
Al Khoury's regime and its supporters, especially Selim Al Khoury, as 'arrogant 
thieves and profiteers'476 In September 1952, the opposition began to arrange 
a general strike 'against corruption', to call for Al Khoury's resignation.477 A 
cabinet crisis resulted, as Sami Al Solh apparently broke ranks to endorse the 
accusations of corruption. Despite Al Khoury's efforts to create a new 
government, the actual strike, on 15-16 September, ensured that these would 
fail, especially when the strike was combined with the army's refusal to 
become involved to back the president in his crisis. The only resolution of the 
crisis could be Al Khoury's resignation and new presidential elections in May 
1952.478
The result was the election of a triumphant Camille Chamoun who found 
that foreign policy matters were assuming an increasingly high profile during 
his term of office because of Lebanese reactions to the changing Middle 
Eastern context. As the experience of Al Khoury's government had 
demonstrated, despite the National Pact, foreign policy issues still had the 
power to generate intercommunal tensions. There were, in 1952, two main 
strands to the foreign policy dimension which were to converge in the 
aftermath of the Suez crisis. One strand related to Lebanese-Syrian relations.
Under the terms of the constitution, the powers of the president were very wide, because he inherited most of those 
held by the High Commissioner during the mandate period. See Malcolm Kerr, 'Political Decision Making in a 
Confessional Democracy' in L. Binder (ed.), Politics in Lebanon. John Wiley, New York, 1966, p. 204; K.S. Salibi, 
Modern History of Lebanon, p. 195.
476 Kamel Mroueh, Al Havat. 10 May 1952; 13 September 1952. Ziadeh indicates that, as in 1947-8, accusations of 
corruption were widespread in the press. Nicola Ziadeh, Svria and Lebanon, p. 11.
477 Kamel Mroueh, Al Havat. 6 September 1952.
478 Michael Johnson, Class and Client in Beirut, p. 122. Despite the suggestions of Rabbath, there is no sustainable 
evidence that W estern intervention engineered this development. Certainly the W est had become anti-Khoury and 
was pro-Chamoun by 1952; but the events of September 1952 in Lebanon were internally generated. Edmond 
Rabbath, La Formation Historigue du Liban. p, 560; Nicola Ziadeh, Svria and Lebanon, pp. 124-5.
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These had been habitually strained since the setting up of the separate 
mandates in 1920.479 In the 1950s, the tension related primarily to the 
divergent economic states of both countries, and to the question of political 
refugees. The greater economic success of Lebanon, with its visibly higher 
standards of living for most communities, including the Sunni there, was a 
cause of considerable resentment to Syrians; but this was a long-term issue 
that contributed extra vigour to more short-term clashes.480
These clashes, in the early to mid 1950s, related primarily to the habit of 
Syrian political refugees fleeing to Lebanon where they took advantage of their 
continuing proximity to Syria and of relative Lebanese press and media 
freedom to make sure that their views were publicised in ways that would be 
heard in Syria. The number of coups in Syria after 1949 were an added 
problem for Lebanese-Syrian relations. This crisis in relations came to a peak 
in 1955, when members of the PPS, Ghassan and Fu’ad Jadid, were 
implicated in the assassination of a prominent Syrian official, Adnan Al Maliki, 
in revenge for Syria's behaviour over Saadeh. As a result, Syria's hostility 
against the Chamoun government became complete because of continued 
Lebanese tolerance of the PPS and its anti-Syrian propaganda, and in 
particular, the support of the PPS for the Chamoun regime.481
The other foreign policy strand had wider dimensions, relating to the 
impact on the Middle East of the Egyptian coup which brought Nasser to power 
as President. In the context of the Cold War, Nasser's policy of distancing 
himself from the West, and seeking to persuade his fellow Arab states to do 
likewise was to have a considerable impact on political relationships within 
Lebanon. The West, and those more Western-orientated Arab states of the 
early 1950s, such as Turkey, Pakistan and Iraq, sought to develop an anti- 
Soviet defence strategy based on 'friendly co-operation' between the Middle
479 See Inmea Sader (ed.), Svro-Lebanese Relations 1934-1985. CEDRE, Bayt A! Moustakbal, 1986, 2 volumes, for a 
chronological survey of the archival and bibliographical material charting the tensions between the two countries.
480 For the factors promoting this, see Michael Johnson, Class and Client in Beirut, pp. 28-9; 120-3.
481 This support had developed as a result of Chamoun's opposition to Al Khoury and the Ba'athist regime in Syria. 
For details of the Syrian position see Nicola Ziadeh, Svria and Lebanon, pp. 162-3; Itamar Rabinovich, ‘Arab Political 
Parties: Ideology and Ethnicity', in Milton J. Esman & Itamar Rabinovich (eds), Ethnicity. Pluralism and the State in the 
Middle East. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1988, p. 158.
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Eastern states, with US backing.482 The outcome of the talks was the 
Baghdad Pact, initially between Turkey and Iraq, reached on 24 February 
1955. Thereafter, Iraq took a lead in seeking to pressure its Arab neighbours 
into joining. In 1954 Nasser had succeeded in getting the removal of British 
troops from Egypt, including the Suez Canal Zone. The concept of the 
Baghdad Pact was thus deeply unwelcome to him involving as it did an Arab 
state, Iraq, which he saw as a rival to his ambition to lead the Arab world, and 
Britain. For Nasser, the pact was 'part of a Western scheme to support the 
creation of small, easily manipulated Arab states in order to combat the tide of 
Arab nationalism and perpetuate their colonial rule'; as well as being a 
personal affront to his personal dream of Arab unity 483 Nasser, therefore, 
sought to pressure Arab states not to Join the Pact 484 Lebanon was one of 
those states subject to pressure by both camps.
Chamoun's term of office had apparently started well: he had made 
conciliatory noises to leaders of ail the major political and commercial 
groupings in Lebanon, but by the mid 1950s the goodwill was evaporating, 
especially amongst the Muslim elites. With no leader of the stature of Riyadh 
Al Solh, the Sunnis felt particularly discontented, believing with some justice 
that their influence had lessened.485 Thus opposition leaders were looking for 
excuses and opportunities to attack and undermine Chamoun. The wider 
Middle Eastern conflict provided such excuses and opportunities. Chamoun 
did turn down the opportunity of joining the Baghdad Pact but not in terms that 
aligned the state clearly with the opposing, Nasser-led camp. His attempt at 
neutrality obviously did not please the various interested parties outside 
Lebanon; of more significance, it increased tensions within the country along 
confessional lines.486 As a result, attitudes within Lebanon to the state's
462 Documents on American Foreign Relations. Harper & Brothers, New York, 1955, pp. 276-8; New York Tim es. 20  
September 1953. Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples. Faber & Faber, London, 1991, p. 365 points out that 
independence had not led to an ending of expectations by such state governments that 'the former imperial rulers' 
would still maintain a  protective military relationship with them.
483 Al Ahram. 17 January 1956; Documents on American Foreign Relations. Daily Report, Foreign Radio Broadcasts, 
Foreign Daily Broadcast Information Service, 13 December 1958, A.3.
484 Leila Meo, Lebanon: Improbable Nation, pp. 94-7.
485 K.S. Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon, p. 198.
486 F0371/12605 VL1011/1 British Embassy, Beirut, to Foreign Office, 1 January 1956, highlights the dilemma faced by 
the Chamoun government in terms of a 'choice between East and W est1; and also mentions in its summary of principal 
events in Lebanon, the letter of appeal of the Maronite Patriarch to Chamoun, on 21 April 1955, urging Chamoun to 
'remain neutral' because of fears of division amongst the Lebanese population.
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foreign policy between 1955 and 1958 relate more to the perspectives dictated 
by confessional traditions than to the actual developments within the Middle 
East, such as the Suez crisis.
In the same year as the Baghdad Pact, Nasser arranged an arms deal 
with the Soviet bloc, signalling to the West that he was willing to work with the 
USSR and causing considerable alarm thereby in the West. The USA, which 
had been offering to fund Nasser's Aswan Dam project, something of huge 
symbolic importance to Egypt as a whole and to Nasser, sought to bring 
Nasser back into line by withdrawing the funding. But Nasser's reaction was 
promptly to negotiate a deal for the dam's funding with the USSR, and also to 
nationalise the Suez Canal Company.487 The 1956 Suez Crisis was a major 
international event, but its impact was also significant for individual states in 
the Middle East, including Lebanon, with its balance between the Western and 
Arab worlds set up by the National Pact. The resolution of the consequent 
Suez Crisis in Egypt's favour served to increase enormously Nasser's standing 
within the Arab world; and consequently to alarm those not in sympathy with 
Arab nationalist ideas. It can be said that the crisis had created a situation 
throughout the Arab world where popular enthusiasm for Nasser threatened 
the ability of any state government that was identified as taking an anti- 
Nasserist position, either explicitly or implicitly, and particularly in terms of 
maintaining relations with the West or advocating the Baghdad Pact. This had 
important implications for Lebanon and the operation of the terms of the 
National Pact, because it meant that the balance envisaged by the Pact would 
not be easy to maintain, especially if there was pressure for or against either 
Nasser or the Western world from within Lebanon.
In the aftermath of the Suez Crisis, Nasser put pressure on the 
Chamoun government to make at least a token gesture of solidarity with the 
Arab world by withdrawing the Lebanese ambassadors to Britain and France. 
Chamoun refused, invoking the terms of the National Pact to claim that he 
could not break with the West. Instead he merely endorsed a condemnation of
487 Dwight Eisenhower, Waging Peace: 1956-61. Doubleday, New York, 1965, p. 24; Raymond Salame, T h e  
Eisenhower Doctrine: a Study in Alliance Politics1, unpublished PhD thesis, American University, Washington, 1974, 
pp. 182; 192-4
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the actions of these powers; but he thereby precipitated an internal crisis in his 
Cabinet, indicating the existence of potentially destabilising forces in 
Lebanon.488 Abdallah Al Yafi had been Prime Minister, and Saeb Salam, 
Minister of State from 3 June 1956, but both men were dissatisfied with the 
current power balance in the regime and at odds with Chamoun over economic 
issues relating to their communities. They sought to use the opportunity 
offered by the Suez Crisis to redress matters by an assertion of their power 
over Chamoun. So they pressed for the ambassadorial withdrawals on the 
grounds that such a policy was in line with both the policy of the Arab League, 
of which Lebanon was a member, and the obligations of the National Pact. On 
18 November 1956 both men resigned in protest at Chamoun's refusal to take 
'an Arab stance1; claiming he was breaking a promise made to them to do so. 
However, they failed to bring down Chamoun himself.489 He reconstructed his 
Cabinet on the same day, bringing in Sami Al Solh as Prime Minister, but Al 
Yafi and Salam had now identified themselves with the broadly pro-Nasserist 
camp within Lebanon, and found it expedient to continue to do so, thereby 
distancing themselves from Chamoun.
Between 1956 and 1958 Nasser came increasingly to represent the 
ambitions and agendas of the Muslim political opposition in Lebanon. In the 
absence of a genuinely strong internal leader, the charismatic figure of Nasser 
provided a useful symbol for those politicians seeking to inspire their own 
followers. Nasser's message was of ‘dignity, social justice, development, anti­
imperialism, anti-Zionism, and pan-Arabism1; and all of these were already part 
of the Muslim political agendas within Lebanon. Thus Nasser and his words 
provided a useful focus through which the Muslim political leaders in Lebanon 
could interpret their existing agendas, giving them a higher profile and greater 
weight in the eyes of their supporters.490
468 Leila Meo, Lebanon: Improbable Nation, pp. 97-8.
489 Yussuf Khoury (ed.), Cabinet Papers. 1926-1984. Muassassat Ai Dirassat Ai Lubnaniyyah, Beirut, 1994, Vol. 1, p. 
447, recording the events of 18 November 1956; Leila Meo, Lebanon: Improbable Nation, pp. 98-9, recounts the Sunni 
claim that Chamoun had promised that Lebanon would sever diplomatic relations with Britain and France as an 
expression of solidarity with Egypt, but that he did not fulfil that promise triggering the resignations of Salam and Yafi. 
However as Meo also points out, Chamoun denied ever having made such a promise.
490 Michael Hudson, Arab Politics. Yale University Press, Connecticut, 1979, p. 243.
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The new cabinet chosen by Chamoun on 18 November 1956 was not 
likely to increase support for the regime amongst the opposition. This was 
particularly so in the case of the appointment of the Greek Orthodox Dr 
Charles Malik as Foreign Minister, a man well-known for his pro-Western 
orientation. As Salibi states, The inclusion of Charles Malik, in the new 
government was in itself a declaration of policy'.491 It is against this 
background that political debate in Lebanon over the Eisenhower Doctrine 
needs to be understood rather than putting the emphasis on the Doctrine itself 
and the pressures that external powers, notably Egypt and the USA, were 
putting on the Lebanese government. The Doctrine announced on 5 January 
1957 by President Eisenhower was intended by the Americans to counteract 
moves towards communism in the Middle East.492 As Salame puts it, it was 'a 
joint resolution of the United States Senate and House of Representatives 
authorising the President to employ the armed forces of the United States to 
protect the independence of any nation controlled by international 
communism1, with Egypt implicitly identified as the villain.493
In presenting his proposals, Eisenhower emphasised his perception of a 
'critical' situation in the Middle East, and argued that America's global 
responsibilities demanded a policy that would enable her to defuse any crisis 
there. Consequently, America had to be prepared to modify traditional support 
for national aspirations amongst states which had formerly been European 
colonies, judging whether those aspirations were tainted by communism or not. 
The Doctrine aimed to go beyond the mere protection of territorial integrity, to 
the provision of necessary military assistance and economic aid to counter the 
growth of international communism. One state specifically identified as a 
possible client for such assistance was Lebanon, where there was a perceived 
threat to its established nationalism from the forces of communism 
masquerading as Arab nationalists.494 Once passed by Congress and signed 
by Eisenhower, on 9 March 1957, the USA sought to sell it to the Arab world,
491 K.S. Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon, p. 199.
492 Paul Zinner (ed.) Documents on US Foreign Relations. New York, 1958, pp. 195-204 for extracts from 
Eisenhower's speech to Congress, 5 January 1957.
493 Raymond Salame, ‘The Eisenhower Doctrine', p. 11; for the text of the joint resolution of Congress, 9 March 1957, 
see M.S. Agwani (ed.), The Lebanese Crisis in 1958. A Documentary Study. Asia Publishing House, 1965, p. 15.
494 For the full text see Department of State Bulletin. XXXVI, January 1957.
172
but with little success. Both Syria and Egypt rejected it vehemently and sought 
to ensure that other states in the region did the same.495 In On 14 March 1957 
James P Richards arrived in Beirut to persuade the Chamoun government to 
endorse the Doctrine.496 By this time, however, there was considerable 
opposition resentment of Chamoun's domestic policies, linked to fears about 
his future political plans, and Muslim (especially Sunni) bitterness over their 
exclusion from real power. Any opposition to reaction to the Doctrine would be 
likely to be based more on this than on a considered judgement of its merits 
and demerits for Lebanon.
Certainly the pro-Nasserist elements in the opposition, such as the Al 
Yafi faction, had begun to demand rejection of the Eisenhower Doctrine before 
Richard's arrival. But the less ideologically aligned factions in the opposition, 
including those led by Christian leaders such as Fouad Ammoun, were less 
decided in their stance, as a survey of reports in Al Havat and other 
newspapers indicates. Al Havat reported that both Jumblat and Bishara Al 
Khoury and his Constitutional Bloc were conscious of merits in the Doctrine, for 
instance.497 This was despite any danger of isolating Lebanon from the rest of 
the Arab world. What ensured rejection of the Doctrine by most of the 
opposition was the perception that Chamoun's acceptance of the Doctrine was 
linked to American endorsement of any plans Chamoun might have for 
following Al Khoury's precedent and seeking re-election via a constitutional 
amendment. The official acceptance of the Doctrine came in the joint 
American-Lebanese statement of 16 March 1957; but the opposition came to 
believe that Richards' visit also enabled Chamoun to confirm American support 
for his re-election.498
Thus endorsement of the Doctrine divided Lebanon into two main 
groups; essentially pro and anti government policy - both explicit and implicit. 
Notable amongst the administration's supporters were the Kata’ib Party, with
495 Leila Meo, Lebanon: Improbable Nation, pp. 107; 115-7. She points out that there was considerable justification for
Arab refusals to endorse the Doctrine, as endorsement wouid be likely to bring the Cold W ar 'to their own doorstep'.
495 Foreign Relations of the US. 1955-157. Volume XIII, Near East, Jordan-Yemen, Department of State Publication 
9665, Washington DC, 1988, p. 208.
437 Al Havat. 28 March 1957.
498 See Foreign Relations of the US. 1955-1957. Vol. XIII, p. 120; Leila Meo, Lebanon. Improbable Nation pp. 124-5.
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their fears of Arab nationalism and of Egypt and Syria in particular.499 The 
opposition comprised a majority of the influential leaders from the Muslim 
community; but also a number of Christian leaders, especially those unwilling 
to see Chamoun re-eiected. Their fury at the government's acceptance of the 
Doctrine was increased by their fear that it had strengthened Chamoun's own 
power and chances of success through electoral fraud. Consequently, they 
claimed that acceptance of the Doctrine compromised the National Pact, and 
amounted to government corruption.500 In the face of the storm caused by 
protests against the Eisenhower Doctrine, the cabinet agreed to hold a 
parliamentary debate on foreign policy and to submit itself to a vote of 
confidence in the Chamber of Deputies starting on 6 April 1957. It was a 
stormy debate, lasting three days, but the undercurrent in that debate 
concerned the established fears and resentments of the parties involved over 
essentially internal matters. The government won the debate, by a majority of 
30 to 1, but before the vote was taken six deputies resigned in protest over 
government policy.501
One result of this debate was the formation of new opposition groupings 
linked primarily by their hostility to Chamoun and his regime, and focused on 
expressing that hostility in the forthcoming elections. The predominantly 
Muslim United National Front formed on 31 March 1957, published on 1 April 
1957, an agenda which summed up the range of feelings about Chamoun's 
policies. It contained accusations about government corruption and a 
commitment to the conditions of the National Pact, which it argued Chamoun 
had broken, and consequently it contained rhetoric about the desirability of 
interconfessional collaboration.502 Figures involved included Sunni leaders like 
Saeb Salam and Abdallah Al Yafi, and some leading Christian figures with
499 Pierre Gemayel, leader of the Kata’ib party, spoke of his fears of being 'engulfed in a Muslim sea' without the 
protection of the Doctrine and of the consequent duty of supporting the government. See Al Havat. 4  March 1958; F. 
Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon, p. 84.
5QQ Al Havat. 19 March 1957 contains a useful summary of these opposition claims. Interestingly enough, despite their 
general support fo.r Chamoun's position, the PPS could not bring themselves to endorse the Eisenhower Doctrine. 
See Abdallah Mohsen, Speech, 2 March 1958, PPS Archives.
501 Al Havat. 7 April 1957.
502 Al Havat, 31 March 1957; 1 April 1957 giving the Manifesto of the United National Front; see also M.S. Agwani, The 
Lebanese Crisis, pp. 29-33 for the full text of the Manifesto.
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broadly Nasserist sympathies such as Bishara Al Khoury, leader of the 
Constitutional Bloc.503
It also included political groupings such as Najjadah, the National 
Organisation and the Al Ba’ath Party. In addition, what came to be known as 
the Third Force appeared on the political scene at the same time. The Third 
Force included a number of political leaders from the Catholic and Greek 
Orthodox sects, which traditionally sought to take a neutral stance in Lebanese 
political conflicts. Certainly Third Force figures such as Henry Pharaon, Yussuf 
Hitti, Joseph Salem and George Naccache, as well as the newspaperman 
Ghassan Tueni, did seek initially to act as a mediating element between the 
United National Front and the government. But as attitudes hardened on both 
sides, the Third Force moved closer in its views and attitudes to the Front. 
Eventually, little but the personalities remained to differentiate it from the 
United National Front in terms of relations with the government.
But as the United National Front’s agenda suggests, the unity of the 
opposition to the Chamoun regime was again driven by expediency rather than 
shared agendas. Resentment over the regime’s endorsement of the 
Eisenhower doctrine, as a symbol of the dissension on foreign policy issues 
linked to fears that foreign policy was being used by Chamoun for his own 
ends. On internal issues, the respective domestic agendas were very different 
and there is no evidence of any discussions to move these agendas closer 
together for the longer term.504 The high profile given to the Doctrine needs to 
be linked to Chamoun’s plans for a new electoral law, the terms of which were 
first published on 18 March 1957, underlining the links between these issues. 
The number of deputies was to be increased from 44 to 66, and some 
constituencies were to be changed, establishing the basis for major political 
changes in both confessional terms and the power bases of currently powerful 
leaders. This proposed law ran directly counter to opposition demands for a 
larger Chamber, one of 88 members, because it was argued that this was 
necessary to provide a fairer confessional representation in the spirit of the
503 Al Khoury’s motivation was more inspired by personal bitterness than ideological convictions; though he did have 
some sympathies with a  more pro-Arab position.
504 Aj_Hayat, 19 March 1957; F Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon, p. 53.
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National Pact, reversing the established bias towards the Maronite community. 
The opposition claim was that Chamoun’s electoral reform would confirm that 
bias, rather than reverse it.505
As expected, in April 1957, Chamoun’s version of the new electoral law 
was passed. But opposition protests continued and increased in vehemence. 
Indeed the resignation of the six deputies at the time of the debate over the 
Eisenhower Doctrine is better understood when it is realised that a major 
motivation behind the resignations was the desire of these men to improve 
their chances of support in constituencies that were predominantly Sunni in the 
forthcoming elections.506 In a strategy that was to become general during the 
election campaign, and the subsequent debates, foreign policy issues were 
used in the rhetoric of both sides but because such issues were held to sum up 
attitudes on a range of other essentially domestic issues, including political 
corruption and the relative status of the various confessional communities.507
As Michael Johnson points out, one effect of Chamoun’s reforms, 
probably intended was a reduction in the power of the traditional landed 
classes of all communities, bolstering that of the ‘commercial-financial 
bourgeoisie’.508 But Chamoun’s prime motivation seems to have been the 
production of a Chamber of Deputies packed with his supporters, which he 
expected to come predominantly from that commercial-financial bourgeoisie, 
even across confessional boundaries, to some extent. A Chamber favourably 
disposed and grateful to Chamoun would be more likely to co-operate in any 
attempt by Chamoun to renew his mandate through an amendment of the 
constitution. Certainly by increasing the numbers of deputies by only 22 he 
reduced the power of existing strong leaders, without making it more difficult 
for the government to gain a majority in the Chamber.
605 This point was made plain in Al Havat. 28 March 1957; 29 March 1957; 16 April 1957.
506 The reasons for their resignations and the reactions to it, making specific allusions to the debate on the electoral 
law, were widely discussed in the Lebanese press. See, for example, Al Havat. 7 April 1957; 8 April 1957; An Nahar. 6 
April 1957; 9 April 1957. The deputies were Hamid Frangieh, Sabri Hamadih, Rachid Abd Al Hamid Karami, Abdailah 
Ai Yafi, Ahmad Al Assad and his son Kamel Al Assad.
507 See, for instance, editorial, Al Havat. 18 June 1957.
508 Michael Johnson, Class and Client in Beirut, p. 123. A 1952 electoral law had broken up the large electoral 
districts into 22 single and 11 two members constituencies, starting a process of undermining the Zu'ama. The 1957 
reform merely continued the process.
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While first political moves in the campaign were made in March and 
April official campaigning did not begin until May. On 12 May 1957 
electioneering started with a government procession and a rally held by the 
United National Front, intended to raise the points on which the Front planned 
to campaign. These points demonstrate the basis on which the Front felt that 
political co-operation could continue within Lebanon:
1. The constitution should not be amended to enable President
Chamoun to stand for re-election;
2. Lebanon should not be neutral in any dispute between 
foreign powers;
3. Lebanon should refuse to house foreign military bases or to 
join foreign military pacts such as the Baghdad Pact;
4. Any aid tending to restrict Lebanon’s sovereignty or to 
influence her foreign policy should be rejected;
5. Lebanon should pursue a policy of close, impartial and 
effective co-operation with other Arab states;
6. The existing government should make way for a caretaker 
government to supervise the elections.509
This list underlines the main fears of the opposition; notably that even though 
he had not articulated this, Chamoun intended to seek another term of office; 
and to use the election for this purpose. The United National Front also 
underlined the opposition belief that the Chamoun regime was corrupt. On 20 
May Hamid Frangieh alleged that Chamoun was guilty of corruption including 
bribery; and also of scare mongering by seeking to use foreign policy issues for 
his own purposes. He was seeking to deceive the electorate into thinking the
509 An Nahar. 13 May 1957.
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very existence of Lebanon was at stake in the election, to divert attention from 
the real issues of corruption and Chamoun’s personal ambitions.510
On 27 May 1957 the United National Front sought to escalate the 
tension and so gain an advantage for its agenda, by warning Chamoun that 
unless he dismissed the Al Solh government within 24 hours in favour of a 
neutral caretaker cabinet which would act to supervise the elections, there 
would be a general strike and ‘peaceful demonstrations’ beginning on 30 
May.511 Similar tactics had succeeded in bringing down the Al Khoury regime 
in 1952, but this time, the government was, or felt itself to be, in a stronger 
position. Thus all demonstrations likely to lead to a breach of the peace were 
banned and the Ministry of the Interior requested to enforce this. The army 
was also instructed to hold itself ready to intervene if it became necessary.512 
The demonstration went ahead in Beirut on 30 May. It escalated into a fight 
between the demonstrators and the gendarmerie, though as was the case with 
all the fighting during this period the scale was limited by army reluctance to 
get too deeply involved.513 However, it set the tone for a bitter campaign, as 
the press reporting indicates. The government claimed that only 4 men and 1 
woman were killed; while opposition leaders maintained that more than 15 
people were killed and about 100 were wounded.514 One Sunni opposition 
leader, Saeb Salam, received a head wound and was taken to hospital in 
custody; and some 350 other demonstrators were arrested and detained in a 
stable.
The government also sought to minimise the popular impact of the 
demonstration and its aftermath by confiscating the next day’s issues of the 
five leading opposition newspapers.515 While the army then moved in to 
ensure that the fighting did not start up again, such government action ensured 
that a relatively minor demonstration became not only a major election issue
510 Al Havat. 20 May 1957.
511 An Nahar 28 May 1957.
512 Al Havat 30 May 1957; 31 May 1957.
513 F.O. 371/142208, British Embassy Beirut to Foreign Office 24 April 1959. This states 'the Commander in Chief 
anxious to prevent the disintegration of the army and lacking sympathy for the President's political plans could seldom 
be persuaded to use his small force for offensive actions’.
514 An Nahar. 31 May 1957. The full truth is not known but it is certain that both sets of figures were inaccurate as, 
apart from anything else, accuracy in such figures on such occasions is in the interests of no parties involved.
515 An Nahar, 3 June 1957. One of the leading newspapers that did appear, because of its generally neutral stance, it 
did report this set of developments, including the figures for both sides and the censorship of other portions of the 
press.
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but a symbol for the opposition of a misuse of government power. The 
opposition was not defused, but encouraged, to further defiance, with a 
consequent increase in tension and disorder within Lebanon. As Najla Attiyah 
comments, The nature of the issues over which the government and the 
opposition were fighting made the election campaign a fight for survival’ for the 
government and the policies it represented.516
In fact, the rest of the actual campaigning was relatively peaceful: it 
was the aftermath of the election that can be described as a situation of 
escalating crisis for the government. After his arrest, Saeb Salam announced 
he was going on hunger strike in an attempt to force the government, including 
Chamoun, to resign.517 At this point the Lebanese army became a potential 
player, since Chamoun wished to use the army to intervene against the 
demonstrators. However, the head of the army, General Shihab, was opposed 
to this. Shihab was a Maronite, from an important landowning family, but he 
did not share Chamoun’s agenda in 1957. Instead, motivated by his desire to 
avoid use of the army, he sought to mediate between both sides and did win 
three major concessions from the government intended to appease the 
opposition. From 31 May to 4 June, Shihab took over control of all the state’s 
security forces, not just the army, relieving immediate fears that Chamoun 
would misuse these again. Second, he secured the appointment of two 
additional ministers to the Cabinet, to act as neutral observers. Dr Yussuf Hitti 
and Muhammad Ali Bayhum were given the task of ensuring the conduct of the 
elections would be fair and free. Finally it was announced that a committee 
would also be set up to oversee the proper conduct of the elections.518
Shihab’s efforts did have some effect in the short term. The threatened 
strike was called off and Salam ended his hunger strike on 2 June. But as An 
Nahar, reporting these developments, commented, effectively the potential for
516 Najla Attiyah, T h e  attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis Towards the State of Lebanon', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 
University of London, 1973.
^  ALHavat, 1 June 1957; see also Al Havat. 3 June for reports on how this compromise was reached.
For an indication of how this arrangement was received by the opposition, see Al Havat. 2 June 1957; 4  June 1957. 
Hitti was an ex-deputy. He had the reputation of being an honest man, but also for being a go-between and a political 
'fixer' probably the reason for his choice. Bayhum was a Sunni, from a traditional political family, but not a leading 
figure, again meaning that he was a relatively neutral choice. See F0371/134115 VL1012/1, No. 68 (Confidential) Sir 
George Middleton to Mr Selwyn Lloyd, No. 68, (Confidential), 2 May 1958, 'Leading Personalities in Lebanon’. See  
also F. Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon, p. 56.
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any national consensus in the forthcoming elections was now minimal, 
amounting to an effective breakdown in the National Pact.519 Even without 
major violence, the election campaign certainly saw a deepening of the divides 
between politicians, often, though not exclusively, along confessional lines. 
For example, pro-government candidates did include a number of Muslim 
candidates who clung to the traditional idea of intercommunal compromise, or 
who felt that their best chance of personal success lay in continuing support for 
Chamoun.520 On 9 June the elections began, to be held over four successive 
Sundays to facilitate the peace-keeping efforts of the security forces. On this 
first Sunday, Beirut and South Lebanon, with 11 seats each, voted, and on 16 
June, Mount Lebanon with 20 seats. On 23 June it was the turn of the Biqa‘, 
with 10 seats and finally on 30th June, North Lebanon, with 14 seats, took its 
turn at the polls. The emphasis on the traditional Maronite stronghold of Mount 
Lebanon, indicated by the high number of seats allocated to it, despite its rural 
character, is a useful indication of how Chamoun’s regime had attempted to 
skew the balance of constituencies in their favour.
Analysis of the results indicates that both opposition and government 
had, to some extent, been successful in pressing their perspectives on their 
followers on issues such as corruption and attitudes for and against the 
Eisenhower Doctrine. In the Matn district, the electoral lists were pro-Doctrine 
in outlook, for instance. Chamoun’s calculations on the importance to his 
cause of the Mount Lebanon district were borne out with the return of 20 
deputies who were all ‘loyalists’ in terms of supporting not only the 
government, but also Chamoun’s plans for re-election.521 Table 1 provides an 
illustration of this;
519 An Nahar. 3  June 1957.
5S0 Saeb Salam, Oral Interview, Geneva, 4  January 1991.
521 Al Havat. 21 June 1957, made this point, interestingly, however, some of these 20 deputies had made it public that 
they had reservations about government foreign policy; again highlighted in the Al Havat report. See also Table 1 
following.
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Table 1 
Mount Lebanon522
Constituency Deputy Political allegiance Votes
Baabda Elia Abou Jaoude 
Edouard Honein 
Mahmoud Ammar 
Bashir Al Awar
Loyalist Maronite 
B N Maronite 
P C Shi’ite 
P C Druze
12578
13838
14891
14359
Matn Salim Lahoud 
Assad Al Achkar 
Albert Moukheiber
Loyalist Maronite 
P P S  Maronite 
B N Greek Orthodox
11172
12168
9063
Baaklin Kahtan Hamadi 
Henri Traboulsi 
Naim Mogabgab
P C Druze 
P C Maronite 
P C Maronite
9074
1048
10153
Aley Amir Magid Arslan 
Leader 
George Aki 
Mounir Abour Fadel
Loyalist Druze
B N Maronite 
Loyalist Greek 
Orthodox
14600
13793
13784
Kisrawan Nohad Boueiz 
Clovis Al Khazin 
Traditional Leader 
Maurice Zouain
B N. Maronite 
Pro B N Maronite
Maronite T raditional 
Leader
16388
16375
16179
Dayr al Qamar Emile Bustani 
Anwar Al Khatib
P.C. Maronite 
Independent Sunni
11530
11605
Borj Hammoud Dicran Tosbath Armenian Unan*.
Jbeil Raymond Edde B N. leader Unan* 
Maronite*
Key:
P.C. = Pro Chamoun 
BN. = Bloc National 
P.P.S.= Parti Populaire Syrien 
* = No opponents stood against these
candidates
The results of the election were set out in the press after each round.523 As 
the pattern of results became clear, Chamoun began to be widely accused of 
attempting to rig the election, first through the electoral law and subsequently
Figures taken from Al Havat. 17 June 1957.
523 For example, A! Havat. 10 June 1957 gave the resuits for Beirut and the south; Al Havat. 11 June 1957, gave the 
results for Mount Lebanon; Al Havat. 24 June gave the results for the Bi'qa; Al Havat. 1 July 1957, gave the results for 
North Lebanon.
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through fraudulent conduct of the election campaign and the electoral process 
itself.524
Some of the most bitter defeated candidates were from the zu’ama 
classes in the various communities, and so members of the traditional 
landowning political elites. They claimed that Chamoun had deliberately 
discriminated against any potential opposition through the electoral law and 
had followed this up by actual electoral misconduct.525 The evidence indicates 
that this was not just the rhetoric of defeat. For instance, the outcome of 
elections in Beirut indicates how disadvantaged opposition candidates were. 
Both Saeb Salam and Abdallah Al Yafi were standing here. They were popular 
sitting deputies, and could have expected re-election. Both these opposition 
leaders lost.
An examination of the composition of the new constituency boundaries 
here is illuminating. To the strongly pro-Sunni and pro-opposition areas of 
Musaytiba and Mazraa, three Christian sectors had been added, Ashrafiyyah, 
Rumayl and Sayfi. Theoretically such a system should be ideal for a multi­
confessional state such as Lebanon, as it meant that candidates would need 
support from all sectors of the electorate, promoting consensus thereby. 
However, in this case the Christian proportion now outnumbered the Muslim by 
a ratio of 60 or even 65 per cent. The Christian sector could be relied on to 
come out in opposition to candidates taking a pan-Arabist, pro-Nasserist 
stance, just the position which would ensure success in the Muslim areas. The 
results as published by An Nahar on 14 June, 1957 illustrate the extent to 
which it had proved practically impossible for opposition candidates to 
succeed. However, the pro-Chamoun candidates, headed by Sami Al Solh, 
reaped the benefit of support from the Christian areas; as the table below 
indicates:
524 Kama! Jumblat, Haaiqat al Thawra al Lubnanivvah [The Truth about the Lebanese Revolution], Dar Al Nashr al 
Arrabiyyah, Beirut, 1959, p. 115; Yussuf Al Sawda, al Khivana al 'uzma [The Biggest Betrayal], Beirut, 1957. This 
pamphlet is held in the AS Sawda Papers, I’Universite de Saint-Esprit, Kaslik, and specifically discusses the issue of 
Chamoun using the election in his attempt to renew his mandate. See also Farid Al Khazin & Paul Salem, A[ 
Intikhatabat ai 'uia Fi Lubnan Fi mma Ba'd al Harb [The First Election After the W ar], Dar An Nahar wa Markaz Al 
Lubnani 111 Dirasat, Beirut, 1993, p. 29, which describes the 1957 election as ‘conducted according to the plans of 
President Chamoun'.
525 Ibid.
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Table 2 
1957 Election Results526
District Constituencies 
- Beirut Sami Al Solh Abdallah Al Yafi Difference
Ashrafiyyah 5936 1942 3994
Rumayl 4411 955 3456
Sayfi 1969 218 1751
Total - East Beirut 12316 3115 9201
Musaytiba 4260 4844 - 584
Mazraa 2322 8270: - 5948
Total - West Beirut 6582 13114 - 6532
Total general 18898 16229 + 2669
This was not the only example of gerrymandering. Kama! Jumblat, another 
sitting deputy in the Shut district with a significant popular following there was 
also defeated. Examination shows that his constituency had been modified to 
include a significant element of pro-government Christians who would not vote 
for a Druze leader of a ‘socialist1 party, even if he had supported the 
government on a key foreign policy issue.527 Defeat was particularly bitter for 
Jumblat, because though officially an opposition leader, certainly on a number 
of key domestic issues, he had openly endorsed Chamoun’s policy of support 
for the Eisenhower Doctrine.528 Consequently he had moved to a position of 
general support for the government in the months before the election.529 The 
manner of his defeat ensured that he became a bitter opponent of Chamoun 
for personal rather than purely political reasons.
52e An Nahar. 14 June 1957.
527 This point was made in the opposition press very strongly. See An Nahar. 18 June 1957.
528 Ai Havat. 16 March 1957. Michael Johnson, Class and Client in Beirut, p. 122, points out that Jumblat's ‘moderate 
social democracy' had been rejected by Chamoun on his election in 1952, though they had been in alliance against Al 
Khoury, placing Jumbiat in the opposition camp.
829 Saeb Salam, Interview, Geneva, 4 January 1991, which stressed this point. It was also made by Caroline Attie, ‘ 
President Chamoun and the Crisis of 1958. Referring to Foreign Service Despatch No. 487, American Embassy 
(Beirut) to Department of State 18 April 1957', unpublished Conference paper, Austin, Texas, 13 September 192. See 
also Ai Havat. 18 June 1957 for comments on the unacceptable nature of Jumblat's defeat.
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As newspaper comment throughout June 1957 indicates, it was not just 
a matter of fraud by a prior rigging of the constituencies in favour of 
government-backed candidates. The actual voting figures were open to 
question. It was pointed out by opposition leaders and newspapers that even 
with the constituencies rigged as indicated above, figures like Kamal Jumblat 
should have had sufficiently large personal followings to have ensured re- 
election, though possibly with smaller majorities.530 instead, the results were a 
sweeping victory for the government, with Its candidates winning over two- 
thirds of the seats, and the opposition a mere eight seats. For both 
contemporaries and historians the results indicate a degree of electoral fraud 
during the voting process in some way. If unequivocal hard evidence is not 
available, cumulative circumstantial evidence indicates that the elections were 
dishonest. It is hard to explain otherwise, in view of the traditional value placed 
on leadership in Lebanon, how so many major opposition leaders were 
defeated.
Investigation reveals that strong pressure was applied to ensure the 
election of some government candidates. Chamoun was reputedly prepared to 
bring pressure on candidates and voters, through tactics which included 
warnings to candidates or voters with relatives in the civil service, to follow a 
government line or bribery resulting in the withdrawal of candidates. The 
election of Dr Charles Malik in the Kura district of Northern Lebanon provides a 
case in point. One of the candidates standing there was a Communist who 
had not the slightest chance of success. However the leading opposing 
candidate was Fouad Ghosn, a Greek Orthodox and a formidable figure for 
Malik to overcome. Ghosn was summoned to the presidential palace and after 
two meetings with Chamoun - lasting, it is said, for a total of nine hours - he 
was induced to withdraw, and subsequently compensated with an 
ambassadorial post.531 In Ghosn’s absence the Communist candidate served 
merely to give the illusion of electoral choice in an election drama the results of
530 For example, Al Havat in its analysis of the Mount Lebanon results reported with sympathy Kamal Jumblat's 
accusations that Chamoun had engineered his defeat. See Ai Havat. 19 June 1957.
531 The withdrawal of Ghosn was widely commented on at the time; he was from a landowning family with a  power 
base in the Kura district. It was agreed that no Z a ’im  would choose not to stand in the elections unless something 
extraordinary had happened. Salim Nassar, Interview, London, 20 Mav 1995; Al Havat. 1 July 1957.
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which had already been decided in a decidedly undemocratic fashion,532 A 
further indication of electoral malpractice was provided by the events of 17 
June. On that day the two 'neutral ministers1 overseeing the elections, Yussuf 
Hitti and Muhammad Beydoun resigned. Although they could not prove any 
fault with the technical conduct of the elections they did suggest that the reality 
was different, as their comment to Al Havat of 18 June underline. They were 
reported as saying that the elections were 'superficially in order, but unfair 
pressures on voters were obvious on examination' which affected the way they
voted.533
There was a brief period following the elections during which the 
tensions in the Lebanon relaxed but the firm popular conviction amongst the 
opposition at least, of electoral malpractice ensured this did not last. Soon the 
general atmosphere degenerated, and certain areas rapidly returned to 
outbursts of lawlessness clearly linked to anti-government feeling. As 
bombings, sabotage, clashes between armed bands and police in mountain 
areas and the resurrection of clan feuds disturbed the peace, the United 
National Front refused to recognise the election results or the legitimacy of the 
government. On 3 July 1957, with all the results published, the opposition 
finally issued a statement 'denouncing election malpractices', and accusing the 
[Lebanese] government 'of trying to act unconstitutionally in order to ensure
Chamoun's re-election'.534 In this continuing tension, foreign policy issues 
were increasingly the issues used by the various confessional factions to sum 
up their positions and increasingly, therefore, these came to symbolise 
confessional discord. For one thing, it was still easier to group together a 
number of disparate political factions on blanket foreign policy issues, while the 
intricacies of Lebanese internal politics consistently tended to divide attempts 
by politicians at co-operation.
532 This point was not lost on the press, see Al Havat. 1 July 1957. See also F. Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon, p. 57; 
Salim Nassar, Interview, London, 10 May 1995, Nassar was a leading newspaperman in 1958, and his comments on 
the public mood at the time must be taken seriously.
Al Havat. 18 June, 1957; see also Mideast Mirror. 23 June, 1957 for a repetition of the claims.
534 This was reported widely, see Al Havat. 4  July 1957.
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In an indication of the extent to which the government and its supporters 
felt under pressure, on 25 July 1957 various mainly Maronite deputies met and 
agreed at their meeting on the formation of a new parliamentary bloc or 
grouping. Invitations were issued to a carefully chosen list of 35 deputies. The 
aim was to include a range of deputies from various political parties and 
confessional groups by invoking their mutual support on foreign policy 
matters. The pro-government grouping was able to overcome its differences 
on internal policy by raising as an issue the need to guard Lebanon against 
Nasserism and Communism, but even this posed difficulties. Not even all 
Maronite politicians included in the grouping were uncritical in their acceptance 
of the reality of the threat posed by Nasserism or Communism. Table 3 lays 
out the confessional allegiances of the pro-government grouping in July 1957:
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_ . . -53 5Table 3
Members of the Pro-Government Grouping by Constituency and Confessional
Allegiance
Beirut Sami Al Solh 
Jamil Mekkaoui 
Fawzi Solh 
Rachid Beydoun 
Joseph Chader 
Chafic Nassif 
Katchik Babikian 
Khalil Al Hibri 
Moses Derkalousian
Sunni
Sunni
Sunni
Shi’a
Armenian
Armenian
Armenian
South Adel Osseiran Shi’a
Yussuf Ai Zein Shi’a
Khazem Khalil Shi’a
Muhammad Fadil Sunni
Reda Wadih Shi’a
Mount Lebanon Emile Bustani Maronite
Anwar Al Khatib Sunni
Naim Mogabgab Maronite
Henri Traboulsi Maronite
Kahtan Hamadih Druze
Clovis Al Khazin Maronite
Maurice Zouain Maronite
Assad Achkar Maronite
Salim Lahoud Maronite
Albert Moukheiber Greek Orthodox
Dikzan Tosbath Armenian
Elia Abou Jaoude Maronite
Bashir Al Awar Druze
Mahmoud Ammar Shi’a
Majid Arslan Druze
Mounir Abour Fadil Greek Orthodox
George Akl Maronite
North Charles Malik (Kura) Greek Orthodox
Kabalan Issa Al Khoury 
(Becharre)
Maronite
Jean Harb (Batroun) Maronite
The table makes it clear that the majority of invitations issued were given to 
deputies from the Maronite stronghold of Mount Lebanon. However, among 
the absentees were prominent Maronites who did not automatically follow the 
government line, notably Raymond Edde and his group of deputies, including
535 Al Havat. 31 July 1957.
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Pierre Edde, Nohad Boueiz and Edouard Honein. Equally a number of non- 
Maronite deputies who had regularly demonstrated their support for the 
government were invited. Invitations were issued only to those it was felt 
would demonstrate the required group loyalty, as British observers pointed
536
out. The intention was to counter apparent unity of the opposition in the 
aftermath of the elections, even though much of that opposition had now to be 
expressed in an extra-parliamentary fashion, due to the small numbers of 
opposition deputies elected.
It was this lack of formal political outlets that led elements in the 
opposition groupings to invoke external support for their position. Essentially 
this enabled a new set of ‘patron-client’ relationships to emerge in Lebanon. 
Egypt and Syria were invoked by elements in the Muslim political communities, 
especially Sunni-dominated ones, to counterbalance the traditional Maronite 
reliance on Western powers. In the context of the Cold War, Maronite leaders 
and others interested in the continuation of a separate, non-Arab Lebanon, 
looked primarily to the USA rather than to France, reasoning, pragmatically, 
that the USA would be a more powerful and effective protector of the economic 
and political interests of a separate Lebanon. Hence the willingness of men 
like Chamoun to endorse American policy in the region, such as the 
Eisenhower Doctrine.537
Even before the elections of 1957 there had been claims by the 
Government of Syrian and Egyptian interference in Lebanon’s affairs, as part 
of attempts by these powers to topple the Chamoun regime. On his visit to 
Beirut in March 1957, Richards reported being told that ‘in the past few months 
the Syrians had sent money and arms to Lebanese tribesmen [i.e.: Muslims] 
along the Syrian border.538 Such claims were used in the election campaign 
by government supporters to attack their opponents, who they blamed for 
inviting these forces into Lebanon.539 But from May 1957 at least, it can be
536 F 0 3 7 1 /1 34116, British Embassy Beirut to Foreign Office, 23 January 1958; 13 March 1958, commenting on the 
internal political situation of Lebanon.
537 Michael Johnson, Class and Client in Beirut, p. 126, stresses the economic dimensions behind the focus on the 
USA.
530 Foreign Relations of the US. 1955-1957. Voi X III, p. 210, footnote 3, quoting Richards’ record of a meeting with 
Shihab, Minister of Defence.
539 Such attacks had their effect: Edward Naim lost in the Baabda district in the 1957 elections because his pro­
government rivals labelled him a Communist, linking him thereby to such accusations and ensuring no Maronite voters
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shown that the claims did have substance to them.540 Apart from indicating a 
willingness by Egypt and Syria to become involved; this also indicates the 
depth of hostility from at least some leaders of the Lebanese opposition to the 
Chamoun regime from this time onwards. There is little convincing evidence 
that any of the political leaders of the time genuinely wished for an ending to 
Lebanon’s independent status. What was sought, instead, was what these 
leaders identified as a return to the principles of the National Pact, in other 
words, a government acknowledgement that Lebanon was part of the Arab 
world that manifested itself in a policy that brought Lebanon into line with other 
Arab states.
To achieve this, some opposition figures were willing to resort, either 
directly or through encouragement of their followers, to increasingly violent 
means to bring down the Chamoun government since this was identified as the 
major obstacle to achievement of their goals. Tension increased from the start 
of 1958. On 27 January the United National Front announced that it would 
oppose any attempt by Chamoun to arrange his re-election.541 On 29 January 
a fist-fight nearly broke out during a debate in the Chamber, when George Akl, 
one of Chamoun’s most ardent supporters, made a speech attacking the 
Syrian and Egyptian governments. Sabri Hamadih, a member of the United 
National Front, made a counterattack on the Chamoun regime, and the hostility 
between the two nearly erupted into physical violence.542
The formation of the United Arab Republic on 1 February 1958 provided 
an opportunity for the wider Arab world to voice a hostility to the Lebanese 
government that was more than just rhetoric fuelled by personal dislike on the 
part of Nasser.543 Back in the 1957 election campaign the press and radio in
would support him. He was, in fact, merely a socialist, with links to Jumblat's party. See Al Havat. 18 June 1957; 21 
June 1957.
540 For instance, Louis de San, Belgian Consul General in Damascus, was arrested by Lebanese gendarmes on 
entering Lebanon on 14 May 1957. His car was full of a large number of weapons and a time bomb, plus a letter with 
general instructions for a terrorist campaign. Joseph Freiha, Oral Interview, Beirut, 14 June 1992, gave details of the 
case. He was the Prosecuting Magistrate in the case. See also F0371 /134174 Tel. No. 1095, Sir George Middleton 
to Foreign Office, 21 July 1958. See also claims made in Al Havat. 8 July 1957; 9 July 1957.
541 No such candidacy had yet been announced but it was widely believed that this was Chamoun's intention. See 
K.S. Salibi, 'Recollections of the 1940s and 1950s’, unpublished conference paper, Austen, Texas, 13 September 
1992, p. 13.
542 An Nahar. 29 January 1958.
543 Foreign Relations of the US 1958-1960. Vol XI, p. 2. footnote 4, makes this point: ‘In a January 8 memorandum to
the Secretary of Defence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff took note of political unrest and subversion in Lebanon, with
probable outside Egyptian and Syrian support’.
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Egypt and Syria had begun a violent personal campaign against Chamoun, his 
Prime Minister Sami Al Solh and the Finance Minister, Charles Malik. They 
were denounced in the standard phraseology as ‘traitors’ and ‘imperialist 
lackeys’.544 These attacks had been well publicised in Lebanon by the 
opposition. In reaction the Lebanese government had banned all Egyptian 
newspapers, the major source of anti-Chamoun propaganda, for the duration 
of the campaign and indeed after, but this had not stopped the dissemination 
of these perspectives because of the determination of the opposition to make 
use of them. This willingness of the Lebanese opposition to make use of such 
hostile comments had real potential to destabilise the Chamoun government. 
So tensions continued to grow in Lebanon. An Nahar on 11 February, for 
example, contained a report on the continuation of government investigations 
into the importation of explosives into Lebanon for use by government 
opponents.545 On the same day the Maronite Patriarch became involved in an 
attempt to restore the interconfessional balance in politics. In an important 
speech he warned that:
‘We the Maronites, are a ship in the Muslim sea. Either 
we have to co-exist with them with love and peace, or we 
have to leave, or else we will be annihilated’.
This speech touched on the traditional fear in the Maronite community, but 
sought to convince his fellow Maronites, including or even primarily those in 
positions of political power, that they had to return to a position of co-operation 
if they were to remain in Lebanon. It is a measure of the extent to which 
widespread Maronite fear-based hostility towards the Arab Muslim world had 
escalated by this point that despite the Patriarch’s intervention the deterioration 
in intercommunal relations continued with numbers of Maronites taking ever 
more rigid positions.
A further complication of affairs came with the unexpected visit to 
Damascus of President Nasser on 24 February. The press despatches of the 
time demonstrate the enthusiasm amongst Lebanese Muslims that Nasser’s
544 lsma'il Moussa Yussuf [The Revolution of the free in Lebanon], Al Zayn, Beirut, 1958. This pamphlet recirculated 
this phraseology, used by figures like Nasser. See also Michael Johnson, Class and Client in Beirut, p. 131.
645 An Nahar. 11 February 1958.
548 An Nahar. 12 February, 1958.
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visit to Damascus stirred up an enthusiasm greater than any Lebanese political 
leader, both pro and anti-government had expected. Thousands of Lebanese 
from Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon, Tyre and other towns travelled to Damascus. Taxi 
fares to Damascus rose to L125 (five times the normal) and taxi drivers in 
Beirut, to drum up trade, chanted ‘to Damascus, to Gamal’.547 In addition, 
Nasser took the opportunity to receive innumerable official and unofficial 
Lebanese delegations, all congratulating him on his efforts. For several days 
he spent most*of his time addressing the cheering crowds of thousands, many 
of whom were Lebanese, who welcomed him with an enthusiasm verging on 
hysteria. One pro-Nasser demonstration in Damascus on 25 February 
numbered around 180,000.548 Such a reaction to Nasser’s presence seemed 
to prove to anti-Nasserist elements in Lebanon that all they had feared about 
the threat posed by pro-Nasserism was true, and would materialise unless 
action was taken to prevent it.
An Nahar warned that those Muslim figures, such as Al Solh, who 
continued to support Chamoun would find themselves ostracised by their 
fellows.549 The Lebanese government continued its attempts to counteract the 
propaganda and demonstrations of the opposition in an atmosphere of 
continuing unrest full of rumour and counter-rumour about plots and counter­
plots. Many of these plots, real or rumoured, seemed to have little particular 
point to them. For example, on 25 February it was announced that a Jordanian 
had been implicated in a plot to plant explosives in several newspaper offices. 
The newspapers were named as An Nahar. Al Havat. and Sada Lubnan. 
However, the newspapers concerned were not government papers, one (Al 
Havat) was pro the Baghdad Pact but An Nahar and Sada Lubnan were both 
supporters of opposition groupings.
This was the background against which the Lebanese government 
moved to prosecute two leading opposition figures, Salam and Husseini, on 
2 March on the charge of making defamatory statements about the 
Lebanese government during a ceremony held by Najjadah to celebrate the
547 F. Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon, p. 62.
54a An Nahar. 25 February 1958; Muhammad Hasanein Haykal, Sanawat Al Galavan [The Years of Jubilation], Ahram, 
Cairo, 1988 p. 319, quoting Reuters and Associated press reports of the time.
549 An Nahar. 26 February 1958.
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Syrian-Egyptian union. The timing was clearly not ideal for such a move, 
but on the other hand the government felt it could not afford to set the 
precedent of overlooking such public comments. On 3 March a new law 
relating to the press was adopted which gave the government, it was hoped,
550greater powers to control the output of journalists from abroad. However 
an important article by the owner of the An Nahar newspaper, Ghassan 
Tueni, appeared in its columns on 9 March. Tueni was also a leading 
journalist in his own right and his comments on the situation provide a clear 
indication that contemporaries were aware of the dangerous situation in 
Lebanon:
This fear over Lebanon is a danger for Lebanon. We find 
in the air a mixture of anxiety and stiffness in the attitudes 
that may lead to the ultimate danger of the
551disappearance of the Lebanese entity.
The concern of the Maronite Patriarch over the continuing situation in 
Lebanon also resurfaced about this time. He made a speech on 11 March in 
which he highlighted the corruption existing in the legal establishment in 
Lebanon, believing that if such issues could be dealt with, confidence in the 
government might be restored and a political collapse avoided. One scandal 
filling the newspapers related to the protection given by high court judges to a 
brothel managed by a Madame called 'Afaf1 - the so-called Afaf Scandal. 
While not directly related to the tensions over political matters it could not help 
but discredit the administration still further at a time when the administration
552could not afford such bad publicity. The Patriarch thus hoped to galvanise 
the government into taking some action that might improve its moral standing. 
He did not, however, succeed in either sense.553
On 12 March the Al Solh government resigned. Sami Al Solh had 
attempted to stave off resignation by enlarging his cabinet, but this had proved
554useless in the battle to win his administration more support. However this
550
A fresh ban on Egyptian papers came in again on 6 April 1958 and indicates the Government’s lack of success 
An N ahar. 9 March 1958.
An Nahar. 11 March 1958.
553 An Nahar. 11 March 1958, reporting the speech, underlined its futility.
F 0 371 /142208, British Embassy, Beirut to Foreign Office, 24 April 1959 reflecting back on the crisis.
192
did not signal the disappearance of Al Solh from government in Lebanon. With 
Chamoun's support Sami Al Solh formed a new government with 14 members
555on the following day, 14 March. The pro-government element in the 
population took the opportunity to stage pro-government demonstrations on 15 
March, shouting support for President Chamoun and demanding the renewal of 
his presidential mandate. But no attempt was made to answer the complaints 
of opposition leaders, so the rearrangement triggered a continuation of Muslim
556counter-demonstrations and fears about the impact of these.
In such a context, many of the more moderate elements in the Maronite 
community, and even now within the government itself were advising on the 
need to evolve a policy of compromise. Charles Malik, for example, began to 
suggest Lebanon take the initiative in trying to arrange a rapprochement 
between the West and Nasser, instead of perpetuating the hostility between 
these two camps in Lebanon. Malik informed Middleton, the British 
Ambassador, that his government was in favour of an end to the coolness
557
between the UAR. and Britain1 This was not so much an indication of a 
fundamental change in policy as an attempt to lessen the tensions surrounding 
Lebanon in order to decrease internal tensions and the supply of arms to the 
opposition.
But as Ghassan Tueni pointed out sarcastically, there were dangers, 
even for the government, of too close an alliance with the West especially 
because (as past and present) events showed that that support could not
558
necessarily be relied on if the policies of the West changed. Overall the 
picture facing Chamoun after the 1957 elections was that of a Chamber which 
was not as firmly behind him and his policies as he might have hoped, certainly 
as he would need for success if he were to be re-elected, because of the fears 
that that Chamber increasingly faced about the intercommunal tensions within 
Lebanon, which they could not and did not want to ignore. There were 
certainly 15 and possibly as many as 20 deputies who were unquestioning
555
Cabinet Papers 1926-1984, Muassassoit al Dirassat al Lubnananiyyah, Beirut, 1994, vol. 1, p. 470.
556
An Nahar. 15 March 1958.
557
An Nahar. 12 Aoril 1958:13 April 1958.
55B
An Nahar. 30 April 1958.
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loyalists to his cause, the majority of whom were Maronites. Equally there 
were between 15 and 20 deputies who could be relied on to oppose his cause 
vigorously, mainly non-Christian. The rest of the deputies were essentially 
uncommitted in the immediate aftermath of the elections. A significant number 
were prepared to support Chamoun on certain issues, especially among the 
Maronite and other Christian deputies. But their support was by no means 
certain, especially for a strategy resulting in his re-election.
According to Al Havat. there was a meeting at the presidential palace on 
14 July 1957, between loyalist deputies, Chamoun and members of 
Chamoun's family, to debate the renewal of his mandate. At that time it was 
reported that even the loyalist deputies were split on the issue of a 
constitutional amendment to permit a renewal of Chamoun's mandate, on the 
basis of both its practicability and its desirability. Chamoun himself sought to 
demonstrate that his re-election was not a matter of personal ambition, but 
would be a result of pressure from his peers, reportedly saying:
I will not participate in the discussion, so it cannot be
insinuated that l have either accepted or rejected any
proposal on the matter. You are the ones who opened
559the topic and must close it.
Such an ostensibly disinterested position was, when publicised, never likely to 
convince the anti-Chamoun element, or convert any waverers. There was a 
general reluctance amongst even Maronite politicians to support a president
seeking a fresh mandate because it created tensions in the political system as
a whole.560 The issue of constitutional reform was a sensitive issue for them 
because of fears that it was only the constitution that protected the Maronite 
community from being subjected to the growing Muslim population in 
Lebanon.561 Thus Chamoun needed to locate any bid for a renewal of his 
mandate in an atmosphere of internal crisis if he was to have any chance of 
succeeding in it. There is evidence that rather than making blunders in his
Al Havat. 16 July 1957.
560 The recent example of Bishara Al Khoury was undoubtedly influential.
551 The influx of Palestinian refugees was certainly an issue here. Michael Johnson, Class and Client in Beirut, p. 118 
again highlights the economic dimension to these fears.
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conduct of foreign policy at this time, he was conducting a high-risk, and 
eventually unsuccessful, policy of creating a containable crisis.562
This point is illuminated by an examination of the position of some of the 
Chamoun loyalists in the period up to the spring of 1958. The Kata’ib party 
was only to become ardently in favour of Chamoun’s re-election during the 
summer of 1958 as a result of events then. Traditionally, the party associated 
itself with safeguarding Lebanese interests by preserving the pro-Western 
stance of Lebanese foreign policy and opposing Arab interference, by force if 
necessary. The party's concept of Lebanese interests was of course an 
essentially Maronite understanding of the term, as Pierre Gemayel had made 
plain, back in 1957, at a press conference on 21 May. Gemayel had stated:
We will hold firmly to our independence and we mean by 
that the freedom to decide our internal as well as external 
fate, maintaining our relations with Arab friends on a 
mutual basis of non-interference in our internal affairs; 
and we will continue our relations with the West as long
. . .  . , 5 6 3as it is in our interests to do so.
The major plank in their policy in 1957 was simply a determination to see 
Chamoun at least finish his mandate in order to maintain that pro-Western 
dimension and to prevent a victory for the Muslim elements in Lebanon. 
Gemayel argued that it was 'premature to think of such matters' but that he 
was personally against renewal because it involved a constitutional 
amendment and he 'would only accept this in a case where the choice was 
between President Chamoun and someone whom we believed would work
564against the interests of Lebanon’. The reasons behind their change can be 
said to be crucial to the change in thinking amongst several Maronite political 
figures in the crisis.
In terms of internal Lebanese developments in 1958, April was to be an 
important month. Civil unrest continued and the question of Chamoun's re­
552 Michael Johnson Class and Client in Beirut, p. 128 makes reference to Chamoun's ‘tactical errors’ in foreign policy; 
but Chamoun was a shrewd politician, and his tactics make sense only if read as an attempt to create an atmosphere 
favourable to his re-election, despite his subsequent denial of such a desire.
563
Al Havat. 22 May 1957.
Al Havat. 18 July 1957.
195
election was still important as an unconfirmed but widely believed rumour. The 
increasingly interventionary role of the army was also a factor, along with 
speeches from Chamoun which hinted of actual American intervention to 
defend his administration and Lebanese independence, a development he 
Justified by reference to intervention from Egypt and Syria. It was in this 
context that in April, the question of Chamoun's re-election became a matter of 
open debate in the Chamber for the first time. On 10 April one deputy George 
Akl, a noted Chamoun supporter, announced his intention of proposing a 
constitutional amendment to allow the re-election of President Chamoun.565 
Chamoun had, at this point still never explicitly stated in public (though equally 
he had still never actually rejected the possibility) that he desired such an 
amendment to let him run for office again. However, American as well as 
British sources provide evidence of Chamoun's intention to stand. In March 
1958 the American Embassy in Beirut reported a meeting with Chamoun 
during which Chamoun had indicated that ‘he intended to place before 
parliament in May the issue of amending the constitution and his subsequent 
re-election’.566
The fact that the question had been raised openly stirred up matters to 
even greater heights of tension with the confirmation it seemed to provide of ail 
the gossip that had been circulating for months, including re-arousing all the 
suspicions about the corrupt nature of the 1957 elections. The reaction of the 
opposition was immediate. On the same day as Akl made his announcement 
300 Muslim leaders, including former Prime Ministers, Speakers of the 
Chamber, current opposition leaders and religious figures, came out in 
opposition to Chamoun's re-election. But it is worth noting that they all also 
took pains to declare their support for Lebanon's continued independence. The 
Mufti, Shaykh Muhammad Alaya decreed that there would be no 
congratulations offered on the Feast of the Bayram marking the end of
567
Ramadan, Instead these 300 notables attended a Ramadan dinner given
555 An Nahar. 10 April 1958.
566 Foreign Relations of the US 1958-1960. Vol XI, Lebanon and Jordan, Department of State Publication 9932, 
Washington DC, 1992, p. 17, reporting the contents of Telegram 2967, 6 March 1958. See also F0371/134116, British 
Embassy, Beirut to Foreign Office, 13 April 1958 reporting that Chamoun had told Toufic Suwaida, Deputy Prime 
Minister of Iraq, of his decision to seek to renew his mandate.
567
An Nahar. 10 April 1958.
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by the Mufti of Lebanon to which, contrary to usual practice, no Muslim
568members of the government were invited. After the party a public statement 
was issued in which the party-goers declared their opposition to any attempt to 
amend the constitution and declared that the lack of congratulations on 
Bayram was a mark of mourning as Lebanon was suffering from the policies of 
the Chamoun administration. This was to be followed by a declaration on 17 
April from the Mufti and some 200 leading Muslims that anyone who offered or 
accepted Bayram congratulations would be regarded as having violated the
r .unanimity of the Muslim community.
Civil unrest not only continued but also escalated. The army was in 
Tyre, one of the major centres of these disturbances, and its efforts to keep the 
peace there were not helped by the announcement of 10 April. As the month 
went on other violent outbursts occurred.570 April also saw the spread of 
rumours in Lebanon that Chamoun had appealed to the US for military aid in 
the shape of the Sixth Fleet to quell the unrest. Lebanese rumour said that the 
fleet would arrive off the Lebanese coast in order to support Chamoun and the 
truth or falsity of the rumour is less significant than the popular reaction. As a 
widely read editorial, full of double meanings and innuendo, by Ghassan Tueni, 
commented ‘Chamoun is not fool enough to ask for the Sixth Fleet, for he
571knows that the Sixth Fleet cannot stop the internal revolt'. But the tension in 
Lebanon was so acute that even The Observer’s foreign correspondent gave 
some credence to the possibility that Chamoun had appealed to the USA for 
the despatch of the Sixth Fleet.572 Thus April was a tense month in Lebanon, 
giving some indication of the chaos to follow. Matters had reached a level of 
tension where only a single incident of significance would be needed to spark 
an explosion.
Certain incidents were of key importance. On 15 April Marouf Saad’s 
demand for the resignation of the government on the grounds of their
568
An Nahar. 10 April 1958.
569
An Nahar. 18 April 1958.
570 An Nahar. 11 April 1958. Chamoun blamed such unrest on the opposition. Jumblat, for example, it was claimed 
was implicated in clashes at Dar Al Baydar.
An Nahar. 13 April 1958, p, 1.
572 The Observer. London, 17 April 1958. See also Foreign Relations of the U.S. 1958 - 1960. Volume XI, p. 23, 
footnote 2, reporting Anglo-American diplomatic reactions to the situation.
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responsibility for the present chaos and the danger of its escalation into 
sectarian violence also contained an allegation that the government was
573arming its supporters. On 20 April explosives were thrown near the house 
of Sami Al Solh while he was receiving visitors calling to congratulate him on
574Bayram. Despite this, on 24 April George Akl reiterated his intention during
575the following week of introducing a motion for amending the constitution.
It was an atmosphere where propagandists on either side were actively 
looking for incidents which they could interpret to their advantage. But it was 
not until May that a really major incident took place. On 8 May Nassib Al 
Matni, the proprietor of the pro-Communist newspaper Telegraph, was 
murdered. According to Qubain, Al Matni had been at odds with the
576administration for some time. On 22 July 1957 he had been arrested and 
subsequently tried for publishing a report that was allegedly defamatory of 
Chamoun. Certainly he was well known as a severe critic of Chamoun and his 
administration and one who had come out in favour of strengthening Lebanese 
relations with the UAR. He was thus clearly a target because of his high profile 
opposition to Chamoun. On 22 November 1957 Al Matni had been stabbed in 
the face when leaving his office in the early hours of the morning. After his 
murder on 8 May four anonymous letters were found in his pockets threatening 
to kill him if he did not abandon his opposition to the government. The last
577
letter was dated 19 April 1958. It has still never been proved whether or not 
these letters were deliberately planted to lead the police astray; equally it is not 
known which group or even side in the interconfessional hostilities got rid of 
Matni. The opposition might have done it to destabilise the situation; the 
government to silence Matni. Either remains a credible possibility.
American sources record that on 9 May rioting began in Tripoli in protest 
against AI Matni's murder, and that events rapidly took a serious turn leading
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578swiftly to armed rebellion. In these clashes with the security forces in Tripoli 
15 were killed and 150 wounded. The clashes continued there on the following 
day with more serious results. The United States Information Services Library
579
in Tripoli was burned; there were 10 deaths and around 100 people injured. 
Within days the country had become divided into a number of virtually 
independent sectors, each under the control of a local leader. Most of the 
heavy fighting occurred in the remaining days of May in all these regions.
Western Beirut had come under the control of the opposition by 20 May, 
and such areas were declared by the army to be out of bounds to all state 
security forces. Tripoli, besieged by government forces turned into a battle field 
as the opposition forces holding the city had managed to get supplies from 
Syria. In Sidon as well, opposition forces assumed control of the city. But the 
fighting there was less intense than in Beirut and Tripoli. The heaviest and 
most continuous fighting took place in the Shuf area, notably in the district 
where Jumblat's followers were found. Undoubtedly here the violence was 
fuelled by the bitter enmity that now existed between Jumblat and Chamoun as 
well as the traditional Maronite-Druze rivalry. In the Balback-Hirmel sector as 
along the entire length of the Lebanese-Syrian border independent local 
opposition leaders established control, maintaining separate commands and 
even separate systems of self-government.
According to General Shihab’s run down of the military situation given 
on 13 May 1958, the major battles occurred between 9 and 18 May. According
580to An Nahar. over 50 were killed and 200 wounded in the period to 14 May. 
Information gathered on 20 May indicated the toll had risen to 60 dead and 300
581wounded, with the major casualties in the north, especially Tripoli. The 
fighting between the opposition and the gendarmerie continued after 18 May, 
in the Shuf district and the Biqa’. But the fighting was not the only thing going 
on in this period. Faced with the escalating conflict desperate attempts were 
being made by various figures to reach some kind of political compromise. For
578
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many who had previously sought to remain neutral between the hard-line pro- 
Chamounists and the hard-line opposition, it now became necessary to identify 
themselves with one side or another of the conflict. It was now more than just 
a matter of a renewal of a presidential mandate in the eyes of most Lebanese. 
In the words of Ghassan Tueni, in his editorial of 13 May 1958, The question
582is: Lebanon’s survival1.
It was in these days, around 13 May, that the Kata’ib party, for instance, 
not only came out in full support of Chamoun but also took to the streets to 
demonstrate their support practically, seeing that as the only way to ensure 
Lebanon’s survival. The Kata’ib party membership was predominantly drawn 
from the petty bourgeoisie in the Maronite community; members were small 
shopkeepers, clerks and minor officials, for instance. Kata’ib members saw 
their livelihood and their Maronite identity as threatened if Lebanon’s 
independence disappeared. Thus Kata’ib militias demonstrated their 
commitment to the survival of Lebanon and accepted, if reluctantly, that this 
survival was, in the summer of 1958, linked to the survival of Chamoun as 
president. Gemayel, leader of the Kata’ib party, remained personally unhappy 
with Chamoun, and there is no indication that at any point during the crisis 
months from May to September 1958 the official policy of the Kata’ib party 
changed to support the concept of Chamoun’s re-election rather than merely 
his completion of his mandate. But the latter concept was seen as sufficiently 
crucial that armed action was justified.583
A self-brokered political solution, arranged by compromise between the 
Lebanese communities, seemed unlikely during May and June 1958 because 
leading figures on either side remained apparently unwilling to seek any 
compromise and there was no pressure for compromise from the masses in 
either the Maronite or Sunni communities. The opposition as a whole 
continued to demand the resignation of the President as the basis of any 
solution, and Rachid Karami, based in Tripoli, threatened to seek a union 
between Tripoli and the UAR. Nor was the government silent. On 13 May the
592
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Foreign Minister Dr Charles Malik announced that the Lebanese government 
had protested to the government of the UAR. against its interference in the 
internal affairs of Lebanon and there was talk of an appeal to the Security
Council.584 Chamoun was refusing to bow to opposition pressure or to the 
public demonstrations against him by resigning, while Shihab was anxious to 
prevent the disintegration of the army into confessional factions and so sought 
to use his troops to quell unrest as little as possible.
It was left to individuals and groups outside the administration itself to 
begin the process of seeking some compromise, though without a great deal of 
initial success as May and June went on. Prominent individuals involved in 
this process included the Maronite Patriarch, Raymond Edde, the leader of the 
largely Maronite National Bloc; his brother Pierre Edde and Adel Osseiran.585 
Among the various plans which evolved the most hopeful seemed one in which 
Shihab would form a caretaker government, pledged to hold elections for a 
President under the existing constitution and on the earliest possible date (23 
July). This was rejected by the opposition which stood by its demand for the 
immediate resignation of Chamoun before it would enter any discussions. 
Equally Chamoun not only refused to resign but was still refusing to make a 
public statement that he would not stand for re-election. Ultimately, though, 
the most important element in the whole mediation plan was the refusal, during
May, June and early July, of General Shihab to accept the office of
^  586 President.
On 18 May, the US Ambassador announced that the Sixth Fleet would 
not be visiting Beirut. This announcement, however, was less of a blow for the 
government because, as An Nahar pointed out, the USA was arranging for the 
delivery of heavy armament to Lebanon, and thereby responding to a 
Lebanese government request in the week in which it was actually made. In 
addition US-provided light armament had already been despatched three days
584
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earlier and it had been noted on 17 May that the US and British fleets in the
587Mediterranean were making unusual movements. It is not surprising that 
Ghassan Tueni described that week as the most dangerous one for Lebanon's
588
future. To Tueni it seemed increasingly possible and even probable that the 
entire political structure of the Lebanon was under threat from factions in 
Lebanon seeking to involve such outside forces. Foreign invasion of some 
kind seemed an imminent danger. The end results of that were horrifying; 
political power would collapse, and either a military dictatorship would result or
589
the reduction of Lebanon itself to a small Christian entity. Tueni's fears were 
not taken lightly by large parts of the Maronite population, who were equally 
aware of what they saw as the growing menace to the continuance of 
Lebanon, symbolised by the evidence widely accepted by that Maronite 
population of intervention in Lebanon’s affairs by the UAR.
It was in this tense atmosphere that, according to British sources, two 
neutral mediators, Raymond Edde and Ahmed Daouk, called on Rachid 
Karami on 20 May and persuaded him to come to Beirut to join their 
compromise discussions for ending the crisis. On 21 May, Rachid Karami 
ordered a largely successful cease-fire in Tripoli which, despite the occupation 
of Baalbak by opposition rebels on that day, brought some optimism to the 
political scene. In terms of Rachid Karami’s contribution to the crisis, it is 
worth noting the claim of Saeb Salam that during the spring of 1958 the UAR. 
had sent 5000 items of armament to Karami in Tripoli, but that at no point 
during the crisis months of May to September 1958 did Karami utilise this in 
the fighting against the Chamoun regime.590 While there is no proof of this 
claim, it does indicate the continuing Sunni perception that it was the Chamoun 
regime, and its Western backers, and not the Muslim or Arab world that was 
responsible for the trouble. Certainly while Rachid Karami was not willing to 
open discussions with Chamoun, he was perfectly prepared to do so with other
587
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Maronite figures who seemed prepared to return to the terms of the National 
Pact.
It was, though, a false optimism as the attempted mediation failed and 
trouble continued throughout June. It was in that month that a United Nations 
Observation Group (UNOGIL) arrived in Lebanon to report on the claims of 
Arab intervention there. A United Nations intervention had been requested by 
Chamoun on 13 May 1958; probably as an alternative worked out by Western 
diplomats in Beirut to Chamoun’s personal desire to request an American 
military intervention.591 The request had been granted, to the approval of 
Chamoun loyalists if not to men like Raymond Edde who would have been 
prepared to endorse suggestions from both the West and the Arab world that 
the Arab League be invited to work out a compromise; a move that would 
almost certainly have been successful. It was widely recognised, in and out of 
Lebanon, that any solution to the crisis coming from the Arab world would 
prove the most acceptable for nearly 50% of the Lebanese population at least, 
and be the least likely to be questioned by them, whatever its terms. This 
would simply leave the problem of working out a compromise acceptable to the 
Maronite community - a not impossible task, given the terms of the National 
Pact. But the Lebanese government rejected this option on 5 June 1958, to 
the furious incomprehension of the Sunni opposition in particular. The 
resentment of this rejection was further increased because, in what was widely 
interpreted as a snub to the League, Charles Malik did not even bother to 
attend the League’s meeting convened to discuss the issue, thereby not even 
giving the gloss of genuine consideration of the proposal for Arab League 
intervention by the Chamoun government. Instead, he went directly to New 
York to plead at a United Nations Security Council meeting for intervention.592 
Malik attempted to justify his actions by claiming that the Lebanese 
government had initially turned to the Arab League for help in solving the crisis, 
but that the Lebanese government had been informed that the League’s 
Council would not meet in time to enable it to take action to stop the UAR.
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intervention in Lebanon.593 Chamoun himself had been opposed to any Arab 
League brokered solution because he knew that such a solution would end his 
hopes of re-election, while he had still hoped, on 13 May 1958 when the first 
request to the United Nations was made, that with American support, he might 
be returned to office.694
Maronite expectations of the proposed United Nations intervention was 
that it would endorse Maronite condemnations of a UAR. intervention. 
However, as British sources reported, the Sunni opposition believed that 
‘Malik’s real intention in going to the UN is to lay the ground for US armed 
intervention in Lebanon’.595 There was a belief that the United Nations had a 
Western bias and thus was susceptible to being manipulated in this way by the 
Chamoun government, while the American government also could be 
manipulated in this way. So the arrival of the UNOGIL was regarded with 
suspicion by the Sunni opposition and elements of the opposition to Chamoun 
from other confessional groups including some Maronites who believed that 
an American intervention would be disastrous for Lebanon. Saeb Salam 
issued a six-point comment on the United Nation’s Lebanon resolution on 12 
June which can be taken as summing up the general Sunni opposition 
perspective at this stage. He stated that he considered the resolution 
endorsing the UNOGIL as an irrelevant and unjustified interference, since the 
Lebanese problem was purely internal in character. He highlighted Sunni fears 
of a Western intervention under the guise of the United Nations intervention, by 
pointedly stating that any prevention of an infiltration of arms into Lebanon 
would have to include stopping the import of American, British, French, 
Turkish, Iraqi and Jordanian arms, rather than arms from the UAR., because it 
was interference from these countries that was aggravating the internal 
tension, not the friendly ‘interest’ of the UAR. And despite Chamoun’s 
rejection of Arab League intervention, Salam argued that only through the
593 There was also the implication, thereby, that the League would not be a neutral force. F 0 3 7 1 /1 2 3 1 19 VL1015/147, 
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594 F. Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon, p. 90.
595 F 0 3 7 1 /1 2 3 1 19 VL1015/147, Telegram no. 4572, British Embassy, Beirut, to Foreign Office, 9 June 1958.
204
League would it be possible to gain a solution that had the consent of the 
Lebanese people as a whole.596
Kamal Jumblat points out that this statement encapsulated the Muslim 
opposition position that the crisis was a direct response to ‘foreign influence’ in 
an interpretation of such influence that did not regard Arab intervention as 
‘foreign’; and that Lebanon’s dependence on the West was ‘unhealthy’ as well 
as a betrayal of the National Pact.597 But despite this, the UNOGIL was swiftly 
despatched to Lebanon, making their observations during the last half of June 
1958. Their first report was published on 4 July, and to the delight of the 
opposition it minimised claims of an Arab foreign intervention there, implying 
that the infiltration of men and armaments from Syria was negligible. On 5 July 
the Group's leader, Galo Plaza, gave a press conference in which he re­
emphasised the conclusion that there was no evidence of any massive
598infiltration of Lebanon.
Such a report served to inflame matters once again. Both the attempts 
to find solutions and the fighting continued, while the observers continued to 
come to observe and compile reports, and US intelligence reports on events in
599Lebanon contradicted the UN conclusions. There seemed little prospect of 
breaking the stalemate in Lebanon as June ended and July commenced and 
the stalemate between the government and the opposition continued. But 
events outside Lebanon were finally responsible for its breaking. In the early 
hours of 14 July 1958 there was a coup in Iraq and that was responsible for a 
major shift in perspectives, for the Lebanese and the US governments. The 
July revolution in Iraq overthrew the monarchy, and the entire royal family was 
killed. The body of one member of the royal family was even dragged into the 
streets and dismembered there by a mob. These events rocked the Arab 
world generally and the impact of the coup in Lebanon was enormous. The
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opposition was jubilant but Chamoun was 'shaken' by the news from Baghdad 
and almost certainly, by the reception of it in Lebanon itself.600
Chamoun renewed his appeal for Western, effectively American, aid to 
protect Lebanon and its ‘legitimate’ government. He demanded immediate
intervention, insisting that unless this was granted within 48 hours he would be
601
a dead man himself and Lebanon would become an Egyptian satellite. Of 
course Chamoun was not the only frightened leader in the Arab world. At the 
same time as Chamoun was demanding aid from the Americans Jordan was 
appealing for British support. In both cases the appeal was answered and 
once again the scene was set for a solution to the crisis that was imposed by
Western powers. On 15 July 2000 US Marines landed in Lebanon while British
602
paratroopers landed in Jordan.
This chapter has indicated how the political figures and parties evolved 
and established their positions during the evolution of the crisis. It leaves 
untouched, however, except by implication, the position and opinions and 
consequent role of the major communities in Lebanon, notably the Sunni and, 
in reaction, the Maronite. It is a consideration of these confessional 
communities that is essential to a fuller understanding of the crisis and its 
development and eventual resolution, in terms of how these manoeuvrings 
affected their sense of identity and self-worth within the state. Political figures 
do not operate in a vacuum, nor necessarily have sheep for supporters. In this 
context, it is over the issue of community mythology that the differences 
between the two communities in 1958 becomes most apparent, with 
considerable implications for political developments as a crisis coalesced. 
There was a clear split of popular perspective on the issue of Lebanese
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‘national destiny’. But it was a split that contained considerable potential for 
intercommunal hostility because of the way that these differing perspectives 
were interpreted by ‘the other side’, and the masses therefore sought leaders 
that would ‘protect’ them and their interests from ‘attack’, and would support 
the kind of Lebanese state that they found acceptable. The pattern of 1958 in 
communal terms therefore represents a return to co-habitation.
As Michael Johnson points out, there is a clear linkage between issues 
relating to the National Pact and the 1958 crisis.603 This chapter has discussed 
the development of the crisis at elite political levels and the stress that leaders 
from both Sunni and Maronite communities, from different perspectives, laid 
on this pact, as well as their experience of the crisis. But the impact of the 
1958 crisis was not restricted to such leaders: it represents a breakdown in 
consensus between the communities at all levels of society. The compromise 
signalled by the National Pact was of importance not just to political leaders: it 
was also of significance to the masses of both communities, the people whom 
those leaders claimed to represent. These masses also had their 
understanding of what the pact should mean, and what it entailed in practice. 
That understanding was derived in part from the information given to them by 
their leaders, but also from their experience of the operation of the state 
system and its impact on them. The flourishing media in Lebanon meant that 
information reached the masses through a wide variety of newspapers and 
other publications as well as by radio broadcasts, giving a popular audience 
information on matters of interest to them from their leaderships, but also, in 
editorials and broadcasts, comment on them. Such media channels also 
provides a way in which comment on popular reactions to events and 
individuals can be accessed by the historian, backed up by comment in oral 
interviews, memoirs and the observations of the various interested external 
powers in their official documents. It is, thus, largely through media reports 
that the contribution to the crisis made by the masses of the Sunni and the 
Maronite communities will be examined in the following two chapters. As with
603 Michael Johnson Class and Client in Beirut, p. 126.
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the political leaders, these communities provided the most significant polarities 
of opinion relating to the crisis at mass levels. Since, on the whole, the mass 
Maronite perspective on their position will be demonstrated as having been 
essentially defensive - a matter of their reaction to events and the agendas of 
other communities, notably the Sunni, it is important to identify what the 
Maronite saw themselves as reacting against. For this reason, the Sunni 
community will be examined first.
208
Chapter 5 
The Sunni Community in 1958
According to Samir Khalaf and Guilaine Denoueux, Nasserism, and a 
consequent revival in Arabism ‘both crystallised latent class aspirations and 
grievances had acted as a catalyst of communal feeling’ amounts the Sunni 
community in Lebanon.604 Nasserism undoubtedly had an impact on the Sunni 
community; but it was an essentially local Sunni interpretation, with Nasserism 
acting as a major factor in the creation of a protective Sunni community 
mythology during the 1950s. Thus merely to state that Nasserism was 
‘responsible’ for Sunni attitudes and actions in Lebanon during the 1958 crisis 
and its evolution, at any level of the community, is to over-simplify a much 
more complex scenario.605 Nasserism, in the general use of the term in Middle 
Eastern history, was modified by factors internal to Lebanon, notably Sunni 
popular perspectives of how it might be interpreted best to serve their own 
agenda.
Raphael Samuel and Paul Thompson have identified how myth has 
been used by social groups to compensate for their feelings of lack of 
confidence in, and solidarity with, a national identity presented to them by 
other social groups.606 The Sunni community in Lebanon in the 1950s was 
one such group. Nasser will be shown to have been important to them not so 
much for what he actually advertised as his agenda and policies, especially in 
Egypt, but for what he was represented to be by the Lebanese Sunnis. As 
Johnson has pointed out, Nasser (especially after the Suez Crisis) took on 
heroic stature as a za’im, who stood above the Lebanese system and united 
people in admiration of his supposed, or mythical, qualities: people who were 
otherwise divided into ‘vertically-linked clientelist structures’.607 Such ‘new’ 
myths, especially relating to the creation of heroes, flourish when historical
604 Samir Khalaf & Guilane Denoueux, 'Urban Networks and Political Conflict in Lebanon’, in Nadim Shehadi & Dana 
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knowledge, in the written, educational sense, is limited and there is no readily 
accessible alternative in the shape of oral traditions that fit a particular 
scenario. The high levels of illiteracy in the Sunni community (demonstrated 
later in the chapter) prevented the former; and Sunni traditions prior to the 
1950s were too ill-defined to substitute for them.608
Nasser provided a readily accessible icon for interpretation, partly 
because he was distant, and partly because the iconography used by the 
Sunnis was so often oral rather than written down, and subject to colder critical 
analysis. The growing sense of crisis in Lebanon, with the Sunni community 
cast in a seemingly permanent ‘opposition’ role to the Maronite or Christian 
dominated government of the state, provided an opportunity for a ‘national 
leader’ to emerge to lead that opposition. Within Lebanon itself, no such Sunni 
figurehead emerged with major popular appeal, partly because of the 
involvement of so many prominent Sunnis with the established order. This left 
the way open for an alternative figure who could be interpreted as 
‘representative’ of the aspirations of the Lebanese Sunnis, including their 
aspirations to be part of a broader community than that of Lebanon.609 West 
Beirut’s brand of Nasserism, for instance, was an ‘oppositional doctrine’, a 
protest against the dominance of the Sunni community by ‘Christian Lebanon’, 
and also, a ‘yearning’ for ‘a Sunni Arab order’. In a sense, then, Nasserism 
summed up what might be described as ‘pan-Arabism’ in a way that gave the 
Lebanese Sunni community a role in a wider international Sunni community.610 
The Lebanese Sunni masses felt a desire for such a role because of their 
dissatisfaction with their role in 1950s Lebanon. There was a popular tradition 
that they were exploited by ‘the rich’, and, as Kalawoun points out, ‘the rich’ in 
this tradition were equated with the Christian, and especially the Maronite, 
community.611
Thus there is a need to examine the shape of the Sunni community at 
this point, and also to take account of the impact on the community, at mass 
level, of a range of local issues and perspectives, including the issue of
603 See, for example, John Tosh, The Pursuit of History. Longman, London, 1984, p. 3, on this point.
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consensus or co-habitation with other confessional communities; the Maronite 
community in particular. Michael Johnson has shown that there is a clear 
linkage between issues relating to the National Pact and the 1958 crisis.612 
The last chapter discussed the development of the crisis at elite political levels 
and the stress that leaders from both Sunni and Maronite communities, from 
different perspectives, laid on this pact, as well as their experience of the crisis. 
But the impact of the 1958 crisis was not restricted to such leaders: it was a 
breakdown in consensus between the communities at all levels of society. The 
National Pact was of importance not just to political leaders: it was also of 
significance to the masses of both communities, the people whom those 
leaders claimed to represent. These masses also had their understanding of 
what the pact meant, and what it entailed in practice; and it was not necessarily 
an understanding that was given to them by their leaders. They had other 
means of gaining information and of gaining a range of viewpoints on events. 
With a flourishing media in Lebanon, meaning that information reached the 
masses through a wide variety of newspapers and other publications as well as 
by radio broadcasts, the potential existed for the masses to be thoroughly well 
informed on matters of interest to them. The contribution to the crisis made by 
the masses of the Sunni and the Maronite communities will be examined in the 
following two chapters. As with the political leaders, these communities 
provided the most significant polarities of opinion relating to the crisis at mass 
levels. Since, on the whole, the mass Maronite perspective on their position 
will be demonstrated as having been essentially defensive - a matter of their 
reaction to events and the agendas of other communities, notably the Sunni, it 
is important to identify what the Maronite saw themselves as reacting against. 
For this reason, the Sunni community will be examined first. The levels of 
literacy in the Sunni community were not as high as those for the Maronite 
community; but any lack here was, in the 1950s, compensated for by the 
community’s ready access to radio broadcasts. The Lebanese radio may have 
operated largely as a voice for the government or established elites, but 
Sunnis could also access broadcasts on Syrian and Egyptian radio. It was 
only at the height of the crisis, in June and July 1958, that such broadcasts
612 Michael Johnson, Class and Client in Beirut, p. 126.
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were jammed, preventing their reception in Lebanon, For the rest of the crisis 
period, such broadcasts were a readily accessible source of anti-Chamoun and 
anti-government policy information and propaganda.613
The structure of the Sunni community was not of a nature to promote 
conscious cohesion within it; traditional loyalties rather than deliberate 
decisions tended to dominate the patterns of allegiance and solidarity within 
the community.614 As with the other communities in Lebanon, the Sunni 
community had been affected by the setting up of a separate Lebanese entity 
in 1920. But arguably the Sunni perception of the Ottoman empire and the 
disappearance of the wider entity to which they had given allegiance had a 
more negative effect than on the other Muslim communities. As has been 
seen in Chapters One and Three, the Sunni community as a whole was 
profoundly opposed to the concept and establishment of a separate Lebanon; 
creating instead the vision of a Greater Syria to counter that of the Maronite 
Greater Lebanon. But as Nicola Ziadeh has pointed out, by the end of the 
mandate period, the community as a whole had become accustomed to being 
part of an entity separate from Syria - even if they did not always like i t 615
The extent to which the Sunni elites, both the traditional land-owning 
classes and the newer (if still small) bourgeoisie, had accepted their position in 
an independent Lebanon and consequently had developed common interests 
with, for example, the Maronites, is summed up by their co-operation in the 
setting up of the National Pact in 1943. As Johnson points out, the ‘Sunni 
notables of Beirut and Lebanon’ had evolved a strategy during the mandate, 
and continued to utilise it subsequently, that ‘emphasised their role as 
communal leaders and champions’.616 They did this by using a rhetoric that 
would permit them to refer at times of potential crisis within their community to 
the dream of a Greater Syria and their commitment to Lebanon’s incorporation 
within it. However, as Chapter Four indicated, with few exceptions, there was 
no real intent behind the rhetoric. It was intended merely to enable the Sunni
613 Anis Moussallem, La Press Libanaise: Expression du Liban politique et Confessionel et Forum des Pays Arabes. 
Librarie General De Droit et de Jurisprudence, Paris, 1977, p. 20.
514 The Sunni Muslim Community, Class and Client in Beirut. The Sunni Muslim Community and the Lebanese State 
1840-1985. ithaca Press, London, 1986, p. 36.
Nicola Ziadeh, Syria and Lebanon. Ernest Benn Ltd, London, 1957, pp. 60-1.
616 Michael Johnson, Class and Client in Beirut, p. 25.
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elites to maintain their leadership role unchallenged by the masses, and not to 
respond directly to popular aspirations. Thus the attitude of the elites meant 
that at this level, the Sunni community in Lebanon had begun to feel a cultural 
identity that can be described as Lebanese, if it was also unequivocally Arab in 
nature.
A problem faced by the Sunni elites, however, was that this sense of 
identification with Lebanon was, for the most part, missing from the masses. 
Even after full independence, and the creation of the National Pact, the Sunni 
masses continued to perceive Lebanon, not just as an artificial creation carved 
out of Syria, but also as a creation that brought with it no tangible benefits for 
them. They had, therefore, no reason to like the status quo. Hilal Khashan has 
pointed out that ‘it is common’ for members of the Sunni community ‘to insist, 
whether rightly or not, that the 1943 National Covenant had discriminated 
against them’.617 In an echo of the more usual position of the Maronite 
community, Khashan also points out that ‘their [Sunni] grievances’ stem from 
their interpretation of the past and the implications they drew from that for their 
present and future.618
In terms of the evolution of majority attitudes amongst the Sunni masses 
for the 1950s and the resultant popular mythologies, the main trends which 
were determinant in shaping these can be traced back to the First World War 
and the mandate periods though they did not coalesce into coherent 
mythologies until later. There were two major Sunni perspectives on Lebanon, 
and one more minor one. The first was that which saw Lebanon as being part 
of a Greater Syria in the way which Faisal had outlined during his brief period 
in Damascus and Beirut. And it involved resentment against the Western 
powers, particularly France, which had prevented its accomplishment. Faisal’s 
presence had had a huge and positive effect on the community at popular 
levels. At a time when Sunnis had had to face the uncertainty associated with 
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, incorporation in Faisal’s Arab kingdom
617 Hilal Khashan, inside the Lebanese Confessional Mind. University Press of America, New York, 1992, p. 67. 
Khashan identifies other minority communities such as the Shi’a and the Armenians who share this perspective, it is 
not intended to claim that the Sunni elite had come to see Lebanon as a natural entity; simply that they had accepted 
its existence as being in their own interests. See also Albert Hourani, ‘Lebanon: The Development of a Political 
Society’, in L. Binder (ed.), Politics in Lebanon, p. 25.
618 Hilal Khashan, Inside the Lebanese Confessional Mind, p. 67.
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had seemed to offer a continuation of Sunni importance.619 It remained a 
popular symbol for what the masses felt they had unjustifiably lost in the shape 
of a Syria defined as a state which would be administered on decentralised 
lines that would echo Ottoman practice and boost Sunni importance within it. 
The main support for this was to be found in urban areas, especially amongst 
the Sunnis of Tripoli and Beirut, though that is not to deny the existence of a 
large following for this perspective in other parts of the country.
A further perspective was that represented by Arab nationalism; though 
this was more limited in its popular appeal because of the intellectual 
overtones associated with Arab nationalism.820 In the post-1920 period, it was 
advanced by politicians from the Al Solh family of Sidon, notably Khazim, 
Takkieddine and their cousin Riyadh.621 Given that Riyadh was to become the 
most significant Lebanese Sunni political leader after 1943 and until his death 
in 1951, this ensured that there was a continuing consciousness of the Arab 
nationalist agenda amongst elements of the urban masses at least, even if it 
held less appeal than the vision of Greater Syria. A further perspective was 
that provided by lslamism. But in the absence of a charismatic religious leader 
to inspire Sunni congregations in Lebanon, and in the face of the Franco- 
Maronite domination of Lebanon, this made little political headway; something 
that provides a real contrast to the cohesion provided for the Maronite masses 
by the Maronite Church.
In discussing the use made of these perspectives on Lebanon by the 
Sunni community in the 1950s, one thing must also be stressed in terms of 
seeking an understanding of community policy and actions. While it is possible 
to speak of a general Sunni attitude in some respects, a divide did exist within 
that community. That divide concerned the views and reactions of the masses, 
both rural and urban, and the views and reactions of those who acted as 
spokesmen for the Sunni community. According to Najla Attiyah, for instance, 
‘a horizontal relationship existed between the masses and the spokesmen.
619 King-Crane Commission Report on the Near East, 1920, published as a supplement to Editor and Publisher. 
December 1922; Najila Attiyah, ‘Attitude of the Lebanese Sunni Towards the State of Lebanon1 unpublished PhD 
thesis, University of London, 1973, p. 69.
620 S ee Chapter One, pp. 88-9.
621 For a more detailed discussion of Arab nationalism and the role of the Solh family in promoting it in the 1930s and
1940s, see Raghid Al Solh, 'Arab Nationalist Attitudes Towards Greater Lebanon', in Shehadi & Mills, Lebanon, p. 51.
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The spokesmen neither received a proper mandate from the masses nor were 
they accountable to them’.622 In practical terms this meant that policy 
decisions were taken exclusively by these so-called spokesmen without any 
real reference to those whose interests they claimed to represent. This had 
been notoriously so with Shaykh Muhammad al Jisr.623 It was even the case 
with a genuinely popular leader like Riyadh Al Solh.
So the mandate period and that of Bishara Al Khoury’s presidency had 
established a pattern within the community which meant that the Sunni masses 
thus had no say in determining the political attitudes of their spokesmen. In 
terms of the trends identified, the ordinary Sunnis, being less exposed than the 
elites to the material opportunities offered to them by the Lebanese state and 
even more attached to religious issues or Islamism, were almost universally 
attracted to the idea of unity with Syria, something that Kamal Salibi 
commented on in his memoir of the period.624 Over time the Sunni elites, as 
indicated in Chapter Four, had become less enthusiastic about the idea of 
immediate union with Syria.
It is necessary to make some differentiation between the urban and the 
rural masses. The urban Sunni masses were in the majority quantitatively; 
mainly located in centres like Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon, they differed 
significantly from the rural Sunnis, particularly in terms of their relationship with 
community leaders. These urban Sunnis were reasonably independent, both 
economically and politically. They had received the benefits of a greater 
exposure to the effects of education and were more open to media 
propaganda, especially after the emergence of radio broadcasting. The rural 
masses, by contrast, were less informed and more dependent, especially 
financially, on their leaders and were thus more under the influence of those 
leaders. These rural masses, largely located in the north and south of 
Lebanon, were less affected by educational developments and by the media. 
The example provided by Aboud Abdei Razzak in the Akkar district underlines 
the continuance of a traditional dependency. He was essentially a feudal lord,
632 Najila Attiyah, 'Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis’, p. 99.
633 See Chapter 3, p. 124.
624 K.S. Salibi, "Recollections of the 1940s and 1950s', unpublished conference paper, Austen, Texas, 13 September 
1992, p . 6. See also Nasser Kalawoun, ‘Role of the Sunni Leadership’, p. 7.
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in terms of his powers, as is indicated by the fact that he was able to co­
operate fully with the Lebanese state without complaints during the 1958 crisis, 
because his followers were largely ignorant of the implications of his 
actions.625 For example in August 1958 the Sunni deputies of Akkar actively 
testified against Syria accusing Syria of being responsible for the trouble along 
the Syrian-Lebanese border with the aim of undermining the Chamoun 
regime.626
The urban masses were less easily influenced by their elites, and were 
so less likely to accept uncritically views and policies voiced by those elites as 
representative of the community where such views and policies did not 
represent the wishes or opinions of the masses. Kalawoun, for instance, 
points out that the ‘permanent conference of the Muslim Commissions’, 
established in 1953 to voice the ideas of the Muslim communities, ‘did not 
enjoy great popular following’, even though he then goes on to argue that it 
reflected ‘the general mood of the community’.627 There is, however, evidence 
that from 1954, the urban masses made increasing demands for a greater role 
in evolving Sunni views and policies as voiced by the spokesmen, though it 
was not until 1957 that these views began to have a major impact on the elites. 
Up to late 1957, and even into 1958, the Sunni elites were largely able to 
continue to disregard the reactions and beliefs emerging among the urban 
masses. As far as possible they sought to maintain contact with the masses 
through the channels offered by the continuation of the dispensation of 
patronage on a traditional patron-client basis, if these channels did not enable 
the elites to exercise their old dominance over the urban masses, the lack of 
powerful populist political organisations to act as pressure groups on the elites 
in the period up to the 1957 elections at least meant that mass expressions of 
grievances against their ‘spokesmen’ remained incoherent and ineffective. 
The religious organisation of the Sunni community did not offer a channel for 
the expression of popular grievances with their own elites or with the state, in a 
direct contrast to the way in which the Maronite Church could act as a focus for 
popular opposition. Rather, the religious hierarchy of the Sunni community
625 Najla Attiyah, ‘Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis’, p. 133.
626 Al Havat. 30 August 1958.
627 Nasser Kalawoun, ‘Role of the Sunni Leadership’, p. 26.
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remained closely linked to the secular social hierarchy.628 Moreover, no real 
equivalent to the Maronite Kata’ib party emerged within the Sunni 
community.629
A factor which undoubtedly affected such developments, and 
consequently the ability of the Sunni masses to express their protests as 
effectively as the Maronite masses, was the relative lack of information of the 
former, particularly in terms of political or economic information that was 
available in uniform format to large numbers at a single point in time. Such 
availability promotes the development of shared attitudes and opinions and 
their coherent expression, and newspapers have been a key factor in such 
developments.630 However, the Sunni masses lacked the quality of 
information which was available to the Maronite masses through their 
newspapers. The poorer quality of education among Sunnis, including a 
higher level of illiteracy, ensured that there was little demand for the type of 
populist newspaper that could sell to the Maronite masses. The effect of this 
was to sustain an ultimate dependence on the leaders on the one hand and on 
the other to keep knowledge of the precise policies they followed at a very 
general level. It was not until the broadcasts on Egyptian and Syrian radio 
began to address Lebanese policy in real detail, rather than providing 
rhetorically general attacks on the government, from late 1957, that radio 
broadcasts could begin to act as an efficient alternative to newspapers for the 
Sunni masses. This created a greater political consciousness based on a 
greater knowledge of events in the Arab world and the role of their own leaders 
in Lebanon in supporting the status quo. It was not accident that the period 
during which the Sunni masses were able to have an effect on their political 
leadership coincided with the period of these broadcasts, as will be seen later 
in this chapter.
It is illuminating to look at the provision of education within the Sunni 
community. It accounts for the lower levels of literacy; and also gives a clue to 
some popular Sunni grievances. It should not, for example, be assumed that
628 Nicola Ziadeh. Syria and Lebanon, p. 160.
629 Samir Khalaf & Guilaine Denoueux, ‘Urban Networks and Political Conflicts, in Shehadi & Mills (eds), Lebanon, p. 
186
830 David Vincent, Literacy and Popular Culture. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, pp. 241-58.
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the Sunni masses were not aware, or not resentful, of the imbalance in terms 
of educational provision; especially of the failure of the government to remedy 
that imbalance. Government schools throughout Lebanon were limited in 
numbers, even in the 1950s, and attempts to expand this provision was not a 
significant element in government policy. In the 1953 pamphlet Moslem 
Lebanon Today Muslim leaders complained that no ‘interest in Moslem 
education is manifested by the government’.631 In 1958, Al Jisr, discussing the 
origins of the crisis, cited popular resentment over this aspect of policy as a 
major factor. His points about the importance of education to Sunnis at all 
levels of the community are emphasised by the evidence given by Desmond 
Stewart that in a development linking ‘the petty bourgeoisie with the sub­
proletariat under the leadership of members of the bourgeoisie’ Muslims in 
Lebanon took up the issue of educational improvement for themselves through 
the Al Maqassed movement.632 More recently, Walid Jumblat has also argued 
that the Muslim communities generally felt deprived of access to education in 
this period.633 It can thus be argued that this was one of the things that caused 
the Sunni masses to feel discriminated against within the Lebanese state. 
Government policy did not focus on educational reform because the Maronites 
had no need for such a policy, and also, according to Jumblat, because the 
government found the unimproved system useful, in that it permitted them to 
use ‘the weapon of education’ in their own interests, by promoting confessional 
differences within the system.634 The educational field had traditionally been 
dominated by private schooling, notably through Christian mission schools, 
and the Sunni community had remained understandably reluctant to send its 
children to be taught in such a mission environment. However, the Maronite 
community made full use of this provision.635 Sunni political leaders did not 
take up the cause of improving educational provision for their community in
631 Moslem Lebanon Today, pp. 7-10.
632 Desmond Stewart, Turmoil in Beirut; A Personal Account. Allen Wingate, London, 1958, pp. 14-15; Michael 
Johnson, Class and Client in Beirut, p. 128.
633 Nadim Al Jisr, Speech, reported in Ai Havat 18 May 1958 (Al Jisr was a Deputy from Tripoli); Walid Jumblat, 
Hawigat Al Thawrat Al Lunaniat. Dar Al Taqadoumiat, Al Moukhtara, 1987, p. 87. This point was also made by Salim  
Nassar, a leading journalist for the pro-Egyptian As S aw ad  in 1958, in his oral interview with me. Salim Nassar, Oral 
Interview, London, 20 May 1995.
634 Walid Jumblat, Haqigat Al Thawrat al Lubnaniat. p. 87. This point was also implicitly made by the United National 
Front’s Manifesto, which referred to the ‘propagation of the confessionai spirit and its exploitation by politicians. 
Manifesto, United National Front, 1 April 1957, in Cahiers de I’Orient Comoemporain. Vol. 36 (Documents), 1957, pp. 
139-42..
635 The factor had been formally identified back in 1938, but little, if anything, had been done subsequently to find a 
solution. See L'Orient. 24 January 1938.
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any serious sense; because they saw no advantage to themselves in such a 
development since it would undermine their position in the Sunni social 
hierarchy. There were Sunni community schools, the Al Maqassed schools, but 
while these were important, the numbers were small in relation to the needs of 
the community.636 There was a further factor: educational standards in private, 
and especially mission, schools were better than they were in either the 
government or the Al Maqassed schools.637 This was particularly so in terms 
of foreign language teaching, but even at the basic level of literacy it had an 
effect. The following tables are illuminating of the enduring nature of this 
problem:
636 Receuil des Statistiaues de la Svrie et du Liban 1945-46-47. Centre de Recherches et de Developpement 
Pedagogique, Beirut, 1947. See also Boutros Labaki, ‘L'Economie Politique du Liban Independant 1943-1975' in 
Shehadi & Mills (eds), Lebanon, p. 177.
637 Linda Schatkowski, T h e  Islamic M aqassed  of Beirut: A Case Study of Modernisation in Lebanon’, Unpublished MA  
thesis, Middle East Area Program, American University of Beirut, 1969.
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Table 1
Proportion of Illiteracy in the Religious Communities of Lebanon in
1932638
Shi’ite Sunni Maronite Greek
Cath
Druze Greek
Orthodox
Percentage: 83 66 48 39 53 53
Table 2
Private Schools in Lebanon according to Confessional Orientation
1944/5639
Number Percentage of Total 
of Private Schools640
Private Christian Schools 748 77.5
Private Muslim Schools 208 21.3
There had been undoubted improvements in the provision of state 
schooling in Lebanon after the end of the war. According to contemporary 
statistics recorded by Ziadeh, the number of state schools had increased by 
1954 to 953, from 238 in 1943. Equally it must be said that it was the Muslim 
communities in general that benefited most from this development because 
they made use of state schooling where it was available. However, it must 
also be pointed out here that these state schools generally only offered 
elementary education: at secondary levels there were only five state 
schools.641 The educational status quo in the Sunni community thus acted 
effectively as a handicap in adult life in terms of career opportunities. For 
instance, the lack of foreign languages, essentially French and English,
630 L'Orient. 24  January 1938.
639 Receuil des Statistiques de la Svrie et du Liban 1945-46-47. Vol. 3, p. 202. See also Boutros Labaki, TEconomie 
Politique du Liban Independant 1943-1975’, in Shehadi & Mills (eds), Lebanon, p. 177.
640 These percentages emphasise the overwhelming predominance of private Christian schools, at over 77%  of the 
total of private schools in Lebanon, over the private Muslim schools in Lebanon.
641 Nicola Ziadeh, Syria and Lebanon, p, 250; Moslem Lebanon Today. Beirut, 1953, p. 10.
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available only at secondary levels of education, prevented the Sunnis from 
operating effectively in a wider commercial field. As Carolyn Gates has 
pointed out, the Lebanese economy and economic policies focused on 
Lebanon’s ‘intermediary role between the West and the Middle East’, with 
Beirut taking a particularly important role as a centre for the passage of trade 
and the provision of financial and other commercial services. It was an 
economy that depended on profits from international trade and the servicing of 
that trade, expediting the passage of goods etc. in and out of states such as 
Syria that had more difficult contacts with the West.642 The open economy 
approach maintained by governments in this period meant that the Maronite 
and other Christian communities had no real challenge to their dominance of 
what Gates identifies as the most profitable sectors of the Lebanese economy; 
the ‘dynamic foreign tertiary sector’ and the financial and commercial services 
sector. According to Gates ‘The public awareness that only a very small 
number’ were benefiting economically from Lebanon’s success was an on­
going contributory factor to popular Sunni resentment of the Maronites and the 
way that community safeguarded its interests.643
Economic factors also generally worked to the disadvantage of the 
Sunni masses in Lebanon. Overall, the Sunnis still had a lower standard of 
living than the Maronites. The Sunni bourgeois elite was economically 
successful, both in the commercial and administrative sectors; the traditional 
land-based Sunni elite retained its old wealth. But the numbers of the 
bourgeoisie in particular remained small in relation to the overall size of the 
community, particularly in comparison with the ratio for the Maronite 
community.644 The negative effect of this on the Sunni masses resulted in a 
perception that the masses were being unfairly excluded from economic as 
well as political and cultural power. Sunnis believed that they were 
discriminated against in employment, being confined to lower paid posts with a 
lesser chance of promotion to the highest levels. Moslem Lebanon Today 
complained about Christian (essentially Maronite) dominance of the civil
642 Carolyn L. Gates, ‘Choice, Content and Performance of a "Service-Orientated Open Economy" Strategy: The Case 
of Lebanon 1948-1958’, unpublished conference paper, Austen Texas, 13 September 1992, pp. 1-2..
643 ibid. pp. 36-40.
644 Michael Johnson, Class and Client in Beirut, pp. 30; 33; 36; 127; Moslem Lebanon Today, pp. 7-10.
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service, for instance.645 But, as Michael Johnson points out, the 
disadvantages faced by the ‘Sunni petty bourgeoisie’ was ‘nowhere near as 
desperate as that of the sub-proletariat’. This element of the Sunni community 
not only lived in squalor but also had little opportunity, through work 
opportunities, to improve the economic position. According to Johnson, There 
can be little doubt that the Sunni sub-proletariat recognised their relative 
deprivation’, and certainly this perception was picked up on by Al Jisr in his 
discussion of the reasons for the crisis in 1958, when he referred explicitly to 
popular consciousness of the ‘economic deprivation’ suffered by the Sunnis as 
a significant factor in their discontent.646
A contributory factor of importance was the obvious and 
disproportionate concentration of the expenditure of government funds in the 
Mount Lebanon districts. From the start the Lebanese government favoured 
Mount Lebanon in the allocation of public projects, despite the fact that these 
areas were already more developed than the mainly Muslim districts, such as 
the Biqa‘ and Akkar.647 The following table is a useful demonstration of this 
showing an imbalance even after the 1958 crisis.
645 Moslem Lebanon Today, p. 7.
646 Michael Johnson, Class and Client in Beirut, pp. 130-31. Nadim Al Jisr, Speech, reported in Al Havat. 18 May 1958. 
The perception has been lasting: W alid Jumblat has also talked of the 'deliberate Maronite strategy to have complete 
control over the economic sector’ in that, and subsequent periods. See Walid Jumblat, Haaiaat Al Thawrat Al 
Lubnaniat. p. 88. A further contemporary impression in line with these comments is provided by the comments of 
Desmond Stewart, who also reported that resentment over their economic position seemed to be a factor with the 
Sunnis he encountered. Such comments provide some indication not so much of the existence of such perceptions as 
their strength, in that Stewart’s account suggests that they were a matter of common discussion. Stewart also seems 
not to feel a need to pass a critical comment himself on such perceptions. See Desmond Stewart, Turmoil in Beirut. A 
Personal Account. Allan Wingate, London, 1958, p. 13. See also Michael Johnson, Class and Client in Beirut, p. 33.
647 Minutes of Parliament. Beirut, 1927-8, p. 17 for an early identification of this trend.
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Table 3
Levels of Lebanese Government Funding by Region, 1960, 
in Thousands of Lebanese Pounds648
Mount Lebanon North South Biqa‘
2.24 2.13 1.53 1.69
The South and the Biqa' both had a Muslim majority in the population, the 
South at 70%, and as the table reveals, the funding for public works and 
projects in these areas was significantly lower than that for the area with the 
highest Maronite element. This state of affairs was perceived by the Sunni as 
resulting from the degree of corruption that was to be found among Maronites 
at all levels of the administration of the state.649 The distortion in the allocation 
of funds added to Sunni consciousness of, and resentment over, the relatively 
lower standards of living of the Sunni community when compared with the 
Maronites. For the bulk of the Sunni community, therefore, the intercommunal 
compromise summed up in the National Pact had little positive impact on their 
lives.
The traditional solution for a discontented population, or discontented 
portion of one, is to seek political expression for their grievances in some way. 
But as pointed out earlier in this chapter, the Sunni lacked a populist party in 
this period; one, in other words, willing to rework the existing system to redress 
Sunni disadvantages. This is not to say that there was no political
648 Raymond Delpart, ‘Liban: L’Evolution du Niveau de Vie en Milieu Rural 1960-1970', Documents, Ministry of 
Planning, Beirut 1970, p. 9 (roneotyped, copies in my possession and in the Bloc National Headquarters, originals 
apparently destroyed by shelling during the civil war). These figures are based on the study of the Institut International 
de Recherche et de Formation en vue du Development Integral et Harmonise (IRFED), Besoins et Possibilities de 
Development du Liban Etude Preiiminaire. 2 vols, I ‘Situation Economique et Sociale1, II ‘Problematique et Orientation', 
Beirut, 1964, the key statistics for Lebanon in this period. The figures are based on a calculation of the different 
elements of public spending, eg. habitation, sanitary measures, schooling etc. This table indicates that the regions 
with Muslim majorities received the lowest levels of public spending when compared to the levels of government 
investiment in areas with a Christian majority.
649 Michael Johnson, Class and Client in Beirut, pp. 117; 132.
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consciousness at mass levels. Writing in 1957, Ziadeh identified an idea 
‘creeping into the minds of people’ in the 1950s about ‘the necessity of equality 
and justice’; which was in that period becoming ‘more than just a cry’.650 But 
the lack of indigenous Muslim populist political parties through which 
discontent could be expressed remained a problem. There was the Najjadah 
grouping; but its predominantly secular orientation meant it was unable to 
attract a substantial membership from the religiously-minded Sunni masses. 
The Communist party suffered from the same disadvantage and was also 
tainted, in Lebanese Sunni eyes, by the support of the USSR for the creation of 
Israel. There was the Progressive Socialist Party, founded in 1949, but 
membership of the Druze-led party was practically confined to followers of 
Kamal Jumblat.651 Even Riyadh Al Solh, with a considerable popular following 
in the masses, demonstrated little willingness to listen to their voice.652
But there was also a further complication surrounding the Sunni masses 
in Lebanon of indigenous political channels to express their discontent with the 
status quo. in the aftermath of Riyadh Al Solh’s death on 16 Juiy 1951, Al 
Khoury had demonstrated that he would seek to bypass the Sunni and other 
Muslim politicians to exercise as much independent power as possible. An 
editorial eulogising Al Solh described Al Khoury as ‘ the partner who took more 
than his share’; and talked of the resentment at this development of the Al Solh 
family and traditional following; and also of the ‘Sunni community’ as a 
whole.653 Certainly in 1951 and 1952, Al Khoury aroused considerable 
resentment amongst the Sunni elites by his attempts to manipulate Sunni 
candidates for the premiership; and his eventual choice of Sami Al Solh did not 
restore his popularity with that political elite.654 Equally, Al Khoury had made 
no attempt to conciliate the Sunni masses, to providing himself with a popular 
base in that community to counteract any protests from the Sunni elites.
650 Nicola Ziadeh, Syria and Lebanon, p. 257.
651 Michael Johnson. Class and Client, p. 128.
662 The traditional Sunni elites were beginning to respond to pressure from the Sunni bourgeoisie in the 1950s, but that 
remained relatively small, and also had no interest in promoting the interests of the masses.
653 Alia Al Solh, Editorial: 'The Most Generous of All W ho Have Left Us’, Al Hikmat. February 1965, p. 44. Alia Al Solh 
was the eldest daughter of Riyad Al Solh.
654 Najla Attiyah, ‘Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis', p. 197 points out that his actions made the Sunni politicians feel 
dependent on the whims of a Maronite president, rather than partners in government.
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This gives a clue to the extent to which the political establishment, 
whether Maronite and Muslim, believed it could ignore the Sunni masses, 
seeing no need to propitiate them by addressing their grievances at any level 
beyond the rhetorical. This did not change under Chamoun. If anything the 
issue became more acute, despite the rhetoric employed by Chamoun to seek 
to assure the Muslim element in the population that he respected Arab 
traditions.655 Sami Al Solh pointed out in his memoirs that the general 
experience of Sunni participation in the state of Lebanon depended heavily on 
the varied experiences of the Sunni leaders in terms of their relationships with 
Maronite leaders. According to him, Sunni politicians were ‘only the 
instruments which they set up before the eyes of the public to be held 
accountable for their errors and misdeeds.656 Given this context, it should not 
be seen as surprising that the Sunni masses in the 1950s looked outside 
Lebanon for sympathy with their grievances, and for a cause to ally themselves 
with, if only as a bargaining counter with which to extract concessions from 
their own, as well as Maronite, community leaders. In this sense, the Sunni 
masses began to echo the pattern set up by the Maronites under Ottoman rule; 
something that had worrying implications for the success of consensus under 
the terms of the National Pact, because this was part of the older tradition of 
intercommunal relations of co-habitation. It is true that this related also to intra­
confessional strife; but the intra-communal tensions among the Sunni would 
have been unlikely to have developed to the levels they had in the early 1950s 
had there been a popular perception that the Maronite community was fulfilling 
its side of the bargain set up in the National Pact.
The continuing will amongst the Sunni community at mass level to 
identify with Syria and Syrian ambitions and interests has already been 
mentioned. This came together in the 1950s with another tradition in the Sunni 
community, dating back to the First World War. this was the seeking for 
heroes to inspire them among the leading figures of the Arab world in general, 
because of a lack of such heroes within Lebanon. Up to the early 1950s, such 
heroes had had little direct impact on Lebanon; representing more a general
655 Chamoun himself claimed this. Camiile Chamoun, Mudhakkarat [Memoirs], Beirut, 1969, pp. 262-3.
656 Sami Al Solh, Mudhakkarat Sami Bev Al Solh [Memoirs of Sami Bey Al Solh], Maktabat al Fikr al-Arabi, Beirut, 
1960, p. 320.
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sense of a maintenance of Arab status in relation to the West.657 But during 
the 1950s the Lebanese Sunni became aware of a new dimension in the Arab 
world, that provided by Nasser after 1952. Nasser’s impact on the Arab world 
generally was so great that in Syria, for example, a majority of the population 
began to demand that the Egyptian president became their leader. This was 
one factor behind the eventual creation of the United Arab Republic. On 
Nasser’s arrival in Syria in 1958, the estimated crowd of 180,000 hailed Nasser 
as ‘The Saviour Hero; the defender of the most sacred things.658 In Lebanon 
the Sunni masses were also stirred to considerable enthusiasm by what 
Nasser seemed to offer in the way of ‘fairer’ policies: Nasser seemed a model 
leader, one who seemed to promote and ‘protect the interests of his people’ in 
the name of both Arab nationalism and Islam. To a community conscious of 
economic discrimination, his economic policies took on status as a ‘champion 
of the poor’ because he gave ‘a sense of dignity to people of low social status’ 
but did it in what appeared to be an essentially Arab and Islamic way.659
The pro-Egyptian stance amongst Lebanese Sunnis can be traced back 
to the Egyptian Revolution of 23 July 1952 which had brought Nasser to power 
and was eventually to give a whole new dimension to Lebanese-Egyptian 
relations. The Sunni masses of Lebanon saw Egypt as the largest and the 
strongest Sunni Arab country. Therefore they felt affinity with it as they have 
always felt with any large and strong Sunni entity; and as already mentioned, 
there is no doubt that the Nasserist slogans calling for social justice had an 
appeal.660 American policy in the Middle East then began to raise further 
consciousness amongst the Sunni masses of events in the wider Arab world 
and made the ordinary Sunnis increasingly dissatisfied with existing Lebanese 
foreign policy, as well as with domestic policy, bringing together the two 
strands that were to be so important in the crisis of 1958.
Popular Sunni awareness of both these strands, and a positive reaction 
to Nasser’s policies and rhetoric as a possible alternative to the Lebanese
657 Najla Attiyah, 'Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis’, p. 69. Such heroes had included Faisal, Attaturk and King Farouk 
of Egypt.
An Nahar. 25 February 1958
659 Michael Johnson, Class and Client in Beirut, p. 131.
660 ibid, referring to the broadcasting of Nasser's speeches and the first appearance of Nasser’s photographs in Beirut
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status quo, began to have a visible effect as popular discontent with the 
Chamoun regime began to rise. A key event here was the visit to Lebanon in 
May 1953 of the US Secretary of State, John Foster Duiles, to get the 
Lebanese government’s support for current American policy in the Middle East 
highlighted the differences between politicians and masses. The Sunni 
politicians were not enthusiastic, but were prepared to accept some 
compromise along the existing lines of Lebanese foreign policy. The Sunni 
masses, however, indicated their different feelings by demonstrating against 
Dulles.661 This was partly because of their long-standing resentment of the 
West, but Nasser’s role in raising anti-American feelings was also crucial. The 
evidence is thus clear that Egyptian manipulation of Lebanese Sunni popular 
opinion started immediately after the coming to power of Nasser and continued 
to have a significant effect on mass behaviour amongst the Sunni throughout 
the rest of Chamoun’s regime.662
The coincidence of timing indicates that it was Dulles’ visit and the 
increasingly high profile taken in the Middle East by Nasser, that helped to 
promote a greater degree of organisation amongst the Sunni masses, by 
providing a series of issues on which they could agree, and, to an extent, act 
from 1953. For instance it was at this point that associations such as the 
Najjadah grouping, the Muslim Young Men’s Union, the Muslim Boy Scouts, Al 
Hayat al Watania [The National Committee] and the Al Maqassed College 
Alumni Association, some already-established and some new, emerged into 
some prominence, taking advantage of this discontent to recruit members by 
their willingness to associate themselves with such grievances. So these 
groupings claimed to be the ‘voice’ of the masses, and from their first 
emergence in 1953, very deliberately made statements, reported in periodicals 
such as Beirut, that linked long-standing domestic grievances and potential 
remedies with what they interpreted as the strategies of Nasserism, rather than 
invoking the terminology of the National Pact, as traditional Sunni leaders 
did.663 The names of the organisations gives a clue as to the particular
SB1 Al Havat. May 1 7 1953
662 Michael Johnson, Class and Client in Beirut, p. 131
SB3 See, for instance, Beirut. 15 October 1953, containing a statement advocating Nasserism as the answer to Sunni 
domestic grievances.
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constituencies within the Sunni community (and the Muslim community 
generally) to which they appealed. The Al Maqassed College Alumni 
Association, for instance, brought together the more literate amongst the Sunni 
masses, its membership drawing on the former students of the charitable 
Muslim schools.
It is easy to point out that such groupings did not have the standing or 
organisation within the Sunni community of the Kata’ib party. The initial 
statements from the groupings tended to be either vacillatory or conciliatory in 
their attitude towards the Sunni elites, for instance, and were certainly not yet 
essentially Sunni in their composition.664 Yet at the same time, they had 
sufficient popular support to bring about a state of tension between the Sunni 
community and the government in the summer and autumn of 1954.665 The 
issue was that of the equality, confessional, cultural and economic, between 
the sects in Lebanon. Al Haya al Watanlyyah raised Sunni dissatisfaction with 
what it defined as contemporary ‘inequality’ in a letter to Chamoun and made 
demands for immediate remedies, a letter supported by the Najjadah 
organisation. The latter grouping had also re-emerged during the early 1950s, 
and also was making claims to be a voice of popular Sunni opinion. These 
organisations displayed a degree of aggression which alarmed the 
government, and the leaders of the Sunni community, and seemed to have it 
within their power to orchestrate demonstrations and strikes by significant 
elements within the Sunni community.666 However, in the end the tension was 
dissolved by the efforts of Sunni leaders who were at that point still able to 
force the community as a whole and the organisations to accept conciliation, 
but no real change in policy towards their grievances.667 Such a scenario 
clearly indicates that these Sunni popular organisations had little power at 
political levels at this point.
GM Two populist deputies who were also members of another organisation, Al M utam aral Watani, were Abdallah Al 
Haj, a Christian, and Kamal Jumblat, a Druze.
665 See the tone of concern in the statement of Prime Minister Abdallah Al Yafi, 20 July 1954, Minutes of Parliament 
V, 1954-55, pp. 1300-1301. Desmond Stewart also gave some comment on this, see Desmond Stewart, Turmoil in 
Beirut, pp. 13-14.
666 See, for instance, the comments in Al Havat. 20 August 1954, reporting the events of the previous day; also Beirut. 
24 August 1954. See also Moslem Lebanon Today.
667 reported in Debate, 9 November 1954, Minutes of Parliament. V, 1954-55, pp. 1682-92.
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Another development came with the emergence of politicised qabadays. 
Such acted as facilitators or intermediaries between the masses and the elites, 
giving the masses channels for passing on their messages to their traditional 
leaders or za’ims,668 In the context of the 1950s, however, they were to 
become an important agency for bringing pressure on the Sunni elites because 
of the reliance of those elites on their services. Labib Zuwiyyah Yamak points 
out that even Sunni ‘notables’ who had become national figures, such as 
Bishara Al Khoury or Kamal Jumblat, were reliant on the ‘elementary political 
organisation constituted by the qabada’iyyat to mobilise their supporters.669 
No alternative power structures to use of the qabadays had evolved for the 
political or socio-economic organisation of the Sunni community in the period 
up to the crisis, and thus the Sunni political elite had no alternative but to make 
use of them. They were essentially an urban phenomenon, men drawn from 
the masses, acting as leaders at street levels, but also as channels for 
communication. During the 1950s, they acted to restrain the growing 
radicalism of the Sunni masses, in the interests of the elites, on the one hand; 
on the other, they acted to pass on the agendas of the Sunni masses on the 
Sunni leadership. They were, essentially, pragmatic facilitators without an 
obvious ideology to link them to either side, but equally, they were drawn from 
the masses themselves and were only able to sustain their role and influence, 
and consequently, value to the za’ims, so long as they kept the support of the 
masses. As the masses became more unified behind Nasserist rhetoric, the 
qabadays needed to reflect that development to the Sunni elites and to 
convince them of the need to respond positively to that rhetoric as popular 
Sunni perception was that the government was moving further and further 
towards a dangerously anti-Arab stance in its policy.670
When Chamoun came into office, his advertised pro-Arab stance meant 
that his mandate was initially welcomed by Sunnis at all levels and he was also 
linked with the British position of opposition to an independent Jewish state in
Michael Johnson, Class and Client in Beirut, pp. 82-3.
659 Labib Zuwiyyah Yamak, ‘Party Politics in the Lebanese Political System’, in L. Binder (ed.), Poiitics in Lebanon, p. 
153.
670 ibid. pp. 152-4; Michael Johnson, Class and Client in Beirut, pp. 82-3.
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Palestine.671 But he had a need in 1952 to conciliate Muslim opinion, and 
there was at that point no clear breach between a pro-Arab and a pro-Western 
policy.672 However, this established some high expectations of his regime 
which were to remain unfulfilled. At first the Sunni community had had no real 
complaints in terms of foreign policy matters. Chamoun’s speeches had 
seemed to indicate to the Sunni that he was maintaining a pro-Arab policy 
though the substance of his policy did not bear out his fine words.673 As late as 
1956 Chamoun’s claim to be acting as a champion of the Arab cause still had 
an effect on Sunni politicians, even if the Sunni masses were less susceptible, 
given the greater appeal of Nasser’s rhetoric and their own continuing 
discontents. But without seeming ridiculous, Al Havat could still publish a letter 
in November 1956, from Chamoun to Eisenhower about the Suez Crisis, in 
which Chamoun portrayed himself as speaking in the Arab interest.674 
However, the aftermath of the Suez Crisis was to reveal very plainly the lack of 
substance in Chamoun’s pro-Arab rhetoric. Yet the unwillingness of the Sunni 
politicians to provoke a crisis over this issue, preferring to seek compromise 
instead, served to highlight the divergence of attitude between the Sunni elites 
and the Sunni masses in the mid-1950s.
But though the Sunni politicians continued to pursue their mainly 
conciliatory approach to policies, the Sunni masses were being more and more 
affected by Egyptian propaganda. The general rhetoric of that propaganda 
enabled the masses to interpret it in ways that had a direct relevance to their 
concerns. An important year in terms of the developing popular Sunni hostility 
to existing Lebanese foreign policy was 1955, the year of the Baghdad Pact. 
As a result of the Pact, Lebanon was forced to try to negotiate its position in 
the new regional arena and to do so against a background of a new-found 
strength within the Arab world. The inspiration of Nasserist policies in Egypt 
had played their part in this, along with the rise of a quasi-religious socialism in 
the Arab world. Having a cause to fight for, the Sunni masses began to exert
671 It has already been mentioned that Chamoun was seen as pro-British rather than pro-French, which was also an 
asset. See Fiches du Monde Arabe. 1 .3 4 -3 8 ,4 2 -4 5 , LaC rise 1975-76 (la 9), IL 106 11 December 1979, no. 1449.
672 Camille Chamoun, Mudhakkarat. pp. 255-6.
673 Ibid.
674 According to Al Havat. 6 November 1956, Chamoun warned the USA that if the Americans did not intervene to halt 
the 'dangerous situation’ in the region, with Egypt under attack by Anglo-French and Israeli armies, the Arab world 
would be forced by ’mass pressure' to intervene on Egypt’s side because hers was a ‘just cause’.
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concerted pressure on their leaders, and to have an impact on official attitudes 
towards the Sunni masses. But this was not so much in the sense that 
attempts were made to remedy their grievances. For instance in April 1955 a 
new body, the Islamic Council, was set up under the leadership of the Mufti. A 
government decree in January of that year had made some acknowledgement 
of the importance and religious status of the Sunni community by placing the 
Muftis ‘bureau’ under the Prime Minister, effectively giving the Mufti status as 
a government official.675 This, in turn, gave the concept of the Council some 
official backing. The Council advertised itself as having ‘a duty to defend the 
rights of the community, which, so it is believed, are not being given sufficient 
consideration by the authorities’.676 An indication of the way that this Council 
was perceived as bypassing the traditional Sunni leaders is provided by the 
opposition of men like Saeb Salam, who feared it would lessen his power as a 
Za’im.677 But the Council was not exactly a radical body - the first genuinely 
radical action in which it participated officially was the 1958 boycott of the 
traditional government Iftar dinner.678
But there was some indication of a modification of attitudes by leaders 
of the Sunni community, as is demonstrated by the actions of the Sunni Prime 
Minister Sami Al Solh who succumbed to the wishes of his own confessional 
community in opposition to cabinet policy in attending the Cairo Conference in 
January 1955.679 Chamoun had opposed attendance at the conference, 
because official Lebanese policy was pro-Iraq rather than pro-Egypt, and Iraq 
had not been invited to the conference. This was the first time that a Lebanese 
Prime Minister acted contrary to the will of the President on such a public and 
important matter.680 However this conciliation of Sunni mass opinion was 
limited to appearances and did not signify any radical change in the attitude of 
Sunni politicians towards the status quo in Lebanon. Thus upon his arrival in
675 Bishara Al Khoury, H aaa’ia Lubnanivvah. Vol. 3, Aurak Lubnaniyyah Publications, Beirut, 1961, p. 476.
878 Beirut. 17 May, 1955. The Council was composed of members elected on 16 April 1955 by all Muslim bodies and 
organisations, and was composed of ex-Prime Ministers, Muslim members of the Municipality Board of Beirut, 
members of the ‘Ulema Association, members of the Al Maqassed Society's committee, members of the professional 
syndicates and popular Muslim organisations.
8 According to the British Embassy, Saeb Salam ‘worked against the formation of this council, as he believed that it 
might tend to put an end to his control of the Moslims in Beirut'. F 0 3 7 1 /1 10958/1017.
678 Al Sivassa. 10 June 1958.
679 Al Jarida, 5 April 1956, argued that Sami Al Solh had been asked by Chamoun not to attend, but that Al Solh had 
threatened to resign if prevented from attending. Clearly he felt that his public credibility with his community depended 
to a coniderable extent on taking such a stand. Nicola Ziadeh, Svria and Lebanon, p. 160.
680 Najla Attiyah, 'Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis', p. 242.
231
Cairo, Al Solh tried unsuccessfully to work out a compromise between Egypt 
and Iraq, demonstrating his continuing willingness to support the official 
Lebanese policy line and his sensitivity to Maronite attitudes, rather than taking 
an unequivocally pro-Nasser line.681
Lebanon’s attempt at conciliation at the conference was to have 
tremendous repercussions internally. Al Solh’s efforts infuriated Egypt and 
made Egyptian politicians determined to bring the Sunni politicians in Lebanon 
into alignment with them. The basis for a propaganda campaign aimed at the 
Muslim element already existed in Lebanon, using the medium of radio, in that 
Egyptian became aware that the conciliatory attitude taken by the government 
at the conference had been unpopular with the Sunni masses. For instance, 
students had led demonstrations against Western alliances in general and 
against the Western-backed alliance between Turkey and Iraq in 
particularly.682 This was a good foundation for an Egyptian propaganda 
intervention aimed at making the Lebanese Sunni leaders dependent on 
Egypt’s goodwill by subverting their basis of popular support so they would 
have to alter their political stance. This attempted subversion was to continue 
for the rest of the Chamoun mandate, and with increasing success as the 
Sunni masses responded positively to the rhetoric directed at them, as will be 
shown later in the chapter. There were attempts in the aftermath of this to bring 
together those Sunni leaders in the opposition and those in the government, 
which were to an extent successful, but ultimately all this was seriously to 
undermine the independence of the Sunni local leaders.683 Thus though the 
Prime Minister and the other Sunnis involved in government continued to give 
support to Chamoun, that support was increasingly lukewarm and hesitantly 
given in the face of Egyptian-inspired hostility to the status quo from the Sunni 
rank and file.
Between 1955 and 1958, pro-government Sunni leaders were effectively 
ceasing to carry major political weight in the Sunni community, despite their 
gradual attempts to respond to expressions of community opinion. The
681 ibid,
682 An Nahar. 26 January 1955.
083 Kalawoun Nasser, T h e  Role of the Sunni Leadership’, p. 29.
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growing dissatisfaction of the Sunni population, for example, led to the 
resignation of Sami Al Solh on 19 September 1955, following a divergence in 
the ministerial ranks over the issue of pro-Egyptian inclination. Even Chamoun 
was not immune to the impact on Sunni politicians of this popular Sunni 
pressure. In order to defuse rising tension and the concerns of Sunni 
politicians, he had to appoint Rachid Karami, son of Abd Al Hamid Karami, a 
leading figure in the Sunni opposition to succeed Al Solh. The most senior 
Sunni political office was thus held by a man whose popular base was in 
Tripoli, therefore practically ensuring that Karami could not take anti-Egyptian 
attitude and would put pressure on the President to be conciliatory in order to 
stay on good terms with his supporters in Tripoli.684 Effectively this 
emphasises the extent to which 1955 needs to be seen as a landmark in terms 
of the ways in which Sunni politicians found themselves having to pay lip- 
service, at least, to the pro-Nasserist Sunni popular attitudes.
Karami’s period as Prime Minister formed what Attiyah has described as 
a transitional period in the history of the president-premier relationship in 
Lebanon.685 The early part of Karami’s term saw attempts by him to conform 
to the usual interpretation of the National Pact taken by Sunni politicians, 
keeping the goodwill of the President as well as the support of his community. 
But as the two perspectives proved impossible to reconcile, Karami 
demonstrated that the most important factor in deciding his actions was the 
wishes of the Sunni community, particularly those of his own constituency in 
Tripoli. This determination to champion a pro-Nasserist line brought about a 
new type of conflict within the government, leading to Karami’s resignation in 
March 1956. Rachid Karami’s resignation was engineered by the pro- 
Chamoun element, in direct reaction to the increasing ability of the Sunni 
masses to impose their agenda on their leaders, coming at a time when Sunni 
popular desires were being perceived by the Maronites as radically opposed to 
established Lebanese policy, rather than, as the Sunnis themselves would
684 Despite that, Karami’s ministerial declaration in the assembly vote of confidence was moderate and did not take a 
strong pro-Nasserite stance. Cabinet Papers. Muasasat al Durasat al Lubnanyya, Beirut, 1986, Vol I 1926-66, Rachid 
Karami, Speech, 4  October 1955, p. 386.
685 Najla Attiyah, ‘Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis’, p. 254.
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have claimed, being in line with the National Pact, in the sense that that 
compromise should be keeping a Maronite agenda in check.686
But though Rachid Karami left office, Chamoun was unable to avoid 
appointing a successor, Abdallah Al Yafi, on 19 March, 1956, who was also an 
admirer of Nasser and who took an even tougher stance.687 In an attempt to 
balance the impact this might have on Lebanese foreign policy, Chamoun 
appointed Salim Lahoud as Minister for Foreign Affairs, because of his rigidly 
traditional Lebanese views. But then Chamoun was forced to bow to Sunni 
popular pressure by appointing pro-Nasserist Saeb Salam, another Sunni, as 
Minister of State to assist in Foreign Affairs to counter Sunni hostility to 
Lahoud, another clear indication of the mounting impact of popular Sunni 
opinions.688 But during the summer and autumn of 1956, the majority of 
Lebanese Sunni, continued to demand a closer alignment with Egypt and a 
move towards social equality on Nasserist lines, as the Sunni media 
indicates.689
This produced a dilemma for Sunni politicians. The Sunni masses 
would not accept anything but full support for Egypt, and wished to see this 
demonstrated in Lebanese policy. In terms of domestic policy, this meant 
Sunni politicians adopting a perspective which had, superficially at least, 
socialist implications in the rhetoric they used. But the socialist implications of 
Nasserism was of less importance to the Sunni masses than the imagery they 
had evolved that associated Nasser with opposition to the Christian dominance 
in Lebanon, and so, as Johnson points out, the issue of genuine socialism in 
Lebanon was not central to either the elite or the popular political agenda690
Minutes of Parliament. V, 1955-56, Committee Meeting, 10 November, 1955.
607 Al Yafi took a clearer stand on foreign policy matters. First he stated the following, that he 'refused to adhere to the 
Baghdad Pact, and second to any Western pact’; that he 'would try to work for the aims of the Arab League and the 
pact of mutual defense as well as for economic co-operation as well as any domain with the Arab brothers'. Cabinet 
Papers. Abdallah Al Yafi, 29 March 1956, p. 399.
688 Cabinet Papers, pp. 398-403.
689 For instance, see Beirut. 2 August 1956; 5 August 1956, for articles arguing that only a  domestic policy modelled 
on Nasserist lines would insitute a system based on equalities in political, social and economic terms, between the 
Christian and Muslim communities.
690 Indeed, Nasser’s own socialism was more rhetorical than real, see Michael Johnson, Class and Client in Beirut, p. 
131. According to Clovis Maksoud, there were some genuinely socialist groupings within Lebanon, reflecting socialist 
aspirations amongst their membership, notably the Ba’ath Socialist party or H arakata l Qawmiyyah a! Arab, and there 
was a certain intellectual constituency that was also impressed by the Nasserist version of socialism and its vision of 
socialist justice as it was in place In Egypt. However, the power of such groupings was ‘limited’, and ‘confined mainly 
to the intelligentsia with some trade union and mass following in the cities of Tripoli and Tyre’. Clovis Maksoud, 
‘Lebanon and Arab Nationalism', in L. Binder (ed.), Politics in Lebanon, p. 253.
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The real problem lay in the fact that a demonstration of support for Nasser in 
foreign policy terms involved, in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis, a formal 
breach with the West, which the many Sunni politicians did not want to support, 
because of the implications for the compromises at the heart of the National 
Pact. They would have been happy with a policy that distanced Lebanon from 
open support for Western policies in the region, and brought the state closer to 
the Arab world. However, the Suez Crisis meant that such compromise was 
no longer acceptable to the Sunni masses, who were less concerned about the 
nuances of the National Pact. They were increasingly encouraged in this 
attitude by Egyptian propaganda reiterating Nasser’s opposition to continued 
contact with the West, and the interpretation that such contact undermined the 
Arab world as a whole. The problems this brought for Sunni politicians is 
underlined by the resignations of Abdallah Al Yafi and Saeb Salam on 16 
November 1956. These resignations also served to heighten intercommunal 
tensions, even though both ministers were eager to demonstrate that they left 
office on good terms with Chamoun.691 On 20 November 1956, Sami Al Solh 
again became Prime Minister in what was intended to be a compromise move, 
and the new administration won a vote of confidence in the Chamber of 
Deputies by thirty-eight votes to two, demonstrating that a complete rift 
between Muslim politicians and the state did not yet exist.692 Indeed the 
potential still existed for compromise between the leaders of the two main 
communities, and for this to be reflected in popular opinion. For example, a 
demonstration took place in Sidon after the formation of the new Cabinet which 
hailed both Chamoun and Nasser.693 A factor that aided this continuation of 
consensus was the attitude of the Sunni religious establishment, which at this 
point showed itself still to be willing to do work with the government and accept 
the existence of the separate Lebanese state. For example, after the formation 
of Sami Al Solh’s new Cabinet on 20 November 1956, the Mufti had addressed 
a gathering of Sunni notables, and issued a plea that the Muslim faithful should
691 Letter of resignation of Abdallah Ai Yafi as Prime Minister, 16 November 1956 in Al Havat. 17 November 1956
692 Beirut. 28 November 1956.
693 An Nahar. 10 January 1957 giving the text of Charles Malik's Declaration in Rome, 9 January 1957, on the 
Eisenhower Doctrine.
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‘block the way of the exploiters’, by which he meant that Muslims should not 
break their ties with the government.694
Sunni politicians started 1957 by seeking to maintain their neutrality 
between pro-Egyptian and pro-Western policies, justified by reference to the 
National Pact, even after the publication in the Arab world of the Eisenhower 
Doctrine in 1957. The official policy of the Lebanese government, including its 
Sunni members, was an enthusiastic acceptance of the Doctrine.695 In this 
respect, the prospect of the impending elections in 1957 made the Sunni 
leaders reluctant to launch attacks on the Eisenhower Doctrine or the policy of 
acceptance of it by the Lebanese government, particularly in the absence of 
official Egyptian reaction to the Doctrine. This conciliatory attitude began to 
modify, however, once Sunni politicians realised the strength of the impact that 
the Egyptian propaganda against the Doctrine was having, and especially after 
the elections of 1957.
It was against the background of a growing popular support for 
Nasserism and the evolution of these organisations and agencies that the 
hierarchy of the Sunni social organisation, held together by tradition and lower 
accessibility to those factors like education which promote greater 
independence and individual thought at lower levels of society, began to 
modify - at least temporarily. By 1957, consciousness of this began to put 
pressure on Sunni leaders to take account of popular Sunni wishes.696 A 1958 
pamphlet by Ismail Moussa Al Yussuf referred to the ‘discontent’ of the masses 
and their ‘recriminations’ against their leaders that their grievances were not 
being listened to by them. That, by May 1958, such discontent was being 
taken seriously by the Sunni leadership is indicated by Al Jisr’s willingness to 
list what he identified as ‘popular grievances’, cultural, educational and 
economic as well as political, in an important speech given in Tripoli in May 
1958 which sought to justify and explain the actions of the Sunni leadership at 
that time partly by reference to the list. The series of well-supported strikes by 
Sunni workers from March 1957 was another factor that Ismail Moussa Al
694 Beirut. 14 December 1956.
695 A point stressed by Charles Malik in Rome, 9 January 1957, see Ai Havat. 10 January 1957.
699 Samir Khalaf & Guilaine Denoueux, 'Urban Networks and Political Conflict' in Shehadi & Mills (eds), Lebanon, p. 
187.
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Yussuf identified as part of the popular Sunni resentment with their leaders. 
He argued quite explicitly that it was ‘in reaction to not being listened to’ that 
they ‘organised themselves and took up arms’.697
The Lebanese Sunni masses adopted a policy line in keeping with the 
Egyptian line, emphasising the influence of Nasser on their thinking.698 During 
1957, the pro-Nasserist attitude of the Sunni masses largely expressed itself in 
rhetoric reported in the media. For instance, plans for a series of strikes and 
demonstrations were drawn up on 29 March 1957, to start the next day. It was 
not until 30 May 1957 that a demonstration actually took place in Beirut. Its 
bloody resolution lessened the immediate popular enthusiasm for a swift 
repeat, and the next such expression of popular discontent was a strike on 5 
November 1957, again in Beirut. During the disturbances surrounding this, 
Adnan Al Hakim, the leader of the Najjadah grouping, was arrested.699 But as 
1958 progressed, the levels of resentment amongst the Sunni masses in 
Lebanon increased, and the Sunni elites also showed themselves more ready 
to respond to popular concerns and to distance themselves from the 
government.
It was the Eisenhower Doctrine, that was to form the common thread in 
both the Egyptian and Syrian propaganda aimed at the Sunni masses and, 
consequently, in the development of a closer relationship between the masses 
and the politicians in the Sunni community. Some idea of the initial strength of 
Sunni popular reactions against the Eisenhower Doctrine can be gauged by 
the aftermath of the publication on 16 March, 1957 of the American-Lebanese 
communique implying Lebanese acceptance of the Doctrine.700 Critical Sunni 
comment was widely reported; and this was not just in the days immediately 
following its publication, it was sustained over a longer period, encouraged by
697 Ismail Moussa Al Yussuf, Thawrat Al ‘Ahrar Fi Lubnan. n.d. but internal evidence, notably reference to recent 
strikes in May 1958, makes it plain that it dates from the late spring or summer of 1958, pp. 36; 135; Nadim Al Jisr, 
Speech, reported in Al Havat. 18 May 1958. Al Havat reported that a decision to go on strike to highlight a range of 
popular grievances was taken on 29 March 1957, and was swiftly followed by demonstrations on 30 March. A 
demonstration on 30 May 1957 ended in violence with seven dead, 73 wounded and 400 arrested. A further strike of 5 
November 1957 involved the populist Najjadah grouping, and saw the arrest of the leader, Adnan Al Hakim. See Al 
Havat. 30 March 1957; 313 March 1957; 31 May 1957; 5 November 1957.
698 A point consistently brought out in Beirut, see for instance the article of 21 December 1956.
699 Al Havat. 30 M ay 1957; 30 May 1957; 31 May 1957; 1 June 1957; 5 November 1957; 6 November 1957. During
the May demonstration, seven were killed, 73  wounded and 400 arrested, according to Al Havat.
700 For the text of the communique of 16 March 1957, see M S Agwani, The Lebanese Crisis 1958: A Documentary
Study. Asia Publishing House, New Delhi, 1965, p, 16.
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the rhetoric of radio broadcasts from Egypt.701 Such popular expression acted 
as a stimulus to the formation of the United National Front on 31 March 1957, 
a political grouping through which opposition Sunni politicians could begin to 
voice their hostility against the Chamoun government and its foreign policy. 
The manifesto produced by the United National Front was signed by important 
Sunni figures including predictable names such as Saeb Salam and Abdallah 
Al Yafi, but also some less expected names such as Takkieddine Al Solh, one 
of Sami Al Solh’s family group. These figures also signed a petition from the 
Front to Chamoun, presented on 12 April 1957, protesting against his policies: 
but it was a protest over domestic as well as foreign policy issues.702 A linkage 
was made between the two by Front’s claiming that the protests over 
Chamoun’s domestic policy was linked to a defence of Lebanon’s sovereignty. 
Independence could only be assured through a defence of the principles of the 
National Pact since, according to the manifesto, that had been ‘unanimously’ 
adopted by ‘the Lebanese people’ as the ‘most effective means’ of ensuring 
‘understanding, harmony and co-operation’ between the communities. This 
element is made still clearer in Point 4 of the manifesto, which claimed that the 
aim was ‘to ensure justice between the religious communities which form the 
Lebanese people so that each community which form the Lebanese people so
that each community may respect one another’s rights and so that none should
have the upper hand over the other’.703
Relating to this, the petition to Chamoun also laid a stress on the need 
for measures to be taken to demonstrate that the 1957 elections would be fair 
and honest. In order to show that their petition had popular, as well as 
political, support a huge demonstration of support for the United National Front 
and the petition was organised and publicised through the media.704 But the 
reaction of the Chamoun government was not to seek compromise; instead the 
demonstration was dispersed with considerable harshness. The effect was 
not, however, to crush opposition but rather to increase popular Sunni
701 See, for example, Al Havat. 11 April 1957, making mention of such broadcasts.
702 M.S. Agwani, The Lebanese Crisis, pp. 29-33, for a translation of the full text of the petition and the manifesto of 
the United National Front. This grouping also included figures from other Muslim communities, such as Kamal 
Jumblat, and even a number of noted Maronite opposition figures such as Fouad Ammoun, Phillippe Takla, and Ilyas 
Al Khoury.
703 M.S. Agwani, The Lebanese Crisis, p. 30.
704 See, for instance, reports in Al Havat. 1 April 1957; Beirut. 3 April 1957.
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disaffection. As An Nahar pointed out, it also made it more difficult for Sunni 
politicians to look for any grounds for co-operation with Chamoun, even if they 
had wanted this.705 In this context the governments high profile pursuit of its 
pro-Western foreign policy must be described as being both aggressive and 
confrontational. A vote of confidence on foreign policy was put forward, 
phrased in such an uncompromising way that even those Sunni leaders who 
were generally willing to accept a pro-Western policy subject to certain 
safeguards, felt unable to support the vote.708 Even so, the majority of Sunni 
deputies were reluctant to resign over the issue. The smallness of the number 
that did resign demonstrated the continuing disparity between the Sunni 
masses and their spokesmen in parliament even at this late stage.707 Only six 
deputies resigned but among them were five Muslims; Abdallah Al Yafi, Ahmad 
Al Assad, Sabri Hamada, Abdallah Al Haj and Kamil Al Assad.708 It can be 
said that the majority of the Sunni deputies were thinking twice before 
antagonising the government or the President because of the imminent 
elections. But amongst the Sunni masses, especially in West Beirut, 
Nasserism was acting as an opposition doctrine, giving shape to a populist 
yearning for a Sunni Arab order.709
By this time, in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis and similar triumphs, the 
Sunni masses had accorded Nasser the status of a local icon, with his face 
posted on walls and hung in classrooms. On the eve of the 1957 election a 
popular Sunni opposition to Lebanese government policy, essentially grounded 
in opposition to the foreign policy, had come into existence that was endorsed 
by the Sunni ‘ulamas and popular organisations. One event in April 1957 
indicates how attitudes amongst the Sunni religious establishment were 
modifying in ways that distanced them from the genera! support for the 
government identified in 1956. Shaykh Shafik Yamut, who was the head of the 
Sharia Court, held a political meeting for the opposition. Among the 
approximately 300 Muslims notables attending were Sunni figures such as 
Saeb Salam, Abd Al Hamid Karami, and Al Yafi, as well as the prominent
705 An Nahar. 13 April 1957.
70G Beirut. 3 April 1957.
707 Najla Attiyah, ‘Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis’, p. 269.
708 Al Sivassa. 7 April 1957.
709 Fouad Ajar, The Arab Predicament. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981, p. 93.
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Shi'ite leaders, Ahmad Al Assad and Sabri Hamadi. Reporting on the meeting, 
Al Sivassa highlighted the extent of this break with tradition by pointing out that 
pro-government Muslim personalities had to be excluded because of public 
hostility to them.710
At the meeting Shaykh Shafik Yamut launched a fierce attack on the 
government; one that had sectarian overtones and was clearly intended for 
popular consumption. He stressed Lebanon’s unqualified identification with 
the Arab world, and called for the pursuit in Lebanon of the type of policy 
followed by the ‘liberal’ revolutionary Arab states. Shaykh Yamut said that the 
reason for the meeting was what he described as ‘public concern’ over ‘Islam’s 
honour and glory’ and proceeded to given an interpretation of what he saw as 
the role of the National Pact. He argued that Muslim support for the Pact 
entailed a government policy which rejected pacts with foreign powers, i.e., 
with the West, and argued for the development of a ‘liberal’ Arab policy based 
on independence and neutrality between the two world camps and the 
continuing struggle to solve the problems of the Arab world, inside and outside 
Lebanon. It was an interpretation that was accepted by the audience and were 
later supported by the Higher Muslim Council, and, according to editorials, 
something that also gained popular support.711 There is thus noticeably 
increasing alienation of the opposition and the Muslim religious establishment 
in the run-up to the election. For example, in the aftermath of the suppression 
of the mainly Muslim demonstration on 30 May 1957, the Mufti protested to 
the President about the harsh reprisals taken by the government and it was 
after this that the Higher Muslim Council joined the United National Front in 
demanding a neutral government in the run-up to the election, criticising the 
general government attitude at this time.712
But even so the religious establishment did not want totally to break its 
ties with the government in the period before the election. It was the results of 
the election that hardened attitudes among the religious establishment, as 
amongst the political establishment, and again, the impact of outside
710 Al Sivassa. 25 April 1957; 26 April 1957; 27  April 1957.
711 See, for instance, editorials in Al Sivassa. 25 April 1957; 27 April.
712 Al Sivassa. 31 May 1957.
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influences on the Sunni masses was an important factor, if only because of the 
continuing lack of an indigenous popular leader with universal appeal. Yet at 
the same time, and despite the high profile given to Nasser in the absence of 
an indigenous leader, the leaders of a popular political opposition that did 
emerge at this point did not go beyond hostility to Chamoun and his policies. 
There was no indication that such leaders felt pressure from their community to 
agitate seriously for formal union with the UAR, for instance. The popular 
opposition concentrated its efforts on complaints about domestic policy and 
other local issues, given a gloss of Nasserism. As late as 16 April 1958 even 
the more radical of the opposition groupings, Najjadah, did not find it 
necessary to condemn either Lebanese sovereignty or the National Pact, so 
long as both were interpreted in the context of the Arab world.713
In the run-up to the 1957 elections the majority of traditional Sunni 
leaders, even those in political opposition, sought to maintain the spirit of 
compromise. This was not just the tradition of the National Pact in operation; it 
was also a fear about the impact of Nasserism on their own followers. Such 
leaders were used to being able to wield considerable influence over their 
followers, and they feared a diminution of their power in a socialist and/or 
larger and essentially Arab entity. For this reason, their hostility to Chamoun’s 
policies was, in itself, not sufficient at this stage to induce them to sever their 
ties with the state.714 Chamoun’s anti-Nasserism and his overly pro-British 
policy did not arouse a degree of opposition amongst the Sunni leaders to 
match that amongst the Sunni voters.715 However the events of the election 
did result in a greater degree of compatibility in this respect, because it forced 
consideration of other issues besides the foreign policy ones that had created 
popular Sunni hostility to the government, such as the domestic grievances 
already discussed and the popular perception that the Chamoun government 
had failed to provide any remedies. To some extent Sunni leaders had already 
made some advances towards the popular position by the start of 1957, 
adopting popular mainstream slogans even when they were not willing to break
713 An Nahar. 15 March 1958, reported an appeal, rather than a warning, from Najjadah to the government to 
moderate its policy towards the Arab world; Al Havat. 16 April 1958. See also M.S. Agwani, The Lebanese Crisis, pp. 
42-3.
714 Minutes of Parliament. V, 1955 - 56, Meeting, 26 November 1956, pp. 107-109; 111-112.
715 Beirut. 14 December 1956.
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with the government entirely. The ability of the President to manipulate the 
premiership meant that ambitious Sunni poiiticians continued to seek both the 
support of their community and a compromise with the state.716
Yet the suggestions of electoral malpractice surrounding the 1957 
elections finally ensured that men like Saeb Salam and Abdallah Al Yafi, for 
reasons of personal and communal bitterness, finally came out in open 
opposition to Chamoun and his policies, abandoning the search for 
compromise on the grounds that Chamoun had broken the terms of the 
National Pact first.717 Increasingly such politicians followed the example of the 
masses by voicing their opposition to Chamoun in terms of opposition to his 
foreign policy: The nature of the issues over which the government and the 
opposition were fighting made the election campaign a fight for survival on 
principles of consensus and within this, for a neutral foreign policy’.718 The 
media underlined the extent to which it was popularly believed by the Sunni 
community, in the summer of 1957, that Chamoun had broken the rules of 
government by consensus.719 While opposition hostility focused ever more 
strongly on Chamoun and his regime, the loyalty of Sunni leaders to the 
Lebanese states was also weakened by the bitter hostility towards Chamoun 
that the defeated leaders now felt. Attempts at mediation at elite levels did still 
take place, instituted by figures inside and outside Lebanon. For instance, 
King Saud, who was afraid of the growing power of Nasserism in the region, 
attempted to mediate between Saeb Salam and Abdallah Al Yafi on the one 
hand and President Chamoun on the other.720 The fact that the Sunni political 
leaders were willing to take part in this attempt and seek a compromise with 
the government to mitigate the effects of the election demonstrates that even 
at this stage there were important Sunni political leaders who attached only 
relative significance to the issue of foreign policy.721 They were practically
716 In the aftermath of resignation, Sunni politicians generally sought to remain on good terms with Chamoun if they 
wished to return to office. Hence Al Yafi’s declaration that ‘W e have not and never shall stab a Lebanese President in 
the back', Minutes of Parliament. V. 1955-56, Meeting, 26 November 1956, pp. 107-109; 111-112.
717 Beirut. 3 Anrii 1957.
718 Najla Attiyah, ‘Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis', p. 274.
719 It was sufficiently acute to be noticed even in the Maronite press, see, for example, Al Havat. 31 May 1957; An 
Nahar. 19 June 1957.
720 Al Sivassa. 14 June 1957; 15 June 1957; 3 July 1957.
721 L’Orient. 3 July 1957.
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more interested in domestic issues, including policies to safeguard their own 
personal interests in the current situation.722
But another factor in the responsiveness of the Sunni elites to such 
popular pressure during 1957 and 1958 was a growing consciousness among 
Sunni politicians that they could, under the right circumstances, have an 
impact on the government of Lebanon: that they did not have simply to accept 
the attitude taken by Sami AI Solh; that of a resigned acceptance of 
manipulation by the Maronite political and commercial establishment.723 
During the Chamoun regime, as Sunni discontent mounted, Sunni politicians 
began to act collectively in order to make their protests felt against Chamoun’s 
tactics. In the final analysis it had been Sunni politicians who had played a 
decisive role in bringing Al Khoury’s regime to an end. Remembrance of this 
also made the Sunni politicians place a greater emphasis on the fulfilment by 
Maronite politicians of what the former interpreted as both terms and spirit of 
the National Pact.
The significance of the National Pact in the years 1952 to 1958 was, 
according to Raghid Al Solh, its contribution to the emergence amongst Sunni 
politicians of a concept he calls ‘democracy by conciliation’.724 There was a 
greater realisation that the system of compromise provided Muslims, as well as 
Maronites, irrespective of their numbers, with a power of veto over any major 
decisions which either side saw as dangerous to its own interest. Because of 
the veto would thus signal a national crisis, it made rule by consensus possible 
but equally made it dependent on mutual co-operation. Moreover it contained 
within it the potential for Sunni politicians to hinder the workings of government 
and even to bring down a president.725
This leads to the conclusion that many opposition leaders, if left to work 
out this crisis purely in terms of the domestic context and devoid of pressures 
from the rest of the Arab world, even if expressed through popular opinion in 
Lebanon, would have sough a course of action less extreme than the one they
722 Al Havat. 3 June 1957.
723 Sami Al Solh, Mudhakkarat. p. 320.
724 Raghid Al Solh, ‘Lebanon and Arab Nationalism, 1936-1945', Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, St. Anthony's College, 
Oxford, 1986, p. 277.
725 Nasser Kalawoun, ‘The Role of the Sunni Leadership', p. 37; Camille Chamoun, Mudhakkarat. pp 262-3.
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eventually adopted.726 As Attiyah has argued, the opposition would not have 
expressed hostility in terms of what she calls ‘a basic alienation from the state’, 
but would have expressed it in terms of a ‘struggle for power’.727 That the 
attempted mediation failed has more to do with continuing opposition to 
Chamoun than to a wish to see the end of a separate Lebanon. On 27 March 
1958, for instance, 82 opposition politicians issued a statement emphasising 
that the real cause of the trouble was that ‘the President is still determined to 
amend the constitution’ to renew his term of office and that, despite 
Chamoun’s rhetoric, ‘the signatories consider that the independence and 
sovereignty of Lebanon were not and will never be’ under threat by elements in 
the Arab world while the ‘Lebanese people adhere to the National Pact which 
has sanctified national unity since 1943’. There was no reason for the 
constitutional amendment and therefore the Lebanese people would ‘resist the 
renewal of the presidential term while pledging such support for the Pact’.728
The internal dimension was of prime significance, but what was 
interpreted as either ‘friendly encouragement’ in the majority Sunni 
perspective, or ‘hostile intervention’ from a government and/or Maronite one, 
by Syria and Nasser, was of great importance in giving shape and coherence 
to the developing hostility of the Lebanese Sunni masses, political and 
religious, by the end of 1957. Nasser enthusiastically seized the opportunity 
offered by dissatisfaction with the outcome of the election to provide the 
political opposition and, to an even greater extent, the Muslim religious 
establishment, with both moral and material support in a successful attempt to 
radicalise anti-government positions in Lebanon. Increasingly detailed 
criticisms were given in these broadcasts of government policy.729 For 
example, Nasser made generous donations to the mosques in Lebanon. It 
was recorded in Al Sivassa on 25 January 1958, that the Egyptian government
726 Najia Attiy.ah, 'Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis’, p. 275.
727 Ibid. p. 276.
728 Al Havat. 28 March 1958.
729 See, for instance, Al Havat. 23 December 1957; 16 March 1958; An Nahar. 29 January 1958; 9 February 1958; 16 
March 1958, ail mentioning such criticisms and relating them to popular disturbances of a pro-Nasserist description.
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had donated 30,000 Egyptian pounds to Lebanese mosques, information also 
recorded with due suspicion in the consular reports of the period.730
But the intervention did not consist merely of these peaceful instances. 
To the concern of the Lebanese government at least, a number of incidents 
from the autumn of 1957 seemed to indicate that this intervention was seeking 
actively to encourage the Sunni masses, and those of other Muslim 
communities into open revolt against the state. On 3 September a Syrian car 
was caught smuggling arms to Lebanon, while on 4 September there was a 
heated debate in parliament about a government project to place the frontiers 
into a state of ‘emergency readiness’ because of the arms smuggling. On 5 
October 1957, the government officially accused the Syrians of spreading 
disruption in Lebanon through the agency of their Intelligence Service.731
Certainly in taking up opposition to government policies, the popular 
Sunni (and other Muslim) organisations and religious bodies did begin to state 
that their opposition to Chamoun was now rooted in Arab issues which were 
not exclusively Lebanese and did invoke the figure of Nasser. But it was 
internal matters that led the opposition to ask, on 8 October 1957, for the trial 
of the ministers responsible for harsh reprisals taken against anti-government 
demonstrators in Beirut, Sidon and Tripoli on 30 May 1957.732 It was therefore 
largely as a result of their own efforts that Chamoun and his Prime Minister A! 
Solh had succeeded in alienating Sunni opinion even at elite levels, and 
indeed, with some exceptions, the opinions of the Muslim community as a 
whole. The rank and file, the popular and religious organisations and all the 
prominent leaders with the exception of Sami Al Solh, were, by the start of 
1958, drawn together by mutual hostility to the regime.733 This anti­
government opposition within Lebanon, particularly the popular Sunni 
opposition, showed itself prepared by this time also to utilise this external
730 FO 371/1134116, Telegram no. 477, Middleton to Selwyn Lloyd, 13 May 1958; FO 371/134127, Telegram no. 956, 
British Embassy, Beirut to Foreign Office, 9 July 1958; FO371/134130, Telegram no. 991, British Embassy, Beirut to 
Foreign Office, 14 July 1958.
731 Al Havat. 3 September 1957; 4  September 1957; 13 September 1957; 19 September 1957; 5 October 1957; 6 
October 1957.
732 Ai Havat. 8 October 1957.
733 M.S. Agwani, The Lebanese Crisis, pp. 35-41.
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intervention and other outside events to increase the impact of its opposition to 
Chamoun, and to take to the streets themselves in solidarity with such hostility.
Taking a lead in the aggression were the Muslim associations with a 
significant degree of Sunni support, such as the Najjadah grouping, the Muslim 
Young Men’s Union, Al Hayat al Wataniyyah and the Al Maqassed College 
Alumni Association. There was also a popular grouping that had been formed 
in Basta, one of the most populous Sunni areas of Beirut, that took as its main 
object putting pressure on Muslim leaders to oppose government policy and to 
adopt a quasi-Nasserist perspective towards domestic grievances.734 By 1958 
these associations felt sufficiently secure of popular support, according to 
Ismail Moussa Al Yussuf, to declare ‘popular revolution’ and to ‘close’ key 
popular areas such as Basta, Moussaytbe, Tarik Jdide, Mazraha and Nourieh 
to established authority, marking that closure by building barricades and 
defending them with armed members of their associations.735
It was a strategy designed to frighten the government into a ‘return’ to 
compliance and compromise; a strategy made possible by the willingness of 
outside forces to see the Lebanese opposition bring down Chamoun, hoping 
thereby to see the end of a pro-Western orientation in Lebanese foreign policy, 
and the responsiveness of the Muslim masses to pro-Nasserist rhetoric.736 It 
ensured that there was, during 1958, an increasing appearance of the 
opposition having a wider, Arab dimension. At popular levels, the declaration of 
the United Arab Republic in 1958 was greeted with predictable enthusiasm. It 
gave the Al Maqassed association an occasion to pronounce that the day 
should be a national holiday. The Union of ‘Ulama, as well as the students of 
the Al Maqassed College and other Muslim schools, sent congratulatory 
telegrams to the Presidents of Syria and Egypt, as did the Muslim Scouts and 
the Union of Arab students.737 In the cables themselves and the associated 
celebrations of the occasion the broader Islamic connotations of this Muslim
734 Ismail Moussa Al Yussuf. Thawrat Al 'Ahrar Fi Lubnan. p. 135.
735 ibid.
733 Though Lebanese Sunni, and other opposition, politicians gave little indication in their speeches etc. that they 
wanted to abandon the National Pact to the extent of a complete break with the W est, for practical, economic reasons 
if for nothing else.
737 Al S ivassa, 2 February 1958, 4  February 1958; 5 February 1958; 7 February 1958.
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jubilation were made plain as the following quote from the 'ulamas’ cable to 
Nasser indicates:
The Association of ‘Ulama in Lebanon...congratulates the 
Arabs and Muslims in all the world on the birth of the 
United Arab Republic... You have fulfilled the great hopes 
of the Arabs and of the Muslims.738
Kamal Salibi recalls being informed that ‘the Muslim Lebanese rejoicing over 
the union between Syria and Egypt was running wild’, and that ‘mobs were 
clamouring for Lebanon to join the union without delay’ as they ‘roamed the 
streets of every town and city’.739 But this popular rejoicing at the ‘birth’ of the 
UAR was interpreted through a local perspective, in that it seemed likely to 
strengthen the Sunni position in relation to fighting the presumed Maronite 
agenda of divesting Lebanon of its Arab identity in favour of a Mediterranean 
European one.740
Nasser’s visit to Damascus in February provided another occasion for 
popular Muslim celebrations in Lebanon with clear anti-government overtones. 
Popular enthusiasm, demonstrated in the trips to Damascus to view the hero of 
the hour, certainly alarmed the government.741 According to Hasanein Haykai, 
quoting Reuters and Associated Press figures, the estimated numbers going to 
Damascus amounted to 500,000, a considerable proportion of the Muslim 
community.742 The Mufti and the Muslim press, and the Muslim masses, used 
the occasion to express openly their allegiance to Nasser, giving a clear 
demonstration of the extent of the degree of popular Muslim alienation from the 
state. The alienation continued to grow, rather than diminish as 1958 went on, 
partly due to Chamoun’s own policies but partly due to judiciously calculated 
intervention from Nasser aimed at the Muslim masses. For instance, President 
Nasser addressed the Lebanese people on 2 March 1958, in a letter that was 
a shrewd piece of politics. He did not openly express a hope that Lebanon 
would join the UAR, but he implied that he possessed that hope, by pointing at 
parallels between Lebanon and Yemen and addressing his Lebanese readers
738 Al Sivassa. 4  February 1958.
738 K.S. Salibi, ‘Recollections of the 1940s and 1950s', p. 15.
740 Muhammad Hasanein Haykai, Sanawat Al Galavan. p. 319.
741 An Nahar. 4  February 1958; 16 March 1958, for instance.
742 Muhammad Hasanein Haykai, Sanawat al Galavam . p. 319.
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as ‘fellow countrymen’. Nasser praised Yemen for being the first country to 
join the UAR union: ‘We welcome Yemen into our union and we feel that this 
unity which springs from the heart of the Arab National and from its will is the 
strength we aim at achieving’. He added that it would be the nucleus of the all- 
embracing unity we hope to see accomplished soon in every Arab country.743
The consciousness of support from the wider Arab world encouraged 
Sunni leaders into taking up tactics that lessened the immediate potential for 
compromise with the Chamoun government, but did seem to promise a return 
to the principles of the National Pact and to a greater Sunni political role within 
the state. Certainly it won approval from the Sunni masses and thereby also 
brought all levels of the Sunni community closer to the Shi’a and Druze 
communities through the invoking of both religious and Arab sentiment. On 11 
April 1958 the Mufti invited the ‘ulama and opposition personalities for an Iftar 
dinner, but contrary to usual practice, the Prime Minister and other government 
ministers were excluded from the invitation. The occasion thus turned into an 
opposition political rally culminating in a vote of defiance against the Chamoun 
government.744 But it was not a vote against the continuance of Lebanese 
independence. Saeb Salam even claimed that ‘We have made a pact with the 
Patriarch against Chamoun’. This snub to the government took place in the 
context of an opposition statement that brought Sunni leaders together with 
those from other Muslim communities. It was decreed that none of the 
traditional congratulations were to be offered during Bayram, the feast at the 
end of Ramadan, in view of Lebanon’s suffering at the hands of her present 
rulers. This was to be followed up on 17 April by a declaration by 200 leading 
Muslims to the effect of anyone who offered or accepted Bayram 
congratulations would be regarded as having ‘violated the unanimity’ of the 
‘Muslim community’. Such moves were applauded by the Sunni masses and 
popular organisations, as the Iftar held by the Mufti indicated. It turned into a 
well-attended popular demonstration against the government.745
743 Al Siavssa. 4 February 1958, which provided a laudatory survey of Nasser’s speeches and press interviews.
744 An Nahar 10 April 1958; 11 April 1958.
745 Al Siiyassa. for instance, reporting these developments on 11 April; 12 April; 17 April 1958; 18 April 1958.
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The Prime Minister responded defiantly to such demonstrations, making 
an announcement, for instance, that he would be receiving congratulations on 
the first day of the Bayram feast at his house.746 But the extent to which those 
Muslims who remained loyal to Chamoun, including Sami Al Solh, were 
isolated is indicated by the events of 20 April. At 4am, Sami Al Solh 
accompanied by the few Muslim members of the government, attended 
prayers in the Omari Mosque. It was reported that such was the strength of 
the religious boycott that the government had considerable difficulty in finding 
an Imam prepared to officiate.747 Later on the same day, explosives were 
thrown nearby Al Solh’s house as he was receiving those visitors who did call 
to give him congratulations.748
The rift between the Prime Minister and his supporters and the rest of 
the Muslim community grew greater after this. Al Solh had offended the 
‘ulamas by trying to stop them attending gatherings such as the Iftar dinner of 
11 April, so the response of the Muslim religious establishment led by the Mufti 
as well as the ‘ulamas was publicly to declare the Prime Minister an 
apostate.749 The immediate impact of the Ramadan events was huge and it 
did not die away. In the longer term it also served to heighten both anti­
government feelings and opposition determination to increase the scale of its 
activities at the same time as Chamoun was seeking to portray such 
developments as evidence of a Muslim and Arab-inspired conspiracy against 
the state; to increase support for his re-election plans by portraying the tension 
as resulting from an intercommunal breach, rather than a simple matter of 
potentially political opposition.750 Thus Chamoun used opportunities such as 
that offered by the spokesman of the Chamber of Deputies, Adel Osseiran, 
when making a speech in Cairo. Osseiran declared that it was in Lebanon’s 
interest to join the United Arab Republic, adding i  will go further than this: the 
day will come when everything will be achieved’. As An Nahar pointed out in 
an editorial on 23 April, Osseiran’s words could not be taken seriously as 
representing an opposition agenda. Osseiran was notorious for making the
746 L'Orient. 21 April 1958.
747 ibid.
748 An Nahar. 21 April 1958, provided a graphic report of this incident.
749 Ibid.750 lWtri
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kind of speech his audience wanted to hear. Back in Lebanon he was to revert 
to support for Lebanese independence, along with the majority of opposition 
leaders.751
Chamoun’s efforts to portray the growing tension as a Maronite-Sunni 
(or Christian-Muslim) affair did have an effect on the Sunni masses as on the 
Maronite masses.752 They identified themselves more strongly with the 
Nasser-led Arab world and against the West, increasingly now personified by 
the USA as a result of Nasser’s invective against the Eisenhower Doctrine and 
of more immediate significance, because of the belief that the US government 
admired and supported Chamoun in his hopes for re-election.753 But even at 
the beginning of May 1958, the Sunni political opposition remained focused on 
the issue of Chamoun’s re-election despite its general disapproval of 
Chamoun’s overly pro-Western foreign policy. All this latter did was 
emphasise the importance of removing Chamoun at the end of his mandate or, 
ideally, before. The opposition stated that Chamoun should go because in 
seeking to strengthen his own position he was reducing the power of the Sunni 
Prime Minister and so the influence guaranteed to the Sunni community under 
the National Pact. They also accused him of manipulating the 1957 elections, 
making him guilty of corruption. Only then was he accused, in vaguer terms, of 
following anti-Nasserist policies. Despite differences with other opposition 
groupings, Muslim and Christian, the Sunni opposition was able to work with 
them because of the atmosphere of emergency created by Chamoun’s 
personal ambitions and willingness to seek to manipulate tensions in Lebanon 
to further his ambitions. This enabled the emergence of a temporary coalition 
of opposition leaders and notables, with popular support, with the major pre­
requisite of a successful opposition, unification on a single point - preventing 
Chamoun’s re-election.754 With the exception of the Osseiran speech referred
751 An Nahar. 23 April 1958.
752 See Chapter Six, p. 273.
753 Saeb Salam, Oral Interview, Geneva, 4  January 1991, talking of a growing anti-Western feeling amongst the Sunni 
and other Muslim groups in Lebanon. See, also for example, Telegram Nos. 328, 529 Beirut, 4  May 1958, pp. 555- 
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s
754 F 0 371 /134 116, Telegram no. 433, British Embassy, Beirut to Foreign Office, 5 May 1958. It is interesting here to 
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to already, no major opposition leader made any public comment or traceable 
private comment indicating a wish to see the end of the Lebanese entity. 
Looking back, Saeb Salam, for instance, stressed that throughout the crisis he 
remained concerned to maintain Lebanon’s independence and never 
supported any policy to dismantle either the free economy or the traditional 
political system in Lebanon.755
However, in the aftermath of the murder of Al Matni on 8 May 1958, the 
position of the Sunni political leadership (like that of the other Muslim 
communities) drew closer to that taken by the Muslim masses. A policy 
meeting of the United National Front on 9 May 1958 decided that open armed 
revolt was the only way forward against Chamoun.756 The resulting unrest 
included outbreaks of violence in Beirut on 12 May, and an attack by Jumblat’s 
forces on the presidential palace of Bayt Al Din. Government reaction, 
including comment from Sami Al Solh and the Maronite loyalist press was to 
argue this violence was not internally generated, but was the result of UAR 
intervention.757 This is not borne out by other evidence. There is unequivocal 
evidence that elements from all levels of the Sunni community in Lebanon 
were prepared to take advantage of the willingness of the UAR to become 
involved in events in the country. It was the availability of this support, in terms 
of arms and manpower, that enabled the United National Front to launch its 
armed revolt after 9 May. But it was not the UAR that was responsible for 
creating the hostility amongst the Sunni element in Lebanon in the first place, 
and it was an essentially Lebanese decision to escalate the crisis by the use of 
armed violence.758 But it was not a conspiracy that aimed to destroy the state. 
From the perspective of the Sunni community in Lebanon, the armed nature 
that ‘intervention’ or Arab aid had taken from May 1958 was justified by claims 
that it was a final effort to resolve, not escalate, the crisis; and that Nasser, for 
instance, was merely showing friendly feeling in an Arab sense by providing 
the materials for armed revolt. For example, the pro-Sunni, Beirut-based
755 Saeb Salam, Oral Interview, Geneva, 4 January 1991.
756 Al Havat. 10 May 1958. See also M S Agwani, The Lebanese Crisis, pp. 57-8 for the full text of the statement by 
the United National Front.
757 Al Havat. 17 May 1958 contained claims from Al Solh to this effect, for instance.
758 Al Amal. 11 May 1958; 12 May 1958; 13 May 1958; Al Havat 12 May 1958; 14 May 1958. See also the summary 
of Lebanese opinion in Documents Diolomatiaues Francais. Vol. I, 1 Jan-30 June 1958, Telegram nos 579-588, 
Roche to Pineau, 12 May, 1958.
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newspaper An Nas publicised Nasser’s plans to propose a solution to the 
Lebanese crisis with approval.759
The external evidence indicates that the actual incorporation of Lebanon 
into the UAR in May 1958 was not even planned by the Sunni masses in 
Lebanon, let alone by Nasser himself. It is significant that Nasser restricted 
himself to attacks on the Chamoun regime, presumably believing (like many in 
Lebanon) that Chamoun’s downfall would provide the real solution to the crisis 
and restore a foreign policy approach in line with the National Pact, which in 
turn would be acceptable to Nasser.780 One explanation for this is likely to lie 
in the fact that there is no evidence that Sunni political and religious leaders in 
Lebanon would have accepted its annexation to the UAR, and the internal 
structure of the Lebanese Sunni community gave such leaders considerable 
power over their followers. The United National Front felt able to state on 14 
May 1958 that it was ‘a purely national and Lebanese [movement], one aiming 
at preserving Lebanon’s structure and independence and the unity of its 
people’ arguing also that the opposition movement would cease its activities 
when ‘the President relinquishes the presidency and his regime vanishes’.761 
The only Sunni leader to indicate serious support for the union with the UAR in 
the summer of 1958 was Adnan Al Hakim, leader of the Najjadah. On 7 June 
he called for Chamoun’s immediate resignation and for him to be succeeded 
by a President who would follow a pro-Nasserist foreign policy leading to 
eventual union. It should be noted, however, that Al Hakim himself laid stress 
on the fact that his opposition group was not working with any other opposition 
group, underlining the singularity of his group’s position.762 Indeed, the group 
was a minority one, largely confined to Beirut and representing a small 
extremist body of opinion, and had little effect on the rest of Muslim opinion at 
the time especially in the light of the secular orientation of Najjadah. Al Hakim 
himself did not come from any of the traditional Sunni elites and so had 
comparatively little influence over the wider community.
759 An N as. 29 M ay 1958.
760 Saeb Salam, Oral Interview, Geneva, 14 January 1991. It is worth noting here that it was Syria that had initiated 
moves to create the UAR and not vice versa. Nasser had been less eager because of what he perceived as the 
problems of a union that he could only control with difficulty, if only because of the distances involved.
Al Havat. 14 May 1958; reporting a United National Front press conference and press release from Saeb Salam
762 Department of State Archives, Centre for Lebanese Studies, Telegram no. 4532, McClintock to Dulles, 7 June
1958, reporting an interview with Al Hakim.
252
A further indication that Lebanese Sunni leaders were using the 
intervention of the UAR and figures like Nasser to further their own agenda is 
provided by a claim made in 1991 by Saeb Salam. Salam claimed that the 
UAR sent 5000 arms to Rachid Karami, but he did not use them to stir up full 
scale revolt.763 Equally, while Syria did hope for a real destabilisation of 
Lebanon, and sought to encourage a development of this through the work of 
their Head of Intelligence, Sarraj, the Sunni leadership did not respond as 
Sarraj hoped. This was made particularly clear in July 1958, when suggestions 
were made that Shihab become a presidential candidate. Sarraj sought to 
convince the Lebanese Sunni leadership that this would be a bad idea. 
However, he was unable to influence these men into open opposition to 
Shihab.764 Because of their established mythology, the Sunni masses were 
more enthusiastic about the concept of links with the UAR and were somewhat 
disappointed at the lack of definite response to it from their leadership. But, as 
Johnson points out, any revolutionary impulses on the streets was, in May and 
early June, easily contained by the Sunni elites, whose interest it was to 
counteract such developments.765
On 5 June the Chamoun government rejected the proposed mediation 
in the crisis by the Arab League. This rejection seemed illogical to the Sunni 
leadership, though there is evidence that the opposition came to believe that 
‘Malik’s real intention in going to the UN’ was to ‘lay the ground for US armed 
intervention in Lebanon’.766 But as the various foreign embassies commented, 
their disappointment was small compared to that felt by the masses.767 Their 
surprise and incomprehension was given an angry edge by the way in which 
the rejection was made and it was certainly a reaction encouraged by the 
astonishment and anger of the delegates to the League, who made their 
feelings on the issue public.768 In what was widely seen as a snub Charles
763 Saeb Salam, Oral Interview, Geneva, 14 January 1991.
765 Michael Johnson, Class and Client in Beirut, p. 134, Saeb Salam, Oral Interview, Geneva, 14 January 1991.
766 F0371 /134119 , UL1015/147, Telegram No. 4572, Middleton to Selwyn Lloyd, 9 June 1958.
767 ]bid; Department ol State Archives, Centre for Lebanese Studies, Telegram No. 4912, McClintock to Dulles, 19
June 1958. See also An Nahar. 6 June 1958, giving an account of the reactions of Bashir Awar, a known moderate,
who resigned his office in protest over this.
7EB Department of State Archives, Centre for Lebanese Studies, Telegram No. 4664, McClintock to Dulles, 12 June 
1958, reporting Saeb Salam's statement that no solution would be possible without the consent of the Lebanese 
people as a whole, and that this could only be gained through the mediation of the Arab League rather than the UN. 
See also Telegram no. 4912, McClintock to Dulles, 19 June 1958.
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Malik, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, did not even bother to attend the 
meeting of the League to give the gloss of genuine consideration of the 
proposal by the Chamoun government. Instead he went directly to New York 
to attend a Security Council meeting to press for UN intervention.
Malik attempted subsequently to justify his actions by claiming that in 
fact the Lebanese government had from the very beginning turned to the Arab 
League for help in solving the crisis.769 However, he claimed that given the 
current tension in Lebanon the Council of the League would not meet soon 
enough to enable it to take any action which would stop UAR interference in 
Lebanese domestic affairs; hence the request for intervention by the Security 
Council.770 Sunni fury at this development was increased by the fact that the 
Council of the Arab League met within the ten day limit stipulated by its charter 
for the setting up of extraordinary sessions, while Malik still insisted that this 
indicated the Council was not viewing the events in Lebanon with the urgency 
that the Lebanese government saw as being necessary.771
The general Sunni perception was that there was no real justification for 
rejecting the help of the Arab League. Worse, by claiming there was serious 
external intervention and by calling on the UN to settle the case they felt that 
the government was lessening the importance of the internal opposition’s 
opinion on the crisis. This, it was feared, could help Chamoun to consolidate 
his position with the support of the West. The opposition believed that Malik’s 
real intention in going to the UN was to lay the ground for American armed 
intervention in Lebanon.772 The Sunni opposition did not question the 
assumption that the UN was a Western-dominated body and would thus favour 
the Western interpretation of events in Lebanon. So the arrival of a UN 
Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) was regarded with hostility by the 
majority of the Lebanese Sunni community.
The United National Front leader, Saeb Salam, issued a six point 
comment on the United Nation’s Lebanon resolution on 12 June, which can be
769 F0371 /134119 , UL1015/147, Telegram no. 598, British Embassy, Beirut to Foreign Office, 23 May 1958; M S 
Agwani, The Lebanese Crisis, pp 1-22 for the text of Charles Malik's speech of 6 June 1958.
™  ibid.
771 ibid.
772 FO 371/134119, UL1015/147, Telegram no. 4572, Middleton to Selwyn Lloyd, 9 June 1958.
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taken as summing up the general Sunni opposition perspective at this stage. 
He stated that he considered the need for international observation and 
intervention as irrelevant as the Lebanese problem was purely internal, the 
issue simply being the need to oust Chamoun. The UNOGIL had no role to 
pay in this. He indicated Sunni fears of Western intervention under the cover 
of the UN by pointedly stating that any prevention of the infiltration of arms into 
Lebanon would have to include stopping the import of American, British, 
French, Turkish, Iraqi and Jordanian arms, rather than arms from the UAR.
He claimed that it was the interference of these countries that was 
aggravating the internal tensions of Lebanon not interest from the UAR. Salam 
insisted that no solution was possible without the consent of the Lebanese 
people as whole and this would best be gained by the mediation of the Arab 
League, not the UN.773 As Kamal Jumblat states in his book, this 
encapsulated the general Muslim perception that the crisis was a direct 
response to foreign influence (Arab intervention not being perceived as such) 
and to Lebanon’s unhealthy dependence on the West as a result of 
Chamoun’s policies. This was a betrayal of the National Pact as it was a 
return to traditional patterns of intercommunal relations.774 Nasser’s hostility to 
the UN was another factor in widespread Sunni resentment over this 
development. The Sunni opposition was thus unpleasantly astonished by the 
speed at which the UN implemented the resolution to send observers.775
The UNOGIL report of 5 July, however, was met with surprised delight 
in the Sunni press, which trumpeted that the government’s complaints ‘have 
been blown up5.776 The report undoubtedly gave a boost to the Sunni 
opposition, as it seemed to indicate that Western support for Chamoun’s re- 
election, still an issue so far as that opposition was concerned, was not a 
foregone conclusion. A further boost to Sunni hopes that Lebanon would soon 
return to the principles of the National Pact in terms of foreign policy was given 
with the Iraqi coup. The pro-Western Iraqi government of the 1950s had
773 Statement, Saeb Salam , reported In Department of State Archives, Centre for Lebanese Studies, Telegram no. 
4664, American Embassy, Beirut to Secretary of State, 12 June 1958.
774 Kamal Jumblat, Haaiaat Al Thawrat Al Lubnaniat. Al Dar Al Takadoumiat, Beirut, 1987, pp. 44-55.
775 Department of State Archives, Centre for Lebanese Studies, Telegram no. 4696, McClintock to Dulles, 13 June 
1958.
776 An N as. 5 July 1958.
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provided the main rivalry to Nasser’s dominance of the Arab world. Through 
the Baghdad Pact, the Chamoun government had linked itself with the Iraqi-led 
camp in the Arab world, in preference to the Nasser-led camp. The Iraqi coup 
thus had important implications for the Chamoun government, as it robbed it of 
any major Arab allies that shared Chamoun’s pro-Western stance. In this 
context, Saeb Salam could rely on popular Sunni support for the claim that ‘the 
coup was not just a victory for Arab Nationalism’ but also for ‘Lebanon and the 
Arab people’.777
The Iraqi coup certainly gave a fresh impetus to tension within Lebanon, 
and to street violence there. As one British observer, Desmond Stewart, 
commented that violence was increasingly directed at the few Sunni 
supporters that remained loyal to Chamoun, as well as to Chamoun himself:
‘an armoured car guarding Sami Al Solh’s house was then seized by the
people. The President [was] still under fire, Solh’s house gutted’.778 The 
subsequent American landings of 16 July 1958 to restore peace in Lebanon 
were thus far from welcome to either the Sunni masses or the Sunni elites, as 
press reactions make plain.779 This was particularly the case in the light of 
Chamoun’s defence of this development, as well as the approving comments 
of Pierre Gemayei and his Kata’ib party.780 On 16 July, Saeb Salam made 
clear the hostility of the political opposition, through a statement in Al Havat. for 
instance.781 However, unlike men like Osseiran he stopped short of demands 
for armed resistance against the ‘violation of Lebanese sovereignty’.782
From Saeb Salam’s perspective, the landings provided an issue which 
might bring about Chamoun’s immediate downfall. Thus a meeting was held in 
Salam’s house on 16 July to discuss the wording of a formal opposition 
response to Chamoun’s welcome of the landings. Confident of popular 
support from the Sunni and other Muslim communities the opposition political 
leaders took up a position where they announced a refusal of any willingness
777 Al Havat, 15 July 1958, reporting Saeb Salam's perspective and similar ones from leading figures like Taki Al Din, 
Al Solh, Anwar Al Khatib, Nazem  Akkarl and predictably Adnan Al Hakim. It also reported popular Sunni enthusiasm  
for the coup.
770 Desmond Stewart, Turmoil in Beirut, p. 101.
779 See, for example, Al Havat. 16 July, 1958.
780 ibid.
701 Al Havat. 16 July 1958.
782 Al Havat. 16 July 1958; 17 July 1958; 18 July 1958.
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to seek a compromise with the government so long as foreign troops remained 
in Lebanon.783 As Ali Bazzi, the Secretary General of the United National 
Front declared, ‘the opposition would never give allegiance to any President 
elected with foreign troops in the country.784 The widespread nature of the 
popular Muslim opposition to the American landings is further underlined by 
the involvement of women’s organisations in the issuing of public protests. A 
group headed by Zahia Salman, and including the daughters of the great Sunni 
leader Riyadh Al Solh, met with figures from the United National Front in a 
move documented and publicised in the press.785 indeed up to 18 July 1958, 
popular Sunni and other Muslim delegations making protests headed for Saeb 
Salam’s house, ail demanding, in the words of the Grand Mufti of Beirut and 
the senior Druze religious leader, Shaykh Akl ‘the immediate withdrawal of 
troops’.786 By 18 July, press censorship was in force in an attempt to quell this 
hostility to the American landings but even so, word of the protests spread by 
word of mouth, keeping hostility and tensions at a high level. All of this makes 
it very clear that the Sunni protests were based on an interpretation of the 
landing as proof of American backing of Chamoun and American desire for his 
re-election. There is no evidence that there was any significant opinion that 
saw it as an action taken to support the principle of guaranteeing the legally 
constituted authority in Lebanon, let alone perceiving it as part of a wider 
American policy in the region.787
The Murphy mission was to bring a big change in the attitude of the 
communities in Lebanon, as well as in the attitude of the Lebanese politicians. 
For a start, as the opposition press at least noted with approval, Murphy put an 
emphasis on making contact with opposition and actual rebel leaders, such as 
Al Yafi, and showed a willingness to listen sympathetically to their 
grievances.788 He sought to make explanations of the American landings in 
their regional context and to emphasise American fears in this context about 
the survival of a separate Lebanon. Opposition leaders showed themselves
783 Al Havat. 17 July 1958; 19th July 1958.
784 Department of State Archives, Centre for Lebanese Studies, Telegram no. 496, McClintock to Dulles, 18 July 1958.
785 See for example, Al Havat. 17 July 1958.
788 Department of State Archives, Centre for Lebanese Studies, Telegram no. 4194, McClintock to Dulles, 18 July 
1958. It is necessary to turn to these sources because of press censorship in Lebanon.
787 Al Havat. 18 July 1958.
788 Al Havat. 22 July 1958.
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willing to listen to these explanations. This is not as surprising as it might 
appear initially, given that the Sunni opposition leaders did not have any 
ambitions to see the end of an independent Lebanon, and so American 
concerns carried a certain conviction, even if not approval. Also they could, at 
least, be used as an amount of ‘face-saving’ in enabling Sunni politicians to 
back down from the positions they had taken in the aftermath of the American 
landings, and which, if not modified, threatened to bring Lebanon to a state of 
total civil war, going beyond the familiar level of violence occurring between 
May and July 1958.
The result on the Sunni media in Lebanon was soon obvious. For 
example, the early opposition hostility to Murphy’s mission, publicised in the 
press on 18 July, had claimed that either it was ‘impossible’ for it to succeed, 
that it was a ‘useless way’ in which to seek a compromise, or at best that there 
was ‘great doubt of its success’.789 An opposition statement bearing Saeb 
Salam’s name gave Murphy 48 hours to produce a compromise, and warned 
that then ‘we will ask for help from all the free countries in the world if the 
American troops do not withdraw’, in a clear threat to escalate the crisis. But 
on 22 July, the opposition was willingly collaborating with Murphy in the 
publicly stated belief that he could create a workable compromise. Al Yafi and 
Uwayni, for example, began to put forward suggestions as to how this could 
work. For instance Al Telegraphe. one of the leading opposition papers 
announced in its headline that ‘Crisis is on the Way to Solution’. The Al Jarida 
told its readers that Murphy, the ‘Man of Good Offices’ had come to Lebanon to 
reassure the Lebanese that the American landings had only come about 
because of Middle East tensions resulting from the Iraqi coup, and that the 
USA had no intentions of widening the Lebanese split ‘by supporting one 
faction of the population against the other’.790
Within the Sunni community, the unity of the past months began to 
break down as the traditional elites, and the bourgeoisie, began to distance 
themselves from the more radical popular elements in order to respond to the 
American attempts at conciliation, instead of demanding a compromise
789 See, for example, Al Havat. 18 July 1958.
790 Al Telegraphe. 22 July 1958; Al Jarida. 22 July 1958; Al Havat. 22 July 1958.
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arranged by leaders from the Arab world. In particular the Sunni leadership 
was reassured by Murphy’s assurance that the Americans had no intention of 
backing Chamoun’s plans for re-election.791
791 Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors. Greenwood Press, Connecticut, 1976, pp. 405-6.
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Chapter 6 
The Maronite Community in 1958
Sunni mythology located Lebanon as a politically independent entity that 
was an integral part of an Arab, and Muslim, world, and used the rhetoric of 
Nasserism to express this perspective. But such expressions, in the context of 
increasing Arab power at the expense of Western influence in the Middle East, 
were interpreted by the Maronite masses as a rejection of Lebanese 
sovereignty, rather than an alternative one. It was a negation of the essence of 
Lebanese ‘nationalism’ contained in Maronite mythology about the state and 
about their own role within that state. The Sunni mythology that evolved 
around the figure of Nasser and placed Lebanon alongside Arab states such 
as Syria and Egypt was a direct challenge to the established notions of 
sovereignty and to Maronite interpretations of Lebanon’s history.792
An intellectual appeal might be made to a Maronite audience to 
comprehend the reality that there was no such threat to Lebanon’s existence or 
to the position of the Maronite community as established by the compromise of 
the National Pact from any of the major Muslim communities. For instance, on 
16 March 1958, it was reported in an editorial in L’Orient that Nassib Al Matni, 
the journalist whose murder is seen as starting the actual 1958 crisis, was 
claiming that ‘Some Christians [i.e.: Maronites] are frightened ...[but] All the 
Christians desire is to be told that the independence and sovereignty of 
Lebanon are not being threatened; then the present atmosphere of 
apprehension and mistrust will disappear completely’.793 However, such a 
Muslim opinion, despite being presented to a Maronite readership in an 
attempt to convey reassurance, stood little likelihood of having any positive 
impact on the Maronite masses. Indeed, appearing in a French language 
paper, it was not even directly accessible to those large numbers whose 
educational skills did not include reading French.
792 Selim Abou, L'ldentite Culturelle. Relations interethniaues et Probl&nes d'Acculturation. Edition Anthropos, Paris, 
1981, p. 160, highlights the links between concepts of nationalism and ‘collective popular myths’ evolving around the 
‘notion of sovereignty.
793 L'Orient. 16 March 1958.
260
The reality was that the Maronite masses were, by March 1958, reacting 
to a number of events which individually would have made them uneasy, and 
cumulatively, created a mood of general alarm. As the content of the more 
populist Arabic-language pro-Maronite newspapers indicates, these events 
included the formation of the UAR., the reports of Nasserist-inspired help for 
malcontents (mainly Sunnis) within Lebanon to demonstrate their grievances 
with violence, and the anti-government propaganda heard on their radios, 
coming from Syrian and Egyptian newspapers.794 In a direct ratio of response 
to the Muslim elevation of Nasser to heroic status, Chamoun assumed status 
as an iconic figure as the embodiment and champion of Me Libanisme’, an 
ideological doctrine that placed the Maronite community at the heart of 
Lebanon, its core and its raison d’etre.795 As Chamoun adopted policies that 
brought him into direct conflict with Nasser, so his heroic stature increased and 
the popular will to equate him, and his continued hold on office, with the 
maintenance of Lebanese independence.796
In formulating the nature of this mass reaction to events and opinions 
inside and outside Lebanon, the Maronite-orientated press had a significant 
role; on the whole radio was less important to this community. Readership 
figures, so far as they exist, as well as general anecdotal evidence, suggests 
that the Maronite masses, at least, cared to be well informed about political 
matters.797 it has been shown that a very specific vision of Lebanon existed 
from a Maronite perspective, one related to myths about an ancient Maronite 
inheritance and the consequent ‘right’ this conferred upon Maronites to identify 
themselves as being at the core of a Lebanese national identity. That vision 
was not restricted to an intellectual community. The repetition of such myths in 
the basic education provided for most Maronite children ensured that such
794 The extent to which the Lebanese press reflected popular opinion has already been mention in the introduction, 
see pp. 42-7; see also Foreign Relations of the United States. 1958-1960. Vol. XI, Lebanon & Jordan, Department of 
State Publication 9932, Washington DC, 1992, pp. 196-7.
795 For a discussion of ‘le Libanisme’, see ‘Le Libanisme, Une Doctrine’, Action. December 1956, pp. 11134-9. It was 
a doctrine particularly associated with the Kata’ib party, the largest and best organised of the political groups in 
Lebanon, which took ‘le Libanisme' as its central ideology.
796 K.S. Salibi, ‘Recollections of the 1940s and 1950s’, unpublished conference paper, Austen, Texas, 13 September 
1992, pp. 14; 15; 17. Salibi indicated how at the time he, and his students at AUB, saw Chamoun as ‘the national 
hero’, who had got away with ‘defiance of Nasser', and in so doing, ‘saved’ Lebanon.
797 Anis Moussallem, La Presse Libanaise: Expression du Liban Poiitiaue et Confessionelle et Forum des pays 
Arabes. Libraire Generale De Droit et de Jurisprudence, Paris, 1977 pp. 1-16; Desmond Stewart, Turmoil in Beirut. A 
Personal Account. Allan Wingate, London, 1958, p. 20. Stewart states ‘that in Lebanon even the uneducated followed 
each [radio] news bulletin with close attention'.
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myths had a wide popular currency.798 And at the popular level, such myths 
were not subjected to critical analysis relating to their validity: indeed the 
academic sustainability of the myths has been an irrelevancy in terms of 
popular perceptions about the individuality and superiority of Maronite culture 
and beliefs. At the popular level the myths were established and rarely 
questioned ‘truths1 rather than myths.799 These ‘truths1 were central to a 
popular Maronite consciousness of what made the Maronites so different: thus 
the ‘proof they provided of a genuine difference between the Maronites and 
other communities could not be undermined without affecting the popular self- 
identity of the Maronite masses.800 This ‘proof1 of difference, and of a more 
ancient existence in Lebanon than any other community, provided the 
justification for the Maronite ‘right’ to claim that without the Maronites there was 
no Lebanon.801 Thus the continued existence and interests of the Maronites 
was inextricably bound up with the continued existence and interests of the 
state of Lebanon; but the same was not true, from a Maronite perspective, of 
any other community.
Because of this, and because of the existence of a popularly available 
Maronite historiography stressing Maronite trials during the Ottoman period in 
particular, the attitude of the Maronite masses in the 1950s tended to be easily 
alarmed into the defensiveness identified in L’Orient. This defensiveness was 
most likely to be roused if it seemed as if the Lebanese entity, and their 
privileged position in that entity, was threatened. If in the past such threats 
had come from the Ottoman empire; they now came from those within 
Lebanon itself who sought to link Lebanon too closely with Syria and Egypt. 
The threats, then, came from quarters identifying themselves not only with the 
traditional threat from Islam, but also with the newer threat of Arab nationalism.
793 Jean Hayek, Al Tarikh al llmi. Al Jiza al Awal. Maktabit Habib, Beirut, 1994.
799 Hilal Khashan, Inside the Lebanese Confessional Mind. University Press of America, 1992, p. 11, quoting Bulus 
Naaman, a former head of the Federation of Lebanese Monks who was a leading figure in the 1975-1985 years. 
Naaman states: 'Lebanon is synonymous with Maronite history and ethos: it is Maronitism antedates the Arab 
conquest of Syria and Lebanon and Arabism is only a historical accident'. He describes the Maronites as the owners 
of their history 'because they are attached to their land'.
800 See Hilal Khashan, Inside the Lebanese Confessional Mind, p. 11, quoting Ibrahim Najjar a member of the 
Phalange party political bureau who was explicit in this matter saying: 'in order for the two civilizations to meet, we 
want the Muslims to concede the superiority of the Christians’.
801 Amine Gemayel, Peace and Unitv. Colin Smythe Ltd, Gerrards Cross, 1984, p. 18. This gives extracts from his 
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262
Maronite popular feeling, as well as that of its elites, stressed Lebanon’s links 
with the West, rather than with the Arab world. Maronite mass reactions to the 
evolution of the 1958 crisis, and elements in that crisis such as the question of 
Chamoun’s re-election, need to be understood in terms of how they were 
popularly perceived to relate to these long-established Maronite concerns 
about their own, and Lebanon’s security and rightful place in the world.
For the masses, it was, consciously, not primarily a matter of pragmatic 
economic self-interest, but rather, part of the central core of what made 
Maronites different from the other communities in the state. It assumed a 
conscious profile only in reaction to the ‘attacks’ on such truths from the 
Muslim communities seeking to align Lebanon with the Arab world. In terms of 
difference, the impact of the West was felt by the Maronites most strongly not 
in material aspects, which were shared by other communities, but through 
religion and ideas of what constituted ‘civilisation’. Thus the popular 
significance of traditional Maronite links with European Christianity and the 
civilisation it produced must not be underestimated. A major part of the 
'difference' of the Maronites was bound up with their religious heritage. It was 
a heritage that not only gave them a distinctiveness in relation to Muslim 
communities but also in relation to other Christian communities within 
Lebanon, because the Maronite church was not an Eastern Christian Church, 
unlike the Greek Orthodox Church, for example. Thus theologically, the 
Maronite community was not just another Christian community in the Middle 
East; it was a community in official communion with the Roman Catholic 
Church setting its religious calendar, for example, in accordance with the 
Roman Catholic Church.802 Nor did the difference stop at the theological; it 
had implications for popular political and cultural loyalties as well. This is 
clearly demonstrated by popular Maronite affection for Roman Catholic - 
inspired French culture, if not always for France itself, during the 1950s.803
French rule during the Mandate period might have been ultimately 
unpopular; but with independence pro-French feelings could reassert
002 This is not a minor point, given that it means that the popularly celebrated Christian festivals of Christmas and 
Easter are celebrated on different dates by the Orthodox and Catholic communities.
803 Desmond Stewart, Turmoil in Beirut: A Personal Account, p. 12. The people in the Maronite areas referred to 
France as umm al hannoune [the nourishing mother].
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themselves especially in the context of threats from Arab Nationalism. 
Maronite education continued to be modelled on French education, and to be 
conducted predominantly in French. In most good schools in the 1950s 
French remained commonly spoken amongst the better-educated elements of 
the Maronite community. Not only that, majority Maronite feeling retained a 
general pro-Western orientation, with English and American culture having a
continuing impact within Lebanon 804 This is a striking contrast to the pattern in 
other post-colonial states in the region at this time, where a spirit of anti- 
Western 'colonialism' was a regular and obvious feeling at all levels of the 
populations. These pro-Western feelings within Maronite thinking, leading to 
government opposition to breaking ties with the West and acceptance of the 
highly-contentious Eisenhower Doctrine, were not confined to elite levels. 
They were publicised widely in the Maronite press, and there is no evidence 
that the reasoning used by the government was not welcomed by the Maronite 
masses. The systems of education in place within the community, and the 
tone of the popular press all helped to reinforce pro-Western attitudes amongst 
the community at all levels.
Another consequence of this thinking in terms of relations with the West 
which also helped to mark out the Maronite community within Lebanon, was 
the economic element. The continuance of the traditional Western orientation 
of education in the Maronite community was also of importance here. The 
presence of Western ideas through missionary institutions had contributed not 
only to Maronite political development but also to attitudes towards economic 
development in a more Western capitalist sense.805 Both the Christian part of 
Beirut and Mount Lebanon had more developed economic infrastructures in 
capitalist terms than the largely non-Christian regions of the north, south and 
the Biqa‘, even though there was in these regions an affluent Muslim upper 
class. Trading and other links with the Western world produced a self­
consciously Western consumer culture within the Maronite community; one 
that valued Western commodities and cultural products for the demonstration
804
For example, one of the leading university institutions in Lebanon has remained The American University of Beirut 
[AUB], and university sector education has retained strong links with Western institutions.
05 Michael Johnson, Class and Client in Beirut, p. 125.
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they made of community orientation.806 This does not mean that there was at 
any time, certainly during the 1940s and 1950s, a simplistic economic division 
within Lebanon where the poor were Muslim and the rich were Christians or 
even Maronites. The crisis of 1958 cannot be explained in terms of a 'reality' 
where the loyalist Maronites were defending the developed areas of Lebanon 
against rebel Muslims controlling the poor areas. The division is far more 
complicated. There were social classes and economic divisions amongst all 
confessional groups, including the Maronites. However, as far as finances 
allowed, the Maronite masses demonstrated a loyalty to Western consumerism 
and capitalism at a time when it was being attacked by Arab nationalism for its 
imperialist connotations. For those whose finances permitted little display, 
religion was the cultural product they clung to most strongly. Religion provided 
the most prominent and uniformly held dimension of communal identity 
amongst such lower strata of the Maronite masses. A factor here was that 
more limited access to education meant that religious belief and its associated 
rituals and popular myths maintained a higher importance than amongst 
relatively better-off, more educated strata where access to a more
807sophisticated community identity evolved.
The political expression of these ideas of Maronite identity by the 
masses was traditionally through the Maronite notables, both the traditional 
land-owning class and the newer commercial and administrative bourgeoisie. 
This was because it was generally from these elites that the political leaders of 
the community generally came; and also many of the leading newspapermen 
and Journalists.808 However, the exposure of the Maronite community to 
Western ideas of education and consumer culture had a political impact also. 
The Maronites showed themselves to be the most politically conscious of the 
communities in Lebanon, in a sense comprehensible to Western perspectives. 
In other words, education ensured that the Maronite population had a 
comprehension of what the West meant by a political party system in a
805 The advertisements in the Maronite-orientated media of the period underline this aspect, see, for example, French 
language publications like L’Orient. but also Arabic language ones such as An Nahar. For comments on commodity
culture see Thomas Richards, The Commodity Culture of Victorian England. Advertising and Spectacle 1851-1914. 
Verso, London, 1991, pp. 1-3; 10; 128; 140.
807
M .W eber. The Sociology of Religion. Methuen, London, 1965, Chapter 8.
808 There was considerable intermarriage at elite levels between the Maronite landowning and commercial classes,
creating kinship alliances at the least.
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democratic state. It cannot be claimed that Maronite political parties were in 
the same state of development as twentieth century political parties in the 
West. It could be argued that most Maronite political parties at this time had a 
greater resemblance to political parties in Britain in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries, in terms of the importance of land-base and kinship
810
affiliations. However, the Kata’ib party, for instance, had, after its
reorganisation in 1949, become a political party in this modern sense rather
811than just a traditional clan grouping. Also, the variety of parties that existed 
in the Maronite community gave a choice to voters that did not simply rely on 
clan affiliations. A disgruntled voter could find a party to vote for that did not 
ally that voter with traditional clan hostilities, for instance, in times of crisis 
Maronite political parties such as the Kata’ib party demonstrated an ability to 
mobilise their membership quickly and coherently, because the internal 
organisation of these political parties were set up, as in the West, to encourage 
precisely that.
The origins of the Kata’ib party were as an essentially Maronite ‘boy 
scout’ movement during the mandate period. But its constituency of support, 
including students and minor civil service officials as well as schoolboys, 
apprentices and men drawn from the Maronite petty bourgeoisie, had 
promoted the development, from 1949, of a sophisticated and effective party 
political organisation that reflected political developments in the West, familiar 
to students and officials especially through their education and employment.812 
It was a popular party in that its funding essentially came from membership 
dues, and its leadership, equally, came from figures promoted through the 
ranks of members. Consequently, it was a party that saw itself as having a 
constant political role in the state, holding regular meetings of its membership
ao9
M. Johnson. Class and Client in Beirut, d . 99.
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1966, pp. 98-100.
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It is worth noting that not ail members of the Kata’ib party were actually Maronite Christians. Joseph Chader, who
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to discuss policy and promote local participation and interaction between party 
members and elected Kata’ib politicians. According to Entelis, the party was 
(and is) ‘the major instrument for guaranteeing Lebanese-Christian interest in 
the state’.813
In this sense the Kata’ib party was unlike, for instance, the Bloc 
National, which must be classified as a ‘cadre’ party, bringing together at 
leadership level individuals from the established Maronite elite. The Bloc 
National also differed in that its main preoccupation was campaigning, and 
therefore meeting, with its supporters in anticipation of forthcoming elections. 
At other times, the emphasis was on interaction at leadership levels.814 The 
data available for membership of the party indicates that, particularly at times 
of perceived crisis for the Maronite community and ‘Lebanon’, the Kata’ib was 
a party with substantial support from the community’s masses. Moreover, the 
ability of the party to recruit extra members at such times indicates a voluntary 
level of support, and the extent to which the party had established itself as ‘the 
focal point’ through which the ordinary members of the community could 
express their concerns and seek advice and guidance on their reactions.815 By 
contrast, the Bloc National support base at this period was significantly 
smaller, drawing on more automatic, or involuntary support, from the followers 
of the essentially za’im leadership of the party.816
It is worth noting here that at the point in 1958 when elements of the 
Maronite community finally felt impelled to take up arms, they generally did so 
under the auspices of the Kata’ib party, the only populist alternative being the 
PPS, but they did not take to the streets as an unorganised mob.817 Equally, it 
is significant of the differences between the Maronite community and other 
confessional groups that with the exception of the Maronite leaders of Zgortha 
in the north, their traditional leaders (with or without a formal political profile) 
took no part in the actual fighting. The atypical exception of Zgortha underlines
013 John Entelis, Pluralism and Party Transformation, p. 10.
014 It is worth remembering that the Gemayels did not come from the traditional Maronite elite. Ibid. p. 101.
015 Ibid, p. 10; Amine Gem ayel, Oral Interview, Paris, 27 March 1992.
016 M d - P P -101; 142-4; Amine Gemayel, Oral Interview, Paris, 27 March 1992; Raymond Edde, Oral Interview, Paris, 
19 July 1994.
817 The Kata'ib party was the single largest Christian party, and predominantly a Maronite one. Indeed, it was the 
largest single political party in Lebanon, something the party itself was very conscious of in the 1950s. ‘Le Libanisme, 
Une Doctrine', Action. December 1956, pp. 1134-39.
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the extent to which most other Maronite political parties, in terms of both 
leaders and members had moved in their politics to a level of complexity 
beyond traditional clan reactions.818 Such comments should not be taken as 
indicating that the Kata’ib party was the only important political or quasi­
political grouping amongst the Maronite community. There was, for instance, 
the Constitutional Bloc, led in the 1950s by Bishara Al Khoury and Camille 
Chamoun’s Liberal Nationalist party as well as the Bloc National. In addition, 
other elements or institutions, such as the Maronite Church and individual 
clergy, had traditionally played a political role in the community. Essentially, it 
can be said that the Maronite community was politically aware to a 
considerable degree, and had a range of options open to it for the expression 
of its political opinions. However, equally, part of that political awareness 
demonstrated itself in a commitment to a maintenance of the political status 
quo and its institutions, established under the National Pact. Thus community 
opinion tended to demonstrate itself through more organised political 
channels.819
There were differences in leadership style between the more 'modern'
820
Maronite and the Muslim political groupings. The Maronite leaders had, on 
the whole, become involved in the 'modern', or Western, economic world in 
their careers, even those that also maintained their traditional family and clan 
links. Hottinger has identified Maronite political leaders from traditionally 
powerful backgrounds who also possessed the support of a 'locally 
circumscribed' community; and who nurtured their followers, or 'clientele1, 
through a traditional kind of patronage system. A leader such as Pierre Edde, 
from a traditional background, but with a career in banking, was able to operate 
in a way that bridged both the old methods of community leadership and more 
modern ones, through the dispensation of ‘patronage’ to political followers who
818 The circumstances in Zgortha consisted of a traditional bloody village feud between the two historically prominent 
families of the region, the Fangieh and the Duwaihi. The feud spilled over into the wider conflict of 1958, but actually 
had little do with the modern face of the Maronite community. See M Johnson Class and Client in Beirut, p. 125; 
Arnold Hottinger, 'Zuama in Historical Perspective1, in L. Binder (ed), Politics in Lebanon, p. 99.
819 This was stressed strongly in several of the oral interviews conducted, notably Amine Gemayel, Oral Interview, 
Paris, 27 March 1992; Ghassan Tueni, Oral Interview, Beirut, 30 July 1992; Sofia Saadeh, Oral Interview, Beirut, 2 
January 1993. See also General Bustani, ■Memoirs1, unpublished typescript.
This is not intended to suggest that the other Christian communities in Lebanon, such as the Greek Orthodox, had 
not developed along similar paths. However, that community is not at issue in this chapter.
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821also had clan or kinship affiliation to him. But the Maronite community had 
leaders - notably Chamoun himself - who were from commercially or 
professionally successful families and who lacked the traditional landed base; 
or newcomers like Emile Bustani. Such leaders used the patronage available 
through their commercial or professional connections to build up a following 
that enabled them to figure in the Maronite political world. Chamoun's success 
in 1952 provides a clear indication that it had become possible for a non-
traditional Maronite leader to achieve powerful office in a way that indicated
822
support for him from all levels of the Maronite community.
Populist Maronite political thinking did derive from the traditional 
Maronite focus on the interests of the community but, developing out of that, it 
came increasingly to focus on their interpretation of the political role of the
823presidency because of the responsibility of the President for foreign policy. 
For the Maronite masses, foreign policy was, in this period of Middle Eastern 
Arab nationalism and anti-Westernism, the key to their security; indeed to the 
very survival of Lebanon as a separate entity.824 The 1958 crisis thus evolved 
as a demonstration of popular Maronite willingness to co-ordinate support in 
political terms around the institution of the presidency when its essentially 
Maronite character seemed threatened, along with existing, pro-Western, 
foreign policy. Chamoun certainly understood the stress laid by the Maronite 
community on foreign policy issues. A shrewd politician, he sought to gauge 
popular Maronite reaction to his rhetoric rather than the reaction of fellow 
politicians. Thus he sought to appeal directly to the community as a whole, 
relying on speeches given in public and reported in the Maronite or pro- 
Western media, hoping thereby to put pressure on less committed Maronite 
politicians by making them respond directly to concerns among their electoral 
following in relation to his rhetoric. In by-passing the Maronite political elite in 
this way, Chamoun apparently had hopes thereby of developing such a
821
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824 See Camille Chamoun, Crlse au Moven Orient, p. 7, recounting the shouting of the Maronite crowd to Chamoun at 
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powerful base of popular support that the other Maronite politicians would find 
it expedient, in terms of the opinions of their own followings, to support 
Chamoun's re-election hopes.825 An examination of his rhetoric, therefore, 
provides clues to the state of popular feeling, or alarm, amongst the Maronite 
masses.
Chamoun's political rhetoric, aimed at the Maronite community as a 
whole, in 1957 and 1958 almost invariably related any internal policy matters, 
especially potentially unpopular ones, to foreign policy statements, playing 
thereby on the readiness of the Maronite masses to respond to any implication 
that Lebanese sovereignty was in jeopardy. In talking of Lebanese finances, for 
example, in March 1958 in a widely-reported speech given at Bkirki, Chamoun 
related the economic issues to his reassurances that under his leadership, the 
Lebanese people would contrive, as they always had done, to resist ‘the 
conquerors and invaders’. In April, at a speech made during a Ramadan feast 
held at the house of Sami Al Solh, he linked internal stability and the
Eisenhower Doctrine, with a justification of his policies towards the Arab
, , 826 world.
But despite the fears that undoubtedly existed about the threat of 
Nasserism, and the importance of foreign policy issues, the Maronite 
community was, in political terms, not as easily manipulated as a superficial 
assessment of its undoubted fears about the threats posed by Nasserism and
827
Arab nationalism might suggest. It was an indication of the relative degree 
of political sophistication among the Maronites, making them less easy to 
manipulate, that the Maronites were, in 1958, acting as a community despite, 
rather than because, of President Chamoun and his rhetoric. They responded 
to that rhetoric because it did echo their genuine fears, but their community
825 Chamoun’s reliance on public reporting of his words was highlighted by several oral interviewees. Ghassan Tueni 
commented on his 'advanced consciousness1 of the value of the media for getting the popular ear, for instance. 
Ghassan Tueni, Oral Interview, Beirut, 30 July 1992. Also Salim Nassar, Oral Interview, London, 20 May 1995; Dr. 
Albert Moukheiber, Oral Interview, Bayt Meiri, 15 April 1995.
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identity was long-established and all Chamoun did was to create a situation 
where communal feeling expressed itself readily.828
Chamoun's attitude towards other Maronite leaders with a substantial 
following needs to be examined. Did he attempt to make alliances with such 
leaders in order to widen his base of support within the Maronite community - 
even to extend that base to other Christian communities? Is there evidence 
that he sought to come to terms with the agendas of political leaders within 
these communities, and that, unlike the situation in the Sunni community, such 
agendas reflected opinion from within the communities rather than merely the 
self-interest of the leaders? There is no direct evidence to indicate that 
Chamoun was conscious of the difference between the Maronite and other 
Christian communities. But his direct appeals to the Maronite community as a 
whole, and not just leaders or particular groups, through his rhetoric and his 
policy during the 1957 elections which undermined traditional leaders, all 
suggests he was aware of a difference. Such a difference was between the 
operation of 'modern1 Maronite political parties and that of traditional 
community powers, and implicitly, that means he was aware of the importance 
that gave to the reactions of the masses, in their capacity of voters. As voters 
rather than loyal followers of traditional leaders, the Maronite masses could be 
susceptible to appeals that touched on issues of popular concern, regardless 
of whether or not they were endorsed by their leaders. As the fluctuating 
membership of the Kata’ib party indicates, Maronite voters in the 1950s clearly 
were prepared to respond more to directly to issues rather than to traditional 
loyalties when a crisis seemed sufficiently threatening. Arguably Chamoun 
simply instinctively recognised that what we may term a 'modernisation' of the 
Maronite community had actually undermined the power base of the traditional 
community leadership in such ways, and he sought to make use of this for his 
own ends. As Johnson points out ‘Chamoun’s political moves against the 
landlords reflected the dominance of the bourgeoisie at a time when urban 
businessmen, lawyers and other professionals increasingly represented rural 
districts in Parliament’.829 But certainly Chamoun seemed to understand how
B2a Amine Gemayel, Oral Interview, Paris, 27 March 1992; John Entelis, Pluralism and Party Transformation, p. 175.
829 Michael Johnson, Class and Client in Beirut, pp. 125; 123.
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to arouse concerns in the Maronite community by rhetoric designed to invoke 
concerns intrinsically part of Maronite mythology - an interesting contrast to his 
apparent position at the start of his mandate.
President Chamoun had taken up his mandate as a popular figure - 
one seen to be, in the spirit of the National Pact, attractive and friendly to 
Christians and non-Christians alike. Born in Mount Lebanon into a 
professional, not a political, family, he had trained as a lawyer before entering 
poiitics in the 1940s. Despite his lack of elite or political family connections, 
Chamoun's talents had ensured his rise - a factor which emphasises the 
evolution of Maronite political perceptions beyond dependence on traditional 
loyalties. He worked actively, and successfully, to shorten Al Khoury's 
mandate. But while Chamoun was popular, it would be a mistake to 
overemphasise the extent of that popularity. In the 1952 elections, Chamoun 
had stood against a traditional Maronite leader, Hamid Frangieh, but had only 
defeated Frangieh by a narrow margin. In office any consolidation of his 
popularity that Chamoun might have hoped to gather as a result of his own 
personal qualities was ephemeral. As seen in the previous chapter’s 
discussion of the Sunni community’s reaction to his policies, Chamoun failed to 
institute domestic policy programmes that addressed existing problems in 
Lebanon. The negative impact of his domestic policies was most powerfully 
felt by the Sunni and other Muslim communities, but it also had an effect on the 
poorer levels of the Maronite community.830 It would be a mistake to presume 
that even in the context of heightened consciousness of foreign policy matters 
in 1957-58, domestic policy had no impact on popular perceptions of a 
politician. Nor could Chamoun rely on the uncritical support of other Maronite 
politicians as was pointed out in Chapter Four. He was 'the despair of' the 
traditional Maronite political leaders. As the British ambassador Middleton 
observed, instead of building up his connections, Chamoun preferred to rely 
mainly on ‘his talent for intrigue' and his 'personal popularity' a diminishing 
asset, even among the Maronite community.831 By 1958, it was only the
030 Sofia Saadeh made this point, Oral Interview, Beirut, 2 January 1993.
831 Salibi, who recalls positive feelings towards Chamoun in this period, identified 1956 as ‘the height of his 
[Chamoun's] popularity', but also identified growing disappointment with him. K.S. Salibi, ‘Recollections of the 1940s 
and 1950s’, p. 13.
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perceived international crisis that kept Chamoun's popular credit as high as it
832was.
In terms of his popular support, Chamoun was fortunate in that his most 
outstanding feature, both in the eyes of the Maronite community and the West, 
was his strongly pro-Western line. Despite his reservations, Middleton 
commented approvingly on Chamoun's 'strong line' in refusing to break with
833the West in 1956. Even here, however, there was potentially a certain 
problem for Chamoun in view of the traditionally pro-French line of the 
Maronite community. Chamoun was, in fact, anti-French. In November of 
1943 he had been arrested by the French, an incident of importance since it 
had endowed Chamoun with anti-French feelings, putting him out of step with 
many of those he needed to support him. Chamoun's anti-French stance was 
made more prominent by his pro-British sympathies.834 Of significance here 
was the fact that Chamoun's wife, Zelfa Tabet, was of mixed Lebanese and 
Irish extraction and so she supposedly encouraged Chamoun to develop a
835more British orientation. As ambassador in London (1944-47) he had made 
a number of connections, especially with the Foreign Office, on which he was 
to draw later. In addition, he was later remembered for being, during that 
period in London, strongly opposed to the French presence in the Middle East,
836which certainly increased his popularity with the Foreign Office. However, in 
being closely identified with the British, Chamoun laid himself open to the 
charge of being a Foreign Office tool, a factor with some potential to 
undermine his personal popularity amongst a community that was traditionally 
more French orientated.837 Certainly when Chamoun did stand for office in
832
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1952, the contest between the two front runners, Chamoun and Frangieh, was, 
by other elites, considered to be a battle between the interests of the Quai
838d'Orsay and Downing Street, with the latter coming out on top that time.
Chamoun’s perceived talent for intrigue was certainly recognised, and 
even to an extent admired, by the Maronite community. General Bustani 
referred to popular perception of Chamoun as an 'astonishing political 
manoeuverer' listing several things to support his claim. For instance, during 
the late 1940s Chamoun had actually been seen as being amongst the most 
pro-Arab of the Christian politicians, something could simply be seen as linked 
to the British (Foreign Office) position given his pro-British orientation. In the 
UN in 1946, Chamoun had linked the cause of Lebanese independence with 
the cause of 'the liberation of the Arab world from all foreign and colonial
839
intervention. During his period of opposition to Al Khoury in 1948-52, he 
had courted those Arab leaders and governments which might have an impact 
on a presidential election in Lebanon, notably those based in Cairo, Baghdad,
Riyadh and Amman, reinforcing perceptions of him as a pro-Arab Maronite.840 
However, it must be remembered that Chamoun was shrewd enough to realise 
that achieving his presidential ambitions required Muslim/Arab support, so he 
portrayed himself as a supporter of themes popular with these groups. Once 
elected, he perceived less of a need for cultivating such support. Chamoun 
thus found it easy to abandon a pro-Arab stance when this suited him better, 
after the events of 1955-56, because it was not a stance based on personal 
conviction, merely expediency. General Bustani has commented what was 
really significant to Chamoun was his pro-British stance and commitment to
841protection of the Maronite community.
As an overall assessment it must be said that Chamoun lacked the 
necessary political finesse to allow him to use his position as president to deal 
successfully from his position with the majority of Maronite politicians or their
B3B
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followers. While he alienated many of the traditional landowning and political 
elites he did not succeed in replacing those he alienated with other political 
figures who were both loyal to him. Arguably it was for this reason that he 
sought to appeal over the heads of Maronite politicians, and to speak directly 
to the Maronite masses in his public rhetoric. He was successful to an extent, 
being able to replace the traditional leaders in the loyalties of a significant 
proportion of the Maronite voters, as the elections of 1957 indicate. Yet even 
so his popularity within Lebanon was already waning by the 1957 elections, 
and was sustained at popular levels after those elections only by the 
development of the crisis and Chamoun’s ability to identify himself publicly with 
the cause of Maronite and Lebanese survival.
Because by 1957 Chamoun had developed an ambition to seek a fresh 
mandate, this provided him with a problem of how to achieve this, electoral 
manipulation was his only practical option. In the 1947 elections, Al Khoury 
had been able to draw on his links with the traditional za’im class. Lacking 
such links and having done much to undermine their power, identification of his 
mandate with Maronite consciousness of Lebanon’s future security may well 
have seemed to him the best guarantee of his position. Events after the 
elections of 1957 then played into his hands, enabling him to sustain that 
perception. The new electoral law of 1957 made the role of the electorate in 
many of the new, smaller constituencies of greater significance. Certainly in 
terms of the Maronite voters, the changes in constituency boundaries generally 
should have worked to make their voice more powerfully heard. In many cases 
it actually did so, but there were also examples which indicate that the voices 
of the Maronite voters in a particular constituency were not properly heard. 
Evidence that some of the elections were fraudulent has been discussed in 
Chapter 4.842 The existence of unhappiness in at least part of the Maronite 
community over the suggestions of electoral dishonesty can be gauged partly 
by the comments of some populist Maronite leaders in the press. Al Havat had 
issued a challenge to the Kata’ib leadership: 'Does your party believe in the 
legality of the parliament of 66 and in its representative character?1 The appeal 
was made, of course, because of the wide base of popular support amongst
842 Chapter 4, pp. 185-193.
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ordinary Maronites for the Kata’ib party. Though officially a government 
supporter, however, the leader of the Kata’ib party, Pierre Gemayel, replied in 
a letter published in Le Soir:
the parliament which has just been given to us, 
represents, in my opinion, only ten per cent of the 
population of the country. At the moment the real
843parliament is in the street.
Nor was Gemayel the only Maronite leader who admitted in print that the 
election had been rigged. Alfred Naccache also went on record in Al Havat.
844agreeing that the elections were dishonest.
Two of the main Maronite opponents of Chamoun, both candidates in 
the general election, Dr. Elias Al Khoury and the potential presidential 
candidate Fouad Ammoun, had held a press conference on 20 June 1957. In 
that conference they had openly accused Chamoun of personal interference in 
the election, and of using the state apparatus to ensure the victory of his own 
supporters. According to Al Khoury, government employees were going to the 
villages and trying to persuade voters not to vote for him. Fouad Ammoun also 
accused the president of direct interference, alleging that in some cases
violence was being used in the final hours of the hustings.845 While both these 
men had personal reasons for accusing Chamoun of political corruption, the 
fact that they not only felt able to voice these accusations, but could do so 
without condemnation from the Maronite press that published their comments 
is a useful indication that the readership of newspapers like Al Havat were 
prepared to accept this perspective. Yet it did not succeed in creating a 
serious popular crisis of confidence in Chamoun’s leadership amongst the 
Maronite masses, probably because the flow of rhetoric from Chamoun and his 
immediate followers was sufficiently successful in creating a sense of a 
broader, impending national crisis amongst the masses. If it did not entirely 
stifle criticism, it was sufficiently to make it seem less significant than it might 
otherwise have done. Consequently, the rhetoric coming from this quarter,
043
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with its invocation of established mythology, corroborated by other evidence 
(including newspapers and the oral commentary of journalists like Ghassan 
Tueni) provides a useful indication of the popular mood amongst the masses.
The success of Maronite candidates overall in the 1957 elections, 
including some opponents of Chamoun, would seem to indicate that Chamoun 
did feel that he could rely on a degree of genuine support from the Maronite 
voters; those voters, of course, most likely to be concerned about 
developments in the region and about local Sunni reactions to them. In 
Maronite strongholds like Mount Lebanon, therefore, the need for electoral 
fraud was less than in other areas, though even in Mount Lebanon there were 
some notable Maronites who lost. But if there is an attempt to suggest the 
existence of a genuine pro-Chamoun factor in Mount Lebanon, the existence 
of a negative element in this support, in which Chamoun benefited from the 
absence of any outstanding, charismatic alternative Maronite political figure 
must be remembered also. Thus during the term of his mandate at least, 
Chamoun would be supported as there was no other Maronite figure who also 
endorsed a pro-Western stance but who had a more appealing or convincing 
internal agenda. This factor was sufficiently acute to be noted by the 
interested Western powers. American reports, for example, stressed that in 
terms of the attitude of the Maronite community ‘the crux of the problem....is 
whether or not there is available a suitable replacement for President 
Chamoun1 who would safeguard their interests.846 Equally Chamoun benefited 
in terms of public support from the high profile taken by foreign policy issues in 
the aftermath of the Suez Crisis and the ongoing negotiations for union 
between Syria and Egypt. It is a measure of the public concern that during the 
last part of 1957 and in the first months of 1958, there was a significant 
increase in the membership of the Kata’ib party.847
In a sense, Nasser himself aided Chamoun’s standing with the Maronite 
masses, for the personal hostility expressed by Nasser towards Chamoun
BA6 Foreign Relations of the United States. 1958-1960 Vol. XI, p. 6, American Embassy, Beirut to Department of State, 
Memorandum, 17 January 1958. American concern in this respect, of course, was based on the identification of the 
pro-Western orientation of the community.
47 Amine Gemayel, Oral Interview, Paris, 27 March 1992, in which he drew a clear linkage between popular 
perceptions of crisis and increased party recruitment. See also John Entelis, Pluralism and Party Transformation, p. 
142-4.
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meant that Chamoun came to personify for them, as no other prominent 
Maronite figure did, resistance to Nasserism and its expression in Lebanon. 
Even the more modern elements of the Maronite community feared Nasserism, 
because of perceptions of its overtones of socialism. Thus the evidence is that 
the popular attitude of the community towards Chamoun was not based on a 
spontaneous popular endorsement of him; but rather of what he appeared to 
represent for the time being in terms of a defence of Maronite interests. By 
such a token, the community would have been equally prepared to support 
another president who could guarantee he would maintain the same line of 
defence. Chamoun thus had to create a scenario where it was popularly 
believed that he was the only Maronite figure who could be relied on to do this 
successfully, if he was to achieve a renewal of his mandate.
An indication that this was not entirely straightforward was also provided 
by the 1957 elections. In constituencies where the contest was between 
Maronite candidates, the contest was fought on issues that did not relate to 
Chamoun and Nasserism. Then it was internal issues that were crucial, 
including the prospect of an amendment to the constitution to permit 
Chamoun’s re-election. The edition of Al Havat which discussed the question 
of electoral fraud and the resignation of the ministers entrusted with the 
conduct of the elections, framed its discussion for public consumption in the 
context of internal issues, rather than foreign policy ones.848 The issue of 
constitutional reform to permit Chamoun to stand again for office was a 
sensitive one for all levels of the Maronite community; not just for the deputies 
and other political leaders. As Pierre Rondot points out, the fact that ‘the 
President of the Republic is not immediately eligible for re-election to this office 
was initially designed to prevent one community or clan from perpetuating 
itself in power to the detriment of the interests of others.849
Given that under the terms of the National Pact, the presidency was 
always going to be held by a Maronite, the idea that the constitution would 
prevent a particular community from developing a monopoly over the office 
was redundant. But to the Maronites it was important for the unity of the
843 Al Havat. 18 June 1957.
849 Pierre Rondot, T h e  Political Institutions of Lebanese Democracy1, in L. Binder (ed) Politics in Lebanon, p. 129.
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community that no particular family or clan developed a hold over the office. 
Given that sectarian and clan affiliations are at the heart of the Lebanese 
political life, it would be potentially deeply divisive for such a monopoly to 
develop.850 Such divisions in the community might threaten the security of the 
community by promoting intracommunal disputes, leaving the Maronites more 
vulnerable to attacks by other communities on their superior position.851 An 
indication of popular attitudes towards the issue of constitutional amendment 
can be gained by an examination of the attitude of the Kata’ib party towards 
this issue in 1957 and 1958. As late as 29 May 1958, the party was opposed 
to such manoeuvring: Pierre Gemayel stated bluntly that ‘We have always 
been against renewal [of the president’s term] and we remain so today as well 
as in the future’.852
Thus there was a reluctance to see any amendment. In addition, there 
were also fears that establishing a precedent for amendment of the constitution 
might lead to Nasserist-inspired attempts to amend it in ways that would 
undermine the position of the Maronite community. In such a context, the 
instinctive reaction of the community was to urge maintenance of the status 
quo for fear of seeing the formula established under the National Pact 
collapsing. Yet despite this refusal to endorse amendment in May, the Kata’ib 
party was at the same time insisting that it supported Chamoun’s present 
policies, especially his foreign policy, and their increased recruitment of 
members provides an indication that this was a popular position with the 
masses. But examination of the Kata’ib position also indicates that as the crisis 
developed, the Chamoun question for the Maronites became two questions. 
There was the question of whether or not Chamoun should finish his mandate 
and the question of whether or not Chamoun should stand for re-election, 
associated with a decision on the necessary change in the constitution. These 
two questions were understood separately at the time. However, even though 
the question of Chamoun completing his mandate was not articulated until
850 This is not to say that such affiliations were not equally important in the political life of other Lebanese 
communities. On this point of affiliations, see Michael Hudson, The Precarious Republic: Political Modernisation in 
Lebanon. Random House, New York, 1985, p. 111; Michael Hudson, Arab Politics. Yale University Press, 1979, p. 
238; John Entelis, Pluralism and Party Transformation in Lebanon: A! Kata'ib 1936-1970 . Brill, Leiden.
851 External sources emphasise that opposition to Chamoun was found within the Maronite community. See 
Documents Diolomatiaues Francais. Vol. 1, 1 Jan - 30 June, Telegram No. 328, 529, Beirut 4 May 1958, pp. 55-6.
852 Pierre Gemayel, Article, Al Amal. 29 May 1958.
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iater, it was the dominant issue in Maronite eyes; on which there was near 
Maronite unanimity.853 Even Maronites in the Third Force, and individuals 
personally opposed to Chamoun like General Shihab, or the Patriarch, 
supported the idea that Chamoun should stay in office until the end of his
mandate.854
The issue at stake here was a broad question of principle that had little 
to do with Chamoun himself. The issue was that a Maronite president should 
never be forced to step down before the full completion of his mandate for any 
reason that could be perceived by the Maronites as being linked to foreign 
interference. Salibi, for instance, remembered the widespread Christian 
concern that it was possible that under ‘popular pressure’ Muslim leaders 
would be forced to ‘surrender the sovereignty of Lebanon to Nasser’ if 
Chamoun was ‘to step down before the end of his constitutional term’, thereby 
‘giving the leaders of the Muslim opposition the victory they wanted’.855 It is 
true that in 1952 Bishara Al Khoury had been forced to step down early from 
his second mandate. However, there had been no foreign policy dimension 
with a popularly perceived threat to the very existence of Lebanon in 1952: a 
purely internal issue of government corruption had brought about his fall and it 
was a fall engineered as much by Maronite, as by Muslim, opponents. In 
1957-58, the Maronite perception tended to be that the only groups wishing to 
force Chamoun into early resignation were forces they saw as Arab nationalist
at best, and pro-Nasserist at worst.856
The private correspondence of Moussa Moubarak, the Lebanese 
Ambassador to Paris in 1958, contains a letter to Pierre Bart, the French 
ambassador, giving an analysis of the situation and popular reaction to it, in 
which this point is highlighted. Moubarak emphasises the foreign dimension of
853 Salibi comments on the widespread popular perception of this point:: ‘his partisans as well as his opponents were 
convinced that he intended to seek a second term of office1, but while that prospect was not widely welcomed, ‘who 
could teil what would happen to Lebanon if Chamoun did step down'. K.S. Salibi, ‘Recollections of the 1940s and 
1950s’, pp. 15-16.
854
See Al Havat. 23 July 1958; 18 August 1958; Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-60 Vol. X1, p. 38, 11 
May 1958, American Embassy, Beirut to Department of State, recording that Shihab' vigorously reaffirmed his support 
for the President for legal time in office’; and 2 June 1958, American Embassy, Beirut to Department of State, that 'the 
Patriarch stated his support for Chamoun so long as he did not run for a second term'.
055 K.S. Salibi, 'Recollections of the 1940s and 1950s’, p. 16.
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the question in 1958 in the popular perception, and the consequent popular 
importance to the Maronite community of this particular issue:
The loyalists consider that it is important to support the 
state authority against the pressures of the people on the 
street [Muslim demonstrators presumed to be inspired by 
Nasserism] in order to ensure that M. Chamoun finishes 
his term of office. Even the Christian elements of the 
Third Force share his [Chamoun's] opinion on the 
deadline for the presidential term of office, in other words,
until 24 September.857
This issue of completion of a presidential mandate in defiance of what was 
popularly interpreted as foreign, not indigenous, pressure was thus inevitably 
linked in the Maronite mind to the equally broad issue of Lebanese 
independence from any foreign pressure, especially if that pressure was pan- 
Arab in nature. It was thus rooted in traditional Maronite thinking, but in the 
context of 1958 was exacerbated by the perceived danger of Nasserism 
imposing its will on Lebanese politics.
The strike of 9 May 1958 that took place in Sunni strongholds such as 
Beirut and Tripoli, in reaction to the assassination of journalist Nassib Matni, 
led to opposition demands for Chamoun's resignation. But the Maronite 
mainstream interpreted this incident as having far-reaching connotations that 
linked the calls for resignation to foreign intervention, as the reports in Al Havat 
reveal. Further credibility to such claims was given by government reaction at 
the time. The prime minister, Sami Al Solh, for instance, accused the United 
Arab Republic of sending arms to Lebanon to fuel rebellion on the streets; with
858such accusations again featuring heavily in the press. Thus the issue of 
completion of the presidential mandate developed into one that was, in popular 
terms seen as being an issue where, regardless of his merits or lack of them, 
a Lebanese and Maronite president was being faced with pressure to step 
down, a pressure that came from Nasser forces. The Maronite community 
developed a position where they were prepared to resist that pressure 
vigorously, as a matter of principle entirely separate from any question of re­
85?
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election and constitutional amendment to permit a renewal of Chamoun's 
mandate. Popular Maronite alarm reached further heights when demands 
began to be made for a new census. As a British Foreign Office despatch 
pointed out, such a demand was seen by Maronites to threaten the National 
Pact because it might well upset 'the foundation of the existing system of 
carefully calculated balances between the various sects and sections of the
859population'. For the Maronites it was up to them to decide the fate of their 
president because under the terms of the National Pact, he was first and 
foremost the representative of their community in the state, and a threat to his 
position from outside the Maronite community seemed a threat to Maronite 
interests.
One prominent Maronite political figure did react positively to the 
question of Chamoun's early removal and sought to win support for this. That 
was Bishara Al Khoury whose motives in this respect are open to question in 
view of Chamoun's role in his own early removal from office in 1952. Equally 
under such circumstances he is unlikely to have seen the possibility of 
Chamoun's fall as a potential constitutional crisis! Al Khoury made his public 
position plain on 20 May 1958, in a statement on Damascus radio, in itself a 
provocative act and one which underlines the extent to which he was out of 
step with general Maronite opinion. A report to the British Foreign Office 
recorded his statement as follows:
The only solution to the Lebanese crisis is the resignation 
of the President. He [Al Khoury] said that the allegation 
that the removal of the President will open Lebanon to 
President Nasser was false. He concluded his statement 
by saying: To sum up the situation: I must say that had a 
word been said by the Lebanese President a month ago, 
the country would have been saved the present tragic
situation. But unfortunately he did not say such a
, 860 
word.
But the general reaction of the Maronite community to this broadcast was 
hostile, indicating the continuing high profile of popular fears in the community
859
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about the threat to Lebanese integrity posed by Nasserism, which meant that 
an attack on Chamoun's right to complete his Mandate was an attack on them 
as well.
Chamoun's re-election was another matter; and for most it was one
which was not automatically linked to the first question. Experience now
861showed that such a scenario created a tension in the Maronite community.
As the Patriarch made plain in his published comments on the issue of a 
constitutional amendment in March 1958, the only acceptable grounds would 
necessarily concentrate less on any broad issue of principle, since no 
precedent would be set in this respect, than on the merits of Chamoun's
candidacy itself. The Patriarch saw no reason in March 1958 to advise the
862Maronite community that there was no realistic alternative to Chamoun.
Yet for the Maronite masses, the evidence is that whole-hearted support 
for Chamoun was increasingly becoming linked with the question of their 
political survival. Support for Chamoun's re-election could be seen as support 
for the kind of Lebanon the Maronite masses wanted, linked with a refusal to 
submit to Nasserist dictates. This development can really be attributed to the 
period after the formation of the UAR on 2 February 1958, and in particular 
after the visit of Nasser to Damascus. The demonstration to the Maronite 
community of just how powerful was Nasser's effect on the Muslim community 
in Lebanon, linked with Nasser's own rhetoric meant that, as French sources 
put it: 'Chamoun came to embody for the Christians of Lebanon the symbol of
863resistance to Nasser'. As one journalist on the moderate wing of the 
opposition, Georges Naccache, commented rather acidly on the Maronite 
reaction at the time of negotiations leading up to the creation of the UAR, and 
before the hysteria surrounding Nasser's visit: 'Un nouveau credo est propose
861
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depuis huit mois aux Libanais; si vous n'Aetes pas Chamounien, c'est que vous 
etes un traitre et un syro-bolchevik'.864
Chamoun was certainly working behind the scenes to create an 
atmosphere where there would be a public demand for a renewal of his
mandate, an atmosphere of crisis. It was for this reason that Chamoun had
decided that his most effective course was going to be not to show his hand 
and make a public stand on the issue of seeking a constitutional amendment 
and a fresh mandate for as long as possible. Of course it must also be 
remembered that it was in the Lebanese tradition that a politician did not 
announce his own personal ambitions, but gave the impression that standing 
for election or for office was the result of pressure put on him by friends and 
supporters. Thus for Chamoun to rely on hints rather than outright statement 
of his intentions was not unusual in itself. For instance, there was the 
comment he made in L'Orient in December 1957:
I have my reasons. I will let my opinions be known in due 
time. It will be in May, June or July .... I fully understand
the worries that the amendment of the constitution can
give you. I am myself against the amendment in 
principle. But there is a point I don't want to leave 
ambiguous. If at the due moment I am not sure of finding 
a successor who will ensure the continuity of my policies,
I am declaring already that it means that I will reconsider
, , 865my position.
While this is a fairly clear hint that re-election was on his agenda, Chamoun 
was still being deliberately ambiguous. It was not a clear statement of his 
position or policy but it left the way open for others to 'pressure' him to stand 
again. He continued to leave his position publicly ambiguous. British Foreign 
Office sources of 13 April reveal that Chamoun had told Tufic Suwaida, the 
Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, that he, Chamoun, had decided to stand again
864
George Naccache, 'A I'heure de Mme Afaf', L'Orient. 17 January 1958. 
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for the presidency - important in signalling his intentions to the West, given
866Iraq's pro-Western stance at the time but no public statement was made.
The problem was that while such a game was part of the political 
tradition of Lebanon, it was not usually played against such a tense 
background. The practical effect of all this was not so much to increase 
Chamoun's own chances of success, as he intended, but to increase the 
tensions within Lebanon itself. Also the uncertainty amongst the Maronite 
community was heightened because while there were many Maronite political 
figures with ambitions to become president, there was no single obvious 
candidate as Moussa Moubarak commented.867 This added a dimension of 
popular insecurity about prospects for the future at a time of tension which 
worked to Chamoun’s advantage. It can be said that by April 1958, a 
significant element in (even a majority of) the Maronite masses had come to 
favour Chamoun’s re-election primarily because of fears associated with the
high profile of Nasser at this time. Chamoun, as Ghassan Tueni commented,
868had become a symbol of resistance to Nasserism. A top secret letter from 
Amir Farid Shihab, head of the Lebanese police to Sir Peter Coghill sums up 
popular sentiments.869 Farid Shihab remarked that Camille Chamoun was 
popularly considered by the masses ‘a god’ for his foreign policy and his 
patriotic sentiments; claiming also that Chamoun was the reason why the 
opposition was being helped in its activities by Egypt, Syria and Russia. He 
added:
We [presumably the Maronite community or that element 
of it with which Shihab identified himself] are going to 
help him because of his sound external policy and 
because Lebanon cannot run the risk of having either a 
weak President or a man won to the enemy, and 
especially because the other candidates are either
866
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dangerous like Bishara Al Khoury or very weak like all the 
other candidates. There is a big gulf between him and all
870those men. He is far better than any one of them.
In the context of the rise of Nasserism in the spring of 1958, the 
Maronite masses were afraid of the outcome if a president acceptable to the 
opposition were elected, something which had considerable implications for 
the survival of the National Pact. It was in this context that in February 1958, 
the Kata’ib party came out in open support of Chamoun’s foreign policy after a 
meeting with him at the presidential palace.871 Salibi also recalls ‘the Christian 
whispers’ that Shihab, the obvious candidate who did enjoy some opposition 
support, ‘actually wanted Chamoun brought down, so he could get the 
presidency for himself with Muslim support’; and the rumours that ‘the man was 
reverting to type...Had not his ancestors at one time been Muslims’.872 And 
once again, a co-habitational pattern of behaviour expressed itself as public 
opinion in the Maronite strongholds; meaning that this public opinion was 
becoming well disposed towards the idea of an actual Western intervention if 
there was a perceived intervention by Nasserist forces in Lebanon. In 
Chamoun, it seemed, they had a president who could guarantee opposition to 
Nasserism; continue Western support at a time of increasing crisis; and even 
bring in Western intervention as in the past if that became necessary.873 With 
Chamoun seeking to escalate rather than to defuse the crisis, relying on 
increasing popular Maronite support and the promise of support from Britain 
and the USA it is not surprising that by the spring of 1958 it had become a
874
major issue. In the aftermath of Chamoun's speech of 20 April when he 
made a spirited defence of his policies and attacked those of others, Moussa
870
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Moubarak claimed that re-election 'dominates the political scene and agitates 
public opinion. The opposition has taken direct action and the loyalists are
, . , . , 875
continuing their propaganda campaign .
Yet despite a pro-Chamoun stance among the Maronite masses, 
Maronite political leaders remained far from united in their willingness to 
endorse Chamoun's ambitions to run for office again. To this must also be 
added the complications provided by the attitude of the Maronite Patriarch and 
the Maronite Chief of the Army, both of whom held important roles within the 
Maronite community. This was especially true of the former, given the 
significant defining role of the Maronite Church in Maronite communal identity. 
The Patriarch at this point was Boulos Meouchi, a relative of Chamoun's 
enemy, Bishara Al Khoury and one of Al Khoury's strongest supporters. Not
surprisingly, he was a personal opponent of Chamoun's.876
Arguably, Meouchi genuinely identified himself with the elements within 
the Maronite community that saw the only permanent safeguard for an 
independent Lebanon lying with explicit consensus with the Muslim elements 
there. The Patriarch believed also that it was in Lebanon's best interests to 
maintain good relations with the Arab world. On 13 February 1958, for 
instance, Meouchi stated that ‘the Maronite community was Arab before the 
advent of Islam, and will always remain faithful to Arab Nationalism’.877 Not 
only was the Maronite Church still a powerful force in Maronite popular 
thinking, but also Meouchi had a very powerful personality. Thus he sought to 
use his authority to assure his flock that he did not see the integrity of the 
Maronite Church as being threatened by closer links with the Arab and Islamic 
world. In a sense, he was he was trying to step outside his role as a 'Christian 
religious chief' to intervene in politics to promote closer links with Muslim/Arab
B75
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Meouchi's intervention in the spring of 1958 must therefore be examined 
in some detail and its impact on Maronite thinking assessed. On 30 May, for 
example, Meouchi gave a press conference at his residence, Bkirki. When he 
was asked if he believed that the opposition leaders were acting in good faith 
he replied: 'Without the slightest doubt they are intelligent men who know well 
that to sacrifice the Lebanon would be against their own interests. Their aim is 
simply to rid the Lebanon of the ruffians who govern if. To a further sensitive 
question, asking if he approved of the complaint by the Lebanese government 
against the United Arab Republic that had been filed with the Security Council 
at the UN, he said:
We had better not wash our dirty linen in public. The 
crisis is internal and no other country is involved. We do 
not want the Lebanon to be a slave to anyone. It should 
co-operate with all countries, especially its neighbours 
and brethren.
The Patriarch thus made the point that in his view the opposition contained 
worthy men who aimed to serve their country by ridding it of a bad government, 
and working towards good relations with her neighbours, but who had no 
intention of supporting a union with the United Arab Republic.
This leaves open the question of how the Patriarch developed his ideas 
since they were demonstrably out of step with majority opinion in the Maronite 
community. In his memoirs Bustani has suggested that the Patriarch's policy 
may even have been inspired by the Hoiy See in Rome. Bustani’s view is that 
the Vatican was aware of the danger of an isolationist policy for the Christian 
communities in Lebanon and so suggested Meouchi's conciliatory line. His 
reasoning here was based on the fact that the Patriarch was appointed by
Rome and that at that time, arguably, the Patriarchy was particularly
880
dependent on Rome. Some support for this view is contained in a telegram 
to the Foreign Office in April 1958 which contained the views of Tufic Suwaida 
on the subject. Suwaida also expressed concern at the Maronite Patriarch's 
attitude, and suggested that Meouchi was possibly receiving misguided
F 0 1 31/134120 UL1015, Telegram no. 642, Sir George Middleton to Selwyn Lloyd, 31 May 1958. 
General Bustani, 'Memoirs', p. 216.
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support from the Vatican. Alternatively, he reasoned, the Vatican was being
881culpably weak in its handling of the Patriarch.
The reality seems to have been rather more complicated than 
suggested by Bustani or Suwaida. It must be remembered that while the
Maronite Patriarch is appointed by Rome, equally the Patriarch had (and has)
882a special relationship with the Vatican. It seems that the Patriarch at this 
point was in conflict with the Vatican rather than being controlled by it, that the 
Vatican put more stress on maintaining good relations with its congregations 
than in the benefits of international diplomacy. Certainly reports spoke of a cold 
war between the papal Nuncio and the Patriarch, with the Nuncio reporting 
back to Rome on what he termed the 'unsatisfactory' nature of the Patriarch's 
behaviour, by which he seemed to mean his anti-Western and his pro- 
Nasserist stance. This meant that the Vatican was aware that the Patriarch 
was playing a 'dangerous' role in Lebanese politics, but its power to do
883
anything effective was limited. The British Embassy in Beirut commented in 
January 1958 that the Patriarch 'has been an absolute headache to the
884Vatican for many months'. This all seems to make it plain that the Vatican 
cannot be held responsible for Meouchi's stand and turns the focus back onto 
the Lebanon itself, and the interplay of personalities there, and the impact of
885this on popular reactions.
it is the reaction of the Maronite masses to the Patriarch's stand on 
Nasserism and Arab nationalism that is important, it was hostile and full of 
non-comprehension. In November 1957, Al Havat. in an editorial, commented 
that the Patriarch was complaining of ‘rebellion against him’ amongst his own 
clergy, including the clash between him and the Archbishop of Byblos, Yussuf 
Aki, because of ‘his political stance1 in relation to Nasser.886 This hostility grew
F 0 371 /134 116, British Embassy, Baghdad to Foreign Office, 13 April 1958.
See Chapter 1, p. 64.
F 0 3 7 1 /1 34184, Sir William Hayter, Deputy Under-Secretary, to Levant Department, 17 April 1958, containing 
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884
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after February 1958, when Meouchi sent personal representatives to Nasser 
to congratulate him on the birth of the United Arab Republic and his election as 
its President. An editorial by Adli Al Hajj, in An Nahar in March 1958, attacked 
the Patriarch and accused him of failing to follow the edicts of the Gospel in 
seeking to conciliate the Arab world. As a result of that episode the Patriarch 
became known to the Maronite community as 'Muhammad Al Meouchi1 and he 
became the target of open Maronite resentment.887 It indicates at this period 
just how far the Maronite masses were from any willingness to seek consensus 
in line with the National Pact, with the Lebanese Muslim communities. The 
Patriarch was the head of the Church, but even he could not command their 
obedience to an approach that seemed so against everything the Maronites 
thought they stood for! The core of the Maronite accusations made against 
him were precisely that he was pro-Muslim. Indeed, in what was seen by 
Qubain as a response to the Patriarch's delegation to Nasser a Maronite priest, 
Father Antoine Qurtbawi, wrote an article that appeared in a Maronite 
periodical that, again according to Qubain, had close connections with 
Chamoun. In the article Father Antoine reminded the world that 'Lebanon is 
not Arab, but is the Lebanon - a Mediterranean country whose language is
a u- i 888Arabic.
But Nasser’s speech of 2 March in Damascus, interpreted by the 
Maronite press as indicating a desire for the incorporation of Lebanon into the 
UAR., triggered considerable fear among the Maronite readership.889 Pierre 
Gemayel’s open letter of 2 March to the Maronite Patriarch asking for the 
Patriarch’s explanation of Nasser’s speech and how the Patriarch could justify 
his claim that there was no threat to the integrity of the Maronite community or 
Church from the wider Arab world, sums up the basis of the fear. In his letter 
Gemayel stressed the intense propaganda to which Lebanon had been 
subjected in view to lead the Lebanese to ask for unions. Gemayel asked the 
Patriarch:
887 Oral interviewees recall use of this term, for instance, Mrs. Genevieve Gemayel, Oral Interview, Beirut, 1 March 
1996; Amine Gemayel, Oral Interview, Paris, 27 March 1992; Sofia Saadeh, Oral Interview, Beirut, 2 January 1993. It 
also appears in print, see An Nahar. 12 March 1958.
F. Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon, p. 63.
809 Al Am al. 3 March 1958; An Nahar. 3 March 1958. See also Chapter 5, pp. 225-6; An invitation to join the UAR 
was never actually explicitly given, and the likelihood is that Nasser never intended to do so, but simply to stir up anti- 
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’to put an end to the equivocation (caused by his pro­
opposition position) from which only the enemies of 
Lebanon stood to gain’.890
Patriarch Meouchi’s answer sought to alleviate these fears, but also to 
maintain good relations with the Sunni community leaders. He replied to 
Gemayel on 4 March 1958, but insisted that his words were intended ‘for Sunni 
as well as Maronite consideration’; he wrote:
To our Arab brethren, wherever they may be, we say that 
whatever is for the good of Lebanon is also for the good 
of the Arabs’.891
He went on to claim that ‘The independence of Lebanon has to be 
preserved and strengthened, with a feeling of profound love we say
“Let us not reconcile ourselves to any unity or union 
which accepts anything that may weaken the sovereignty 
and independence of Lebanon’.892
In a statement of 9 March 1958 the Patriarch sought to be reassuring to the 
Maronite community, writing:
‘My dear sons, I have a letter from President Gamal Abd 
Al Nasser, the President of the United Arab emirates and 
an old friend of Lebanon saying that Lebanon as it stands 
at present is a structure with complete sovereignty and 
independence and these will not be threatened’.
The Patriarch’s efforts had the opposite effect to that intended by him; 
as indicated by the popular reaction against the Patriarch from within the 
Maronite community. For instance, hostility towards the Patriarch was indicated 
by the popular credibility given to Saeb Salam’s widely-reported claim on 10 
April 1958 that the Muslim opposition had 'made a pact with the Patriarch
894against Chamoun1. The consequent popular resentment even had the effect 
of increasing popular support for Chamoun. On 11 March 1958, two days after
Al Amal. 3 March 1958.
891 Oriente Moderno. March 1958 (translated from the Italian from a copy in AUB Library); Al Amal. 5 March 1958; 6 
March 1958. See also M.S. Agwani, The Lebanese Crisis 1958: A Documentary Study. Asia House, New York, 1965, 
p. 46.
M d , pp. 46-67.
893 Ibjd, pp. 47-8, quoting summary of world broadcast, part IV 2 -3 ,1 2  March 1958.
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Meouchi had attacked Chamoun and his regime because of the regime’s 
corruption, and the day after Saeb Salam’s attack on the Patriarch, Chamoun 
attended mass at Antelias. Antelias was the seat of the Armenian 
Patriarchate, and Chamoun had come to congratulate the new Armenian 
Patriarch on his election. But, according to An Nahar on 12 March, Chamoun 
arrived at Antelias and was 'welcomed by huge crowds' coming from all over 
Mount Lebanon; in other words, Maronites had turned out to attend a 
ceremony at a rival religious centre, to demonstrate opposition to their own 
Patriarch and support for Chamoun. An Nahar used its editorial columns to 
refer to the extent of public support for Chamoun, and corresponding hostility 
to Meouchi, while making a plea to the Patriarch to change his stance in this
895respect.
Within the Church itself, the effect of all this was to distance the 
Patriarch from the rest of the Maronite Church, rather than to persuade the 
Church to follow Meouchi’s line and seek to use the pulpit to persuade 
congregations to endorse his views. His clergy began preaching sermons that 
were implicitly hostile to him, as indicated by press reports on the Patriarch's 
press conference in May 1958. He was asked 'Is it true that the bishops have 
broken with Bkirki [i.e. with the Patriarch]?1. Meouchi's answer was 'A few', but 
he attempted to defuse this by claiming that 'they are in the pay of the
896Government'. True or not it does indicate that there was at least some 
pressure from Maronite public opinion on the bishops of the Maronite church to 
cut their ties with the Patriarch. Certainly, the editorial comments on the press 
conference emphasise the degree of alienation from Meouchi within the 
Church, and comment satirically on Meouchi’s unwillingness to accept this and 
modify his stance.897 It seems a reasonable inference that the majority of 
clerics in the Maronite Church, whatever may have been their personal 
feelings over the sense of Meouchi's words on maintaining a friendly attitude 
towards the Arab world and on Chamoun, were not prepared to risk their hold 
over their congregations by supporting their Patriarch on an issue where
895
An Nahar. 11 March 1958.
FO 371/134120 UL1015, Telegram 642, Sir George Middleton to Selwyn Lloyd, 31 May 1958. Al Amal. 25 May 
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popular feeling was so demonstrably against the Patriarch. It is also worth 
noting that by the 1950s the majority of parish priests came from the lower 
levels of the population, not the elites.
The popular Maronite refusal to compromise in 1958 was undoubtedly 
heightened by the popular, if unfounded, Lebanese belief in the willingness of 
the Western powers to take action to support Chamoun's re-election if the 
tension rose high enough repeating old patterns. There were leaders of the 
Maronite community, such as the Edde brothers, who feared that Chamoun’s 
re-election and/or any Western intervention would have an overall destabilising 
effect on Lebanon itself. The evidence is that such fears were popularly taken 
less seriously than the fears of an external Arab threat. Maronite popular 
perception saw the Muslim opposition as being encouraged in its unco­
operative policy towards Chamoun and so to their own community by the UAR. 
for reasons linked to UAR. policy and ambitions. In other words these loyalists 
saw the possibility of Western intervention against the background of an 
already existing hostile, external intervention.
Chamoun and his closest supporters did their best to foster a Maronite 
popular perception of the reality of such an intervention. Charles Malik's 
speech on 13 May at a press conference in Beirut, openly accused the UAR of 
intervention in the Lebanon, and of causing Lebanon's problems as a result. It 
was the first public statement that claimed there was an intervention and it was 
well received by the Maronite masses. Malik insisted that any policy of 
conciliation towards the UAR had to be abandoned because of this 
intervention. He related various incidents which he claimed supported his 
thesis of UAR interference and then said : ‘All of these incidents are only the 
latest manifestations of a concealed movement that has been going on for 
months and indeed for years, designed to undermine and destroy Lebanon as 
a free, independent and sovereign state and bring about a radical modification
898in her fundamental orientation’. Malik's points were reinforced later by 
Pierre Gemayel, the Kata’ib leader, in a press conference of 4 June 1958.
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Gemayel argued that the tensions of 1958 were not internal in origin, but 
dated back to November 1956, when Lebanese opposition leaders had, 
according to him, taken up the Nasserist option and invited Nasser’s 
intervention, regardless, of the Lebanese nation's legitimate interests, its 
independence and sovereignty. In other words he argued that the electoral 
battle waged by the opposition had been and was still being waged under 
Nasser’s banner. The point underlying Gemayel's statement was his belief that 
the Lebanese were unwilling to fight fellow Lebanese. The violent incidents 
that had taken place were explained by the fact that they were not an 
expression of internal dissent so much as armed UAR interventions, and the 
ending of such intervention would lead to a prompt reconciliation between the
899divergent Lebanese elements. All this helped to reinforce the Maronite 
perspective of an external intervention that was hostile to them and Lebanon.
The popularity of such beliefs with some Maronite elements cannot be 
denied. Those who supported an extension of Chamoun’s mandate found a 
theory which argued that the troubles that beset Lebanon were externally and 
not internally generated very attractive. It was strongly supported by the Kata’ib 
party, but did also gain an audience amongst the Maronite masses as a whole. 
This was particularly in the aftermath of speeches such as that by Sami Al 
Solh, on 17 May 1958, in which he talked in alarmist terms about attacks on 
frontier posts, etc., as evidence of UAR. interference and incitement to
900
revolt. However, this should not be taken as an indication that the Maronite 
masses universally shared the loyalist opinion on the best solution of the 
problem. Gemayel's views also found a sympathetic echo among the Western 
powers; certainly the US Embassy generally supported Gemayel's analysis of 
the causes of the crisis in Lebanon. Even so it cautioned that it gave
901
insufficient emphasis to the role of local politicians' ambitions.
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There were incidents which reinforced the loyalists' perspective, and 
with some justice. There was a degree of deliberate physical intervention on 
the part of Syria and Egypt. The evidence quoted in contemporary 
newspapers and also diplomatic archives on UAR supplied arms and men 
taking part in demonstrations in the Lebanon must be taken seriously.902 
Another factor heightening tension was the Maronite reaction to the reports in 
the media of Sunni feelings at this point. What was identified as popular Sunni 
resentment of Maronite pro-Western attitudes at this period expressed itself in 
accusations of Maronite insensitivity to pan-Arab aspirations in the interest of
903
total submission to the West. But the Maronites generally did not 
comprehend the fears of the Sunnis about alienation from the Arab world if 
Maronite policies were continued, instead the Maronite masses generally 
understood Sunni sentiments as confirming Sunni involvement with what the 
Maronites accepted as UAR ambitions to absorb Lebanon. Thus to a 
considerable degree, the paranoia was based on a mass misunderstanding by 
the Maronites of the reasons why the Sunni community was upset at this point, 
and of any actions that the Sunni had in mind to take so as to reduce the 
reasons for their discontent.
This led to a Maronite feeling of being under siege, exacerbated by a
904fear of an enemy within the walls. It must be remembered that this was a 
particularly emotive issue for the Maronite community. Fear of being ruled from 
outside was, and is still, a very sensitive point905 It would be a mistake to 
make judgements about Maronite attitudes which assume a simple uniformity 
of reaction, even as the crisis intensified. Yet it is certain that as the crisis 
proceeded the popular Maronite attitude towards Chamoun's re-election did 
apparently become more uniformly positive out of a spirit of sheer 
defensiveness, as Maronite paranoia in 1958 was heightened by the 
comments of the Sunni Prime Minister, Sami Al Solh. His words seemed to
l°* Al Havat. 20 July 1958.
Al Havat Is a particularly fruitful source for this. It was apparent from 1957, but particularly acute in 1958. See Al 
Havat. 10 May and 11 May, 1957; 20 July 1958
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reinforce their perspective that there was a threat from the UAR. Undoubtedly 
also, he was taken more seriously on this point by the loyalists because of his 
Sunni background, which seemed to give him extra credibility. Al Solh made 
vigorous efforts to spread information amongst the Lebanese people through 
the medium of radio broadcasts and newspaper articles, which publicised his 
interpretation of there being a UAR intervention in Lebanon.906 Al Solh's 
intention seems to have been the creation of a broad consensus in Lebanon as 
a whole, supporting the government and Chamoun's cause generally, by 
raising fears about the collapse of Lebanese independence. For example, in 
his broadcast of 5 June, Al Solh raised the spectre of foreign-inspired 
opposition leaders who falsely claimed that the Lebanese people wanted 
Lebanese policy to be ‘evolved on the banks of the Barada (i.e. Damascus) or
907
the Nile (Cairo)’.
But Al Solh's words undoubtedly reinforced the alarm that already 
existed amongst the numerical majority of the Maronite community.908 The 
latter were increasingly convinced of the reality and the dangers of foreign 
intervention in Lebanon in this context. Even so a note of caution must be 
struck. There is no evidence to show that the logical corollary of all this was 
for all of the Maronite community to move to a support of Chamoun's policy of 
re-election. To sum up, the attempts to inspire alarm were successful amongst 
the Maronites. The fear of the annexation of Lebanon by the UAR, whether real 
or imaginary, did inspire some elements in the Maronite community to support 
Chamoun's re-election as part of a defensive reaction, in a way that they 
otherwise would not have done: but this was not universal. Even at the end of 
May 1958 the alarmist words of men like Gemayel and Al Solh did not 
convince loyal followers of Bishara Al Khoury or the Patriarch that there was a 
real threat. If they accepted the reality of the intervention, they interpreted it as 
being provoked by Chamoun’s policies. The solution to the crisis, therefore, 
was Chamoun’s retirement not his re-election
906 See, for example, Al Havat. 7 May 1957.
907
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Several prominent Maronite leaders, including the Patriarch, with faith in 
the compromise encapsulated in the National Pact, were convinced by the 
summer of 1958 that it was Chamoun and his policies, not inter-community 
relations, that were really at the heart of the crisis. These men sought to 
convince not only their own followers but also the majority of Maronites that 
Chamoun was destroying the National Pact and thereby dragging Lebanon 
down a path leading to the kind of confessional conflict that had marked the
909darkest periods in Lebanon's history. They used opportunities for political 
speeches, the press and the pulpit, to seek to put across their belief that 
Chamoun's immediate removal was the key to the restoration of peace in 
Lebanon. Papers such as An Nahar carried articles arguing that by turning to 
the West and seeking its active intervention, Chamoun and his supporters 
endangered the current, compromise-based political system in an
910
unacceptable way. Indeed even before the Patriarch had made his public 
statement, pro-Patriarch elements in the Lebanese press had come out 
against the Chamoun policy which saw the possibility of Western intervention 
as desirable; one stating:
‘it is about time that the USA and Britain stopped 
smearing Lebanon's reputation by movement of planes 
and ships and by the misrepresentations they spread 
about military movements’.
On 19 May, through the columns of L'Orient. Rene Aggiouri, added another 
dimension to the fears of those within the Maronite community who did not 
support the idea of a Western intervention despite the 'reality' of the UAR one. 
He argued that it was necessary to dispel the idea of such intervention, 
because of the implication that might be drawn that the American and British
909
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governments could be planning to use the Lebanese situation as a pretext for
912military action which might involve the entire Middle East.
Its publication in L’Orient published by George Naccache, a prominent 
member of the Third Force, is significant, as is the fact that L’Orient also 
published the comments of Charles Helou, journalist and another Third Force 
member, calling for international recognition and guarantees of Lebanon’s 
neutrality, in a conscious imitation of Switzerland’s position, a stance that
913
aimed to prevent either Western or UAR. intervention. Such press 
comments indicate that anti-Chamoun reactions amongst some parts of the 
Maronite community need to be seen as manifestations of the unease felt by 
some within it that the fundamental compromise in Lebanese politics was 
being endangered by Chamoun’s manoeuvrings. It can be argued, for 
instance, that Aggiouri's main aim in his statement was to defuse what he saw 
as the unthinkingly extreme reaction of the Chamoun loyalists in their fear of an 
Arab threat to Lebanon's stability. Thus Aggiouri sought to show how small the 
importance of the Lebanon was to the USA, for example, in its dealings with 
the Middle East as a whole, to prevent loyalist support for a policy which might 
destroy the compromise and thus Lebanon itself.
Other evidence, including further comment in papers such as An Nahar. 
indicate, however, that such anti-Chamoun reactions did not recruit a major 
popular following. These appeals on behalf, essentially, of the National Pact 
did little to shift the fears of large numbers in the community. Al Amal. a voice 
for the Kata’ib party, continued to urge the need for active Western 
intervention, to secure Chamoun’s re-election, despite Pierre Gemayel’s 
continuing unwillingness to endorse, formally, such a policy.914 The reason 
given by Al Amal was that anything was better than Nasser - showing now 
deeply entrenched in the readership of this paper, widely-read in the summer 
of 1958, was the idea of a Nasserist intervention.915 In terms of its impact on 
the Maronite community, therefore, the UN intervention in the summer of 1958
912
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needs to be assessed in the knowledge that there were deep divisions within 
that community over Chamoun's policy of invoking the West.
The UN intervention occurred in the context of the heightening of
916
tensions in Lebanon in the aftermath of the murder of Nassib Al Matni. 
Initially Chamoun had sought to use the street violence in the aftermath of the 
murder to invoke US military intervention but UN intervention had been agreed 
on instead.917 As a way of assessing the perspective of the Maronite masses 
at this time, reaction, indicated through the press, to this intervention is useful. 
The concept of the intervention won general Maronite support even though the 
alternative was intervention by the Arab League.918 What is significant here is 
that the government rejection of Arab League intervention, which would have 
been in the tradition of compromise in the National Pact, was not criticised at 
popular levels: as the Maronite populist newspaper comment on the
919intervention underlines. There was a widespread expectation in the 
Maronite community, even among those who did not support Chamoun’s 
current policies, that the UN Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL), would 
endorse the claims of the Chamoun regime, because the UN was popularly 
seen as a Western body that would naturally favour the Maronite
920
community. One presidential heir-apparent, Selim Lahoud, publicly
921described the United Nation’s action as ‘good and reasonable’. Another 
would-be, if less likely, presidential candidate, Jawad Boulos, declared that the
922UN intervention was a ‘good omen’ for the future. Opposition Maronite 
elements expressed their expectation of a predictably pro-Chamoun result 
rather more gloomily.923 Adel Osseiran, Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies,
915
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told an American Embassy employee that when UN observers arrived, the 
splits between the government and the opposition and between Lebanon and
924UAR would be increased.
When it became apparent to the Maronite community that their 
confidence in a UNOG1L report endorsing claims of UAR intervention were 
mistaken, there was an acute popular reaction that left a permanent legacy in 
terms of the way that it altered Lebanese opinions and alliances. As the first 
hints came at the end of June 1958 that the UNOGIL report would not be to 
the government’s liking, the pro-Chamoun press began attacking the
925
observers. These attacks peaked with the issue of the first report on 3 July 
1958. The headline in Al Amal read ‘Observers Failed Their Mission’, for
926
example. The pro-Chamoun Al Ahrar gave the headline ‘Observers Unable 
to Discover Infiltration Because Barred from Insurgent Controlled A r e a s ’ .927 
An Nahar. Al Amal and Al Ahrar all quoted Lebanese government officials as
928being ‘bitter’ and ‘worried’ about the outcome. The UNOGIL assessment 
that there was not a massive infiltration from Syria, and in so doing, created a 
panic in the Maronite community that related as much to the ‘betrayal’ of 
Maronite expectations of Western support in times of need as to the actual
929content of the report.
Summing up the report in order to relate it to its impact on Maronite 
opinion it should be remembered that the UNOGIL report did not give an 
adequate or coherent assessment of the situation from a Maronite perspective. 
On the one hand it claimed that the rebellion was indigenous in origin, while at
930the same time not denying that there was a UAR intervention. However it 
made no attempt to define the scale of the intervention, and it was the scale of
925
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that intervention which was the main point of controversy within Lebanon itself. 
Thus the questions that had dominated before the United Nation’s involvement 
still remained; could radio and press attacks against the Lebanese government 
count as intervention or not? Was the quantity of arms smuggled into 
Lebanese territory enough to provide proof of a physical UAR intervention or 
not? Many Maronites insisted they could and did, justifying thereby the 
generation of the fear, tension and resentment in the Maronite community, and 
the consequent defensive reaction of that community.
Maronite disappointment with the UNOGIL'S conclusions were thus
931acute enough to make their position more extreme. The vulnerability now 
felt by the community had a broadly destabilising effect. Even those that were 
by no means pro-Chamoun shared the general alarm that the report indicated 
that community was losing ground both internally and internationally.932 This 
was particularly significant in terms of the traditional Maronite belief that 
dependence on the West was the only final security they could depend on. If 
that had gone, what other hope had they? Because of this, there was an 
increased readiness to listen to figures like Chamoun and Charles Malik when 
they claimed that the only solution lay in a military intervention by the 
Americans, as much to demonstrate that the USA was still committed to the
933Maronite cause, if the UN was not.
It was felt by many Maronites that the compromise underpinning the 
National Pact was destroyed if the Sunni opposition was able to impose its 
interpretation of events supported by the UN, since the Arab world would also 
line up behind the Muslim community. In terms of its external relations, the 
community felt deserted and isolated in a way that it had never felt before. In 
its vulnerability there was undoubtedly a greater willingness to seek a Maronite 
unity in the face of an external threat that seemed worse than the possibility of
031
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Chamoun's re-election - or at least made that possibility a less immediate 
problem, one that could be deferred until a later point.
There is evidence to show a significant shift in popular attitudes after the 
publication of the UN report, even if based more on the popular fears outlined 
above than on intrinsic support for Chamoun and his policies. It remained 
popular belief that Chamoun was still trying to involve the West in order to 
secure his re-election; but many Maronites previously opposed to intervention 
were now prepared to welcome a demonstration of pro-Maronite Western 
feeling. It must be seen as significant, therefore, that the loyalist Kata’ib party, 
for example, increased still further in numbers at this stage, because of its role 
as an indicator of mass Maronite opinions.934 It can be said to have
935
represented the hard-line core of Maronite feeling in the community. In late 
1954 Kata’ib numbers had been around 26,000 - but by July 1958, according 
to the French-speaking newspaper, L'Orient. this had gone up to 62,200,
936making it the largest political party in Lebanon at that date. Indeed, Kata’ib 
numbers had been growing even before the report, inspired by events like the 
destruction of Lebanese flags during Muslim demonstrations in Tyre and
937Tripoli, which gave popular colour to the rhetoric of UAR intervention.
Yet even so it remains impossible to claim that this represented the 
universal Maronite attitude at this stage, despite the increase of tension in 
Lebanon and the increasing feeling of Maronite isolation, in and out of 
Lebanon. Most of the tension was internally generated and external factors 
were interpreted to fit in with these internal reasons. Chamoun continued his 
efforts during the summer of 1958 to give the West the impression that the 
conflict in Lebanon was part of the wider problem of the Middle East. He 
sought to show it was a struggle between a pro-Western Lebanon and an 
external radical Arab nationalism, allied with Communism and with dissident 
Muslim elements in Lebanon aiming to stage a take-over there. He realised
934 Mrs. Genevieve Gemayel, Oral Interview, Beirut, 1 March 1996; Amine Gemayel, Oral Interview, Paris, 27 March 
1992, both commented on the increased recruitment in the summer of 1958, when there was, according to the latter, a 
feeling that the situation had developed into a choice between pro and anti-Lebanese forces.
Amine Gemayel, Oral Interview, Paris, 27 March 1992.
936
Figures taken from the survey conducted by L'Orient. 11 December 1958.
Foreign Relations of the United States 1958- 1960. Vol. X!, p. 35; reporting Telegram No. 3826, from McClintockto 
Dulles, Beirut, 11 May 1958.
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that there was not sufficient support within the Maronite community, let alone 
other elements in Lebanon, to secure his re-election by straightforward means 
and nothing he did seemed to increase his support internally so continuation in 
office depended on active intervention by the West, which essentially meant 
the Americans, in his support. Chamoun's own insecurity is emphasised by 
the claims that he sent his wife's jewels and his grandson out of the country in
July 1958.038 Reports of this certainly increased the state of tension within the 
Maronite community. However, despite the tendency to Maronite paranoia 
caused by the West’s apparent desertion, indicated in the UNOGIL report, the 
continuance of opposition amongst prominent Maronite figures such as 
General Shihab and the Patriarch and of support for these figures within the 
community ensured that some important, if numerically smaller, Maronite 
elements continued to see Chamoun as the cause of, not the solution, to the 
crisis. Shihab consistently maintained a belief that the crisis could best be 
settled by Chamoun openly stating that he would retire from the presidency at
939the end of his term of office. There is no indication of any widespread 
dissatisfaction with this position among the Maronite element within the armed
940forces. Equally, the Patriarch continued to draw support from elements 
within the Maronite community, in and outside Lebanon, even if he did not
941have all the officials of his Church solidly behind his position.
In negotiating with the Western powers for active intervention Chamoun 
had done his best, with some success, to alarm these powers into a sense of 
crisis relating to the internal situation of Lebanon, and Lebanon's position 
within the Middle East as a whole, hoping to convince them to overlook or
942misinterpret any lack of internal enthusiasm for his re-election. But the
838
An alternative interpretation of this might be that Chamoun himself genuinely believed in the possibility of UAR- 
backed civil war in Lebanon if the W est did not intervene. He was a product of Mount Lebanon, after all. However, 
this seems the less likely interpretation. See Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, p. 397.
General Bustani, 'Memoirs', p. 189; Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-1960 Vol. XI p. 55, Telegram Nos 
3949 & 3 9 5 8 ,1 6  May, 1958, on Western efforts to get Chamoun to announce his retirement.
940
General Bustani, 'Memoirs', pp. 189-90.
941
See, for example, Boulos Meouchi to Brendan A. Finn, Maronite emigrant in the USA, 11 July 1958, Meouchi 
Papers.
942
For an indication of Chamoun's success in this respect see F0371/134124, Telegram  No. 775, British Embassy, 
Beirut, 16 June 1958; F 0371 /134117 UL1015/62 Telegram No. 1151, British Embassy, Beirut, 15 May 1958; and 
F 0371 /134124 Telegram No. 1624, Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador, Washington, to Selwyn Lloyd, 19 June 
1958, for example; also Foreign Relations of the United States. 1958-1960 Vol. X I, p. 71, recording Dulles' 
acceptance of Chamoun's fears that Lebanon was in danger of being ‘lost to Nasserism'.
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Western powers also had access to the opinions of men like the Patriarch and
943Shihab. The UNOGIL report also strengthened Western belief that military 
intervention in Lebanon would be counterproductive, both for Lebanon and the
944
Western position in the Middle East Thus it cannot be argued that Maronite 
alarms really galvanised the West into interventionary action, or that Western 
alarms created an atmosphere of universal Maronite hysteria even in the days 
immediately succeeding the UNOGIL report.
But then, on 15 July 1958, American Marines landed on the beaches of 
Beirut, to the surprise of most in the Maronite community. There was a mixed 
reaction to this American intervention. It was apparently greeted with initial 
enthusiasm by most Maronites, if only because it did show that the Americans 
did support Lebanon, while the revolution in Iraq had increased popular fears 
(possibly not entirely groundless) that Nasser aimed to take over the entire 
region, and that he had the capacity to do so without American intervention. In 
this context, the prospects for the survival, not just of Chamoun, but also of any 
pro-Western government in Lebanon, such as was supported by the Maronite 
community looked bleak. Even if his re-election had not been secured, up till 
then Chamoun's prospects of completing his term of office and retiring on 23 
September 1958 had seemed good in the eyes of the Maronite community. 
Even people like Shihab who opposed his re-election had generally supported 
the policy of Chamoun completing his term, seeing that as important to
945
maintaining the current balance in the political system. But the events in 
Baghdad made the prospect of this seem bleak. Fears were widely expressed 
that his government might fall before the end of its term of office; even that 
Chamoun himself might be assassinated, making the Maronite community
946deeply vulnerable to Muslim and pan-Arab ambitions.
It was these fears that caused the firing of bullets in joy that were noted 
in a number of the Maronite streets of Beirut in the immediate aftermath of the 
American landings. Even if it can be claimed that these expressions of support
943
See F 0 371 /134 124  , Telegram No. 775, British Embassy, Beirut to Foreign Office, 16 June 1958, for example.
See, for example, New York Tim es. 7 July 1958.
945
General Bustani 'Memoirs', p. 223.
946
Al Havat. 16 July 1958.
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were mainly confined to Chamoun loyalists, there were no serious expressions 
of popular hostility from the Maronites to this way of showing pleasure by the
947loyalists. It is true that the majority of Maronite political leaders remained 
silent in the immediate aftermath of the landings, the only exceptions being 
government spokesmen. This can be accounted for partly by political 
astuteness on the part of these men, who feared creating a degree of 
resentment and hostility amongst the Muslim community that would result in 
open civil war if they made open expressions of support for the landings. But 
even despite the pressure of the Iraqi coup, those Maronite politicians who
948
were not Chamoun loyalists were equivocal about the landings.
On the one hand they hoped that the presence of the Americans would 
enable the general election to be held at the due time, and would also ensure 
that the Maronite role in the political system would be safeguarded, but on the 
other hand they were aware of the problems caused by the growing hostility
949
voiced by Sunni politicians. Essentially such men were aware that they 
were dependent upon Muslim support within the current Lebanese political 
formula, and it was a formula they had no wish to change. In this respect it is 
important to contrast the moderation displayed at this point by Selim Lahoud 
with the belligerent mood of Pierre Gemayel. Gemayel and his followers in the 
Kata’ib party were Chamoun loyalists, and showed an unquestioning support of 
the American presence, stating that the actions of the Muslim opposition had
950obliged them to take this position. Lahoud had come out in support of 
Chamoun's re-election, but now, with presidential hopes of his own he felt able, 
at this point, to seek moderate Maronite backing for a personal position based
951
on compromise. This underlines the fact that the Kata’ib party and its 
position of support for Chamoun's re-election was still popularly seen in the 
Maronite community as being too extremist in its views to gain universal
947
Ibid: see also Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-1960. Vol. XI, p. 389, Telegram No. 658, 24  July 1958, 
in which McClintock reported 1 I also have feeling most Lebanese welcome our presence here and feel it will make it 
possible for them to reach a political solution'.
Raymond Edde, Oral Interview, Paris, 20 March 1991.
949
Raymond Edde, Oral Interview, Paris, 20 March 1991; Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-1960 Vol. X I, p. 
241, reporting Telegram No. 290, indicating that McClintock believed that Pierre Edde, brother of Raymond, was, 
despite his pro-government inclination, hostile to the landings.
See Pierre Gemayel, Speech Al Havat. 18 July 1958.
S ee Al Havat. 19 July 1958.
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support, even at this time of crisis. Yet increasingly, even those Maronite 
politicians who were Chamoun loyalists, in favour of his re-election, came to 
see the American landings as standing in the way of achieving any resolution 
of the internal crisis in Lebanon. They began to join with the opposition voices 
in seeking a withdrawal of the troops as a preliminary to arranging a 
compromise that would safeguard the Lebanese compromise and the Maronite
952role in the Lebanese state.
But from the perspective of the Maronite masses, the solution was not 
so straightforward; in the atmosphere of tension by late July 1958, the simple 
removal of American troops and arrangement of a compromise seemed to be 
in danger of removing, not protecting, the privileged Maronite role in the state. 
In addition, the fear was that such a compromise might depend on the 
Maronites breaking their relations with the West, something that had profound 
economic as well as cultural implications, of course. It must be remembered 
that Nasser continued to have an impact on Maronite thinking, personifying, as 
he did, the Maronite nightmare of Arab intervention in Lebanon’s affairs. It was 
thus Nasser, not Chamoun, that got the popular blame for the crisis. As 
Moubarak commented to Charles Malik, he had explained to the Portuguese 
ambassador in Paris that the troubles that had occurred in some cities like 
Tripoli and Beirut were caused not only by the proposal to re-elect President 
Chamoun but were also provoked by the agents of Nasser.953
In the press, memories of past massacres of Maronites at the hands of 
‘Muslim oppressors’ and the need for resistance to foreign domination if the 
community was to survive, had been evoked throughout the crisis, first 
creeping into public rhetoric as early as 1956, when Pierre Gemayel had 
argued that it was necessary to value ‘our relations with France’, because 
France had ‘helped to free us from Ottoman oppression and made us part of 
the civilised world’, Later that year, against a background of some local Sunni 
unrest and the imposition of newspaper censorship, Ghassan Tueni had 
justified government policy, and exhorted Maronites to ‘Remember 1840, 1848,
See, for example, Al Havat. 19 July 1958.
953 Moussa Moubarak to Charles Malik, Letter, 12 May 1958, Moussa Moubarak Papers.
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1860, 1936’.954 By 1958, the invoking of such a dark mythology had become 
more frequent and, on occasions, more cryptic or implicit, implying that there 
was no need to explain such references in detail. Indeed, reference to this 
‘history’ was not just restricted to the Maronites, a further indication of the 
widespread nature of this perception. On 17 May 1958, Nadim Ai Jisr said that 
the reasons for the Maronite tension ‘are the reasons of 1860’, explaining that 
‘once again, the Christian minority refused to live accordingly’.955 Shortly 
afterwards, during a press conference, Ghassan Tueni described to ‘this week’ 
as ‘the most dangerous for Lebanon since 1860’, saying that ‘neither World 
War I nor World War II had been ad dangerous’. In justifying his stance, he did 
refer explicitly to the ‘past Maronite-Druze massacres in Lebanese history’, 
hoping that ‘these would not be repeated’ and a ‘solution’ would be found.956 
Pierre Gemayel made use of more inflammatory rhetoric, linking the events of 
1860 and other crises during the Ottoman period to the choice that ‘Christians’ 
in 1958 again had to make between ‘liberty and slavery’.957
This did not create a popular mood that favoured consensus; rather a 
return to the old habits of co-habitation and mutual suspicion. After all, the 
Maronite masses themselves had never been consulted on the National Pact 
and its terms. So long as it had seemed to work in Maronite interests, it had 
been accepted at the popular level. The events of May, June and July 1958 
were interpreted by many amongst the masses as indicating that the Muslims 
were seeking to reassert their old domination, leading to Lebanon’s 
disappearance in any meaningful sense. For the Maronite masses to be 
willing to support a restoration of the National Pact, there had to be some real 
demonstration that it was not a disguised Sunni triumph. The joyful reactions 
of the Muslim population to the Iraqi coup seemed to indicate the expectation 
of that population that such a triumph was in view.958 Thus even if many 
Maronite politicians had a more sophisticated view of events and the potential
954 Pierre Gemayel, Speech, Al Amal. 10 April 1956; Al Havat. 10 April 1956; Ghassan Tueni, Speech, Al Havat. 27 
November 1956. This latter is an interesting perspective for a supposedly moderate newspaperman to maintain in 
justification for government policy as early as 1956, and as such an indication of how instinctive was such an appeal to 
such a mythology of past calamity for the Maronites.
955 Nadim Al Jisr, Al Havat. 17 May 1958. Nadim Al Jisr was a Deputy.
956 Ghassan Tueni, Al Havat. 20 May 1958. Such a solution, however, did not, according to Tueni, lie in abandoning 
either Chamoun before the end of his mandate, or to breaking ties with the West.
957 Pierre Gemayel, Speech, Al Amal 25 June 1958; Al Havat. 25 June 1958.
958 Al Havat. 15 July 1958.
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for a return to consensus, a majority in the Maronite masses were increasingly 
exposed to rhetoric that linked fears of Arab intervention in their affairs to 
passages in their past which had supposedly threatened their very existence. 
Consequently, it should not be seen as surprising that many came to believe 
that this was prevented only by the hard-line stance taken by Chamoun and by 
the presence of American troops, showing that despite the UNOGIL report, the 
West was still prepared to protect Maronite interests. The PPS papers contain 
a speech given by Pierre Gemayel on 18 July 1958 to his followers, in which 
he stated his ‘unquestioning support of the US presence’ because ‘the actions 
of the Muslim opposition and their friends had obliged them to take t
his position’, for instance.959 Al Havat also referred to ‘popular panic’ in its 
discussion of the divergent understanding of the implications of the Iraqi coup 
of the Maronite community in general and the political establishment.960
The upsurge in popular support for the Kata’ib party, representing 
unwavering support for Chamoun and the American landings, continued at the 
end of July. Consequently Chamoun himself felt encouraged to believe that he 
could at least complete his mandate, if the prospect of re-election seemed 
remote. Thus the Maronite leaders who, with the exception of a small core 
such as Pierre Gemayel, now looked to a first step in the solution of the crisis 
by compromise rather than violence as lying with the removal of both Chamoun 
and the American troops, found themselves effectively out of step with what 
almost certainly constituted a majority in the Maronite masses.961 There were 
appeals from leaders such as Farid Kozma for a return to consensus and for a 
consequent downplaying of historical mythologies: ‘Let us not remember the 
dark past except to learn a lesson and so work together in unity, instead of 
being tied up in fear’.962 But the ‘dark past’ did not go away, either in popular
969 Pierre Gemayel, Speech, 18 July 1958, PPS Papers, Beirut. K.S. Salibi, ‘Recollections of the 1940s and 1950s’, p. 
15, commented on his memory of being informed of 'a full-scale Muslim insurrection enjoying the personal backing of 
Nasser, and provided with arms and other assistance from the UAR'. Mrs. Genevieve Gem ayel, Oral Interview, Beirut, 
1 March 1996, also commented on her memories of Maronite panic, and her belief that it was a factor in sustaining 
recruitment to the party at this point.
960 Al Havat. 16 July 1958.
961 In the interests of trade and commerce, the bourgeoisie tended to support a peaceful compromise. There is no 
way of getting satisfactory statistics to confirm the impression given in the press and by commentators such as 
Moubarak and Bustani that the majority of the Maronite masses were, towards the end of July, still firmly behind 
Chamoun, at least in terms of a completion of his mandate. However, there is no useful evidence to contradict this 
perspective.
Karid Kozma, Al Havat. 17 October 1958. This, again, emphasises the contemporary recognition of a popular 
reliance on mythology in the interpretation of contemporary events.
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memory or in the rhetoric of leaders, as the comment of Bashir Gemayel in 
1975 indicates.
Even so, there was a lessening of tension. To the extent that there was 
a change in popular Maronite perception from the end of July, it was a 
modification that began amongst the Lebanese army, including the Maronite 
elements there, and spread from there, encouraged by the Maronite political 
leaders and by the interested Western powers. The reaction of the army to the 
American landings had been hostile from the start. There had been occasions 
when the two armies had been on the verge of clashing physically. The 
Lebanese army deployed itself to resist any attempt by American forces to 
enter Beirut itself, and only the efforts of McClintock and Shihab prevented a 
direct clash.963 Shihab himself had been against the landings, seeing them as 
having the potential to split the army and so lead to a full-scale civil war. As 
Bustani commented, Shihab considers that to implicate the army would lead 
the country to complete disintegration and annihilation. For if the army is 
implicated there would be a high risk that it would collapse along confessional 
lines. The General preferred to leave the police and the gendarmerie to tackle 
these internal problems.964
By the summer of 1958, Shihab had a high, if not necessarily a popular, 
profile in Lebanon. He was extremely popular with his troops, and he 
commanded respect, if not popular liking, for his determination to keep the 
army out of intercommunai and political disputes.965 From quite early on in the 
crisis he had been one of the figures put forward as a possible alternative to 
Chamoun, though he himself had displayed reluctance to consider such a 
prospect.966 From the popular Maronite perspective, however, the 
replacement of Chamoun by Shihab in the immediate aftermath of the
963 Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-1960. Vol. XI, p. 254, Telegram No. 428, 16 July 1958, recording 
McCiintock’s account tor Dulles of the reaction of the Lebanese army.
964 It must not be forgotten that the army was interconfessional in composition. See General Bustani, ‘Memoirs’, p. 89
965 It was a respect shared to an extent at least by Western observers; the British considered him to be ‘honest and 
loyal’ though they doubted his ‘intelligence’; the Americans commented ‘All he has Is common-sense - but a great deal 
of that’, while fearing that he was 'too apolitical’ to be as pro-Western as they would like. See F0371 /134115 UL1012, 
British Embassy, Beirut to Foreign Office, 12 May 1958, on Leading Personalities in Lebanon, p. 6; Foreign Relations 
of the United States. 1958-1960. Vol. XI, p. 12, American Embassy, Beirut to Department of State, 21 February 1958.
966 Al Havat made this point in May, reiterating it again in July 1958, claiming it was the only acceptable solution if 
internal stability was to be sustained. Al Havat. 17 May 1958; 31 July 1958. Moussa Moubarak, Letter, 2 August 
1958, Moussa Moubarak Papers, commenting on Shihab 'obstinately refusing' to put himself forward. The addressee 
is unclear, but possibly Pierre Bart.
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American landings, at a point when Shihab had consistently been refusing 
since May to commit the army to support Chamoun, was not a particularly 
popular move. During June and July, elements in the pro-Chamoun camp, 
including Kata’ib party members, had been demanding the active intervention 
of the army to deal with Lebanon’s ‘enemies’, in the interests of state 
security.967 It is true that some limited action had been undertaken, such as 
that in Sidon on 28 May 1958, against pro-UAR demonstrators, on the few 
occasions when it did seem that state security was threatened.968 Indeed, 
since Shihab was known to have a personal dislike of Chamoun, the 
suggestion that Shihab should replace Chamoun was seen as ‘evidence’ that 
Shihab had been plotting and manoeuvring for political power for himself.969
However, by 30 July, even Chamoun had accepted American view that 
Shihab should succeed him - though Chamoun still intended to complete his 
mandate, while Shihab himself was refusing to confirm he was willing to stand. 
Chamoun is reported by McClintock as telling the loyalist deputies [that] if they 
did not accept his advice, meet tomorrow and elect Shihab, he would himself 
resign his office.970 But what was popularly seen as Shihab’s ‘indecision’ and 
‘inactivity’, including his refusal to confirm his position on the presidency, 
helped to sustain Chamoun’s mass appeal and the popular support for 
Chamoun’s completion of his mandate amongst the Maronite community. 
Thus the arrangement that Chamoun effectively be sidelined for the remainder 
of his mandate, and that he be replaced by Shihab, was one acquiesced in by 
the Maronite masses simply because, in the end, Chamoun himself 
acquiesced in it. Faced with a refusal by the Americans to support any other 
solution, Chamoun had no practical choice in the matter.
But for the Maronite community, the return to the consensus 
arrangements of the National Pact was simply a cover for the continuation 
amongst them of perspectives based on the old patterns of co-habitation. The 
majority did now accept that Shihab would act to safeguard the traditional pro-
967 General Bustani, ‘Memoirs', pp. 188-9.
963 Al Havat. 29 May 1958.
959 FO 371/134110 UL10115/1741, British Embassy, Beirut to Foreign Office, 18 May 1958, Memorandum, making an
early comment on this factor, It may well have been a factor in Shihab's failure to win real liking outside the army that,
in contrast to Chamoun’s handsome and charismatic appearance, Shihab looked forbidding and behaved in a stern
manner.
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Western stance of the community, but they continued to see no problem in the 
continuance of such links, and none of the shame assigned to them by the 
Arab world. Indeed attempts to convince the Maronite masses of this simply, 
defensively, increased their determination to maintain such links. To abandon 
them would imply abandonment of the mythology which was at the heart of 
their feeling of national identity, and their claim to be, morally at least, the most 
significant of the confessional communities in Lebanon. This perspective 
ensured that they would continue to remain suspicious of those elements in 
Lebanon which did try a policy of persuasion for the modification of this 
mythology - such as the Sunni community and many Sunni political leaders, 
but also leaders like Walid Jumblat. Maronite community mythology, therefore, 
was not materially altered in any fundamental way by the events of 1958.971 
The National Pact was restored with support from Maronite politicians; but 
many amongst the masses remained suspicious of the compromise arranged 
in 1958, with their political perspective still dominated by confessional and clan 
considerations. This is indicated by the extent to which Chamoun’s own 
status as a symbol of ‘le Libanisme’ was sustained, and his personality invoked 
in subsequent crises, in 1968, for instance, when there was again a Maronite 
belief that Nasser was interfering with Lebanese internal politics, over the 
status of the Palestinians, Chamoun enjoyed a surge in his popular status. An 
attempt to curtail his public appearances by the security service provides an 
interesting indication of the extent of public support he could still invoke at such 
times. Within an hour of this move, news of the attempt to restrict his 
movements spread, and Maronites from the Mount Lebanon region, and some 
from the North, converged on Jounieh, where Chamoun was to be found, and 
my own memory is that it appeared that the whole mountain had come to
970 Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-1960. Vol. XI, p. 411, Telegram No. 836, 30 July 1958.
971 Its backing for Chamoun remained until the last day of mandate and weeks after. See Foreign Relations of the 
United States 1958-1960. Vol. XI, p. 593, Telegram No. 342, 2 October, 1958, recounting McClintock informing Dulles 
that ‘I took half an hour to move half a  mile where a helicopter landed at Chamoun's villa as the road was blocked filled 
with cheering adherents of the ex-President'. An estimate of average daily visits of adherents to Chamoun's residence 
was recorded as round 5,000.
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demonstrate their support. In the subsequent elections of 1968, Maronite 
candidates backed by him swept to victory in the majority of contested seats.
312
Conclusion
The 1958 crisis was essentially a development coming out of the 
established pattern of Lebanon’s communal politics, which was, in turn, based 
on conflicting community mythologies that served to underpin distinct 
community identities. These essentially community identities were, however, 
interpreted by their adherents as being the core of ‘national’ identity within 
Lebanon, and the result was the establishment of divergent visions of 
Lebanon’s destiny in ways that gave little opportunity for a self-generated 
compromise and return to the consensus envisaged by the National Pact. In 
this context, it was the interaction with the regional, as well as the international 
political scene that enabled resolution of the crisis and restoration of some 
semblance of consensus. It was a crisis that marked a total breakdown, at 
least for a while, of the political compromise that had been intended to give 
stability to an independent Lebanon, and was thus a crucial event in Lebanese 
history. This is why it is impossible to explain the collapse of that compromise 
simply in terms of external pressures - even though it can fairly be argued that 
it was external sources that brokered the restoration of that compromise.
This thesis has tried to show the extent to which the Lebanese 
themselves brought about their own crisis because of the differing agendas 
and perspectives that had become institutionalised in the Lebanese political, 
social and cultural systems as a result of the popular status given to these 
community mythologies, particularly in terms of reactions to the Maronite 
versions of Lebanon’s history. This contradicts the air of inevitability about 
Lebanon’s part, at least, in the events in the Middle East after the rise of 
Nasser which is often assumed by an examination of events from an external 
perspective. That crises were constantly likely to occur can be said to have 
been predictable; that they would inevitably be linked to Nasserism and wider 
events in the Middle East was not. It was the existence of a vacuum within the 
Sunni community, in terms of an acceptable local popular champion, that 
enabled Nasser and Nasserism to assume the profile it took in the 1958 crisis. 
It is also worth noting in this context that the pro-Western state of Jordan did
313
not collapse despite considerable pressure from pro-Nasserist elements in the 
Middle East. Lebanese factors were primarily responsible for the creation of 
the Lebanese crisis of 1958.
This includes the extent to which elements in Lebanon were responsible 
for accepting, reinterpreting and manipulating external pressures and interests 
to further the ambitions of their own communal groups, and themselves, within 
Lebanon itself, consistently doing so by invoking the rhetoric of their respective 
mythologies. By August 1958, the outcome of a presidential election was 
being advertised as the way forward: choosing a president who would be 
acceptable to all elements in Lebanon, thus reconstructing the National Pact. 
Consensus increasingly focused on the issue that was now being popularly 
seen by politicians and people on all sides as being all-important: the issue of 
the withdrawal of American troops from Lebanon. The end result, 
accomplishment of that withdrawal and election of an acceptable candidate, 
was one that did appear to restore the Lebanese political compromise with the 
support of politicians at least from all sides.
Yet in reality, once again it was a compromise arranged by outside 
powers, in an echo of 1860 and so many of the other crises in Lebanon’s past. 
Unlike the crisis itself, the solution was not internally generated. Being 
reached in such a way, the compromise remained a fragile one and did not 
tackle the fundamental problems that underlay the National Pact. It is the fact 
that the solution was to a large extent brokered by external powers that has led 
so many observers of the 1958 crisis to presume, mistakenly, that the origins 
of the crisis were equally predominantly external. The origins of the crisis must 
instead be seen as lying in the unwillingness of the communities in Lebanon, 
especially the community leaders, to confront the realities of the differences 
between them, and working them through, to then seek a basis for 
intercommunai consensus on an honest basis.
It must be said that the fact that the various communities were so 
culturally conditioned by reliance on their mythology into identifying themselves 
and others in confessional colours when categorising them was a major
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hindrance to the development of a situation where such honesty was possible; 
even at the highest levels of community hierarchies. The association of 
religious belief and communal identity served to work against the potential for 
compromise between the communities. This becomes even clearer in an 
examination of the aftermath of the crisis and the reactions of the communities 
to the solution; which in itself had become part of the mythology of different 
communities, and so consistently differently interpreted by them.
The traditional system of inter-communal compromise had been 
strained to breaking point in the summer of 1958. The pressures of 
Chamoun’s personal ambitions, his publicly pro-Western and anti-Nasserist 
stance were being interpreted by panicked Maronites as an attempt to protect 
their interests, not his own, and so increased hostility to those elements in 
Lebanon that were anti-Chamoun, even where they also indicated a support for 
the continuation of an independent Lebanon. Equally, the Sunni and the other 
Muslim communities were increasingly fearful that Chamoun intended to use 
the crisis not only to renew his mandate, but also to strengthen the position of 
the Maronite and other Christina elements over the Muslim position.972 When 
what had been most feared by the Muslim opposition, an American military 
intervention, actually happened, opposition hostility was fervent. But the 
leaders of the opposition at least became conscious that opposition to the 
landings was also present amongst leaders from the various Christian 
communities, including the Maronites - that in political terms, Chamoun was 
becoming isolated and therefore weakened. Initial Sunni protests from their 
political leaders were based on an interpretation of the landing as proof of 
American backing of Chamoun and American desire for his re-election, and in 
the belief that the Maronite political element would seize the opportunity to 
bring about that scenario. Their fears on this score were lessened by the 
demonstrated opposition from that political element to the landings, and its 
demonstrated willingness to seek a compromise that would not be based on a 
renewal of Chamoun’s mandate. This laid down the grounds for the Murphy 
mission in terms of the negotiations with the political elements in Lebanon.
972 See, for example, Al Havat. 16 July, 1958.
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The reaction of the Lebanese army to the American landings is also an 
interesting indication of the fact that one of the short-term products of that 
landing was actually to unite the communities in Lebanon- in hostility against 
those landings. There was a real danger of hostilities breaking out between 
the Lebanese troops and American troops, to the surprise and dismay of those 
troops and of the American leadership.973 But Shihab insisted to McClintock 
that the attitude of his troops was not part of some ‘conspiracy’ by elements in 
Lebanon, with the intention of overthrowing the Lebanese government, but was 
a ‘spontaneous’ reaction that crossed confessional boundaries and was simply 
focused on removing American troops from Lebanese soil. Certainly this 
reaction did include Maronite and Sunni, officers and men, even if the original 
motivation had come from the latter. It is generally accepted that the ordinary, 
and mainly Muslim soldiers, were men who were now prepared to die at their 
guns as a symbolic gesture of patriotic defiance, and that this in turn inspired 
the mainly Maronite officers to follow their lead out of similar feelings of 
patriotism.974 The seriousness of the reaction is underlined by the American 
sources, which note that even on 16 July, Shihab himself did not know how far 
his staff and men would be prepared to go to put into practice their willingness 
to engage in hostilities with the American troops.975
Equally, it was the assessment of the American sources that the mood 
of the Lebanese army was in tune with the mood of the Lebanese population 
as a whole.976 It is against this background that Robert Murphy’s attempts to 
make overtures to all elements in the Lebanese political dimension, and 
especially the opposition, to explain the American motivations in making the 
landing, become significant. By talking sympathetically to all leaders in the 
Lebanese political arena, Murphy was successful in defusing the situation. 
Murphy put an emphasis on making contact with opposition and actual rebel 
leaders, such as Yafi, and showed a willingness to listen sympathetically to 
their grievances. He made explanations of the American landings in ways that
973 General Bustani, ‘Memoirs', p. 200.
974 See, for example, General Bustani, ‘Memoirs' p. 200.
975 Department of State Archives, Centre for Lebanese Studies, Telegram No. 496 (Section Two of Two) Robert 
Murphy to Secretary of State, 18 July 1958.
970 Department of State Archives, Centre for Lebanese Studies, Telegram No. 618, McClintock to Secretary of State, 
22 July 1958.
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explained American motivation in terms of the wider regional issues, which 
seems to have defused the issue from the perspective of the Sunni leaders, 
most of whom had anyway no wish to see the immediate end of an 
independent Lebanon. Thus in this context American regional concerns 
carried a certain conviction, if not approval, and could at least be used as part 
of a ‘face-saving’ exercise in terms of enabling Sunni politicians to back down 
from the positions they had taken in the aftermath of the American landings 
and which now threatened to bring Lebanon to an outbreak of hostilities with 
the USA. In terms of Lebanese particulars, the Sunni leadership was 
reassured by Murphy’s assurance that the Americans had no intention of 
backing any plans by Chamoun to arrange his re-election. More widely, the 
Sunni leaders were reassured by the fact that the Americans had entered into 
discussions with Nasser by this point, and so could be popularly interpreted as 
having entered into process of restoring good relations in the Middle East.977
indeed these perceptions began to have an effect on Muslim public 
opinion via the press in Lebanon. For example, the early opposition to his 
mission voiced by the opposition through the press on 18 July, when it was 
claimed that either it was ‘impossible’ for the Murphy mission to succeed, or at 
best that there was ‘great doubt of its success’, began to be publicly 
dispersed.978 The press reports of 19 July began to talk in terms of the 
opposition waiting ‘in expectation’ for the result of the mission.979 On 22 July it 
was reported that the opposition was voluntarily collaborating with Murphy 
because of their publicly stated belief that he could create a workable 
compromise, Al Telegraph, one of the leading opposition papers, announced in 
a headline on that date that ‘Crisis is on the Way to Solution’. Al Jarida told its 
readers that Murphy, whom it described as the ‘Man of Good Offices’ had 
come to Lebanon to reassure the Lebanese that the American landings had 
only come about because of Middle East tensions resulting from the Iraqi coup, 
and that the USA had no intentions of widening the Lebanese split ‘by 
supporting one faction of the population against the other.980
977 See R Murphy, Diplomats among W arriors. Greenwood Press, Westport, p. 19.
978 See Al Havat. 18 July 1958, for example.
979 See Al Havat. 19 July 1958, for example.
980 Al Telegraph. 22 July 1958; Al Jarida. 22 July 1958.
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Of equal significance is the evidence that Murphy’s suggestions for 
compromise that was increasingly to be based on an immediate replacement 
of Chamoun found increasing support from amongst the Maronite politicians. 
Of course the Chamoun government itself, and its hard-line supporters, were 
hostile, seeing in Murphy’s mission the end of their hopes for a continuation of 
Chamoun in power. But increasingly this group was declining in number and 
isolated in terms of its impact. Those Maronite politicians who had only 
supported Chamoun in terms of his finishing his mandate were swiftly moved 
to a position of favouring Murphy’s efforts. However, numbers of moderates 
even among those who supported his re-election were coming out publicly in 
favour of a compromise such as that being brokered by Murphy.
However, it must be noted that in agreeing on Shihab as a compromise 
candidate, the Maronite politicians were ahead of the Maronite masses in their 
willingness to accept such a replacement for a man who, as a result of the 
events of the past months, was very much identified with the protection of 
Lebanese/Maronite integrity, especially when they did so before the end of 
Chamoun’s mandate. It had seemed to the brokers of the compromise that the 
only hope for a solution lay in an immediate replacement of Chamoun, and that 
as a replacement, Shihab was the obvious choice. He was acceptable to the 
Americans, and to the two main sides, it seemed, of the political equation 
within Lebanon, in terms of the political elites. As it turned out, this meant that, 
given the powers of Sunni political leaders over their followers, there was no 
major dissatisfaction voiced with the compromise from that quarter since it did 
mean the masses had achieved the removal of Chamoun, which had become 
their main goal.
However, there was a discernible sense in which the Maronite masses 
felt that they were the losers when Shihab was installed as President, because 
he had popularly been interpreted amongst the Maronite masses at the height 
of the crisis as being in the opposition camp. It was made worse by the fact 
that Shihab appointed an ex-rebel leader, Rachid Abd Al Hamid Karami, as his 
Prime Minister, in a move that made political sense in terms of the overall 
political map of Lebanon but created great resentments amongst the Maronite
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masses, who saw it as an affront because of the way that it conflicted with their 
established mythology about their role in the state. It is thus fair to say that 
from the perspective of a significant element in the Maronite community, given 
the independence of that community from its political leadership, there was no 
resolution of the crisis at this point - something which was to have 
repercussions in the aftermath of the withdrawal of American troops.
It can be argued in this context that the outcome, being generated from 
outside and not unanimously agreed upon from within, was as doomed as all 
the other ‘solutions’ to Lebanon’s past problems. The crises of 1860,1958 and 
the later ones of 1976 all bear striking similarities to one another in terms of the 
creation of an internally generated crisis and a solution brokered from outside 
Lebanon that did not address the roots of the crisis, and so was vulnerable to 
breaking down. The Lebanese did not seem to be willing to pinpoint the 
shortcomings of their system of administration and government as a prelude to 
evolving a solution. The Amine Gemayel draft plan of 1987 comes in the line 
of those compromise agreements but could not develop into a document 
generating consensus, although according to Walid Khalidi, it incorporated a 
formulation of Lebanese Arab identity as well as dismantling the sectarian 
system within ten or fifteen years.981 In 1990, the solution to the most recent 
crisis, the Ta’if accord, was again based on the 1943 pact and the communal 
divisions incorporated in the heart of that pact, even if it was modified in certain 
significant ways. But it failed to confront the issue of reworking the differential 
community mythologies. Under the terms of the Ta’if accord, the Muslims and 
the Christians, essentially the Maronites, were placed on an equal footing 
within the state, after the weakening of the Maronite community in particular in 
the recent civil war. The accord thus shared out several of the prerogatives of 
the office of President under the constitution to the ministerial cabinet as a 
whole. The parliament also gained some added power, notably in terms of the 
office of the Speaker of the House. But these new arrangements still enshrine 
the idea of a relatively static communal base for Lebanon’s administration and 
government, even if the communal balance of power is now rather different.
901 Walid Khalidi, (ed.) Leila Fawaz, State and Society in Lebanon. The Centre for Lebanese Studies, Oxford, 1991, p. 
34.
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Effectively the state is now led by three heads in what has come to be termed 
popularly the ‘three presidents’. There is still a Maronite President, and a 
Sunni Prime Minister, but there is now a Shi’ite Speaker of the House, and all 
three need to be consulted on every decision. In theory, even in practice, this 
means that the Maronite/Christian position can now be outvoted by a Muslim 
combination.982
Outside powers might be forgiven for not realising the fundamental 
flaws of that pact and the implications of assuming an essentially static 
communal mix. But few in Lebanon itself, and none of any real influence, 
except, of course, the new actors like the Shiites themselves, have been willing 
to point out that this is not the case; that the actors in the Lebanese drama had 
changed in status and number; that new actors had arrived and gained 
importance.983 For reasons of individual and communal self-interest, the 
essentially temporary nature of these solutions do not strike the protagonists, 
and the creation of a genuinely national identity is postponed yet again. Ever 
since 1943, and more than ever in 1995, the Lebanese have been running in 
circles, with each community attempting to get hold of an advantage in power 
over other communities, while still preserving the fiction of the 1943 
compromise.
An examination of the Ta’if accord in operation underlines the 
continuing weakness of seeking consensus in Lebanon by continuing to use 
confessionally-based communities as the basis for the administration of the 
state. At one level this could be said to be indicated by the perception of a 
continuing need for threats or even actual force to enforce that consensus. 
Perhaps of greater significance, it is worth noting that the aftermath of 1990 
sees a repetition of the chronic ‘mistake’ of Lebanese presidents. They have 
consistently tried to break the Lebanese constitution in order to renew their six 
year term of office and this has equally consistently led to crisis. If not all those 
crises have been on the scale of that in 1958, no renewal has been devoid of 
problems. Bishara Al Khoury falsified the parliamentary election of 25 May
982 For the T a ’if accord see Lebanon: Official Gazette, Special Issue No. 39, Constitutional Law No. 1 8 ,2 7  September 
1990, p. 2.
983 Nabih Bezzi, the Shi’ite Speaker of the House on the main current political issues, Al Havat. 31 August 1995; Al 
Havat. 1 September 1995.
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1947 so as to get enough support to amend Article 49 of the constitution. 
President Chamoun increased the number of deputies from 44 to 66 and for 
the same reason, rigged the election of those deputies. Fouad Shihab did, in 
fact, go at the end of his term of office, but allowed tensions to rise in Lebanon 
associated with the speculation that he intended to seek an amendment of 
Article 49.
In 1976, President Sulayman Frangieh also tried to renew his term of 
office. In 1995, President Elias Hrawi sought to follow in the path of his 
predecessors, seeking an amendment of Article 49 to allow a renewal of his 
term of office despite an urgent need to bring to an end such a corrupt regime. 
His actions were greeted with despair and resentment by a good proportion of 
the Maronite community and many of its leaders, including the Patriarch. Nor 
was it a development universally welcomed by other leaders from other 
communities. The Lebanese press underlined this in articles such as those in 
L’Orient Le Jour of 16 March 1995. This all served to indicate that the 
communal basis of rule in Lebanon, surrounded as it is with the emotions 
generated by confessional loyalties and prejudices, cannot be sufficiently 
flexible to allow for the evolution and modernisation of the state. Thus when 
stresses and tensions arise, and especially those internally generated and 
bringing with them economic and social hardships, the political dimension is 
strained and the political formula for government put under pressure. At times 
that pressure is strong enough to provoke outright crisis to the point of civil 
war; at other times, it proves possible to defuse it internally. Partly, this is 
regulated by the will to invoke outside intervention of the various communities, 
and their success in doing so, at such times of crisis, and in so doing, replaying 
the ‘patron-client’ game identified by Buheiry.
Each confessional community in Lebanon has identified its external 
patron; sometimes these may change, but often there is a considerable 
baggage of history carried with that patron-client relationship, as in the case of 
the relationship between the Maronite community and France. The 
significance of this is that the baggage of history has a tendency to mean that 
the Lebanese clients at least bring an emotional, rather than a logical
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dimension of the patron’s self interest in becoming involved, or abstaining from 
becoming involved, in a particular crisis - and therefore any accurate 
assessment by the Lebanese clients of the potential for escalation of a crisis 
resulting from outside intervention that justifies itself by claiming a response to 
an internal request for help. It is in this light that it can be argued that the only 
lasting solution for the Lebanese is likely to lie in building a state, instead of 
continuing a consensus; that a secular base for the state is the only likely 
remedy for all the problems of sectarianism.984 For instance, it would promote 
a uniformity of education, and one that might be able to include not only the 
influences and learning of the West, but also key ideas of Arab culture and 
thinking. According to Amine Gemayel in his book Rebuilding Lebanon, the 
need today is to promote a common political culture based on a historical 
Lebanese identity and to let this outweigh any other means of identification for 
citizens of Lebanon985 It is however worth pointing out that during his term of 
office, he failed to implement such a solution, and there currently seems little 
likelihood of a swift achievement of such a development of common values, 
common participation between the communities in political, social and 
economic developments in Lebanon. Such could only be based on a 
development of a common mythology, and this currently seems a distant 
prospect.
984 See Dominique Chevallier, 'Comment I’Etat a-til, ete compress au Liban', in Nadim Shehadi & Dana Haffar Milis 
(eds), Lebanon. A History of Conflict and Consensus. I.B. Tauris, London 1988, p. 222.
35 There is recognition of a need for a  new National Pact, but no leaders or communities seem willing to work out its 
terms.
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152. F.mllc Tyan
Rom about 1897; Maronite. Educated French 
School of Law: graduated as a lawyer and studied 
thereafter in Paris. Joined Lebanese C ivil Service 
(Department of Justice). Resigned his post as 
Magistrate in about 1949 in protest against the laxity 
o f the administration of justice under President 
Bechara el-Khoury. Reappointed under President 
Chamoun and rose to the top o f the magistracy. 
Appointed Minister of Justice fo r a few months in
1957. Honest. O f the “ formation fraiifaise,”  
efficient in his job but not an important political 
figure.
153. Abdallah Yah
Born 1899, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated 
Jesuit University, Beirut, and in France. Married. 
Lawyer and politician. Several times Minister. 
Prime Minister 1936 and again 1951-52 and 1953-54, 
and in 1956, when he was in effect dismissed by 
President Chamoun after the Beirut meeting of 
Heads of Arab States, over the question of breaking 
of relations w ith Britain and France. A  compara­
tively honest but weak politician, who grew increas­
ingly restive under the Bechara el-Khoury rdgime, 
but in 1956 fell under the spell of Saeb Salam and 
allowed himself to be dragged into the pro-Nasser 
and anti-West school, and has now become a leader 
o f the opposition to President Chamoun’s ic-eiection.
154. Maurice Zounin
Born Mameltein (near Junieh) 1902. Belongs to 
a leading Maronite fam ily of Fctouh-Kesrouan, 
M l. Lebanon. On the death of his father, George 
Zouain (who played a leading part in the history 
o f prc-1914 M l. Lebanon), in 1952, resigned from 
his post in the Lebanese administration and entered 
politics. Deputy (for M l. Lebanon) since 1953, and 
member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the 
Chamber. Was once a Cabinet M inister (Public 
Education). Medium intelligence; French education. 
Married.
155. Simon Zoncin
Born 1910, Beirut; Maronite; educated Jesuit 
University, Beirut. Married. Served all his life in 
Gendarmerie: now head of it with rank o f colonel. 
Honest and loyal. Visited the United States officially 
for two months in 1956.
156. Constantin Zurnik
Born 1908, Damascus; Greek Orthodox; educated 
American University of Reirut and United States. 
Married. Professor at American University of 
Beirut; then president of Syrian University. 
Damascus, which post he relinquished in 1952 to 
become administration vice-president of the 
American University of Beirut, of which he acted 
as President from 1955 to 1957. Reverted as 
Professor. Nationalist; honest and capable.
Religious Personalities 
Maronite
1. Monseigncur Antoine Abed
Born 1901. Archbishop of T ripo li since 1931. 
Closely associated with the French but friendly to 
this Embassy. Also interested in commerce.
2. Mnnsclgnctir Pierre D ib
Born about 1885. Archbishop of Cairo but lives 
mainly at the Patriarch’s seat at Bkerkd. Learned 
and reputedly virtuous. A member o f the com­
mission which conducts the Patriarch’s affairs and a 
possible successor to him.
3. Monscigneur Elias Farnli
A Maronite, formerly Archimandrite representing 
the Maronite Patriarch in Alexandria (W akil 
Patriarch). Born about 1907. Studied at the Jesuit 
School in Beirut. A  good speaker in Arabic and 
comes from South Lebanon, K farbo’hutn. Appointed 
Maronite Archbishop of Cyprus in May 1954.
4. Monseigncur Anfoinc Khoraish
Maronite Archbishop of Sidon and Dar-el-Kamar. 
Born about 1903. Before his appointment to Sidon 
in 1950 lie was bishop on the patriarchal staff at 
Bkerke. Recently returned from a period of study 
and research in the Vatican.
5. Monseigncur .lean Marotin
Maronite Dean of St. George’s Cathedral of 
Beirut, he was born at Beit Mcri in about 1913. He 
was at one time principal of the College de la Sagesse 
in Beirut, then Patriarchal Vicar in Paris, and has 
been a Lebanese delegate to U.N.E.S.C.O. since
1954. He is highly educated, speaks French and a 
little  English. A very loyal friend of Hamid 
Frangie (No. 48) although his brother Bechara 
Maroun, a journalist, supports President Chamoun.
6. Ilis Beatitude Patriarch Boulos Mconscbi
Born 1802. Jezzin. A fter living many years in 
the United States, was Archbishop of Tyre. Was 
Chairman of Apostolic Commission to manage the 
affairs o f the Patriarchate during the extreme old 
age of Patriarch Arida. Has shown himself a 
vindictive and intriguing leader; trying to make 
himself popular with Moslem leaders. Several 
Christian leaders believe, however, that he is going 
too far in this policy, forgetting that he is a Christian 
religious chief and not a political leader. Violently 
opposed to Chamoun and, o f course, a strong sup­
porter o f Sheikh Bechara el-Khoury, who is his• 
relative. Indirect pressure from Rome forced him 
to modify this attitude in the spring of 1957. 
Speaks English.
7. Monseigncur Abdallah Nnujaint
Maronite, born 1904 at Baalbek. Studied for a 
short period in Rome. For the last few years has 
been partly in charge of the Maronite Community in 
Baalbek. During the British occupation (1941 45) 
always entertained very good relations with the 
British m ilitary authorities. Supports President 
Chamoun’s re-election. Known as the “  Brigand 
B ishop" since he always carries a pistol.
8. Monseigncur Ignacc Ziade
Born 1906. Archbishop of Aleppo, 1945, and • 
Beirut, 1952. An educated and pleasant personality 
who is also a member of the commission managing 
the Patriarchate. In private conversation very ready 
to advocate the need for a strong Western policy in 
the Middle East.
Greek Catholic
9. Monseigncur Philippe Nabaa
Born about 1905; studied at Rome. Now A rch­
bishop of Beirut. A genial and cultivated prelate 
who shows friendliness to this Embassy and looks 
Westward.
10. I lis  Beatitude Patriarch Maximos Saycgh 
Born 1878, Aleppo. Archbishop of Tyre, 1917,
and of Beirut, 1933, and Patriarch since 1947.
Popular among his small community. A n ti­
communist and believes in the need for Western
support of the Christian position in the Lebanon.
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Greek Orthodox
11. Monseigneur Elic Karnm
Rorn 1896. Archbishop o f Mount Lebanon, liv ing 
just outside Beirut. Maintains friendly relations 
w ith all foreigners but generally regarded as a 
Communist sympathiser and known to have close 
connections w ith the Soviet Embassy (e.g., he 
celebrated a mass for the repose o f Stalin’s soul). 
Visited Russia several times.
12. Monsclgneur F.lie Saliby
Born 1876. Archbishop o f Beirut since 1935. 
A  smooth-tongued ecclesiastic, l ie  is a tough 
element o f resistance to the all too pervasive Com ­
munism in the Greek Orthodox Church. Visited 
Soviet Union. 1956, and has always been friendly 
to this Embassy.
Syrian Calho'ic
13. Cardinal Gabriel I "  Tappnuni
Born 1879. Mosul. Consecrated Bishop. 1913; 
Archbishop of A leppo, 1921; Patriarch, 1929; 
Cardinal, 1933. Worked closely w ith the French 
who supported him during the Mandate as a 
counterpoise to the Maronites. A  strong champion 
o f Chamoun. and o f Christian rights in Lebanon 
and Syria. Despite his pro-French reputation 
makes friendly gestures to this Embassy.
Syrian Orthodox
14. Monseigncur Jnknuh Severios
Born in Batali, Iraq, in 1912, he was elected 
Patriarch of the Syrian Orthodox Church in Syria 
and the Lebanon in 1957. He studied in Mosul 
Clerical School and was sent to Beirut as an 
instructor at the Syrian orphanage. In 1933 he was 
ordained and appointed President o f the St. Ignatius 
School o f Malabar, India. He returned to Mosul 
in 1946 where he was nominated member of the 
Sharia Court. In 1950 he was appointed Archbishop 
in Lebanon and Damascus, l ie  is a well-known poet 
and historian and has written several books on early 
Christianity and Syrian Church history. Speaks 
English.
Armenian Cntlmlic
15. Cardinal Gr6gnlrc Pierre X V  Agagianian
Born 1895, T itlis ; studied at Rome. Ordained 
1917; consecrated Bishop 1935; Patriarch o f Arm en­
ian Catholics throughout the world 1937; appointed 
Cardinal 1945. A cultivated man of small stature 
but imposing presence. Speaks English and is in 
touch w ith English-speaking Catholics throughout 
the world. Despite his Russian origins, a vigorous 
opponent o f Communism, and unites in his person 
many opposing forces o f East and West (political, 
ecclesiastical and geographical) and is therefore 
generally regarded, perhaps somewhat optim istically, 
as papabile. Appointed to Vatican in 1958.
Armenian Orthodox
16. Ilis Beatitude Patriarch Zareh Paylasian,
Catholicos of Cilicia
Elected in 1956 despite opposition from  a dele­
gation from Russian Armenia led by Catholicos 
Vasken I o f Echmiadzin. A strong Tashnaq, not 
well supported by other factions among the 
Armenians. A  strong character.
17. Monseigneur Khoren Paroyan
Born about 1905, Cyprus. Came to the Lebanon 
at the age of 15 and is now Archbishop of the
( 17
Lebanon. He remains a British subject and still 
visits his parents every year in Cyprus, l ie  is a 
friendly indiv iduall o f no great intellectual stature. 
Said to have been antagonised by the Tashnaq 
(R ight-w ing) tactics at the election o f the C ilic ian 
Catholicos in February 1956.
Jew
18. Ilenzion Lechtman
Born about 1891 in Poland. Came to Beirut 1935 
and has acted as Rabbi since 1948. Even the Jewish 
com munity regard hint as colourless. Acting Grand 
Rabbi in Lebanon o f Jewish community.
Sunni Moslem
19. Sheikh Mohammed Alaya
Born 1883, Beirut; prim ary education only, but 
after many years in religious courts is experienced 
in Shia law. Tw ice married and twice divorced. 
Appointed M u fti o f the Lebanese Republic 1952 as 
a result o f pressure on President el-Khoury by 
Abdallah Yaft and the Salam fam ily, who have 
since forced him in to  declared opposition to Presi­
dent Chamoun. Honest but weak and unintelligent.
20. Sheikh Hussein cl-Khalih
Shia Moslem Qadi at present acting as head o f the 
Shia Jafari Shari Court in Beirut.
Druze
21. Sheikh Mohnincd Alton Chakra
Sheikh A k l o f the Druze Community elected in 
the summer of 1948; about 55 years old; married 
and lives at Amatour. Sheikh Mohamed is not o f 
a high education but a good speaker. Before his 
election he was the owner of a garage o f transport 
in Damascus. He is regarded as a “  foster child ”  
o f Kamal Jumblat. He is shrewd and a practical 
Druze, not over his religion, but over his Druze 
internal po litica l party.
22. Sheikh Rasrhid Ilnmadch
Sheikh A k l of the Druze Comm unity elected in 
September 1954; about 60 years old; married and 
an inhabitant of Baaklin. Sheikh Rashid is a 
licencie en dro it from  the French School of Law in 
Beirut. He comes from a leading Druze fam ily. 
Once a magistrate in the Lebanese Court o f Appeal, 
but dismissed on the charge of accepting a bribe; he 
was in fact caught red-handed by Fuad Ammoun, 
then his chief.
23. Mnkadcin A li Mizher
Born 1896. Cousin o f Kemal Jumblatt. Formerly 
a lawyer w ith po litica l ambitions. He was appointed 
Kadi o f the Druzcs in Lebanon in 1945. He speaks 
English and professes the traditional Druze friend­
ship fo r the British but is probably a rather sly 
intriguer. SulTers from poor health.
Obituary
Mohamed Salan (No. 107 of 1957 list).
Religions Personalities:
Monseigneur Augustin Boustani (No. 2 o f 1957 list). 
Sayed Abdel Hussein Sharafeddin (No. 19 o f 1957 
list).
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LEADING PERSONALITIES IN  THE LEBANON
Sir George Middleton to Mr. Sehvyn Lloyd. (Received May 9)
(No. 68. Confidential) Beirut,
Sir, May 2, J95S.
I have the honour to transmit herewith 
the annual report on Leading Personalities 
in the Lebanon.
I have, &c.
G. H. MIDDLETON.
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Index of Leading Personalities in (lie Lebanon
1. Ibrahim Abdel Aal.
2. Robert Abeia.
3. M un ir Abou-Fadel.
•1. Halim  Abou-lzzedin.
5. Joseph A lxm -K liater.
6. Camille Aboussouan.
7. Ibrahim Ahdab.
8. Bechir Ahwnr.
9. Nazzim Akkari.
10. Georges A k l.
11. Sheikh Najib A lanuiddin
12. Naim Am iom ii.
A13. Found Ammonn.
14. Hussein Aoueini.
15. Carlos Arida.
16. George Arida.
17. Fernand Arsanios.
* 18. F.mir Mcgid Arslan.
19. Ahmed el-Assad.
20. Assad el-Assad.
21. A li Bazzi.
22. R aif Rellama.
23. Rashid Bcydoun.
24. Am in Beyhum.
25. Nazih Bisri.
26. Jawad Boulos.
27. Emile Boustani.
28. Fouad Boustani.
29. Nicholas Bustros.
30. Fouad Chader.
31. Joseph Chader.
^ S 3 2 . Camille N im r Chamoun.
33. Joseph N im r Chamoun.
34. R. P. Charles de Chamussy.
35. Joseph Charbel.
36. Em ir Abdel-Aziz Chehab. 
)(37. Em ir Farid Chehab.
38. General Fouad Chehab.
39. Emir Khnled Chehab.
40. Farid Cozma.
41. Ahmed Daouk.
42. Nadim Demechki^.
X^3. Pierre Eddd.
)(44. Raymond Edd6.
45. Maud Fargeallah.
46. Jean Fatlal.
47. Edmond Frangi£,
^ 8 .  Hamid Frangid.
49. Moussa de Freige.
50. Maurice Gemayel.
X.5I. Pierre Gemayel.
52. Colonel Jean Aziz Ghazi. 
Y53. Fouad Ghosn.
54. Farid Habib.
55. Ibrahim  Haidar.
56. Selim Haidar.
57. Georges Haiitiari.
58. Abdallah lla jj.
59. Georges Hakim.
XfiO. Sabri Hamadd.
61. Said Ha made.
62. Joseph Harfouche.
63. Chafik Hatcm.
64. Charles Helou.
65. Khalil H ilir i.
66. Joseph H itti.
67. Fawzi Hoss.
68. Georges Hraoui.
69. Kemal Jumblatt.
70. M ile. Ibtihaj Kaddoura.
71. Georges Karam.
72. Joseph Karam.
73. Rifaat Kazoun.
74. Raschid Kcramd.
75. Charles Kettaneh.
76. Knzem el-Khalil.
77. Anwar K lia tib.
78. Clovis el-Khazen.
79. lzzet Khurchid.
80. Sheikh Bechara el-Khoury.
81. Elias Khoury.
82. Emile Khoury.
83. Sheikh Fouad el-Khoury.
84. Gabriel Khoury.
85. Sheikh Khalil el-Khoury.
86. Sheikh Sami el-Khoury.
87. SheikIi Selim el-Khoury.
88. V ictor Khoury.
89. Salah Lnbabidi.
90. Lt.-Col. Fuad Lahoud.
91. Colonel Jamil Lahoud. 
$92. Selim Lahoud.
93. Subhi Mahmassani.
94. Charles M alik.
95. Nasri Malouf.
96. Abcfiillah Mashnouq.
97. Badri Meouclii,
98. Jamil M ikkaw i.
99. Moussa Mobarak.
100. Naim Mogharghab.
101. Moukhtar Moukaiech.
102. A lbert Moukhaiber.
103. Saadi Mounla.
104. Kamel Mroueli.
105. Gabriel M urr.
106. A lfred Naccache.
107. Georges Naccache.
108. A d ib  Nahas.
109. General Souleiman Naufal.
110. Muhieddin Nsouli.
111. Mustnpha Nsouli.
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112. Bechir Osman.
113. Adel Osseiran.
114. Menri Pharaon.
115. General Nonreddine Rifai.
116. Mine. Hdlfcne Rihan.
M8. Mohammed Snbra.
119. Negib Sadaka.
120 Abdel Rahman Sahmarani
121. Saeb Salam.
122. Anis Saleh.
123. Joseph Salem.
124. Nicolas Salem.
125. Colonel Toufiq Salem.
126. Fouad Sarrouf.
127. Fouad Sawaya.
128. Mohammed Shoucair.
129. Sami Shoucair.
130. A lfred Skaf.
131. Jean Skaf.
132. Joseph Skaf.
133. Adel Solh.
134. Knzem Solh.
X 0 5 - Sami Solh.
136. Takieddin Solh.
137. Linda Sursock.
138. Jacques Tabet.
139. Joy Tabcl.
140. Mine. Laure Tabet.
141. Bahige Takieddin.
142. Khalil 1 akieddin.
143. Philippe Tukla.
144 Philippe Tamer.
145. A (if T ib i.
146. Dikran Tosbath.
147. Colonel Fauzi Traboulsi.
148 Gabriel Trad.
149. Andre Tucni.
i~\ 50. Ghassan Tueni.
151. Charles Tyan.
152. Emile Tyan.
153. Abdallah Yafi.
151. Maurice Zouain.
155. Simon Zouein.
156. Constantin Zuraik.
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1. Ibrahim Abdel Aal
Born 1917, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated 
Jesuit University, Beirut, and French School of 
Engineering, Beirut. Fam ily of Egyptian origin. 
Engineer by training; c iv il servant by adoption. 
Formerly Director-General o f Public Works; now 
Director-General of Concessionary Companies. 
Intelligent, hard-working and, as far as is known, 
honest, but w ithout many social graces.
2. Robert Abela
Born 1908, Sidon; Roman Catholic; educated 
Jesuit University. Married. Owner-editor of (Arab 
language) newspaper, Zamtm. Manager for Beirut 
o f Arab News Agency. Now in third year as 
president o f Lebanese Press Syndicate. Not a 
strong man but co-operative and useful. A  British 
subject (Maltese o rig in—dual nationality) who 
speaks no English but is instinctively pro-British. 
Stood but failed in the 1957 elections.
.3. M unir Abmi-Fndel
A CJreek Orthodox orig inally from A in  Anoub 
(M ount Lebanon). Born about 1908. Me served 
in the Palestine Police from 1930 to May 1045 
and subsequently collaborated w ith the Arabs, 
under the ex-M ufti o f Palestine, fighting the Jews. 
In 1948 he returned to Lebanon where he started 
a trade and banking business. Me has gradually 
lost his anti-British attitude and has become 
friendly with President Chamoun. Elected for the 
first time as Deputy for A ley (M ount Lebanon) in 
1957, and is now President o f the O il Committee 
of the Chamber. Me is clever and vain. Me and 
his wife both speak excellent English.
4. Halim  Abou l/zc illn
Born 1913, Mount Lebanon; Druze; educated at 
American University, Beirut. Bachelor. Lebanese 
Foreign Service; after serving in Cairo transferred 
to M inistry of Foreign Affairs in 1950; he became 
head of the Political Section in 1951 and Chief of 
Protocol in 1953. Acting Director-General, M inistry 
o f Information, March 1954 March 1955. In A pril 
1955 transferred back to the M inistry o f Foreign 
Affairs as Mead of Protocol; later appointed 
Assistant Secretary-General but on being returned 
to his former appointment as Mead of the Political 
Section in January 1956 lie ceased coming to 
the office in protest. Honest, intelligent and has 
political am bitions.' Visited United Kingdom at 
invitation o f Her Majesty's Government, August
1954. A Lebanese delegate to A fro-Asian Con­
ference, Bandoeng, A p ril 1955. Appointed 
Ambassador to India in 1957. Co-operative w ith 
this Embassy. Speaks good English.
5. Joseph Aboii-Khater
Born Zahle about 1905; Greek Catholic; 
educated Jesuit University, Beirut, and studied law 
in France. Married. Lawyer. A  leader o f the
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anti-Skaf faclion in Zahle. Formerly Lebanese 
M inister in Mexico; appointed M inister at Rome,
I *>53. raised to Ambassador, 1956, Clever and 
politica lly ambitious.
6. Camille Ahoiissoiinn
Roman Catholic, son o f the late Nagib 
Abotissouan, one time Chief Justice of Lebanon, 
though his fam ily originated in Jerusalem. Horn 
about 1910, French education, highly cultured. 
H is marriage with a Sidnaoui girl was subsequently 
annulled. Member o f the F.E.N. Club and 
Lebanese delegate to U.N.E.S.C.O. He speaks 
very little  English but exquisite French, is clever, 
but a crashing bore.
7. Ibrahim Ahdab
Horn Beirut 1902; Sunni Moslem; educated 
College des Fr^res, Beirut. Married. Former 
contractor and engineer. Lebanese M inister at 
Ankara since 1947. Honest and intelligent but 
indecisive. Transferred to Rernc in February 1954. 
Sent to Ankara in February 1955 as Special Envoy 
mainly to prepare Lebanese President's visit to 
Turkey and to study on the spot development of 
situation arising out o f Baghdad Pact. Appointed 
Ambassador to the Court of St. James’s in July 
1955.
8. Bechir Alnvnr
A Druze of Qornayil, near Hammana. Mount 
Lebanon. Rom 1910, educated at the French 
College des Freres. Has been several times 
a Deputy and three times a M inister. An honest 
and moderate non-party politician, lie was made 
M inister o f Justice in Sami Solh’s Cabinet of March 
1958. M arried, speaks only French.
9. Nazim Akknri
Born 1898, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated 
Jesuit University. Beirut. Married. The best civil 
servant in the Lebanon. Director-General o f the 
Prime M inister’s Office since 1945. Tem porarily 
Prime M inister and M inister for Foreign Affairs, 
September 1952. Honest, shrewd and experienced. 
A  most useful and helpful source o f advice and 
information.
10. Georges Akl
A  Maronite o f Damour. He was born in 1904 
and received a French education. He belonged at 
one time to the Edde Brothers’ National bloc until 
lie quarrelled w ith them in 1954. He has been a 
Deputy o f Mount Lebanon since 1953 and was a 
member o f Rachid Karamd’s Cabinet in September
1955. Serves on the Foreign Affairs Committee of 
the Chamber. He now supports President 
Chamoun. He is married and speaks only French.
11. Sheikh Najib Alamuddin
Druze. Born about 1917. Married. O f 
Lebanese origin, he migrated to Palestine and was 
in Government service there for some time. 
Educated at American University o f Beirut and 
thereafter did a year at Exeter College studying the 
Rrilish secondary educational system, lias  worked 
for some years in the Educational Department of 
the Jordan Government. Returned to Beirut from 
Palestine after the war of 1948 49 and has been 
successful in commerce. Is now managing director 
of M iddle East A irlines and of the M iddle East A ir 
Servicing Corporation, and therefore an important 
figure in the build ing up of British interests in civ il 
aviation in the M iddle East. An able executive w ith 
a Western outlook, and pro-British (he is one o f the 
most active members o f the Board of Governors of 
the projected English School), but his own interests 
come first. He is rumoured to have political 
ambitions, but denies it.
12. Naim Aminuni
Born 1916. Worked for some seven years w ith 
Iraq Petroleum Company, from which he gained 
respect for British administrative methods. A 
career diplomat, has served in Russia and Brazil. 
Assistant Director o f Economic Section o f M inistry 
o f Foreign A ffairs 1953-55. Appointed D irector at 
end of 1955 and promoted to rank of M inister 
Plenipotentiary. Excellent linguist. Able and 
ambitious, he is co-operative w ith this Embassy 
although his politica l ideas are Leftish. W ife is 
intelligent and attractive. Appointed M inister in 
Colombia in 1957.
13. Fouad Ammoiin
Born 1899, Deir el-Kamar; Maronite; educated 
College des Frfcres. Beirut. Married. Former judge. 
Formerly Secretary-General, M in istry o f Foreign 
Affairs, w ith rank of Ambassador, until November 
1956, when he resigned in order to be able to stand 
for election to the Legislature in 1957. He was in 
fact defeated in the election by Emile Boustani 
(No. 27). Since this failure he has drifted further 
and further towards the Salam-Yufi group, and is 
now among the leaders of the Left-w ing Christian 
Opposition. Well educated w ith a broad mind and 
good grasp of his profession. When a c iv il servant, 
he showed himself friendly and helpful to this 
embassy w ithin his powers but not a strong 
character. Visited the United Kingdom in A p ril 
1956 as guest of the British Council.
14. Ilussein Aoueini
Born 1902. Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated Greek 
Catholic College. Beirut Married. O f humble 
origins but while still young made a large fortune in 
Saudi Arabia, where he still has many contacts. He 
has many other business interests, including, it is said, 
smuggling. Formerly Deputy, 1947-51. In 1951 
formed caretaker Cabinet to supervise elections 
which he did successfully and honestly. Still 
regarded as a possible “  non-political ”  Prime 
M inister but somewhat discredited for his financial 
connections with the fam ily of President el-Khoury 
and w ith Saudi Arabia, whose paymaster he is well 
known to be. Clever but an unprincipled oppor­
tunist. Took a leading part in combating Baghdad 
Pact and to this end joined hands w ith the Oppo­
sition, notable as prime mover o f the Congress of 
Organisations and Parlies (Moslem, A rab Nation­
alist and fellow-travelling).
15. Carlos Arida
Maronite o f T r ipo li, born about 1922, son o f a 
wealthy Christian fam ily o f North Lebanon. Some 
education at the Jesuit School, Beirut. Is part owner 
of A R LE B  Corporation and recently, in partnership 
w ith his brother Alphonse, bought shares in Lebanon 
International Airways. An active young man who 
has business interests in various Arab Stales. 
Despite being a Maronite, he recently married, 
according to Greek Orthodox doctrines, the ex-wife 
o f Ibrahim  Sursock. l ie  is a very able business 
man, who enjoys presidential support in his enter­
prises.
16. Georg Arida
Born about 1898, in Australia; Maronite; educated 
abroad, mainly in Australia. Canada and Mexico. 
Married. A British subject, and formerly Honorary 
British Vice-Consul at T ripo li, having returned to 
his fam ily home there and opened a textile factory 
which earned him great wealth during the Second 
W orld War. His wife has social ambitions (e.g., his 
daughter married Sheikh K ha lil el-Khoury (No. 85) 
but a Papal annulment was obtained in January 
1956) and they are anxious to cut a dash (e.g., their
53474
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purchase after the war of H itler's yacht which they 
sold at a heavy loss). Rut he himself is a m ild and 
amiable character w ith little  personality.
17. Fernand Arsanios
Horn 1898, Batroim; Maronite; educated College 
des Frfcres, Remit. Married. Judge. Persona non 
f’lt i la  under President el-Khoury. Appointed Pro- 
curcttr Gdndral o f the Supreme Court in February 
1953; well known for his honesty and political inde­
pendence. Serves, w ith President Chamoun (to 
whom he is sincerely devoted), as principal Oppo­
sition target, owing to his obligation to enforce 
disciplinary measures on the more active or out­
spoken of the President’s detractors.
(8. F.mir Megid Arslan
Rom about 1908, Choueifat; Druze; educated 
College des Frercs, Rcirut. Anti-German during 
the war; helped resist Vichy France. Several 
times M inister since 1943 as Druze representative, 
loyal to President e l-Khoury; bitter opponent o f 
Kemal Joumblatt. Again M inister in the second 
Y ali Cabinet under the Chamoun regime. Accom­
panied President on his visit to South America in 
May 1954. Repeatedly represented the Druzes in 
Cabinets since 1943, and continuously since 1954, 
mostly as Minister of Defence. Again M inister of 
Defence in the Cabinets o f Sami Solh (1954). Rachid 
Kcrnme (19.55) and Abdallah Yati (1956). M inister 
of Health and Agriculture in Sami Solh Government 
of November 1956, back to the M in istry of Defence 
again in August 1957, and then once more to A g ri­
culture in March 1958.
A cheerful, uneducated and highly venal feudal 
chieftain w ith a boyish passion for drcssing-up and 
firearms. In the habit of smuggling cattle into Israel.
Having lost his wife in 1953, he remarried in 
February 1956.
19. Alonrd cl-Assnd
Horn 1905, Taibe. South Lebanon; Shia Moslem; 
primary education only. Married to the clever 
daughter (who never appears in public) of his uncle, 
from whom he has inherited the feudal paramountcy 
in South Lebanon. Several times M inister since 
1941; President of the Chamber o f Deputies from 
1951 until October 1953. The election of his rival, 
Adel Ossciran, as President o f the Chamber since 
then and the appointment, twice, o f another rival, 
Kazcm e l-K ha lil, as M inister, made him side with 
the Opposition. He attacked the President person­
ally, organising meetings, Ac., in which operations 
he was financed by Saudi money. A reconciliation 
between him and the President in February 1956 did 
not last long and he began again his intrigues and 
plots against President Chamoun, but one must 
admit that this attitude is somewhat justified by the 
Piesidcnt’s constant hostile altitude towards him. 
Although he failed in the 1957 elections, he is now 
completely in the hands o f the Opposition and keeps 
in constant touch w ith the Egyptian representative, 
who keeps him well supplied w ith money. Suspected 
of being one of the clandestine channels used by the 
U.A.R. to send arms into the Lebanon. He and his 
son. Deputy Kamal, during the Suez crisis, aligned 
themselves openly against us and they were both 
among the Deputies who asked for the severance of 
diplomatic relations w ith Rritain and France. He 
undermines authority by all lucrative means, includ­
ing the sale o f parliamentary seats and smuggling 
on the Israel border. A t one time (1957) he main­
tained close touch w ith the Americans and was 
thought to be under their protection.
20. Assnd cl-Ass»d ,
Horn about 1915; married. Shia Moslem from 
Taibd (South Lebanon) and a member o f the
powerful South Lebanon fam ily of the el-Assads 
(Ahmed el-Assad is his father-in-law). Educated 
American University o f Beirut; appointed D irector- 
General o f the M in istry of Information soon after 
the 1939-45 war and still holds the post. Was 
suspended in 1951 for corrupt practices but 
recovered his post through political intervention. 
Opportunist, and not friendly to us.
21. Ali Buzz!
A Shia of Bint-Jebail, South Lebanon, for which 
he is Deputy. Born about 1905, he received a 
prim ary education and then studied law in Damas­
cus. He is a violent A rab Nationalist and a loyal 
supporter o f Hamid Frangie (No. 48). He speaks 
only Arabic. He is married but his wife does not 
go out. W ith Takieddin Solh (No. 136) he forms a 
well-known tandem.
22. Raif Roll,una
Born 1897, Beirut; Maronite; educated American 
University, Beirut. Married. Lecturer in bacteri­
ology at American University, Beirut. M inister of 
Education, 1949. Appointed Assistant Secretary- 
General o f the Arab League in 1953. W itty and a 
good speaker but a political light-weight. Appointed 
Lebanese Ambassador to R io ole Janeiro in 1957, 
but owing to budgetary difliculties, has not yet been 
able to take up his new post.
23. Rashid Beyilnun
Born about 1897, Beirut; Shia Moslem; primary 
education. Married. Deputy for Beirut since 
1943, except for one failure to be re-elected in 1953. 
Became Minister (fo r the second time) in Sami 
Solh’s Government of March 1958 when he was 
given the portfo lio  o f National Defence. A  genial 
Moslem hack politician of no great significance. 
Has founded, partly w ith his own money, a large 
Shia Moslem college in Beirut.
24. Amin Rcyhum
Born 1907, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated 
College des Fibres, Beirut. Married. Elected 
Deputy 1951 but has since greatly disappointed his 
electors and has never spoken in the Chamber. Did 
not stand for the 1953 or 1957 legislative elections.
25. Nazih Bisri
Sunni Moslem of Sidon. Born about 1908. 
Married, and a graduate o f the American University 
of Beirut. Enjoys popularity in Sidon and was 
elected Deputy in 1953. Was Minister of Health 
and National Economy from September 1955 to 
March 1956, then M inister o f Health and Social 
Affairs from  March 1956 to November 1956. Failed 
in the 1957 elections.
26. Jnwnrf Bnulns
Rom 1900, T r ip o li; M aronite; educated College 
des Freres, Beirut. Married. Deputy and Minister 
for Foreign Adairs under French Mandate. Now an 
unsuccessful and disgruntled ex-politician posing as 
an elder statesman, ready to resume office pour 
sinn er la patrie. Engaged in w riting an interminable 
H istory o f the Near East (he has now reached about 
3,000 n.c.) about which, as most other things, he is 
a crashing bore. Has, since 1955, put himself under 
the wing o f the United States Embassy in Beirut, and 
is even spoken o f as a possible presidential candidate.
27. F.milc Boustani
Rom 1907. Sidon; Maronite (w ith Protestant 
intervals when it suits him); educated American 
University of Beirut and Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology. Married to a pleasant redhead. A self- 
made contractor of great wealth. Head of the C.A.T.
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(Conlnicling and Trading) Company w ith ramifica­
tions in the Arab countries and Persian Gnlf. 
Deputy for M l. Lebanon since 1951. Strong Pan- 
Arabist posing as a “  candid friend ”  o f Britain 
w itli the accent on “ candid." Anxious to lie Presi­
dent o f (lie Republic, he makes his commercial 
interests serve his political ambitions and vice 
versa. I l is  main line is to gain popularity and 
notoriety by consistent opposition to the powers that 
be. The enfant terrible o f Lebanese politics, he 
should not be trusted out o f eyesight or earshot but 
his skin is so thick that he is quite an engaging 
rogue. Speaks excellent English. Appointed Minister 
of Public Works and of Planning under the Premier­
ship o f Abdallah Vafi on March 19, 1956, but threw 
his weight about so much that he only lasted two 
months. Me did, however, insist on keeping the 
post o f Head of the independent Reconstruction 
Office in which, if  by unorthodox means, he 
succeeded in doing a good deal to repair the ravages 
of the earthquake of March 16, 1956. (Me resigned 
from this in the summer o f 1957). Member o f the 
Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee.
2R. Fouad Boustani
A  Maronite, born about 1908, married and a 
graduate of the French University de Saint Joseph 
in Beirut A good writer w ith an excellent command 
of classical Arabic and author of the Lebanese 
Encyclopaedia. Honorary doctor of letters of the 
French University. Regan life in Rachaya, South 
Lebanon, where he served for some lime as a jun io r 
c iv il servant before joining the M inistry of Educa­
tion In 1955 he was appointed President of the 
new Lebanese University, lie  is a strong Lebanese 
Nationalist and completely loyal to President 
Chamoun.
29. Nicolas Itiisfros
Born 1896, Beirut; Greek Orthodox; educated 
Jesuit University, Beirut. Married. A rich socialite 
o f a rather effeminate type. Entered official life 
as Chief o f Protocol to (he President of the Republic,
1937. Resigned 1938. Re-appointed 1943; later 
transferred in same capacity to M in istry for Foreign 
Affairs in 1949. Molds rank o f M inister Plenipo­
tentiary. Active in intrigues leading to fa ll of 
President el-Khoury in September 1952 and now 
repeating the operation against President Chamoun. 
A quarrelsome chatterbox but intelligent and well 
informed, w ith pleasant social manners.
.30. Fouad Chader
Born 1910. Hits spent (he greater part o f his 
career in the Customs, where he established a 
reputation for honesty and good administration. 
Has been Director o f C iv il Aviation since 1953. Is 
friendly and intelligent.
.31. Joseph Chader
Born about 1908, an Armenian Catholic, lawyer 
and leading Phalangist. French secondary educa­
tion. He has been a Deputy since 1953 and was 
made M inister for Planning in March 1958. l ie  is 
the first Phalangist and the first Armenian to become 
a Minister, lie  is clever, apparently honest, and 
brother of Fouad Chader (No. .30).
.32. Camille Nimr Chamoun
Born 1901, Deir el-Kamar; Maronite; educated 
College des Frfcres, Beirut. Married to the former 
Zelfa Tabet. an attractive woman of mixed Irish and 
Lebanese extraction; his sons have been educated in 
England. President o f the Republic since Septem­
ber 1952; formerly lawyer and politician. M inister 
of the Interior, September 1943; arrested by (he
French November 1943. since when strongly pre­
judiced against France. Lebanese M inister in 
London 1944 47. Minister o f Finance 1947 and of 
the Interior 1947 to May 1948. The most consistent 
leader of the Opposition to President el-Khoury from 
1948 to September 1952. when lie was himself elected 
President, defeating Hamid Frangie. l ie  proved for 
a long lime either too weak or too idle to pursue a 
persistent policy on the domestic front, and was 
a disappointment to the Opposition and the despair 
o f the old political bosses whom he refused to 
consult, relying largely on his personal popularity 
and his talent for intrigue. In matters of foreign 
policy, his British connections and superficial 
Anglicisms helped win him the reputation o f being 
a British tool, though in fact his policy, while whole­
heartedly supporting us in any conflict with 
Communism, was basically Lebanese and pro-Arab. 
In the events o f November 1956 he took a sur­
prisingly and encouragingly strong line, refusing to 
allow Lebanon to be stampeded into a break w ith 
the West and adhesion to the extremist and Russo- 
phile course of Syria and Fgypt, while upholding 
the basic claims of the Arabs and the authority of 
the United Nations. He proved strong enough al 
this time to dismiss a pro-Egyptian Government and 
bring in a strong and neutral one. In the past year 
he has become increasingly the target of jealous, 
disgruntled and disappointed politicians under the 
pretext of opposition to his pro-Western foreign 
policy and continued support o f Charles M alik. 
His attractive personality makes excellent first 
impressions. Speaks excellent English.
33. Joseph Nimr Chamoun
Born 1896, Deir el-Kamar; Maronite; educated 
CollCge des Frfcres and American University o f 
Beirut. Married. Brother o f President Camille 
Chamoun. Director-General of Public Works 
1944 48. Director-General o f Inspection Depart­
ment since June 1952, for which role he is utterly 
unsuited. An industrious subordinate. While 
carrying on w ith his job at the Inspection Department 
was also appointed acting Chief o f the Telephone 
Department in 1954.
34. R. P. Charles de Clianmssy
Born about 1903; Pfcrc Recteur (Head) o f St. 
Joseph’s University (Jesuits), l ie  has charming 
manners and is always friendly to this embassy, 
but he is a convinced French Jesuit and consistent 
in his opposition (and obstructionism) to the scheme 
fo r a British School in the Lebanon.
35. Joseph Cliarbel
Born 1896, Zahlc; Maronite; educated Collfcgc de 
la Sagesse. Bachelor. Procureur General, 1943-52. 
Now President o f the Conseil d 'E lat. V ictim  of an 
attack by a member o f the P.P.S., as a result of 
which he lay in hospital for several months. 
Honest and well educated but w ithout much moral 
courage.
36. Fmir Abdcl-Aziz Chehnb
Born 1908 al Baalxla, M t. Lebanon. Maronite. 
Great grandson of E m ir Bechir Chehab II. 
Educated at Jesuit College. Formerly a magistrate, 
then Mohafez of North Lebanon and later o f South 
Lebanon. Appointed Director-General of the 
Interior in August 1955. Very clever, cunning and 
an opportunist. Helpful to us.
37. F.mir Farid Chehab
Born 1909; Maronite; educated privately. Head 
o f Counter Espionage Department under the 
French Mandate. Imprisoned by Free French for 
contacts w ith V ichy, 1942-43. Re-entered Police 
Department, 1943, and became Director o f SOrctd
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Gencrale, 1948. He is very helpful to this 
Embassy, but is not as deeply imbued w ith a sense 
of civic duty as he would have us believe. 
Extravagant and fond of the bright lights. Made 
a C.D.E. in June 1956. Married to an intelligent and 
attractive wife who was lirs l married to an English­
man. Speaks French and some English. A clever 
policeman and Deputy Chairman of Interpol, 1957.
38. General Found Chehab
Born 1901, Beirut; Maronite; educated College 
des Fr£rcs Marisles, Jounieh. Married to a French 
wife. Trained in the French army and Commander- 
in-Chief of the Lebanese Armed Forces since 1945. 
Gained great prestige for keeping the peace during 
“ revo lu tion ”  of September 1952, when he was 
temporarily Prime M inister. Was brought into the 
Government at the almost equally serious time of 
crisis in November 1956, but left it again in January 
1957 as soon as he considered the crisis had passed. 
Honest and loyal and determined to preserve the 
political independence of the army. I l is  personal 
charm is greater than his intelligence and he is the 
exasperation of hist more politically-m inded sub­
ordinates. Spoken of as a possible presidential 
candidate.
39. Emir Khaled Chehab
Born 1891, Hasbaya; Sunni Moslem; primary 
education. Married. Formerly Prime M inister 
and President o f the Chamber under the French 
Mandate. Lebanese M inister at Amman 1948-52, 
when he was recalled by President Chamoun to 
become Prime M inister. Resumed his duties at 
Amman, w ith the rank of Ambassador in 1953, 
Honest and possessed of a certain peasant 
shrewdness, but his weakness and a certain appear­
ance of im becility were not calculated to inculcate 
respect for his Government. He is, however, well 
meaning and friendly.
40. Farid Coznta
A Maronite o f Jezzinq (South Lebanon) born 
about 1907. He is a graduate o f the French School 
o f Law and w'as M tonnier o f the Lebanese Bar 
Association from 1955 to 1956. He was elected 
Deputy for Jezzine for the first time in 1957 and 
was appointed M inister o f Education and In fo r­
mation in Sami Solh’s Cabinet of August 1957. 
In its successor o f March 1958 he holds the port­
fo lio  o f Information only. A bachelor, he speaks 
only French.
41. Ahmed Daouk
Born 1899, Beirut: Sunni Moslem; educated 
Jesuit University, Beirut. Married. Prime M inistei 
1941-42 but lost influence through weakness and 
incompetence. Appointed Lebanese M inister in 
Paris 1944 and promoted Ambassador in 1953. 
Put on the retired list in December 1955, but by 
virtue of a special arrangement managed to remain 
in Paris until the end of 1957, when he returned 
to the Lebanon. Often spoken of as a possible 
“  neutral ”  Prime M inister.
42. Nndiiti Doiicclikif
Born 1915, Beirut: Sunni Moslem; educated
American University o f Beirut. Married to an 
intelligent and attractive English wife. Lebanese 
Foreign Service. Served London, Ottawa, Cairo 
and Switzerland (w ith Czechoslovakia). Appointed 
Lebanese Ambassador in Washington at the end of
1957. An able and likeable young man, he is 
inclined to advocate Arab Nationalist views and 
wishes to enter political life. Speaks good English.
43. Pierre Edrlc
Born 1920, Beirut; Maronite; educated Jesuit 
University, Beirut. Son of late President Etude 
Edde; married 1950 a rich Lebanese o f Brazil. 
Politician and champion o f Christian rights in the 
Lebanon. A lthough active in politics ever since 
his childhood, his lirst entry into public life was Ins 
election as Deputy of Mount Lebanon in 1951. 
M inister o f Finance under A. Y a li from August 1953 
to March 1954. Left with his fam ily for Brazil, 
his w ife’s country of orig in, in September 1956, 
where he intended to remain for two or three years, 
but he returned to the Lebanon in May 1957 to 
consider taking part in the elections o f June 1957 
if the going was good for him. It was. and he was 
elected, this time to the Beirut district. Appointed 
M inister o f Finance in Sami Solh’s Government of 
March 1958. Shrewd and an intriguer, and a 
possible presidential candidate.
44. Raymond Ld«l6
Born 1918; Beirut; Maronite; educated Jesuit 
University, Beirut. Bachelor. Lawyer. Elder son 
o f President Em ile Edde from whom lie inherited 
leadership o f the Francophile “  Itloc  Nation il.”  
Elected Deputy for Byblos (Jbail) in July 1953. and 
again in June 1957. He is now member o f the 
Foreign Affairs Committee o f the Chamber and of 
the Adm inistration and Justice Committee Honest 
and likeable.
45. Maitil Fargcnllah
Wife o f George Fargeallah, a Christian notable 
o f Beirut. Nee Moutran, a leading Greek Catholic 
fam ily of Baalbek. Lebanon. Born 1910. Not only 
one (’f the society ladies of Beirut, but also very 
deeply involved in politics. Vain and subject to 
frequent changes in her political attitudes. Pro- 
British on the whole w ith pro-American 
intermittcncc. Opened her house to the British 
A rm y during the Occupation period 1941 - 45. Not 
very intelligent, but likes to think that she is a 
political genius. Was a friend o f President 
el-Khoury and his son, K ha lil; was also (until 1957) 
a great friend o f President Chamoun and his wife; 
but subsequently turned against them, and is now 
committed to the Opposition.
46. .lean Fallal
Born 190.3, Damascus; Syrian Catholic; educated 
in Austria. Married. Merchant and part owner of 
a firm of commission agents in Damascus and 
Beirut. Personally honest but a shrewd money­
maker with his ear close to the politica l ground 
Very helpful to the Commercial Section o f this 
Embassy.
47. Fdmond F’rangie
Born about 1910. Maronite. Married An 
upholsterer by trade and fo r many years President 
o f Upholsterers’ Trade Union. President of League 
of Syndicates (Jamiat) since 1955. Popular in trade 
union circles; anti-Communist and pro West. 
Largely responsible for .laniait affiliating to the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. 
Seems more honest than many of his colleagues. A 
quiet manner conceal* considerable obstinacy.
48. Hamid Fmagic
Born 1905, Zghorta; M aronite; educated College 
des Fr£res. T ripo li, and French School o f Law, 
Beirut Married. Lawyer and politician and 
Deputy. Since 1941 several times Minister, usually 
of Foreign Affairs, the last time being in the Sami 
Solh Cabinet o f 1954 which he joined in 1955 when 
it was reshuffled; he resigned, however, in August 
1955, accusing the President o f undermining his 
work. Motivated presumably by the disappointment
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v o f his politica l hopes, he turned (in 1956) to 
increasingly open opposition to the President and he 
began to ally himself w ith the pro-Egyptian elements. 
A llowed himself to be appointed Chairman of an 
“  Arab Rally ”  o f prominent Arab personages whose 
aim was to support the cause of Colonel Nasser and 
the “  liberated ”  A rab States against the West. This 
move recoiled on his head when the events of 
November 1956, and the subsequent rapid slide 
towards the left in Syria and Egypt, thoroughly 
alarmed Christian and moderate Lebanese. His 
politica l career was cut short by a severe cerebral 
haemorrhage in October 1957, necessitating surgical 
treatment in London. A lthough complete recovery 
is possible he is for the present out of political life.
49. Moussn de Frcigc
Rom 1910, Reirut; Roman Catholic; educated 
Jesuit University. Reirut. Married. Has the heredi­
tary papal title o f Marquis which he likes to use. A 
wealthy socialite and race horse owner, connected 
w ith the fam ily o f President cl-Khoury and un­
popular among Moslems. Had assumed responsi­
b ility  for direction of l.e Jour even before the death 
o f his uncle, Michel Chiha, in December 1954. 
Speaks English.
5ft. Maurice Getnayel
Rom 1910, Rikfaya; Maronite; educated Jesuit 
University and French School of Law, Reirut. 
Married. Lawyer. Leading Phalangist; cousin and 
brother-in-law of Pierre Gemayel (No. 44). Seeks to 
promote irrigation and electrical schemes. Relatively 
honest and intelligent.
51. Pierre Gcmnycl
Horn about 1909, Rikfaya; Maronite; educated 
Jesuit University, Reirut. Married. Leader of the 
Phalange Movement which affects extreme Christian 
and Lebanese nationalism in opposition to Moslem 
Pan-Arab ideas. One of the most vigorous reformist 
politicians outside the Chamber. Adopted a flank 
and courageous pro-Western attitude before, during 
and after the Suez alla ir and he and his party gained 
tremendously in Christian circles. A director o f 
Amal. Visited United States in A p ril 1958 for two 
months.
52. Colonel .lean Az.iz C.lia/i
Horn 1900. Reirut; M aronite; educated Egypt and 
French A rm y Schools. Married to a French wife. 
Although next in seniority to General Cheltab in 
Lebanese army has little  to say in its alfairs. A 
pleasant and vigorous personality, but discipline 
seems to irk him and he is inclined to rather loose 
anti-Western talk, which may reflect political 
ambitions and restlessness in his present job. Speaks 
English In January 1954 was accused of preparing 
a m ilita ry coup directed against his Commander-in- 
Chief and, as a result o f this, was put on pension 
w ithout being court-martialled.
5J. Found Ghosn
Greek Orthodox of Koura; born 1912. Educated 
Ecnle dcs Ft6res, T rip o li. A c iv il servant when his 
father, the late Nicolas Ghosn, was a permanent 
Deputy, both under the French mandate and sifter 
the ludcpen lencc. Succeeded his father in the 
Chamber o f Deputies. Appointed M inister of 
Education and of Posts and Telegraphs in the Yafi 
Cabinet of June 8, 1956, until November 16, 1956. 
Amiable but not very bright.
In the 1957 elections he threatened to be such a 
serious rival to Charles M a lik  that the Government 
(under American pressure) was forced to buy him 
olf. He is therefore no longer a Deputy.
I 7
54. Farid llabih
Greek Orthodox from Kousba, Koura. Rom 
1908. Studied in College dcs Frcres, T ripo li, and 
obtained degree of law from Jesuit School. Reirut. 
about I9J4. Appointed magistrate in 1929, then 
Kaimakam (sub-district officer). Director o f the 
Etal C iv il from 1942; promoted Director-General 
December 1955. Fa irly honest; friendly to us and 
co-operative. Well known in Greek Orthodox 
clerical circles. Married.
55. Ibrahim llnidar
Rorn 1888, Rckaa; Shia Moslem; educated locally 
and in France. Married. A tiny little  man, known 
generally as “  the giant of the Rckaa.”  whose bum p­
tiousness and seniority in the Chamber gives his 
remarks more weight than they deserve, but a friend 
o f the Hashemites and reasonably pro-Rritish. A 
crafty and dishonest politica l intriguer who lost his 
last m inisterial post for com plicity in hashish 
smuggling, but who was re-elected Deputy for the 
Rekaa in 1957. and is a member o f the parliamentary 
Foreign A lfairs Committee.
56. Sclim llnidar
Rorn 1912, Raalbek; Shia Moslem. Doctor of 
law, Paris. Judge and poet turned politician, with 
an attractive and lively wife. Lebanese M inister in 
Tehran from 1948 t i l l  October 1952, when he became 
Cabinet M inister. Elected Deputy in 1953, but failed 
to be ic-elcctcd in 1957. An amiable and gentle 
but colourless figure w ith intellectual leanings. 
M inister of Agriculture and Posts and Telegraphs in 
the Sami Solli Cabinet of September 1954. Appointed 
Ambassador to Morocco in March 1958. Roth he 
and his wife speak good French but no English.
57. Georges llaimnri
Rorn 1898, Reirut; Maronite; educated Jesuit 
University, Reirut. Married. “  Chef de Cabinet "  
to the President o f the Republic 1920 43 and from 
1945. O.R.E. 1947. Chairman of Lebanese 
Government Commission on Palestine Refugees 
since 1948. Honest until a few years ago when he 
began to feather his own and his fam ily’s nest. 
Much under the influence of his father confessors 
but very friendly and helpful to the Rritish. He is 
rather an old woman and his relations with Presi­
dent Chamoun. though strained at first, are now 
steadily improving. In 1958 he was appointed 
to the Department of Customs in succession to 
Moussn Mobarak {q.v.) w ithout, however, relinquish­
ing his duties at the Presidency.
58. Abdnllah lla ij
Rorn 1898, Ghobairi (near Reirut); Shia Moslem, 
educated American University of Reirut. Married. 
School-teacher in Raghdad, when he was expelled, 
having been guilty o f embezzlement. Then a 
politician. Elected Deputy in 1951 in the Opposition 
list, re-elected in 1953, but did not stand in the 1957 
elections. Dishonest but dynamic. A  rather 
unsavoury character w ith a nuisance value in , ' ; ‘2es. 
Proved to be very anti-Western and especially anti- 
Rritish during the Suez affair; was one of the few 
who insisted that diplomatic relations with Rritain 
and France should be severed.
57. Georges llakim
Rorn 1914, T ripo li, Greek Orthodox; educated 
at American University of Reirut. Married to an 
American wife. Professor and politician; after 
teaching economics at the American University of 
Reirut joined Lebanese Foreign Service and served 
at Lebanese Legation at Washington and the per­
manent Lebanese delegation at the United Nations. 
Appointed M inister of Finance and National
CONFIDENTIAL
^
COPYRIGHT -  HOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPH/CALLY WI THOUT P ERM!SSI OH
8 I CO NFIDENTIAL
Economy October 1952; also Foreign M inister in 
February 1953. Honest and very intelligent, but 
stubborn and inclined to take an academic approach. 
Holds Left-w ing economic views which he applies 
skdftilly  and w ith more politica l sense than appears 
at first sight. During the year 1954 underwent several 
surgical operations both in the Lebanon and in the 
United States. He recovered and although still 
weak resumed work as Assistant Secretary- General 
in the M inistry o f Foreign Affairs un til he was 
transferred to Bonn as M inister in 1955. Was 
recalled temporarily at the end of that year to advise 
in the negotiations w ith the I.P.C. Returned again 
from  Bonn in A p ril 1956 to become M inister of 
National Economy. Again returned to Bonn as 
M inister in A p ril 1957.
61). Snlrri IlnmaHe
Born about 1903, Bckaa; Shia Moslem; educated 
College dcs Frcres, Reirut. Married to daughter of 
A lm ie.l al-Assad (No. 19). Deputy fo r Baalbek - 
lle rm c l and former Minister. President of the 
Chamber o f Deputies 1943 46 and 1948-51. A 
crude and venal politic ian whose local influence in 
the Bekaa gives him a nuisance value. A notorious 
hashish smuggler and one of the principal targets of 
the reformers. .
61. Said Unmade
Born about 1895, Mount Lebanon; Druze; 
educated American University o f Beirut. Widower. 
Professor of applied economics, American University 
o f Beirut. The Laski o f the Lebanon (in modera­
tion). Inspires the generally Left-w ing economic 
views of such people as Georges lla k im  and Kcmal 
Joumblatt But a very gentle revolutionary w ith 
much charm and a good command of English.
62. .Insepli llnrfnuclie
Born 1914, Beirut; Maronite. Unmarried. 
Educated Jesuit University. Served in French 
Consulate-General in Cairo until 1945, when lie was 
attached to Lebanese M in is try  o f Foreign Adairs. 
Has served as Charge? d ’Affaires in Brussels and as 
M inister to the Holy Sec. Appointed head of the 
Political Section of the M in is try  o f Foreign Adairs 
in 1953. Reappointed Lebanese M inister (subse­
quently upgraded to Ambassador) to the Holy See 
in 1955, and additionally to Portugal in 1957. 
Strongly anti-Conununist and pro-Western in 
political outlook. Anxious to promote closer rela­
tions between Lebanon and the Western Powers. 
Intelligent, friendly but slightly superficial.
63. Clinfik Ilatcm
Born 1910, Beirut; Maronite; educated Jesuit 
University and French School of Law, Beirut. 
Married. Judge. Senior and leading odicial of the 
M inistry o f Justice un til February 1953, when he 
became acting Director-General o f that M in istry. 
An efficient subordinate who knows how to make 
himself useful, especially to President Chamoun, as 
a draftsman and expert o f legal matters. A lthough 
fa irly  honest, he is a time-server and intriguer.
64. Charles Helnti
Born 1912, Beirut; M aronite; educated Jesuit 
University, Beirut. Married. Lawyer and politician. 
Associated w ith l.c  Jour. Lebanese M inister to 
the Holy See 1947-49; M inister for Foreign Affairs 
1951 52. M inister o f Justice in the Government of 
Sami Solh o f September 1954. D id not stand in the 
1957 elections. An intelligent and patriotic Leban­
ese of the Christian persuasion w ith a close eye on 
his own advancement. Considered a possible presi­
dential candidate in 1958.
65. Khalil llih ri
Born 1907, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated 
American University of Beirut. Married. Wealthy 
business man (real estate). A rab nationalist but 
makes no secret o f his belief in co-operation w ith 
the British. Used to spend lavishly to ensure his 
popularity among lower class Moslems of Beirut, 
but has now lost much of his money and most of 
his popularity. Influential in Moslem organisations. 
Opposed A. Yafi in the 1953 elections but failed. 
Honest, loyal, generous but lazy. Won against Yafi 
in the 1957 elections and made M inister o f Public 
Works in the Sami Solh Government of March 1958.
66. Joseph llitti
Born 1896, Shemlan; Maronite; educated A m eri­
can University o f Beirut, followed by medical studies 
in the United States and Canada. Married. Brother 
o f Professor Philippe H itti, the A rab historian, o f 
Princeton University, United States. Elected Deputy 
in 1947; stood again in 1951 but failed. Honest and 
a good physician w ithout much personality or pre­
sence. His judgment in politica l matters is somewhat 
distorted by personal disappointments. But he 
makes himself useful as a politica l go-between ami 
“  fixer.”  Enthusiastic supporter o f proposed British 
School Considered a possible presidential candidate 
in 1958.
67. Fawzi el-lloss
Born about 1909 in Beirut o f a Sunni Moslem 
bourgeois fam ily. He began earning his liv ing by 
giving swimming, rid ing and (later) (lying lessons, 
and was subsequently employed by the M unicipality 
o f Beirut in a very jun io r capacity, l ie  founded the 
M idd le Fast A irlines Company w ith the financial 
backing o f (he Salam fam ily, but later broke w ith 
them as a result o f a dispute ami ensuing legal 
action, which he w on- largely thanks to Prime 
M inister Sami Solh. He is a member of the Board 
o f M E.A., and attended (he C iv il Aviation Con­
vention in Chicago in 1944 as a member o f the 
Lebanese delegation headed by Camille Chamoun. 
In association w ith his brother he runs a successful 
business in Kuwait, and himself owns a flourishing 
commercial dairy farm in Sofar. Elected Deputy 
fo r Beirut (Second D ivision) in 1957. and now 
President o f the Public Works Committee of the 
Chamber. He is clever and ambitious, and speaks 
good English. He and his attractive wife lead an 
entirely Westernised modern life and entertain a lot.
68. Gcnrgcs llrnoui
A Maronite, born about 1910, and Deputy for 
Zable (Rckaa) since 1953. A M inister in the Yafi 
Government of 1954. He is a fa irly  intelligent 
supporter o f President Chamoun. Speaks only 
French.
69. Ketnal Jumhlatt
Born 1914, Mount Lebanon; Druze; educate ! 
Jesuit University, Beirut. Married to a lively and 
intelligent member o f the Arslan clan. Deputy from 
1943 to 1957 and feudal leader o f the Druze faction 
opposed to the Arslans. He is also leader of the 
Socialist and Progressive Party and the principal 
exponent o f ideological socialism in the Lebanon, 
which he expounds on (he platform  and through his 
newspaper A l Anba. H is reform ist views and his 
personal attacks were a main motive force leading 
to President e l-Khoury’s fa ll in September 1952. 
But he has since not concealed his disappointment 
w ith the slow progress of reform under President 
Chamoun. Despite much hard work to increase his 
follow ing inside and outside the Chamber, he failed 
be re-elected in 1957, much to his sadness and 
hum iliation. A fte r several unsuccessful attempts at 
reconciliation w ith the President, he openly joined
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the Opposition in 1958, anti now indulges in sporadic 
trials o f strength w ith the security forces. 
It is hard to know how much of his influence 
is ideological and how much depends on 
his position as a Druze chieftain. A lthough 
opposed to Communism lie was until recently 
inclined to neglect the dangers o f his Left-w ing 
neutralism; o f late is showing signs of a positive 
pro-West policy. A fiery demagogue in public, he 
has gentle and unassuming manners in private 
conversation.
70. Mile. Ihtihnj Kaddoura
Dorn 1898, Beirut; Sunni Moslem. Leading mem­
ber of various feminist organisations. Appointed 
municipal councillor February 1953. Honest and 
well meaning.
71. Georges Knram
Born 1897, Beirut; Maronite; educated Antoura 
College (Lazarists). Married. Rich lim ber merchant 
and large share-bolder in A ir  l.iban. Elected Deputy 
1951 but failed in the 1953 elections, and did not 
stand in 1957. The facl that he was once imprisoned 
for a false Customs declaration has been conveniently 
forgotten and he was appointed M inister of Finance 
in 1953, when Sa'eb Salam was Prime Minister, and 
again in the Yafi Cabinet o f March 19, 1956. Neither 
honest nor intelligent but shrewd at making money. 
Vain and mean but quite presentable socially.
72. .Inscpli Karnui
Born 1899, Zghorla; Maronite; educated College 
dcs Ftcrcs, T ripo li. Married. The principal con­
tender w ith Hamid Frangie for leadership of the 
Christians in North Lebanon. Deputy since 1944 but 
failed in the 1953 elections ami again in 1957. Rather 
weak character.
73. Uifaat Kazmin
Born about 1908, Bekaa; Sunni Moslem; educated 
Lycec Fran<,ais. Married. Venal and a known arms 
smuggler, he is also a fanatical Moslem anil was 
arrested in December 1952 for com plicity in the 
murder of a Christian lawyer during municipal elec­
tions and subsequently acquitted. Is now on the 
Opposition side, meaning opposition to the person 
of the President and not to the Government in office. 
Formerly a Deputy, he was defeated in the 1957 
elections.
74. Bnschiil Kcram6
Born 1923, T r ip o li; Sunni Moslem; hits law degree 
from Cairo. Bachelor. Feudal leader who inherited 
political influence and prestige in T r ip o li o f his 
father, Abdel Hamid KerannS, but which he has 
not yet consolidated. Deputy fo r T r ip o li since 1951, 
tind member o f the Foreign AITairs Committee o f (he 
Chamber, lias  served as M inister o f Justice and 
National Economy. An ardent advocate o f economic 
union with Syria, he has failed to achieve anything 
concrete. Weak, vain and moderately intelligent but 
honest and well meaning. M inister for National 
Economy and Social AITairs since August 1953. 
Prime M inister from September 1955 until March
1956. He showed himself obstinate and a fanatical 
Moslem in this office; he accomplished nothing o f 
any value and showed strong Left-w ing tendencies. 
Although a leader of the Moslem opposition against 
the re-election of President Chamoun, he harbours 
no personal animosity against him.
75. Clwrlc? Kcttanrli
Born 1905. Jerusalem; Roman Catholic; educated 
American University o f Beirut. Married to a 
charming and intelligent wife. Member o f the 
important merchant firm  o f Kettanch Fr£res. 
A lthough scrupulous in his personal dealings he is
a tough and ruthless business man. Has shrewd 
business sense but outside this field his judgment is 
fallib le . Very wealthy and generous. Speaks good 
English and French.
76. Knzcni cl-Khnlil
A Shia o f Pyre, South Lebanon. Born 1903. Of 
prim ary education only, he now speaks reasonable 
English. He is ill-mannered and notoriously corrupt, 
coming from a leading fam ily of the d istrict well- 
known for their freebooting activities. He is a 
strong supporter o f President Chamoun who, in 
return, tries to overlook his nefarious activities, 
thought this is not always easy. He is, however, a 
useful opponent o f Ahmed cl Assail (No. 19), and is 
a brother-in-law of Adel Ossciran (No. 113). 
Married. He was M inister o f National Economy in 
Sami Solh’s Government o f August 1957 and, in 
spite o f a subsequent scandal involving his im por­
tation o f diseased cattle from the Sudan, has 
managed to retain his position in the new Govern­
ment o f March 1958.
77. Anwar Khntilr
Born 1903, Sltehim; Sunni Moslem; educated 
School of Law, Damascus. Formerly judge, then 
practised as lawyer. Prominent member o f the 
Socialist Progressive Party o f Kcmal Jum hlalt; 
Deputy for Deir el-Kamar (M l. Lebanon). Fairly 
intelligent and relatively honest.
78. Clovis cl-Klwzen
Single, and born in about 1912, he belongs to a 
leading Maronite fam ily o f Mount Lebanon. He 
has been a Deputy for Kesrouan since 1953 but 
carries weight only in his constituency. He became 
M inister fo r Education in March 1958, although his 
own education was o f the most cursory kind. 
Speaks French.
79. Iz/ct Kluirchid
Born 1902, Beirut (o f fam ily w ith Turkish origins); 
Sunni Moslem; educated Ottoman Government 
School, Beirut. Married. Chief of Protocol at the 
M inistry of Foreign AfTairs 1945 52. w ith intervals 
as Chief o f Police. Was Director-General o f Posts 
and Telegraphs in 1955 until he was reappointed 
Chef de Protocole. Honest anil civilised, he tends- to 
be used to lend respectability to a Department which 
has lost face.
fift. Slrcikh Rcchara cl-Khoury
Born 1892, Beirut (w ith fam ily origins in Mount 
I cbatton); Maronite; educated Jesuit University, 
Beirut. Married. Lawyer and politician. A fter 
b itter opposition to President Edcle and several terms 
as Prime M inister under French Mandate, he became 
the first independent President o f the Lebanese 
Republic in 1943, and stood firm ly against French 
pretensions in that year, being interned for his pains. 
Throughout his term o f olfice he remained grateful 
for British support at that time. As President he 
showed great skill in manipulating the balance of 
political forces in the country and in thereby main­
taining himself as the dominant factor in public life. 
But his inab ility  to say “ n o "  to his fam ily (wife, 
brothers, son and remoter relatives) led to his regime 
becoming a synonym for corruption and nepotism. 
His increasingly blind self-confidence led him to 
resent and to try  to suppress (he criticism  and 
clamour for reform and so brought him into conllict 
w ith the Press and public opinion. During 1952 the 
opposition to him gradually gained momentum and 
forced him to resign in September, since when he has 
retired into private life, although reputed still to take 
a close, indirect interest in politics. In foreign affairs 
he had remained consistently pro-Western and anti- 
Coinmunist throughout his term of olfice. His short­
comings as President derived mainly from weakness
53474
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anti inab ility  to rise above the moral standards o f 
those who surrounded him ; but he hail been a clever 
and successful lawyer; he conducted public business 
w ith elliciency and despatch and he is kindly and 
amiable in private contacts. Renewed his political 
activities against Chamoun in 1957 and became a 
possible candidate himself for re-election.
HI. Elias Khntiry (l)r.)
Horn 1898, Mount Lebanon; Maronite; educated 
College de la Sagesse, Beirut. Married. Prominent 
in medical organisations and good works. Ex-Deputy 
(failed in 1957 elections) and former M inister of 
Health. Honest and well meaning.
82. Emile Khntiry
Rorn about 1887; Maronite; educated College de 
la Sagesse, Reirut. Bachelor. Journalist and d ip lo ­
matist. Formerly foreign correspondent o f Egyptian 
paper, FA-Ahram. Lebanese M inister at Rome, 
1948 55. Intelligent, but dishonest. Is in the front 
row of the anli-Chamoun group.
85. Sheikh Found el-Klionry
Born 1894, Beirut; Maronite; educated Jesuit 
University, Beirut. Wealthy merchant w ith a finger 
in almost every commercial pie. Brother o f Presi­
dent e l-Khoury whom he supported financially on 
the way up. During his brother’s term of olfice 
greatly increased his already substantial fortune.
84. Gnhricl Khntiry
Born about 1910. Maronite, educated French 
schools, Beirut. Married. Employee of Ranquc de 
Syrie el du L ilian since about 1955. President of 
Union o f Bank Employees since 1946. President of 
Federation of United Syndicates. Supports the 
Etldc “  It lo r  National.”  Anti-Communist and pro- 
West. Has the confidence o f trade union colleagues 
and leads his federation intelligently. Has a 
reputation for financial and mental integrity.
85. Sheikh Khalil el-Khoury
Born 1925; Maronite; educated Jesuit University, 
Beirut Married the rich and charming former 
Jacqueline A rida. daughter of George A ritla  (No. 16). 
E lder son of President el-Khoury and member of his 
law firm . Made a large fortune by explo iting his 
privileged position during his father's presidency.
I ay low for the first eighteen months or so of 
(  hamoun’s presidency, but is now steadily resuming 
his political intrigues. Separated from his wife in 
January 1955. (Marriage annulled, January 1956.) 
l ie  has since decided to lie rather low. Despite 
considerable personal charm he is well versed in the 
technique of corrupt politica l intrigue, but his 
methods are so tortuous that they tend to become 
transparent.
86. Sheikh Sami el-Khoury
Born 1895, Beirut; M aronite; educated Jesuit 
University, Beirut. Married. Brother of President 
el Khoury. Formerly Director o f Justice. Secretary- 
General of M in is try  o f Foreign AITairs, 1944 45. 
Lebanese M inister at Cairo, 1945 52; at Brussels 
and The Hague from December 1952 until July 
1955, when he was appointed Ambassador to 
M adrid. A neat little  man w ith no great intelligence 
or personality.
87. Sheikh Sclim el-Khoury
Born 1896. Rashmaya; Maronite; educated at 
Jesuit University, Beirut. Bachelor. Brother of 
President el-Khoury. during whose presidency he 
exercised great influence behind the scenes and came 
to be known as “  the Sultan.”  Though he never 
attended the Chamber he controlled eleven votes 
there. He thus made himself one of the main
targets o f the reformers. L ittle  is heard o f him now 
and he is presumably resting on his tarnished laurels.
88. Victor Khoury
Born 1905, Hadelh; Maronite; educated Jesuit 
University, Beirut, and in Mexico. Bachelor whose 
sister acts as hostess. Formerly lawyer. In 1944 
appointed Counsellor at Lebanese Legation at 
London; M inister in 1947 and Ambassador in 1955. 
Transferred to Washington in 1955. and back to 
Beirut as Secretary-General o f the M in istry o f 
Foreign AITairs in January 1958. Not a very strong 
character but makes good use o f his amiable social 
manners; pompous.
89. Salah Labahidi
Born 1896, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated 
American University o f Beirut. Married. C iv il 
servant, formerly Sub-district Governor (Kaimakam) 
o f Baalbek. Appointed Chief of Police o f Beirut, 
March 1955. A rabic scholar; honest anti energetic; 
a great friend of Ahtlallah Yafi, but co-operatos 
w illing ly  w ith us.
90. Eicut.-Cnloncl Found Lnhoud
Nephew of Colonel Jamil Lahoud (No. 91) and 
brother o f Sclim (No. 92). Born at Baabdath 1912. 
Gazetted from Hours M ilita ry  Academy September I.
1955. Attached British A rm y in United Kingdom 
and D A .O  R. in August 1947. SlalT College, C'am- 
berley, 1955. Inspector o f A rm our, 1956. Has 
been to United Kingdom in 1956 and 1957 to 
negotiate over purchase of armoured cars anti tanks. 
Intelligent. Friendly disposition. Speaks llucnt 
French anil good English. Rightly regarded by 
General Chelrab as unreliable in financial matters. 
Has strained relations w ith his uncle. Colonel Jam il 
Lahoud, on political grounds. Is one of the more 
capable and ambitious Lebanese army officers anti, 
although (bought unreliable, may be a future Chief 
of Staff.
91. Colonel Jamil Lahoud
Born Daabdat. 1905; belongs to a leading 
Maronite fam ily of Mount Lebanon. "T o w n  
M a jo r ”  or Area Commander since 1950. Pro- 
British. French education. Married. Has a son 
on a two-year course at Royal Naval College, 
Dartmouth, from 1958.
92. Sclim Lahoud
Born 1910; Maronite. Chief engineer o f the 
Water Company o f Beirut. Studied engineering at 
the College ties Arts et Mdticrs o f L ille , France. 
Elected Deputy for Mount Lebanon in a by-election 
in A p ril 1954 and re-elected in June 1957. A p ­
pointed in 1954 Chairman of the L itan i Board for 
hydro-electric and irrigation development o f 
resources o f Lebanon’s chief river. Appointed 
M inister o f Public Education under the Premiership 
of Sami .Solh in July 1955 and M inister for Foreign 
Affairs in the Kernim5 Government o f September 
1955, which post lie managed to maintain in 
successive Cabinets un til the fa ll o f the Yafi Govern­
ment in November 1956—rather surprisingly, since 
he was never a sk ilfu l Foreign Minister. (He tended 
to be helpless between (he President and the Prime 
M inister and made more than one blunder.) He was 
subsequently made M inister o f Public Works in the 
Sami Solh Government o f August 1957; in this post, 
however, despite his previous reputation for honesty, 
he rapidly gained such a reputation fo r corruption 
(in part by a national scandal concerning the 
purchase of water pipes) that he became a liab ility  to 
the Government and the only member of it who was 
not maintained in the enlarged Solh Cabinet o f 
February 1958. He was at one time reported to 
be in serious financial difficulties, but since his tenure
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of lltc M inistry this is no longer the case, l ie  is a 
director of M iddle East A irlines, and serves on the 
Foreign Affairs Committee o f the Chamber, lie  is 
married and friendly to the West.
93. Snltlii Mnhmnssnni
Horn 1908. Heirnt; Sunni Moslem; educated Lycee 
Franyais, American University o f Beirut and 
French School of Law. Married. A judge until 
1947 when he resigned to stand unsuccessfully for 
Parliament. Now practises law; legal adviser to 
Poin. IV  in the Lebanon. A clear and clever 
lawyer, who is also professor of Islamic law at 
American University o f Beirut.
94. Charles Malik
Born 1906, North Lebanon; CJreek Orthodox; 
educated American University o f Reirut and 
Harvard. Married. Formerly professor o f ph ilo ­
sophy and science, American University o f Beirut. 
As Lebanese Ambassador at Washington from 1945 
to December 1955 and Permanent Representative sit 
the United Nations, lie attracted much attention by 
public speaking in the United States and bu ilt up 
for himself an influential position in Washington. 
His reputation in his own country also gained 
through his long absence from the scene. Has now 
returned to Beirut where he is once more on the 
staff of the American University. He has political 
ambitions and accepted office as M inister for Foreign 
Affairs and of Education in the strong Solh Govern­
ment formed in November 1956. l ie  immediately 
began to fo llow , largely as Head of the I ebanese 
Delegation at the United Nations Assembly, a 
foreign policy which certainly reflected the views of 
the President but for which the Prime M inister (Sami 
Solh) had frequently to devise skilfu l public defences. 
Continued as M inister for Foreign A lfairs (though 
no longer of Education after autumn 1957) in the 
reconstituted Sami Solh Government o f February 
1958. Elected as Deputy in June 1957 after the 
retirement of his riva l at American instigation and 
expense. His pro-American foreign policy has 
made him one o f the main channels for opposition 
attacks on President Chamoun.
95. Nnsri M a ln u f
Born 1911. Mount Lebanon; Greek Catholic, 
educated Syrian School o f Law o f Damascus. 
Bachelor. Lawyer, journalist and politician. 
Prominent member o f lltc National Appeal Party. 
M inister o f Finance, National Economy and Social 
Affairs in Sami Solh Government o f November 1956, 
but was defeated in the 1957 elections. B rillian t 
w riter and orator in Arabic. Honest, vain and proud 
of his independence but lazy. Susceptible to fem i­
nine influence. Nominated in summer 1957 as 
Ambassador to Egypt, but Egyptian (lyremcnt to his 
appointment has not yet been given.
96. Abdullah Mashnouq
Born 1899. Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated 
American University o f Beirut. Married. Journalist, 
formerly principal o f the Moslem Makassed College 
o f Beirut. Owns and edits Beirut al-Massa. U ntil 
the end o f 1956, edited an excellent monthly 
magazine. The O il Family, fo r the Iraq Petroleum 
Company, but was discharged by the company for 
his violent hostility towards it. A fanatic on the 
subject of Islam and a strong supporter o f Syro- 
1.ebanese union. Clever and a strong personality, 
but venal. Is now strongly advocating the policy of 
the I) A R. Conducted a violently anti-Western 
campaign in his paper during and after the Suez 
affair. Speaks good English. One of the leaders 
o f (he Opposition against the re-election o f President 
( hainoun
97. Radri Mcnuchi
Born 1902; Maronite; educated Jesuit University, 
Beirut. Married. President o f the high Court since 
1950. Only moderately clever and, although basically 
honest, has yielded to pressure from his cousin the 
Patriarch in his judgments on cases w ith a political 
bearing.
98. .Inmil Mikkawi
Born 1911, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated Lycdc 
Fran9ais. Reirut. Married to a French wife. In flu ­
ential among younger Moslems and formerly leader 
o f the Moslem nationalist Najjadel Party. Served 
at Lebanese Legation at London, and M inister at 
Berne from 1946 until 1953 when he resigned, stood 
fo r the 1953 elections and failed to be elected. 
He then devoted his attention to build ing up a 
lucrative legal practice and in September 1955 under 
R. Kerame was made M inister of Public Works 
and, later, acting M inister o f Finance. He kept 
these portfolios until the M inistry fell in March
1956. Was re-elected Deputy (Beirut D istrict) in 
June 1957 and served as M inister of Finance in 
Sami Solli’s Government o f August 1957 until he 
resigned in February 1958. Voted against the new 
Government in the confidence debate o f March 
1958. Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee 
o f the Chamber. Member o f Board o f Governors 
o f the English School, Director of M iddle East 
A irlines and legal adviser to B.O.A.C.
97. Moussn Mubarak
Born 1901, Antoura; Maronite; educated Lazarist 
College, Antoura. Married to an intelligent wife. 
Closely associated w ith the French Mandatory 
authorities 1923-41. Appointed “ chef de C ab ine t-’ 
to President el-Khoury 1943. In charge of Customs 
Department from 1944 to 1957 except for an inter­
lude from September 1952 to February 1953 when 
he was M inister for Foreign Affairs. Despite his 
French culture and connections he is consistently 
friendly to the British and is honest and independent. 
He is almost unique in the Lebanon as having 
resigned a M inisterial portfo lio  on a point of p rin ­
ciple. A lthough at first he succeeded in remaining 
on friendly terms w ith both the ex-Prcsidcnt Khoury 
and President Chamoun, his relations with the former 
soon deteriorated. A t the end of 1957 he finally 
achieved his long-time ambition to be appointed 
Lebanese Ambassador in Paris, which had been 
blocked for years, partly because of the Maronite 
Patriarch and partly because of the reported French 
desire not to see this ex-cmployce of theirs, though 
staunchly pro-French, hold such a position in their 
c , ’ '. Intelligent and good company, but given to 
talking too much and thus occasionally dropping 
bricks.
Iflt). Naim Mnghabghnb
A  Greek Catholic o f A in-Zhalta, born 1911. 
Lived in Cairo until 1942. English education, l ie  
is clever, tough, unscrupulous and a very loyal asso­
ciate o f President Chamoun since the days when the 
latter was still on his way up. He played his part in 
the Lebanese struggle for independence in 1943. 
Since 1953 he has been Deputy for the Chowf 
(M ount Lebanon) and served as M inister for Public 
Works in Sami Solh’s Cabinet o f 1954. He is now 
President of the Finance and Budget Committee of 
the Chamber.
101. Moukhtar Moukaicch
Born 1901, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated 
College des Freres, Beirut. Bachelor. Formerly 
lawyer. Interned for pro-German activities 1942. 
Served diplomatic posts including Washington. 
Ankara and Ottawa. Appointed Consul-General at
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Marseilles in 195-1. Appointed Lebanese M inister 
to Belgium and Holland in July I955. Fanatical 
Moslem. Intelligent but restless and dissatisfied w ith 
his lot.
102. Albert IMnukliaihcr
Greek Orthodox o f Hcit-M eri, single, born about 
1913. l ie  is a graduate of tbe French School of 
Medicine and a clever G P. l ie  was elected Deputy 
for Metn (M ount Lebanon) in 1957 and is now, since 
March 1958, M inister for Public Health, l ie  studie I 
at one time in Switzerland, speaks good English and 
French and has considerable influence in his area.
103. Snndi IHounla
Horn 1895, T r ip o li; Sunni Moslem; educated O tto ­
man Government School, T ripo li. Bachelor. Land­
owner and politician. Deputy and former M inister. 
Prime M inister in 1946. Appointed Co-Guardian of 
the E lectricity Company o f Beirut in 1953 and C hair­
man of the E lectricity Company Board in 1954. Did 
not stand in the 1957 elections. A  genial old homo­
sexual muddlehead.
104. Kamel Mroiieh
Born 1916; Shia Moslem; educated American 
University of Beirut. Married. Journalist; now 
editor o f lla ya t and The D a ily  Star. Broadcast 
from Berlin in the war. V io lently  nationalist. A 
clever but unscrupulous journalist. Has sometimes 
been a useful a lly  but must be treated w ith caution. 
Speaks excellent English. An A rab union enthusiast. 
An outstanding supporter o f the Baghdad Pact, as a 
result o f frequent subsidies from the Iraqi Govern­
ment.
105. Gnluicl IMurr
Born 1895; Greek Orthodox; educated American 
University o f Beirut. Married. M inister from 
1953 to 1955. Served in United States A rm y in 
First W orld War. Returned to Lebanon in 1922 ami 
became cinema proprietor. Deputy 1943 51 53, but 
failed in 1957. Several times Minister. Honest and 
well meaning.
106. Alfred Naccachc
Born 1888, Beirut; Maronite; educated Jesuit U n i­
versity. Beirut. Married Formerly lawyer and 
President of the Court of Appeal. President of the 
Lebanese Republic under French Mandate 1941-43 
when dismissed by General C’atroux. Deputy 
1943 47, re-elected Deputy in 1953. A M inister for 
Foreign AITairs from 1953 to 1955. Has done some 
, !;‘ !:a l journalism. He is much under Jesuit 
influence but bis opposition to President el-Khoury 
commends him  to President Chamoun who often 
consults him. He is absolutely honest but neither a 
strong character nor a capable administrator. Has, 
in association w ith three others, founded a bank 
(Banquc de Beyrouth & des Pays Arabcs (S A L .) ) .  
Represented Lebanon at the Coronation in 1953, and 
at the Inauguration of tire new Argentine President in
1958.
107. Georges Naccachc
Born 1903. A lexandria; M aronite; educated 
Jesuit College. Alexandria. Married. Formerly 
c iv il engineer; now newspaper owner and journalist. 
Part-proprietor of I.'O rient since 1924. Writes well 
and is clever; but gambles and is venal.
108. Adih Nahas
Born 1903, T r ip o li; Greek Orthodox; educated 
College dcs Frfcres, T r ipo li. Married. Government 
servant. Formerly Director-General o f the Interior 
and Mohafez o f South Lebanon. Lebanese M inister 
at Buenos Aires 1948-53, and now M inister at R io
dc Janeiro. A first-rate official, honest, intelligent* 
capable and pro-British. O R E. 1947. Promoted 
to rank o f Ambassador at R io de Janeiro in March 
1955, and transferred to Athens in 1957.
109. General Soulcinian Nnufnl
Born 1900, Merjayoun; Greek Catholic; educated 
Jesuit University, Beirut. Married. Served in the 
Lebanese A rm y under the French Mandate. 
Appointed head o f the Gendarmerie 1941 and dis­
missed after collaborating w ith the French in 
November 1943. Formerly Director-General 
M in is try  o f National Economy, and then M inister 
o f National Economy 1947 48. Now Managing 
D irector and Chairman o f the Board o f the recently- 
established Lebanese Television Company, in addi­
tion to which he controls the Capitole Cinema and 
does some journalism. Honest and capable, he 
believes strongly in maintaining the Christian 
position in (he Lebanon if necessary by authoritarian 
methods.
110. Muldcddin Nsnuli
Born 1900, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated 
.College des Frfcres, Beirut. Married. Journalist. 
Former Deputy. M inister o f Information under 
Sa'eb Salam from A p ril until August 1953. Interned 
as Axis sympathiser, 1941, but is now strong sup­
porter o f co-operation w ith the West against 
communism. Despite his Arab loyalties, is ready 
to take a moderate line on such things as Palestine 
and M iddle East defence. Speaks English, lias 
visited England. M inister of Information and at 
different times of Finance and of Interior in Sami 
Sollt's Government o f 1954 55. Made serious 
efforts to reduce corruption and maladministration, 
especially at Finance M inistry Health bad.
111. IMtislnphn Nsouli
Born 1916, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated 
American University o f Beirut. W ife does not go 
out. C iv il servant; joined Lebanese Adm inistration 
in 1944 after working in his father’s firm  (glassware). 
Appointed Director-General o f National Economy 
in February 1953. Honest and intelligent, but not 
a strong character. Speaks English and is in close 
touch with United States Embassy; but also helpful 
to this Embassy. Accompanied Lebanese President 
on his visit to South America in May 1954.
112. Bechir Osman
A  Sunni Moslem o f A kkar, born about 1913. 
Studied at the College dcs lucres in T ripo li and is 
now Deputy for A kkar (North Lebanon) for the 
third time. An opportunist ami supporter of Nasser, 
he was one o f the first to travel to Damascus to 
congratulate him  on the foundation o f the United 
A rab State. He owns property in Syria. Was 
made M inister o f Posts and Telegraphs in March
1958. He is married, but his wife does not go out. 
He speaks only French.
113. Adel Ossciran
Born 1903, Sidon; Shia Moslem; educated 
American University o f Beirut. Married. Land­
owner and lawyer. R ival leader to Ahmed el-Assad 
in South Lebanon. Elected Speaker of the Lebanese 
Chamber o f Deputies in 1953 and re-elected in 1954, 
1955, 1956 and 1957. Close politica l associate of 
Camille Chamoun (now President) from 1943. 
Strong Arab Nationalist, especially on Palestine, but 
friendly to the United States and Brita in though only 
w ith in  the lim itations o f the above views. A  strong 
character, blunt and uncompromising. Speaks 
excellent English. A lthough openly and violently 
critica l of Anglo-French action in Suez, he. never­
theless, refused to recommend severing o f diplomatic 
relations w ith the West. He did, however, when
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leading a parliamentary delegation to Damascus in 
February 1958 to olfer congratulations on the birth 
of the United Arab Republic, get sufficiently carried 
away as to declare that “  Lebanon would, sooner or 
later, join the Arab caravan a remark which 
caused considerable indignation in almost all sections 
o f the Chamber. He has since been a frequent 
v is itor to Cairo, where he has made sim ilar remarks 
which he has later had to deny.
114. Ilenrf Phnraon
Horn 1902, Beirut; Greek Catholic; educated 
privately and Jesuit University, Beirut. Widower. 
Banker, politician and racehorse owner, in ascending 
order of interest. Ex-Deputy and several times 
M inister for Foreign AfTairs. By lavish expenditure 
poses as champion of Christian lower classes in 
Beirut. Homosexual and not above employing 
gangsters or bribery, he, nevertheless, believes in 
co-operation w ith the West and lias spoken in 
favour o f M iddle East defence. A strong opponent 
o f the Baghdad Pact, he was one of the first 
organisers of the opposition to President Chamoun’s 
re election.
115. General Noureddin Rifnl
Born about 1895, T ripo li; Sunni Moslem; educated 
Ottoman Government School, Beirut. Married. 
Served in the gendarmerie. Formerly Mohafez of 
North Lebanon. Appointed Director of Internal 
Security Forces. June 1952 un til March 1953, when 
he was made Inspector-General only o f the Internal 
Security Forces. Retired 1957. An impressive little  
man, but a firm , capable administrator. Hom o­
sexual.
116. Mme. Ilf lrn e  Rilian
Born about 1907, Beirut; Greek Orthodox. Wife 
o f Dr. Habib R ilian, of American University o f 
Beirut. A leading advocate o f women’s rights. 
Formerly taught in a school for girls in Cairo. 
Appointed municipal councillor, February 1953.
117. Manrnuf Sand
A Sunni Moslem o f Sidon. born about 1915. f ie  
is uneducated and speaks only Arabic. He began 
life w ith the police until 1953, and in 1957 was 
elected Deputy fo r Sidon. Is a violent Arab 
Nationalist who visited Russia in 1957 and came 
back imbued w ith pro-Russian ideas. He delivers 
two or three speeches a week, all strongly anti- 
imperialist in tone and, as a result o f continuous 
agitation, now has a strong hold on the populace in 
Sidon. A regular pilgrim  to the Nasser shrine.
118. Mnhnmed Sahra
Shia Moslem, born about 1913. Lawyer, graduate 
of Jesuit School o f Law. Professional diplomat 
un til, in March 1956, he was recalled from the post 
of Ambassador to Jordan (he had previously been 
M inister to Iran) to hold the portfolios o f Public 
Works and Inform ation in the Yafi Cabinet. He 
was an able M inister and was the only one (apart 
from the inevitable E m ir M ajid Arslan) to be 
retained in the strong Solh Cabinet which followed 
it in November. He is capable and is well liked in 
Shia circles and trusted by the President. A lthough 
he could not be described as pro-British, he main­
tained a reasonably objective attitude during the 
crisis o f November 1956 and is friendly to deal w ith. 
Returned to the Embassy in Jordan in 1957.
119. Ncgib Snrialcn
Greek Catholic from Zahl£. Studied in A1- 
Charkieh School. Zahlc and obtained a degree in 
law from the French School at Beirut. Left for 
France, where he remained during the war and came
back w ith a degree o f doctor in law. Appointed to 
M inister for Foreign Affairs, 1945. Later transferred 
as Director-General o f Education. Retransferred in 
December 1955 to Foreign M inistry as Assistant 
Secretary-General. On the resignation o f Found 
Am ino im  it proved impossible to settle the rival 
claims for the succession, and Sadaka was finally 
appointed Acting Secretary-General, a post which he 
filled adequately and honestly if  w ithout inspiration 
o r real influence, until he was appointed Ambassador 
to Berne in 1957. H ighly educated and honest. 
Visited United Kingdom as guest o f British 
Council in 1955. Inclined towards socialism and 
progressionism. Married.
120. Ahdcl Rahman Snhmnrani
Born 1903, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated Jesuit 
University, Beirut, and the Sorbonne. Bachelor. 
His sister acts as his hostess. President of the Beirut 
Chamber o f Commerce since 1949. A pompous 
bore, much given to lecturing Western representatives 
on how to conduct their policy so as to satisfy Arab 
aspirations, but unfortunately quite influential, 
particularly in a Pan-Arab direction.
121. Sneh Snlam
Born about 1902, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated 
American University o f Beirut. Married to a 
charming and gentle wife. Politician and business 
man. Ex-chairman, w ith a small personal holding, 
of M idd le East A ir  Lines. Deputy in the 1943 and 
1951 Chambers. Formerly M inister of the Interior. 
Prime M inister fo r a few days in September 1952 
when he helped administer the coup tic pnicc to 
President el-Khoury. Again Prime M inister from 
A p ril until August 1953. A fter resuming his close 
links w ith the British owing to his association w ith 
the B.O.A C., he has gradually fallen more and more 
for President Nasser, whose policy vis-a-vis the 
British he supported to the maximum. During the 
Suez affair he was rabidly in favour of breaking off 
d ip lom atic relations w ith us and reason for his 
resignation (together w ith Abdallah Y a fi’s), while the 
conference o f Heads of A rab States was in progress 
in November 1956, was the resistance o f President 
Chamoun to side against Brita in and France. A 
bit o f an adventurer in politics and business but he 
is intelligent and forward looking and is likely to 
remain a prominent figure. Appointed M inister of 
State in the Yafi Cabinet o f March 19, 1956. 
Conducted the negotiations w ith the Iraq Petroleum 
Company w ith a hostile spirit. Now the leading 
champion o f Abdel-Nasscr and the chief opponent 
to the re-election o f President Chamoun. Speaks 
excellent English. A  leading supporter o f the 
project to establish an English secondary school in 
Lebanon, o f which he is trustee (President’s 
nomination), and in A p ril 1958 succeeded his brother 
as principal of the Mugasscd Moslem College.
122. Anis Saleh
Born 1907, Beirut; M aronite; educated Jesuit 
University, Beirut. M arried. Formerly magistrate 
and Director-General o f Justice. He made himself 
too useful to President el-Khoury and did not 
survive his fa ll. Now has a very good practice as a 
lawyer.
123. Joseph Salem
Born 1897. Tyre; Greek Catholic; educated 
College Patriarcal, Beirut. Married. Influentia l 
business man (m ainly banking and insurance). 
President o f Association o f Merchants since 1956. 
Lebanese M inister at Cairo, 1944-45. M inister o f 
the Interior. 1945-46. Although rather boorish at 
first sight he is usually friendly and co-operative 
and certainly has intelligence and independent 
judgment. He is usually well-informed about what
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goes on behind the scenes and is a leading Christian 
opponent (thro»gl\ the Tra is itm e Force, which he 
founded) of the re-election o f President Chamoun.
124. Nicolas Salem
A Greek Catholic o f Tyre. Born 1897, the tw in 
brother of Joseph Salem (No. 123) and brother of 
Colonel Toufiq Salem (No. 125), the Chief of Staff. 
French education. An unscrupulous and clever 
business man who became Deputy in 1953 and
M inister for Education in March 1954 under
Abdullah Yafi. Re-elected Deputy (fo r Jezzine,
South Lebanon) in 1957. Since 1950 he has been 
doing good business in Saudi Arabia. Married, he 
speaks good French and some English.
125. Colonel Toufiq Salem
Dorn 1904; Tyre; Greek O rthodox; educated
College Patriarcal, Beirut. Married. Trained in 
the French A rm y (as a contemporary o f General 
Shishakli). Chief o f Staff of the Lebanese Armed 
Forces since 1945. A brusque and quick-tempered 
officer who tends to fret under General Chehab’s 
calmer methods but is fundamentally good-natured 
and helpful.
126. Found Snrrnuf
Born 1906 in Cairo, o f Lebanese orig in; Greek 
Orthodox; educated at the American University of 
Beirut. Married to a pleasant w ife born and brought 
up in Manchester. Journalist. Edited Al-Mokattcm i 
newspaper in Cairo, founded by his father. Wrote 
Roosevelt’s life in Arabic. Appointed Vice- 
President (in charge of Public Relations) o f American 
University o f Beirut in 1952. Capable and honest.
127. Found Sinvnyn
Born 1909 at Zahld. Greek Catholic. Educated 
at Collfcgc Patriarcal. Beirut. A fte r being a judge 
for several years was appointed Mohafez of Mount 
Lebanon from 1944 46. Mohafez o f South Lebanon, 
1947-49. Director o f Communications and Trans­
port, 1949-55. Director-General of Education, 
December 1955. Bachelor. Honest and a capable 
c iv il servant but conceited.
128. Mohammed Shoncnir
Born 1912, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated 
American University of Beirut. Married. Politician 
and journalist. Member of the tiny but vocal 
National Appeal Party. Was a disciple and great 
admirer o f late Riad Solh. Clever and honest by 
Lebanese standards but loyal to Ids friends. V iolent 
supporter of a pro-Iraqi policy in Syria and is more 
deadly opposed to present- ru ling teams in Damascus, 
including Kouwatly and Assali, who were, until 
recently, his great friends. Is anti-Nasser and a 
friend of ours who w illing ly  co-operates when he has 
a chance. Visited England 1952.
129. Sami Shoucair
Born 1923, Beirut; Greek Orthodox; married; 
educated Jesuit University, Beirut, and studied 
electrical engineering in the United States. Director 
o f C iv il Aviation in the Lebanon from 1950 until 
1953 when he was dismissed because of his close 
connections w ith ex-President Bechara el-Khoury. 
A lthough born wealthy, would not miss an oppor­
tunity o f making money. His main interests are 
women and money and he is unscrupulous and 
energetic in pursuit of these objectives. Very much 
in the pocket of the Americans.
130. Alfred Skaf
Born 1907, Zahlc; Greek Catholic; educated 
Collfcge des Frcres, Beirut. Married. A powerftd 
figure in the Bekaa but off the po litica l stage since 
an unsuccessful term as M inister of Supply in 1943.
131. Jean Skaf
Born 1908, Zahle; Greek Catholic; educated at 
Zable. Bachelor. Ex-Deputy and former M inister. 
Intelligent and ambitious. Friendly. Failed in the 
1957 elections.
132. Joseph Skaf
Greek Catholic from  Zahl6. Born about 1918. 
Speaks some English and French. Elected Deputy 
for South Lebanon in 1947 and is now Deputy for 
Zahle. M inister since 1956, now holds portfo lio  o f 
Social AITairs. Popular leader o f the Beka’a group of 
Deputies. Weak character. A lthough a rich land­
owner, owes large sums o f money to bank.
133. Adel Solh
Sunni Moslem o f Beirut, brother o f Qazam and 
Takieddin Solh and a cousin of Sami Solh. Bom 
about 1902. Married to a Turk. O f poor education. 
Unlike his (wo brothers, he is not active and very 
little  is known of him prio r to his appointment us 
President of the Beirut M unicipality.
134. Kazem Solh
Born 1903; Reirut; Sunni Moslem; educated
Istanbul, Damascus and French School o f Law, 
Beirut. Married. President o f the National Appeal 
Party. Lebanese M inister at Baghdad since 1947, 
promoted to the rank o f Ambassador in 1953. 
Intelligent and ambitious.
135. Sami Solh
Born 1891, Sidon; Sunni Moslem; educated Istan­
bul Government College. Widower. Son of a 
Turkish official. Formerly Magistrate and President 
o f the High Court. Prime M inister 1942-43,
1945-46 and 1952, when he resigned in protest
against President e l-K houry’s attempt to throw upon 
him the blame fo r corruption in public life. He 
retains considerable influence w ith the lower Moslem 
classes in Beirut, but although amiable and well 
meaning is too vain and too weak to fo llow  any con­
sistent line o f thought or policy fo r very long. 
Again Prime M inister from September 1954 to
September 1955; visited Turkey w ith President in 
A p ril 1955 and headed Lebanese delegation to 
Bandoeng Conference in A p ril 1955. Was called in 
to head a strong crisis Cabinet in November 1956, 
in which he was Prime M inister and carried the 
portfolios of the Interior, Justice and Information, 
and added that of Defence when General Chehab 
resigned in January 1957. Was acting Foreign 
M inister during M . M a lik ’s long absence at the 
General Assembly of the United Nations. Had a 
serious illness in A p ril 1957; from this, however, lie 
completely recovered, and, having been re-elected in 
June 1957, has since formed two new Governments, 
the first in August 1957, and the second, consisting 
of no less than fourteen members, in March 1958.
136. Takieddin Solh
Born 1910, Sidon; Sunni Moslem; educated Jesuit 
University, Beirut. Bachelor. Cousin o f late Riad 
Solh and nephew of Sami Solh (No. 135). Arab 
nationalist w ith po litica l ambitions; dabbles in 
journalism, Failed in 1953 elections, but elected 
for the Bekaa in 1957. Chairman of National Appeal 
Party. Formerly Counsellor of Lebanese Legation 
at Cairo; later in Secretariat o f A rab League. Very 
intelligent and relatively honest, but given to 
intrigues. Member of the Foreign A ffairs Com­
mittee of the Chamber, opposed to re-election of 
President Chamoun. Member o f Lebanese National 
Commission for U.N.E.S.C.O. Speaks French.
137. Linda Siirsock
Born 1887; belongs to the leading Greek Orthodox 
Sursock fam ily o f Beirut both by b irth and by
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marriage, being the w idow o f M ichel Sursock. The 
lending Society lady o f Beirut. Perfest hostess; very 
hospitable house. Interested in charitable work.
138. Jacques Tabet
Born 1887. Beirut; M aronite; educated Jesuit 
University. Beirut. Married. A  rich socialite and 
land-owner who keeps in the social swing but has 
no po litica l significance.
139. Joy Tahet
Born Beirut 1905; belongs to a leading Maronite 
Lebanese fam ily. Swiss mother. Private Anglo-
Saxon education. Great wealth. Leading Society 
figure; is the son-in-law o f Mrs. Linda Sursock. 
Clever and good-mannered.
140. Mme. Laure Tabet
Born 1896, A lexandria; M aronite; educated at 
Roman Catholic College fo r G irls. Alexandria. 
Having no children, diverted her energies into 
feminist activities in and outside Lebanon, notably 
Red Cross and International Council o f Women. 
Appointed municipal councillor, February 1953. 
H ighly civilised and speaks good English.
141. Rahige Takieddin
Born 1908, Baaklin; Druze; educated College 
Patriarcal. Beirut. Married. Lawyer and politician. 
Ex-Deputy; form erly M inister o f Agriculture. A  
loyal adherent of President el-Khoury, whose spokes­
man he has often been in the Chamber.
142. Khalil Takieddin
Born 1905, Baaklin; Druze; educated College 
Patriarcal, Beirut. Married. C iv il servant, and 
Arabic poet. Served mainly in the Secretariat o f the 
Chamber until appointed Lebanese M inister at 
Moscow and Stockholm 1946-53 when he became 
M inister to Mexico. Clever and socially presentable 
but servile and venal. L ike  the rest of his fam ily, 
nil opportunist. A leading figure in the pro- 
Egyptian set. Appointed Ambassador to Cairo 
December 1955. transferred to Ankara in 1957.
143. Philippe Tnkla
Born I9 |4 ; Greek Catholic; educated College des 
Lnzaristcs, Antoura. M arried to a rich Lebanese of 
Brazil by virtue o f whose fortune he has acquired 
a certain independent standing. Lawyer and po li­
tician. Deputy for the Bekaa and loyal supporter 
o f ex-President el-Khoury. Several times M inister 
for Foreign AITairs and now President o f the Foreign 
AITairs Committee o f the Chamber. He is intelligent 
and in most respects honest and has pleasant 
manners. He is quick on the uptake and easy to 
deal w ith on matters o f business. Represented 
Lebanese President at the Coronation and at cere­
monies held in Uruguay on the taking of olfice o f 
Uruguayan President in February 1955. Having 
consecutively failed to secure a po rtfo lio  under 
Chamoun, lie now opposes his re-election.
144. Philippe Tamer
Born about 1910 Greek O ithodox from North 
Lebanon. Has risen from modest orig in by doubtful 
means. He is held in some contempt in commercial 
circles and his economic views are purely selfish and 
usually unsound.
145. Afif Tibi
Sunni Moslem, born 1912. For long a struggling 
journalist until he obtained the favour o f the Sheikhs 
o f Kuwait, for whom he now acts as one o f the 
general representatives, go-betweens and pimps. 
D irector and owner o f A l-Y aum  newspaper w ith his
brother W afiq, and President o f the Itasta Com­
mittee. He worked in Berlin for the German 
broadcasting during the war. A natural toady, he is 
nevertheless highly intelligent and quite unscrupu­
lous. His sympathies seem to be moderate Arab 
Nationalist but personal interest is his dominant 
motive. Speaks good French.
146. Dikran Tosbnth
Armenian O rthodox, born 1908 in Beirut. He 
received a French education and is highly cultured. 
He is a good journalist, owner o f the French evening 
paper Le Soir and a Deputy fo r Bourj Hamoud 
(M ount Lebanon) since 1953. Member o f the 
Foreign A ffairs Committee o f the Chamber. He has 
always been a strong supporter o f President 
Chamoun. He is clever and likeable and speaks 
French and some English, as does his Armenian 
wife.
147. Colonel Fntizi Trahoulsi
Born 1901, D cir el-Kam ar; Maronite; educated 
College des Frfcrcs, Beirut. Married. Served 
Lebanese Gendarmerie, later in command of Internal 
Security Forces. Once a personal friend o f President 
Chamoun, has not been fo r the last two years on 
speaking terms w ith the President, w ith whom he 
is angry for not appointing him General, or an 
Ambassador somewhere. As a result he attempted 
to print and circulate a number o f fantastic charges 
against General Chehab (No. 38) but Ircforc lie 
could do so was arrested (in March 1958) on a 
charge o f attempting to subvert the morale o f the 
army. Honest and loyal but tactless, vain, pompous, 
excitable and o f mediocre intelligence.
148. Gabriel Trad
Born 1893; Beirut; Greek Orthodox; educated 
Jesuit University, Beirut. Married. A rich socialite 
who enjoys parties but is also generous and prom i­
nent in charitable organisations. Honest and 
likeable, but far from intelligent. Chairman of 
several organisations and clubs.
149. Andr6 Tuenl
Born 1910, Beirut; Greek Orthodox; educated 
College dcs Frfcres, T r ipo li. Married. C iv il Servant. 
Formerly Director-General of Finance, and Director- 
General of Public Works. Relatively honest, hard 
worker and capable but an unattractive creature. 
Unpopular w ith his subordinates.
150. Chassan Tuenl
Bom 1926, Beirut; Greek O rthodox; educated at 
the American University o f Beirut and then studied 
journalism at Harvard University. United States. 
Journalist and politician. Prominent ex-member of 
the P.P.S.; Deputy from 1951 to 1957, when he failed 
to be re-elected. Educated, ambitious and energetic. 
Relatively honest. Speaks excellent English and 
visited England 1951. Ex-Deputy President, Cham­
ber of Deputies. M arried m January 1955 the 
daughter o f Mohammed A ly  llam ade, a Druze, 
w ithout having to change his religion. One o f the 
few Deputies prepared to stand up publicly for the 
Western connection.
151. Charles Tyan
Born 1900, Beirut. M aronite; married; educated 
Jesuit University, Beirut. C iv il Servant employed 
in M in istry o f Public Works 1943-52 where he 
acquired wide expert knowledge o f o il and trans­
port. Undoubtedly very corrupt but helpful to the 
1 PC. Appointed Director-General o f the Conseil 
de Bonification et Ddveloppcment Economiquc.
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